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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis addresses the controversial question of a religious or theological ‘turn’ in 
Derrida’s later work.  Emphasising both the consistency of Derrida’s work and the 
significance of mode and genre, I consider Derrida’s atheistic rethinking of God, 
investigating the way that the relationship between God and writing determines the 
configuration of ethics, politics and religion in his later work.  The thesis consists of four 
chapters, each focusing on a different mode of discourse.  The first chapter, Confession, 
tracks Derrida’s ‘double reading’ in ‘Circumfession’, arguing that it both subverts the 
constitutive economies of structure, subject and God, and itself confesses deconstruction’s 
alliance with an ‘athetic writing’ which rethinks God and subjectivity through non-identity.  
The chapter briefly turns to ‘Envois’ to consider the political implications of confession.   
Chapters Two and Three address the relationship between deconstruction and 
negative theology.  The first of these, Dialogue, argues that the dialogical mode defines 
deconstruction, ensuring consistency between Derrida’s early and later work and refuting 
claims of a ‘turn’.  Reading ‘Sauf le nom (Post Scriptum)’, I argue that the dialogical nature 
of the text enables a ‘post-writing’ which articulates non-ontotheological conceptions of 
God and gestures towards the political implications of deconstruction.  The third chapter, 
Silence, explores the link between God and language, arguing that Derrida espouses a 
relativistic or linguistic silence as a way of bearing witness to a linguistic God, and noting, 
however, a residual tension in Derrida’s work between the singularity of religious 
commitment and the universality of ethics.   
The last chapter, Reason, reads ‘Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of 
“Religion” at the Limits of Reason Alone’, analysing both the interdependence of reason and 
religion, and the ‘Enlightenment to come’, and arguing that the text’s neglect of the 
question of God creates a tension between the private and the public or political.  Assessing 
Richard Rorty’s depiction of this tension, I argue that by connecting democracy and public 
space with singularity and secrecy, Derrida’s conception of literature challenges this 
dichotomy.  Finally, in the Conclusion, I reiterate the non-identical and non-sovereign 
concept of God which emerges from these texts, and stress its significance for any 
assessment of the ethics and politics of deconstruction.  
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Introduction 
 
1.  After the ‘Theological Turn’? 
 
Although contentious, Slavoj Žižek’s 2006 proclamation that “the Derridean fashion is 
fading away”1 recognised continental philosophy’s increasing divergence from Derrida’s 
work.  Such a move may be understood both as part of a broader rejection of the so-called 
‘linguistic turn’ and as the search for a more overtly political philosophy.  Here Derrida’s 
critics, who tend to focus on his later work, include Žižek himself and Alain Badiou, some 
of whose criticisms of contemporary philosophy in ‘The (Re)turn of Philosophy Itself’ are 
directly aimed at Derrida.  In an indictment of the paralysis of philosophy, Badiou asserts his 
intention “to tear philosophy away from this genealogical imperative”,2 critiquing what he 
perceives as the political passivity of philosophy and “those who intend to fill the gap with 
meager reflections on ethics”.3  This urgent desire for a new, more prescriptive politics fuels 
Badiou’s frustration with deconstruction, and provides one of the triggers for what John 
Mullarkey terms ‘post-continental philosophy’.  Mullarkey asserts that “the interest in 
Deleuze and growing interest in Badiou, for instance, is partly related to their positive 
engagement with both the sciences and radical politics”,4 and his study draws out the 
tensions between immanence and transcendence, and realism and anti-realism, which 
emerge in the encounters between continental and post-continental philosophy.   
 One expression of the tension between realism and anti-realism emerges under the 
aegis of ‘speculative realism’, a growing movement which connects the work of Žižek, 
Badiou and Deleuze to that of rising figures such as François Laruelle, Quentin Meillassoux 
and Ray Brassier, thinkers united by a certain rejection of “the traditional focus on textual 
critique”5 often associated with Derrida, and by a subsequent “turn toward reality itself”.6  
Introducing these thinkers in a recent collection, the editors disavow any debt to 
deconstruction, clearly setting this new species of thought in contra-distinction to post-
                                                             
1 Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006), p. 11. 
2 Alain Badiou, ‘The (Re)turn of Philosophy Itself’, in Manifesto for Philosophy, trans. and ed. by Norman 
Madarasz (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), pp. 113-138 (p. 115).  
3 Badiou, pp. 113-138 (p. 114). 
4 John Mullarkey, Post-Continental Philosophy: An Outline (London: Continuum, 2006), p. 3. 
5 Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman, ‘Towards a Speculative Philosophy’, in The Speculative Turn, 
ed. by Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman (Melbourne: re.press, 2011), pp. 1-18 (p. 3). 
6 Bryant, Srnicek and Harman, pp. 1-18 (p. 3).   
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structuralism, deconstruction, and to the ‘linguistic turn’.  Although ‘speculative realism’ 
describes variant texts and ideas, certain key themes emerge.  Such thinkers emphasise the 
autonomy of philosophy and the need for an ambitious new philosophy which is not 
dependent on other disciplines and which rejects the genealogical mode often associated 
with Derrida.7  Further, these thinkers argue that the “critical and linguistic turns”8 of the 
twentieth century are both politically insufficient and incapable of answering the questions 
raised by current sciences, technologies and environmental problems.  Developing this 
claim, the editors of The Speculative Turn observe:    
 
This general anti-realist trend has manifested itself in continental philosophy in a 
number of ways, but especially through preoccupation with such issues as death and 
finitude, an aversion to science, a focus on language, culture and subjectivity to the 
detriment of material factors, an anthropocentric stance towards nature, a 
relinquishing of the search for absolutes, and an acquiescence to the specific 
conditions of our historical thrownness.  We might also point to the lack of genuine 
and effective political action in continental philosophy- arguably a result of the 
‘cultural’ turn taken by Marxism, and the increased focus on textual and ideological 
critique at the expense of the economic realm.9 
 
In a similar vein, speculative realist Quentin Meillassoux critiques the so-called ‘theological 
turn’.10  Attributing the perceived inadequacy of current philosophy to ‘correlationism’, or 
“the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking 
and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other“,11 Meillassoux looks to 
account for this religious or theological ‘turn’ in continental philosophy.  Here he claims 
that “thought, under the pressure of correlationism, has relinquished its right to criticize the 
irrational when the latter lays claim to the absolute”.12  He continues:  
 
Once the absolute has become unthinkable, even atheism, which also targets God’s 
inexistence in the manner of an absolute, is reduced to a mere belief, and hence to a 
religion, albeit of the nihilist kind.  Faith is pitched against faith, since what 
determines our fundamental choices cannot be rationally proved.  In other words, 
                                                             
7 See, for example, Bryant, Srnicek and Harman’s claim that “the phase of subservient commentary on the 
history of philosophy seems to have ended”, Bryant, Srnicek and Harman, pp. 1-18 (p. 1). 
8 Bryant, Srnicek and Harman, pp. 1-18 (p. 3). 
9 Bryant, Srnicek and Harman, pp. 1-18 (p. 4). 
10 For an account of Meillassoux’s relationship with this ‘turn’, including some attempt to locate Derrida’s own 
work, see Christopher Watkin, Difficult Atheism: Post-Theological Thinking in Alain Badiou, Jean-Luc Nancy 
and Quentin Meillassoux (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011). 
11 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, trans. by Ray Brassier 
(London: Continuum, 2008), p. 5. 
12Meillassoux, p. 45.  
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the de-absolutization of thought boils down to the mobilization of a fideist 
argument; but a fideism that is ‘fundamental’ rather than merely ‘historical’ in 
nature... Scepticism with regard to the metaphysical absolute thereby legitimates de 
jure every variety whatsoever of belief in an absolute, the best as well as the worst.  
The destruction of the metaphysical rationalization of Christian theology has 
resulted in a generalized becoming-religious of thought, viz., in a fideism of any 
belief whatsoever.13 
 
Meillassoux criticises the effects of this generalized fideism, arguing that philosophy has 
conceded too much ground and must turn to address “properly ontological questions”.14  It is 
in this philosophical context, alongside a continuing attempt to understand Derrida’s 
inheritance, given his own problematization of that concept, that the current questions and 
preoccupations surrounding Derrida’s work, emerge.   
 
Since Derrida’s increasingly explicit engagement with ethical and religious issues in the 
1980s, ethical and religious readings have been prevalent and persistent in Derrida studies, 
with Derrida’s work often viewed in light of a religious or theological ‘turn’.15  Such a ‘turn’ 
is widely regarded as part of the broader “return of the religious” in continental philosophy 
                                                             
13 Meillassoux, p. 46.  
14 Bryant, Srnicek and Harman, pp. 1-18 (p. 4).  On this, John Mullarkey highlights some of the problems that 
speculative realism or post-continental philosophy might face.  He describes: “In the end, Post-Continental 
philosophy gives rise to a problem of discourse, of the possibility of epistemic norms and even political values 
within a naturalistic thinking that must be travailed if we are not to repeat the same philosophemes that 
Derrida’s work highlighted so well.  How can a philosophy of immanence critique its outside?” Mullarkey, p. 9. 
15 The groundbreaking ethical reading of Derrida’s work is Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction: 
Derrida and Levinas (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).  Critiques of Critchley’s position can be found in Marko 
Ƶlomislic, Jacques Derrida’s Aporetic Ethics (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007) and Martin Hägglund, 
Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).   
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and beyond, to which Meillassoux refers.16  As Frederic Jameson explains, “religion is once 
again very much on the agenda of any serious attempt to come to terms with the specificity 
of our own time”.17  Moreover, for Arthur Bradley in his comprehensive ‘Genealogy of the 
Theological Turn’, “Derrida’s work has arguably been the defining site where theological 
debates within continental philosophy are played out”.18  However, both the existence of 
such a ‘turn’ in Derrida’s work, its nature, and its consequences, are contested.19  Referring 
to his own work, Derrida observes a change “in the strategy of the text”20 which might 
usefully be described in James K. A. Smith’s terms, as a shift “from the theoretical 
frameworks that shape our given institutions to [a] consider[ation] (and disturb[ance]) [of] 
the institutions themselves”,21 or, in the words of Pheng Cheah and Suzanne Guerlac, to 
                                                             
16 Jacques Derrida, ‘Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of “Religion” at the Limits of Reason Alone’, trans. 
by Samuel Weber in Acts of Religion, ed. by Gil Andijar (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 42-101 (p. 78).  An 
early, influential analysis of this ‘turn’ can be found in Dominique Janicaud’s Le Tournant théologique de la 
phenomenologie française (Paris: L’Éclat, 1991).  Since then, and aside from works focusing on Derrida, further 
examples and examinations of this philosophical phenomenon are disparate and include: Giorgio Agamben, The 
Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, trans. by Pat Dailey (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2006); Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, trans. by Ray Brassier 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Mary Bryden, Deleuze and Religion (London: Routledge, 2000); 
Jeremy Carrette, Foucault and Religion, (London: Routledge, 2000); Kevin Hart, Dark Gaze: Maurice Blanchot 
and the Sacred (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2004); Michel Henry, I am the Truth: Toward a Philosophy 
of Christianity, trans. by Susan Emanuel (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002); Julia Kristeva, This 
Incredible Need to Believe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); John Milbank and Slavoj Žižek, The 
Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009); Jean-Luc Nancy, Dis-enclosure: The 
Deconstruction of Christianity, trans. by Bettina Bergo, Gabriel Malenfant and Michael B. Smith (New York: 
Fordham University Press 2008); Michael Purcell, Levinas and Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006) and Slavoj Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity (Cambridge: The 
MIT Press 2003).  Interpretations of this trend are offered by Philippa Berry who attributes it to a reassessment 
of Heidegger, and Gianni Vattimo, who links it to a postmodern dissolution of meta-narratives and looks to the 
possibility of approaching “the religious need of common consciousness independently of the framework of 
Enlightenment critique.”  See Philippa Berry, ‘Introduction’, in Shadow of Spirit: Postmodernism and Religion, 
ed. by Philippa Berry and Andrew Wernick (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 1-8 (p. 6), and Gianni Vattimo, ‘The 
Trace of the Trace’, in Religion, ed. by Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), pp. 
79-94 (p. 84). 
17 Frederic Jameson, Valences of the Dialectic (London: Verso, 2009), p. 166.  
18 Arthur Bradley, ‘Derrida’s God: A Genealogy of the Theological Turn’, Paragraph, 29 (2006), 21-42 (p. 22). 
19 See, for example, Kuisma Korhonen, Textual Friendship: The Essay as Impossible Encounter from Plato and 
Montaigne to Levinas and Derrida (New York: Humanity Books, 2006).  Korhonen insists that “The term ‘ethical 
turn’ is, however, misleading, because there is not any radical reorientation or rupture in Derrida’s work”, p . 363.  
Other critical issues raised by the ‘turn’ include its implications for secularity; on this, see Mark Cauchi, ‘The 
Secular to Come: Interrogating the Derridean “Secular”’, JCRT, 10.1 (Winter 2009), 1-25; and Derrida’s own 
challenge to the meaning of the term ‘religion’.  This is illustrated by David Wood’s comment: “For it is all very 
well to call Derrida a ‘religious thinker’, but, after Derrida, the meaning of ‘religious’ has arguably changed”, 
David Wood, ‘God: Poison or Cure? A Reply to John D. Caputo’, in Styles of Piety: Practicing Philosophy after 
the Death of God, ed. by S. Clark Buckner and Matthew Statler (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006), pp. 
205-211 (p. 206).   
20 Jacques Derrida, ‘Epoché and Faith: An interview with Jacques Derrida’, in Derrida and Religion: Other 
Testaments, ed. by Yvonne Sherwood and Kevin Hart (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 27-50 (p. 37).  Derrida is 
here referring specifically to his approach to the name of God.   
21 James K. A. Smith, Jacques Derrida: Live Theory (London: Continuum, 2005). p. 65. 
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“the phase of affirmative deconstruction”.22  Of those who accept some notion of a shift or 
‘turn’, critics are broadly divided between those such as John D. Caputo, for whom the ‘turn’ 
is a fulfilment of deconstructive thought, and those such as Arthur Bradley, Martin 
Hägglund and Slavoj Žižek, who reject the religious elements or implications of Derrida’s 
thought, with Žižek dismissing it as part of a “massive onslaught of obscurantism”.23  In 
contrast to the dominance of religious and ethical readings of Derrida’s work in recent 
years, latterly, the non-ethical and non-religious - and often more explicitly political- 
approach, is gaining popularity.  This is no doubt related to the larger philosophical context 
which I have discussed, in particular the increasing scepticism towards Derrida, and the 
appeal for a more political philosophy.  
 
As early as 1996, Richard Beardsworth’s monograph Derrida and the Political delineated 
two possible futures for Derrida’s thought: one left-wing, and more explicitly politically 
focused, which returns to the earlier texts in order to re-think the relation between the 
human and the technical; and the other, right-wing, focusing on the aporia as such, 
particularly through the religious imagery of later Derrida.24  In light of more recent 
developments, Arthur Bradley has declared Beardsworth’s prediction “uncannily prophetic”, 
siding with the technical over the religious, and insisting that “the theological turn must be 
consigned to deconstruction’s past if the historical present it describes is to gain inventive or 
transformative power and the radical future it affirms is to open.”25  Bradley’s 
uncompromising stance comprises a theoretical objection, derived from Bernard Stiegler, 
that the later work is guilty of a “transcendentalization of the aporia of origin”,26 alongside a 
rejection of critical material which manipulates deconstruction in service of religious ends.   
Underlying Beardsworth’s position is the belief that religious and progressively 
political readings of Derrida are incompatible, and that, as Bradley insists, we must reject 
the former in order to safeguard the latter.  Although such a firm division between religion 
and politics seems undeconstructive, the rejection of, and hostility towards, religious 
readings of Derrida, often in the name of a more overtly political deconstruction, is fast 
becoming the new orthodoxy amongst Derrida’s commentators.  Significant figures here 
                                                             
22 Pheng Cheah and Suzanne Guerlac, ‘Introduction’, in Derrida and the Time of the Political, ed. by Pheng 
Cheah and Suzanne Guerlac (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), pp. 1-37.  
23 Slavoj Žižek, The Fragile Absolute or, Why is the Christian legacy worth fighting for? (London: Verso, 2000), 
p. 1. 
24 Richard Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 156-7. 
25 Bradley, ‘Derrida’s God’, 21-42 (p. 38).  
26 Bradley, ‘Derrida’s God’, 21-42 (p. 26).  
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include Martin Hägglund, to whom I shall return in Chapter One, and Patrick O’Connor, 
who locates himself within the dichotomy which Beardsworth sets out between left- and 
right-wing, or politics and religion.  O’Connor asserts:   
 
The insights of Gasché, Lawlor and Hägglund allow an atheistic and profane reading 
of Derrida.  Consolidating this orientation, I affirm herein a strictly ‘left-Derridean’ 
re-appraisal of Derrida’s work.  In analogy with the way the Young Hegelians 
contested ‘conservative’ appropriations of Hegel, this work endeavours to present an 
orientation of Derrida’s work which deviates from interpretations of Derrida which 
cast him as primarily an ethical and religious philosopher (including among others 
Caputo, Simon Critchley, Hent de Vries, Richard Kearney, Mark Dooley and Slavoj 
Žižek.27 
   
Keen to assert the “radical egalitarian impetus”28 of deconstruction against ethical and 
religious readings, O’Connor stresses Derrida’s status as a philosopher and political thinker, 
and terms “commendable” Bradley’s “desire for a materialist turn in deconstruction”.29  
Implicit in O’Connor’s position is the conflation of ethical and religious readings and the 
assumption that the ethical and political elements of Derrida’s writing are easily separable.  
A similar separation between ethics and politics can be detected in the work of Alex 
Thomson30 and it is becoming acceptable to conflate and cursorily dismiss highly disparate 
religious and ethical readings, even under the guise that one is returning to a more 
‘authentic’ Derrida.  Examples of this include Jones Irwin, who argues that On Touching 
“reminds one of the explosive and recalcitrant dimension of deconstruction which is too 
often lost in attempts to subsume Derrida’s thought under, for example, attempts to ‘return’ 
to more or less orthodox versions of ethics or religion”.31  Equally, in a controversial article 
which stresses the “neurally political”32 nature of On Touching, Tom Cohen “attempts to 
lean against the suffocating trend towards mourning, theological exegesis and close-circuit 
canonisation that has characterised Derrida studies in the wake of his death”,33 and indicts 
the “reading of proximity, or a domestication dovetailing with a certain misappropriation, 
more or less welcomed, of the turn toward ethics.”34 
                                                             
27 Patrick O’Connor, Derrida: Profanations (London: Continuum, 2010), p. 4. 
28 O’Connor, p. 11.  
29 O’Connor, p. 3 
30 Alex Thomson, Deconstruction and Democracy (London: Continuum, 2005).  I shall return to this in the 
Conclusion.  
31 Jones Irwin, Derrida and the Writing of the Body (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), p. 11. 
32 Tom Cohen, ‘Tactless- the Severed Hand of J.D.’, in Derrida Today 2.1 (2009), 1-22 (p. 4). 
33 Cohen, 1-22 (p. 1). 
34 Cohen, 1-22 (p. 20).  
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Such dismissive responses to ethical and religious analyses of Derrida’s work are 
frequently motivated by the valuable intention to recuperate Derrida for a new generation, 
and particularly to demonstrate his contribution to philosophical and political thought in a 
climate which is increasingly uninterested in, or even hostile to, his work.  However, 
without any interaction with ethics or religion, this political power, and particularly 
Derrida’s notion of responsibility, feels undertheorised, even meaningless.  Such critics are 
also at risk of fetishizing the political, of setting it apart from deconstructive critique.  On 
this danger, Geoff Bennington warns: “‘politics’, so often invoked as though it were eo ipso 
something ‘radical’, remains in just the same position of passive inheritance until its 
metaphysical genealogy is interrogated, and it is to that extent no more promising a 
candidate for ‘radicality’ than anything else”.35 
In response to such ‘political’ readings, I reject the premise that all ethical and religious 
exegesis is outdated, erroneous or depoliticising and argue that an oversimplistic 
denunciation is as reductive as some of the religious readings which these critics look to 
counter.  In contrast, this thesis will return to the question of a religious ‘turn’ in Derrida’s 
work, analysing Derrida’s engagement with questions of religion and God, and assessing the 
relationship between the religious and the political as it emerges or is undermined.  
Focusing primarily on Derrida’s ‘atheistic’ rethinking of God, I will consider what Hent de 
Vries terms Derrida’s “search and desire for the appropriate speech with respect to God”,36 
and investigate the ways in which Derrida’s adoption of different textual modes influences 
the development of the figure of God and reveals a significant relationship between God and 
the process of writing.  Turning first to current religious readings of Derrida’s work, I shall 
assess their insights and limitations before outlining an alternative reading, which both 
responds to the religious elements and to the importance of mode in Derrida’s writing.  
 
2. Assessing the Religious Readings 
 
One of the earliest and most enduring interests in Derrida’s significance for religious 
thought comes from Biblical Studies, which has been influenced by Derrida since the early 
                                                             
35 Geoffrey Bennington, Interrupting Derrida (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 22.  
36 Hent de Vries, Philosophy and the Turn to Religion (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1999), p. 
312. 
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1980s.37  Often inspired by what Yvonne Sherwood calls Derrida’s own “penchant for very 
careful, very risky Bible study”,38 writing in this field tends to use deconstruction, often 
Derrida’s earlier work, to suggest alternative perspectives towards biblical texts.  
Historically, Sherwood observes, this methodology resulted in “certain institutionalised 
misreadings of vintage Derrida”,39 a trend which she aims to change.  Despite this 
endeavour, it seems that recent texts in the field still offer rather predictable applications of 
deconstruction, or fail to explore the nuances of Derrida’s position.40  Although Derrida’s 
work may be useful for Biblical Studies, it seems unlikely that Biblical Studies will 
illuminate Derrida’s work- particularly its relationship with religion- on its own terms.       
            A similar problem is evident in specifically Jewish analyses of Derrida’s work.  
Although early scholarship on Derrida’s interest in religion was almost exclusively 
Christian,41 critical work has since diversified, incorporating responses from other religious 
traditions.42  In reaction both to Jürgen Habermas’s controversial claim that “Derrida, all 
denials notwithstanding, remains close to Jewish mysticism”43 and to Derrida’s own 
                                                             
37 Perhaps the earliest example of this is ‘Derrida and Biblical Studies’, Semeia, 23 (1982). More recent examples 
include: The Cambridge Companion to Biblical Interpretation, ed. by John Barton (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998); Patrick J. E. Chatelion Counet, John, a Postmodern Gospel: Introduction to 
Deconstructive Exegesis Applied to the Fourth Gospel (Leiden: Brill, 2000);  Brian D. Ingraffia, Postmodern 
Theory and Biblical Theology: Vanquishing God's Shadow (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); 
 Theodore W. Jennings, Reading Derrida/Thinking Paul: On Justice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); 
The Postmodern Bible Reader, ed. by David Jobling, Tina Pippin and Ronald Schleifer (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001); 
Stephen D. Moore, Poststructuralism and the New Testament: Derrida and Foucault at the Foot of the Cross, 
(Minneapolis, Fortress Press: 1994); David Rutledge, Reading Marginally: Feminism, Deconstruction and the 
Bible (Leiden: Brill, 1996) and David Seeley, Deconstructing the New Testament (Leiden: Brill, 1994). 
38 Yvonne Sherwood, ‘Introduction: Derrida’s Bible’, in Derrida’s Bible: Reading a Page of Scripture  
with a Little Help from Derrida, ed. by Yvonne Sherwood (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 1-20 (p. 
1). 
39 Sherwood, pp. 1-20 (p. 7).   
40 See, for example, Andrew P. Wilson’s largely unsupported and rather controversial claims that there is a 
schism “between the deconstructivist movement and Derridean theory” (p. 20), and that Derrida is “reasonably 
disinterested in the political applications of his own work” (p. 39). Andrew P. Wilson, Transfigured: A Derridean 
Rereading of the Markan Transfiguration (London: T & T Clark, 2007). 
41 It is possible to argue that Christianity has a privileged relationship to deconstruction.  See Derrida’s 
description of the Christian origins of the term ‘deconstruction’ in Derrida, ‘Epoché and Faith’, pp. 27-50 (p. 33).  
See also Jean-Luc Nancy, Dis-Enclosure: The Deconstruction of Christianity, trans. by Bettina Bergo, Gabriel 
Malenfant and Michael B. Smith (New York, Fordham University Press, 2008) and Leonard Lawlor’s claim that 
Derrida’s text Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-Portrait and Other Ruins “opens a larger, more ambitious project 
that we can call ‘the deconstruction of Christianity’”. Leonard Lawlor, The Implications of Immanence: Toward 
a New Concept of Life (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006), p. 31.  
42 Other examples include Ian Almond, Sufism and Deconstruction: a comparative study of Derrida and Ibn 
‘Arabi (London: Routledge, 2004); Gil Anidjar, The Jew, The Arab: A History of the Enemy (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2003); Mustapha Chérif, Islam and the West: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida, trans. by 
Teresa Lavender Fagan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); Robert Magliola, Derrida on the Mend 
(West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1984); Youxuan Wang, Buddhism and Deconstruction: Towards a 
Comparative Semiotics (London: Routledge 2001), and Buddhisms and Deconstructions, ed. by Jin Y. Park 
(Lanham, MD and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006). 
43 Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve lectures, trans. by Frederick Lawrence 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1987), p. 182. 
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engagement with his Jewish roots, many of these responses come from Jewish perspectives.  
However, in focusing on what Derrida’s work may offer for Judaism, or suggesting that 
Judaism may provide the authoritative way of reading Derrida, these works are often limited 
in their exegesis.  One example of this is Gideon Ofrat’s The Jewish Derrida, a thorough and 
systematic assessment of Derrida’s relationship with Judaism whose claim that the figure of 
the Jew provides the definitive approach to Derrida is nonetheless reductive.44  Another 
interesting and useful study is that of Susan Handelman, who views Derrida’s [early] work 
as “the latest in the line of Jewish heretic hermeneutics”45, emphasising the importance of 
writing in Rabbinic thought and its independence from an ontotheological phonocentrism.46  
Similarly, other attempts to ‘claim’ Derrida for Judaism, such as that by Jonathan Boyarin 
who asserts that Derrida is one of the “three great Jewish thinkers of our century much of 
whose work can be seen as signposts leading toward a postmodern Jewish science”,47 or 
Walter Brueggemann, who insists that “Derrida’s deconstruction is indeed a form of Jewish 
iconoclasm”,48 are interesting and insightful yet lack sufficient focus on deconstruction to 
radically change our perception of Derrida’s work.    
 
A rather more thorough approach to Derrida’s relationship with questions of ‘God’ and 
religion is provided by John D. Caputo, although, as I shall show, his account is not without 
limitations.  Now regarded as “the classic treatment of Derrida and religion”,49  Caputo holds 
that “deconstruction itself is structured like a religion – it lives and breathes a religious and 
messianic air; like religion it turns on a faith, a hope, even a prayer for the possibility of the 
impossible”.50  Caputo characterises a yearning for the impossible and an infinite openness to 
heterogeneity as religious features of deconstruction.  Crucially, however, this 
“religiousness” is indeterminate and detached from religious institutions and their violent 
                                                             
44 See for example, Gideon Ofrat’s claim that “circumcision is Jacques Derrida’s most basic philosophical 
experience”, Gideon Ofrat, The Jewish Derrida, trans. by Peretz Kidron (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
2001), p. 44. 
45 Susan Handelman, The Slayers of Moses: The Emergence of Rabbinic Interpretation in Modern Literary 
Theory (Albany: State University Of New York Press, 1982), p. 163. 
46 One limitation shared by both Ofrat and Handelman’s texts is an overstatement of the significance of the 
absent father in Derrida’s work.  
47 Jonathan Boyarin, Thinking in Jewish (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 195. 
48 Walter Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1997), p. 740. 
49 James K. A. Smith, Jacques Derrida: Live Theory (London: Continuum, 2005), p. 142.  Smith is referring to 
Caputo’s monograph The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion Without Religion.  
50 John D. Caputo in John D. Caputo and Carl Raschke, ‘Loosening Philosophy’s Tongue: A Conversation with 
Jack Caputo’, JCRT, 3.2 (Spring 2002) <http://www.jcrt.org/archives/03.2/caputo_raschke.shtml> [accessed 25 
May 2010] (para. 5 of 47). 
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heritages, “it repeats nondogmatically the religious structure of experience, the category of 
the religious”.51  In this way, it also resembles the messianic structure without being bound 
to any determinate messianism; it is, as Derrida describes in Specters of Marx, “a structural 
messianism, a messianism without religion, even a messianism without messianism”.52  Yet, 
as James K. A. Smith acknowledges, this ‘structural messianism’ is problematic:     
 
If, in order to avoid any implication of the messianic in the wars of the determinate 
messianisms, we evacuate the messianic structure of any content, then we must 
conclude, as Caputo rightly observed, that the messianic is not a quasi transcendental 
but a pure transcendental stricto sensu- a pure, Greco-modern universal of the most 
classical species that remains immune to history and space.  And that, as far as 
deconstruction is concerned, is heresy, along with being a little incroyable53   
 
Caputo concedes that deconstruction must therefore be “one more messianism”.54  Smith 
concurs, and reveals his own Christian position, arguing that Derrida should rethink 
religion as pharmacological and acknowledge that determinate messianisms “are not 
necessarily violent”.55  The assumed dichotomy between the structural messianic and 
determinate messianisms reinforces both the distinction between form and content which 
deconstruction so rigorously questions, as well as the empirico-transcendental distinction.  
Such tensions in Derrida’s work are crucial and demand a careful articulation of Derrida’s 
quasi-transcendental position if Derrida is to escape Arthur Bradley’s charge that he 
transcendentalizes the aporia.56  However, Caputo retreats from these and other tensions 
                                                             
51 John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1997), p. xxi. 
52 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International, trans. 
by Peggy Kamuf (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 59.  Frederic Jameson offers an interesting reading of the 
inherently Judaic nature of Derrida’s understanding of the messianic, asserting that “…the messianic does not 
mean immediate hope in that sense, perhaps not even hope against hope; it is a unique variety of the species 
hope that scarcely bears any of the latter’s normal characteristics, and that flourishes only in a time of absolute 
hopelessness”, Jameson, p. 177. 
53 James K. A. Smith, ‘Determined Violence: Derrida’s Structural Religion’, The Journal of Religion, 78.2 (April 
1998), 197-212 (p. 210). 
54 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, p. 142.  
55 Smith, ‘Determined Violence’, 197-212 (p. 211). 
56 It is Bradley himself who resolves this apparent tension between the structural messianic and individual 
messianisms most convincingly. He asserts: “The logic of deconstruction would insist that there are no absolutely 
determined messianisms because every religion of the book needs to open itself to the possibility of repetition in 
contexts outside its own choosing in order to be itself in the first place and –by the same token- there can be no 
completely general messianism either because every messianism still contains the traces of its historical context 
and there is no possibility of escaping context and historical contingency per se”, Arthur Bradley, Negative 
Theology and Modern French Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 40.  For discussions of the meaning and 
significance of the ‘quasi-transcendental’ for Derrida, see Geoffrey Bennington, ‘Derridabase’, in Geoffrey 
Bennington and Jacques Derrida, Jacques Derrida (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 267-284, 
Richard Rorty, ‘Is Derrida a “Quasi”-Transcendental Philosopher?’, Contemporary Literature, 36.1 (Spring 1995), 
173-200, and John Protevi’s Political Physics. Protevi refers to “the peculiar ascent/fall movement of quasi-
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and does little to elucidate either the complex relationship between religion, ethics, and 
politics at the interface of the messianic, or the connection between the ‘structural religion’ 
and the religious implications of the structure of subjectivity.    
 A similar claim about deconstruction’s affinity with religion is made by Henry 
Sussman, who maintains that Derrida’s “rapprochement”57 with religion is part of his 
“theological project”58 and, moreover, that deconstruction is “the fourth possible Abrahamic 
religion”.59  The nature of this claim remains uncertain, with Sussman at times labelling 
deconstruction both as an independent religion and as a structure or process which is 
parasitic on the Abrahamic religions, operating within their self critical spaces and 
providing them with redemptive possibilities.60  Indeed, Sussman undermines his original 
boldness by asserting that “Deconstruction is too polymorphous in its approaches to 
constitute a sustained position”;61 rather, it is more “a bearing" towards life than a set of 
dogmas, and such a ‘bearing’ “has never sufficed as the sufficient condition for a religious 
community in the past”.62   
   One key feature of Caputo’s reading is his attention to the increasing influence of 
Levinas and Kierkegaard on Derrida’s work.  Caputo distinguishes his own position from 
that of Mark C. Taylor, who proceeds from “a more Nietzschean conception of 
deconstruction”.63  Taylor, along with Carl A. Raschke and others is strongly influenced by 
the ‘Death of God’ theology proposed by Thomas J. J. Altizer,64 and allies it closely with 
deconstruction.  Taylor identifies deconstruction as “the ‘hermeneutic’ of the death of God” 
and thus the starting point for his “postmodern a/theology”65; Raschke similarly claims that 
“deconstruction is the death of God put into writing”.66  Although these thinkers foreground 
the crucial yet underexplored relationship between God and writing in Derrida, however 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
transcendentality”, John Protevi, Political Physics: Deleuze, Derrida and the body politic (London: Athlone 
Press, 2001), p. 85.    
57 Henry Sussman, The Task of the Critics: Poetics, Philosophy and Religion (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005), p. 207. 
58 Sussman, p. 185. 
59 Sussman, p. 240.  
60 Sussman, p. 180. 
61 Sussman, p. 224. 
62 Sussman, p. 225. 
63 John D. Caputo, ‘Loosening Philosophy’s Tongue’ (para. 12 of 47). 
64 For connections between ‘Death of God’ theology and deconstruction see Thomas J. J. Altizer, Max A. Myers, 
Carl A. Raschke, Robert P. Scharlemann, Mark C. Taylor and Charles E. Winquist, Deconstruction and Theology 
(New York: Crossroad, 1982). 
65 Mark C. Taylor, Erring: A Postmodern A/theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1984), p. 6. 
66 Carl A. Raschke, ‘The Deconstruction of God’, in Deconstruction and Theology, as before, pp. 1-33 (p. 27). 
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this schema is also a rather reductive interpretation of the multi-faceted God which appears 
in Derrida’s work.  Steven Shakespeare observes:  
 
Their use of the trope of incarnation (especially when allied to Altizer’s notion of 
total presence) suggests a total emptying out of God into writing, God embodied as 
the trace.  This risks losing sight of ways in which God names a future and an 
otherness that resist embodied immediacy.  The undecidability in Derrida’s 
thinking, which still maintains contact with reference and the singular otherness 
named by God, here becomes ‘decided’, a sacralization of purely immanent flows.67 
 
Similarly, Hugh Rayment-Pickard notes Derrida’s own rejection of the reductive ‘Death of 
God’ position: “I do not believe in what is so easily called the death of philosophy (nor, 
moreover, in the simple death of whatever –the book, man, god, especially since, as we all 
know, what is dead wields a very specific power”.68  Despite their likenesses, Caputo stresses 
the dissimilarity between himself and the ‘Death of God’ thinkers, particularly Taylor, a 
difference characterised as that “between immanence and the wholly other”.69  Caputo 
contends that deconstruction is religious in a more ‘traditional’ way than the ‘Death of God’ 
thinkers admit.  However, his own understanding of deconstruction as “a style of thinking” 
rather than “a set of theories” can lead to imprecision, and, as Shakespeare remarks, is 
“ontologically thin”.70   
 A thinker who may resolve some of the problems with Caputo’s account, and a key 
interlocutor of both Caputo and Derrida, is Richard Kearney.  Kearney situates his work 
within the ‘return of the religious’, using Derrida and deconstruction to rethink God outside 
of ontotheology, institution and dogma in order to formulate “a form of post-theism that 
allows us to revisit the sacred in the midst of the secular”.71  Although his goal, to resuscitate 
a “vigorously ecumenical”72 theism for the twenty first century, clearly delineates his project 
from that of Derrida, all three thinkers are united by their interest in what Kearney refers to 
                                                             
67 Steven Shakespeare, Derrida and Theology (London: T & T Clark, 2009), p. 180. 
68 Jacques Derrida, quoted in Hugh Rayment-Pickard, Impossible God: Derrida’s Theology (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2003), p. 134. 
69 John D. Caputo, ‘Loosening Philosophy’s Tongue’ (para. 11 of 47). This characterisation of the difference 
between the two thinkers seems to overlook the deconstructive emphasis on the inevitability of contamination.  
70 Shakespeare, Derrida, p. 200. 
71 Richard Kearney, Anatheism: Returning to God After God (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), p. 
57. 
72 Richard Kearney, The God Who May Be: A Hermeneutics of Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2001), p. 6. 
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as a “God- or post God- of radical powerlessness”.73  Of Derrida’s famously declared atheism, 
he asserts:  
 
Atheism, then, is less a refusal of God as such, for Derrida, than a renunciation of a 
specific  God (or Gods) – a renunciation which could almost be said to serve as a 
condition of possibility of a God still to come, still to be named.74 
  
This observation is considerably more nuanced than the claim that Derrida’s atheism 
renders him uninterested in or hostile towards questions of religion and ‘God’.  However, 
whereas deconstruction denies faith a predetermined focus, Kearney looks to affirm a 
scriptural God, and to pursue the impact of Derrida’s observations about faith, God and 
eschatology on Christianity.  He argues that the indeterminate faith of deconstruction risks 
“becoming so empty that it loses faith in the here and now altogether”,75 and perceives “a 
radical absence of any historical instantiation of the divine”.76  Derrida himself expands on 
this point, asserting: 
 
 I would share your hope for resurrection, reconciliation, and redemption.  But I 
think I have a responsibility as someone who thinks deconstructively. Even if I 
dream of redemption, I have the responsibility to acknowledge, to obey the necessity 
of the possibility that there is khōra rather than a relationship with the anthropo-
theologic God of Revelation.  At some point, you, Richard, translate your faith into 
something determinable and then you have to keep the ‘name’ of resurrection.  My 
own understanding of faith is that there is faith whenever one gives up not only any 
certainty but also any determined hope.  If one says that resurrection is the horizon 
of one’s hope then one knows what one names when one says ‘resurrection’ – faith is 
not pure faith.  It is already knowledge, that’s why, sometimes, you call me an 
atheist.77 
 
The choice which Derrida presents here is between a certain unframed or unlimited hope or 
faith (khōra) and faith in a predefined God.  Kearney represents this choice simply as that 
between atheism and theism,78 although Caputo has argued that Derrida’s work itself 
                                                             
73 Kearney, Anatheism, p. 58. 
74 Kearney, The God Who May Be, p. 71. 
75 Kearney, Anatheism, p. 65. 
76Kearney, Anatheism, p. 64.  Kearney here overlooks Derrida’s presentation of the problematic relationship 
between singular, ahistorical incidences of faith and the historicity of religious institutions. See, for example: 
Jacques Derrida, ‘Sauf le nom (Post Scriptum)’, trans. by John P. Leavey Jr. in On the Name, ed. by Thomas 
Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 35-85. 
77 Jacques Derrida, ‘Terror and Religion (Jacques Derrida in conversation with Richard Kearney)’, in Traversing 
the Imaginary: Richard Kearney and the Postmodern Challenge, ed. by Peter Gratton and John Panteleimon 
Manoussakis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007), pp. 18-28 (p. 26).  
78 By time of the publication of Anatheism in 2010, Kearney’s position has shifted. ‘Anatheism’ refers to 
nondogmatic versions of both theism and atheism, and so the choice between the two is no longer central to 
Kearney’s argument.   
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challenges this opposition.  The approaches of Derrida and his critics to this problematic are 
significant, and thus it is unsurprising, despite Derrida’s apparent clarity here, that some 
confusion surrounds them.  Kearney, for example, identifies inconsistency in Caputo’s 
response.  At times, Kearney observes, Caputo privileges khōra, and at others, he insists that 
“the issue remains radically undecidable”.79  Kearney regards Caputo’s unwillingness to 
clarify his position as disingenuous; it is “as though Caputo, a crypto-theist, is desperately 
trying not to evangelize deconstruction by turning it into a crypto-theology”.80  Kearney’s 
criticism is apt as, despite Caputo’s evangelism, he is often reluctant to elucidate his position 
towards traditional theism.  Following Derrida’s clarification of his own position, Kearney 
suggests that both Caputo and, at times, Derrida “set up a somewhat precipitous gulf” 
between “divinity” and “its deconstructive other”.81   
 
Caputo’s work on Derrida, particularly his focus on the importance of Levinas and 
Kierkegaard for Derrida, has proved influential for other commentators.  Modifying 
Caputo’s sympathetic position,82 James K. A. Smith reads Derrida through the latter’s 
engagement with Levinas, insisting that “deconstruction is an affirmative response to the 
call of the other”,83 which has always been both political84 and Levinasian.85  For Smith, any 
‘turn’ is better understood as “an intensification of its [deconstruction’s] original vocation”86 
rather than an incursion of anything new.  He maintains that Levinas’s influence is always 
“filtered through Kierkegaard”,87 however, he conflates Levinas and Derrida and lacks a 
nuanced account of the relationship between ethics and religion in Derrida, following 
Levinas’s belief that “the ethical relation to the other is religion”.88  This overlooks the 
tensions between religion, faith and ethics which exemplify Derrida’s engagement with the 
religious.  Elsewhere, Smith is ambivalent towards Derrida.  Envisaging future possibilities 
for Christianity, including that of a “deconstructive church”,89 he aligns himself with 
                                                             
79 Richard Kearney, Strangers, Gods and Monsters: Interpreting Otherness (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 201. 
80 Kearney, Strangers, p. 209. 
81 Kearney, Strangers, p. 208. 
82 For another account of Derrida largely following Caputo see Dawne McCance, Derrida on Religion: Thinker of 
Differance (London: Equinox, 2009). 
83 James K. A. Smith, Jacques Derrida, p. 13. 
84 James K. A. Smith, Jacques Derrida, p. 65. 
85 James K. A. Smith, Jacques Derrida, p. 14. 
86 James K. A. Smith, Jacques Derrida, p. 66. 
87 James K. A. Smith, Jacques Derrida, p. 80. 
88 James K. A. Smith, Jacques Derrida, p. 78. 
89 James K. A. Smith, Who’s Afraid of Postmodernism? Taking Derrida, Lyotard and Foucault to Church (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006), p. 57. 
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Radical Orthodoxy, which he perceives as “more properly postmodern than Derridean 
religious scepticism”90 due to its rejection of the Cartesian model of knowledge.   
 Perhaps one of the most significant religious responses to deconstruction, Radical 
Orthodoxy, “a sensibility”91 rather than a movement, rejects the Cartesian paradigm and 
theological concessions to modernity in favour of an autonomous, unapologetic, and 
ecumenical postmodern theology which begins with revelation and incarnation and returns 
to “the deep theological resources of the Christian tradition”,92 notably Augustine and 
Aquinas, as well as to a rethinking of Platonism.93  Led by John Milbank, Radical Orthodoxy 
critiques Derrida as a Nietzschean, dismissing his thought and that of other thinkers as 
“elaborations of a single nihilistic philosophy”.  Such a philosophy, Milbank claims, is allied 
with “postmodernism” and “articulates itself as, first, an absolute historicism, second as an 
ontology of difference, and third as an ethical nihilism”.94  In a rather shallow reading of 
Derrida, Milbank claims that deconstruction’s anti-foundationalism “implies a tiresome, red-
guard politics of ceaseless negativity”.95  In a more extensive consideration of Derrida 
elsewhere, he rejects the “gesture of martyrdom”96 which he perceives as constituting both 
Derrida’s ethics and a certain post-Kantian tradition, favouring instead “a mutual and 
unending gift-exchange”97 as the basis of ethics.  Milbank repudiates not only the lack of 
mutuality he perceives in Derrida’s ethics but also the assumption that death can provide 
any grounds for ethics (he insists rather that it is “complicit with evil”98), the insistence on a 
non-interventionist God if any, and the supposition that “religious self-sacrifice is only 
                                                             
90 Smith, Who’s Afraid of Postmodernism?, p. 126.  
91 Smith, Who’s Afraid of Postmodernism?, p. 117. 
92 James K. A. Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-Secular Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker Academic and Bletchley: Paternoster Press, 2004), p. 68.   
93 Douglas Hedley and Wayne J. Hankey argue that “the theology of Radical Orthodoxy remains deeply and self-
consciously enigmatic.  The style is oracular and opaque, its rhetoric combative; it refuses dialogue”, Wayne J. 
Hankey and Douglas Hedley, ‘Introduction’, in Deconstructing Radical Orthodoxy: Postmodern Theology, 
Rhetoric and Truth (Aldershot: Ashgate 2005), pp. xiii-xviii (p. xiv).  A variety of other critical positions can be 
found in the same volume.  
94 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 1990), p. 278.  
Assertions of Derrida’s nihilism are not unique to Radical Orthodoxy. See also, for example, Julian Young’s 
dismissal of Derrida’s work as a manifestation of “the nihilism of postmodernity” in Julian Young, The Death of 
God and the Meaning of Life (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 196.  For a convincing rebuttal of the nihilist charge 
see Hugh Rayment-Pickard, ‘Derrida and Nihilism’, in Deconstructing Radical Orthodoxy, as before, pp. 161-
175. 
95 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, p. 315. 
96 John Milbank, ‘The Midwinter Sacrifice’, in The Blackwell Companion to Postmodern Theology, ed. by 
Graham Ward (Malden, MA: Blackwell 2001), pp. 107-130 (p. 113).  
97 Milbank, ‘The Midwinter Sacrifice’, pp. 107-130 (p. 121). 
98 Milbank, ‘The Midwinter Sacrifice’, pp. 107-130 (p. 122). 
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realized in a secular sphere”.99  Rejecting all non-theological interpretations of ontology and 
phenomenology as incomplete, other Radical Orthodoxy thinkers follow Milbank’s critique 
of Derrida.  Catherine Pickstock repudiates Derrida as a nihilist, complicit in the 
necrophiliac tendencies of postmodernity, and argues that “Derrida’s emphasis on writing is 
a denial of the living and dying physical body”.100  Clearly driven by a strong alternative 
agenda, Radical Orthodoxy offers a limited, even faulty, account of Derrida’s relationship 
with the religious.      
 
Rather more generous and exploratory accounts of Derrida and religion can be found in the 
writing of thinkers such as Graham Ward, Kevin Hart and Hugh Rayment-Pickard who 
focus on Derrida’s relationship with language.  Ward argues that “Différance calls the 
theological into play”101 and links Derrida to the theologican Karl Barth with the claim that 
Barth provides a theological reading of the “law of textuality”102 that is différance (and that 
“language is always and ineradicably theological”103).  Ward regards Derrida’s ‘turn’ as a 
“‘spiritualizing’” of “the economy of representation”104 and Derrida’s work as a “supplement 
to Levinas’s”.105  Crucially, he perceives the importance of textuality for Derrida’s analysis of 
humanity, divinity and their interaction.  However, by restricting Derrida’s thought to 
Barth’s Christianity he short-circuits possible non-Christian responses as, “Put briefly, the 
incarnation is the meaning of and the hermeneutic for understanding all language”.106 
Kevin Hart uses deconstruction, and draws attention to the deconstructive elements 
of scripture and theology, in order to conceive of “a ‘non-metaphysical theology’”. 107  His 
                                                             
99 Milbank, ‘The Midwinter Sacrifice’, pp. 107-130 (p. 122). For a generally convincing critique of Milbank’s 
position, see Tyler Roberts, ‘Sacrifice and Secularization: Derrida, de Vries and the Future of Mourning’, in 
Derrida and Religion, as before, pp. 263-282. 
100 Catherine Pickstock, After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1998), p. 19.  Pickstock’s claim overlooks texts such as ‘Circumfession’, which focuses on ‘the living and dying 
physical body’. Jacques Derrida, ‘Circumfession’, in Jacques Derrida, ed. and trans. by Geoffrey Bennington 
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Deconstruction (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 173.  
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107 Kevin Hart, The Trespass of the Sign: Deconstruction, Theology and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), p. xi. A similar position is found in Don Cupitt’s work. Cupitt aims to “get religious 
belief (and myself, and you) into this new completely post-metaphysical world without subverting myself.” Don 
Cupitt, Only Human (London: SCM Press, 1985), p. xi.  For a critical perspective on this “sharpening of the anti-
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particular interest is in the connections between mysticism, negative theology and 
deconstruction, and he writes with a focus on Derrida’s earlier texts.  He argues that Derrida 
overlooks the “deconstructive power” of negative theology,108 a claim which is disproved by 
later texts such as ‘Sauf le nom (Post Scriptum)’, unpublished at the time of Hart’s writing.  
Other assertions which are questioned by later publications include the statement that 
“deconstruction poses no assertive power”109 and that “Derrida is more concerned” with “the 
God of the philosophers” rather than “the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob”.110  
 Engaging with Derrida’s later work, Hugh Rayment-Pickard argues that Derrida 
“implicitly recommends the idea of the impossibility of God as an alternative theology”.111  
He tracks Derrida’s analyses of Husserl and Heidegger, particularly through the concept of 
death, in order to investigate Derrida’s ‘impossible God’.  Rayment-Pickard asserts the 
primacy of theological claims112 and argues that ‘general theology’ is “the core topic and 
organizing theme behind Derrida’s entire project”.113  Yet, having foregrounded ‘general 
theology’ and its focus on “the conditions of possibility of ‘all the metaphysical 
determinations of truth’”,114 he rejects the conclusion of Kevin Hart’s similar observations 
that Derrida’s interest lies “only with discourses and in the conditions of knowledge”115 and 
that he is, therefore, a Kantian idealist.  Rayment-Pickard acknowledges a shift in Derrida’s 
“theological mood” from “brooding grief” to “joyous feelings of attachment, if not love, for 
the lost object”116 and focuses on the chiasmus which is “at the heart of Derrida’s 
philosophy”,117 depicting it as the excessive, self-transcending nature of language which 
insists “within the space of deconstructed metaphysics”.118  Following Mark Taylor, he 
rather reductively subsumes Derrida’s non-synonymous substitutions “under the title 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
metaphysical thrust of apophaticism” see Rowan Williams, ‘Hegel and the gods of postmodernity’, in Shadow of 
Spirit, as before, pp. 72-80 (p. 77).  
108 Hart, Trespass, p. 198. See also his claim that “negative theology is a form of deconstruction” (p. 186), a 
position critiqued by Graham Ward who argues: “Negative theology is a language-use.  Différance is a language-
condition.” Ward, p. 226. 
109 Hart, Trespass, p. 75. 
110 Hart, Trespass, p. 29. 
111 Hugh Rayment-Pickard, Impossible God: Derrida’s Theology (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), p. 9. 
112 Rayment-Pickard, p. 3. 
113 Rayment-Pickard, p. 5. 
114 Rayment-Pickard, p. 5. 
115 Rayment-Pickard, p. 124. 
116 Rayment-Pickard, p. 146. 
117 Rayment-Pickard, p. 119. 
118 Rayment-Pickard, p. 162. 
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‘death’”.119  Although the notion of ‘impossibility’ is central to his thesis then, he doesn’t 
fully explore its connection to ethical responsibility on Derrida.120  
 Observing the tension between philosophy and religion through the figure of the 
adieu, Hent de Vries’s Philosophy and the Turn to Religion is perhaps the most 
comprehensive philosophical assessment of Derrida’s religious engagement.  For de Vries, 
Derrida’s adieu establishes a position of simultaneous proximity and distance or ‘double 
movement’ in relation to the religious phenomena under discussion.  Nonetheless, de Vries 
privileges the religious elements of deconstructive language, maintaining, for example, that 
“‘God’ is the best word for the trace, for its always necessary and possible erasure”,121 as well 
as being the focus of Derrida’s studies of negative theology122 and that which evokes “the 
very structure of experience, language, and thought, in general”.123  De Vries’s insistence on 
the link between God and textuality is crucial, however, his deference towards Derrida 
causes him to overlook important tensions in Derrida’s work.  
 
Although these religious readings of Derrida are diverse in style, aim and focus, they exhibit 
recurring features and limitations.  Those readings which look to promote a certain type of 
religious engagement, such as the exegeses of Radical Orthodoxy thinkers, and to some 
extent, Ward, Hart, Smith, Caputo and Kearney, tend to skew Derrida’s work to this end, 
either overemphasising Derrida’s religious focus, identifying it with orthodox positions that 
Derrida would disavow, or trying to resolve deconstructive undecidability.  Analyses from 
Biblical Studies or specifically Jewish readings tend to see how Derrida may illuminate their 
fields rather than aiming at mutual illumination.  Other limitations include a keen interest 
in religion but little in God,124 a lack of focus on the relationship between Derrida’s religious 
interest and issues of mode, genre, style and performativity, and, as de Vries and Caputo 
demonstrate, a frustrating reverence towards Derrida which limits exploration of the 
                                                             
119 Rayment-Pickard, p. 17. 
120 See for example, Derrida’s insistence that the impossibility of democracy means that one should “force oneself 
to achieve it”, Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, trans. by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michal Naas (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 74.  
121 Hent de Vries, Philosophy and the Turn to Religion, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 
p. 94. 
122 De Vries, p. 27. 
123 De Vries, p. 67. 
124 Exceptions to this include Marius Timmann Mjaaland, David Wood and Rodolphe Gasché. See Marius 
Timmann Mjaaland, Autopsia: Self, Death and God after Kierkegaard and Derrida, trans. Brian McNeil (Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, 2008); David Wood, ‘Thinking God in the Wake of Kierkegaard’, in Kierkegaard: A Critical 
Reader, ed. by Jane Chamberlain and Jonathan Rée (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 53-74, and Rodolphe 
Gasché, Inventions of Difference: On Jacques Derrida (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).     
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oeuvre’s internal tensions and problems.  This thesis endeavours to respond to some of these 
problems and limitations.   
  
3. Outlining a Different Approach 
 
In this thesis I aim to establish a decisive link between God and writing by exploring 
Derrida’s investigation into, and transformation of, the concept of God in various later 
texts,125 as well as his adoption of different modes and genres.  Considering the 
characteristics of God as revealed by different discourses, I shall argue that rather than 
providing a stable definition or identity of God, they demonstrate the non self-identity of 
God and the irreducibility of God to a single model or tradition.  Such a God would be 
dynamic and irrecuperable for ontotheology, dogma or institution.  I shall maintain that 
Derrida’s model of God, although connected to faith, does not and cannot constitute a 
religion, even a ‘religion without religion’ (as scholars such as John Caputo claim).126   
Further, I shall examine the figure of God as an important site of tension within 
Derrida’s work, which challenges the perceived relationships between ethics, religion, 
politics and subjectivity.  Such conflict is often obscured by critics who assume the existence 
of a univocal and transparent ‘ethical’ or ‘religious’ turn in Derrida’s work.  Rather, Derrida’s 
reformulation of God is inhibited by its potential discord with his political impulses.  
Derrida’s model of God is radically interiorised, and focuses on the individual, ahistorical 
experience of faith and the constitution of subjectivity through this faith.  Inescapably 
singular, the experience of faith appears to be in tension with the institutions it nonetheless 
founds and supports.  It is, as Carl A. Raschke asserts, “the de-constituting sign... the grand 
de-sign within the economy of all ‘world religions’”.127  At times, however, Derrida retreats 
from the tension between his ‘religious’ model of subjectivity and non-sovereign God and 
his broader socio-political vision, with references to the former in his political texts virtually 
non-existent.128  This flight from the aporia is oddly undeconstructive.  It overlooks the fact 
that the thinking of ethics, subjectivity, democracy and the bounds of the ‘human’ cannot 
                                                             
125 There are no clear and unequivocal divisions between Derrida’s early, middle and late works.  Here I use the 
phrase ‘later texts’ to refer to those published from about the late 1980s onwards.   
126 See John D. Caputo. Prayers and Tears. 
127 Carl A. Raschke, ‘Derrida and the Return of Religion: Religious Theory after Postmodernism’, JCRT, 6.2 
(2005), 1-16 (p. 15). 
128 See Jacques Derrida, ‘Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of “Religion” at the Limits of Reason Alone’, 
trans. by Samuel Weber in Acts of Religion, ed. by Gil Anidjar (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 42-101. 
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be accomplished without this reformulation of God, both as a rethinking of interiority 
through secrecy and non-sovereignty and as a refiguring of excessive yet immanent grounds 
of possibility.   
 
I will approach Derrida’s reconfiguration of God and its consequences through his adoption 
of different genres, as, I argue, not only is writing and textuality significant for Derrida, but 
the choice of genre carries a paradoxical responsibility.129  In this way, my approach to his 
work will be determined by its own concerns, examining its preoccupations, methods and 
consistency on its own terms.  Here, I shall briefly explain the importance of genre, mode 
and idiom for Derrida; these often overlooked elements will be central to my approach.   
For Derrida, there is more than rhetoric or style at stake in the adoption of a genre.  
Rather, in Learning to Live Finally he maintains that “It is necessary in each situation to 
create an appropriate mode of exposition, to invent the law of the singular event, to take 
into account the presumed or desired addressee”.130  The increased performativity of 
Derrida’s later texts and their corresponding self awareness magnifies this sense of 
responsibility.131  In ‘The Law of Genre’, considering what is at stake in the allocation of 
genre, he offers alternative interpretive hypotheses on the following statements: “Genres are 
not to be mixed/I will not mix genres./I repeat: genres are not to be mixed. I will not mix 
them”.132  In the first hypothesis, the constative utterances describe “a practice, an act or 
event” and are ethically neutral; in the second, the statements are performative, and the 
sounding of the word genre creates “a limit” which is followed by ethical and juridical 
norms.  Consequently, for Derrida, the constative and performative perspectives are 
connected by a mutual dependence, a “parasitical economy” which renders performativity 
                                                             
129 The meaning and significance of ‘writing’ and ‘textuality’ for Derrida is subject to much critical debate which 
I shall address in the course of the thesis.   
130 Jacques Derrida, Learning to Live Finally: An Interview with Jean Birnbaum, trans. by Pascale-Anne Brault 
and Michael Naas (Hoboken, NJ: Melville House Publishing, 2007), p. 31. On this see also his earlier assertion 
that “it is necessary to be prepared to invent the coming of a discourse capable of taking this into account”, 
Jacques Derrida in Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco, For What Tomorrow... A Dialogue, trans. by Jeff 
Fort (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 58. 
131 See Simon Critchley’s claim that the change from early to late Derrida may be understood as a shift from the 
constative to the performative. Simon Critchley, Ethics Politics Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas and 
Contemporary French Thought (London: Verso, 2009), p. 96.  For a discussion of the potential problems of 
performativity, see Jacques Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, trans. by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael 
Naas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 152. 
132 Jacques Derrida, ‘The Law of Genre’, trans. by Avital Ronell in Acts of Literature, ed. by Derek Attridge 
(London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 221-252 (p. 223). 
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and its ethical implications inescapable.133  Such responsibility would entail responding to 
particularity, yet is inevitably compromised by the generality of genre.  However, Derrida 
demonstrates that the reductive and restrictive nature of generic boundaries i.e. the 
generality of genre, is however counterbalanced by its permeability.134 Here he identifies a 
mark or trait which both enables genre and cannot be subsumed by it.  Of this écluse he 
remarks: “The clause or floodgate of genre declasses what it allows to be classed”.135  It thus 
protects singularity.   
For Derrida, the responsibility to attend to singularity is also revealed by the 
possibility of the idiom,136 which names an untranslatable singularity and “a purity which is 
not very pure... the only impure ‘purity’ for which I dare [he dares] confess a taste”.137   
Derrida demonstrates that the absolute idiom is always already compromised and 
contaminated by “a common language, concepts, laws, general norms”,138 yet his 
precoccupation continues.  This subsequent quest for the idiom permeates his writing, and 
the “unknown grammar”139 which he foresees is associated with literature, God and the 
“paraph”140 of autobiographical remembering.  Such a quest for the singularity of the idiom 
accounts for his interests in writing and literature.  Writing stages the encounter between 
the singular and the general, rendering reading “a mixed experience of the other in his or 
her singularity as well as philosophical content, information that can be torn out of this 
singular context. Both at the same time”.141  Whereas philosophy denies its link to the idiom 
in order to preserve its appearance of universality, literature aspires to be idiomatic.142  For 
                                                             
133 For further discussion of the relationship between the constative and the performative see Jacques Derrida, 
‘Psyche: Invention of the Other’, trans. by Catherine Porter in Psyche: Inventions of the Other Volume 1, ed. by 
Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 1-47.  
134 See Jacques Derrida, Right of Inspection, photographs by Marie-Franc oise Plissart and trans. by David Wills 
(New York: Monacelli Press, 1998).  Here Derrida discusses generic responsibility and the effects of 
inappropriate framing or narration with reference to the photographic novel.  Identifying “the tug-of-war 
between the visible and the utterable”, Derrida observes the way that the imposition of a narrative mode 
stabilises and controls the meaning of the images, leaving no marker for that which could not be codified (not 
paginated). 
135 Derrida, ‘The Law of Genre’, pp. 221-252 (p. 231). 
136 Derrida is fascinated by this possibility, describing “this idiomatic writing whose purity, I realize, is 
inaccessible, but about which I continue to dream”. Jacques Derrida, ‘Unsealing (“the old new language”)’, trans. 
by Peggy Kamuf in Points, as before, pp. 115-131 (p. 118). 
137 Jacques Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other or, The Prosthesis of Origin, trans. by Patrick Mensah 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 47. 
138 Jacques Derrida, ‘“There is No One Narcissism” (Autobiophotographies)’, trans. by Peggy Kamuf in Points: 
Interviews, 1974-1994 , pp. 196-215 (p. 200). 
139 Jacques Derrida, ‘Circumfession’, in Jacques Derrida, ed. and trans. by Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1999), p. 287. 
140 Derrida, ‘Unsealing (“the old new language”)’, pp. 115-131 (p. 119). 
141 Jacques Derrida, ‘“There is No One Narcissism” (Autobiophotographies)’, pp. 196-215 (p. 201). 
142 Jacques Derrida, ‘Passages- from Traumatism to Promise’, trans. by Peggy Kamuf in Points, pp. 372-395 (p. 
374). 
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this reason, Derrida favours literary modes, valuing their proximity to singularity and to 
“the untranslatable”. 143  As the “absolute place of the secret of this heteronomy”,144 literature 
is also a possible point of intersection between the interior space of subject formation and 
the public space of the ‘democracy to come’, and thus the disjunction between religion and 
politics.  
Questions of genre and mode are also central to my study as they are, for Derrida, 
already linked to the meaning of ‘God’ and of the ‘name of God’.  Indeed, for Derrida, the 
name of God is the paradigmatic idiom, which both forbids and commands translation,145 
historically authorizing a certain “Babelization”.146  Further, God is the “ultimate 
addressee”,147 and points towards a futural language, “‘the old new language’”,148 whose 
emergence I shall track as it develops through Derrida’s reconfiguration of the meaning of 
‘God’.  This language would be “not only the narration of a past that is inaccessible to me, 
but a narration that would also be a future, that would determine a future”.149  Such an 
idiomatic language would contaminate modes, “accumulate and... mobilize a very large 
number of styles, genres, languages, levels”150 and incorporate extra-linguistic modes151 in 
order to experience the “Omnipotence-otherness”152 of the text.   
 As I have shown, Derrida regards language and genre as productive and 
performative.  Textuality, and in particular, the choice of an appropriate mode, provide a 
way to bear witness, and, as Paul Ricoeur describes, to “attend to singularity and give it 
expression”.153  Given the central significance of textuality for Derrida, in this thesis, I shall 
track his engagement with the question of ‘God’ as it is expressed through different modes 
and genres, noting the significance of these changes to the issues raised and conclusions 
formed. The thesis will consist of four chapters which I shall now outline.  Each will focus 
                                                             
143 Jacques Derrida, The Ear of the Other: Otobiography, Transference, Translation, ed. by Christie MacDonald 
and trans. by Peggy Kamuf (New York: Schocken Books, 1985), p. 148.     
144 Jacques Derrida, Geneses, Genealogies, Genres and Genius: The secrets of the archive, trans. by Beverley Bie 
Brahic (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), p. 48. 
145Derrida declares that “God himself is in the double bind”, Derrida, The Ear of the Other, p. 102.  
146 Jacques Derrida, Aporias, trans. by Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 10. 
147 Derrida is here referring to confession. Jacques Derrida, ‘The Eyes of Language: The Abyss and the Volcano’, 
trans. by Gil Anidjar in Acts of Religion, ed. Gil Anidjar (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 191-227 (p. 208).   
148 Derrida, ‘Unsealing (“the old new language”)’, pp. 115-131 (p. 119). 
149 Derrida, ‘“There is No One Narcissism” (Autobiophotographies)’, pp. 196-215 (p. 207). 
150 Jacques Derrida, ‘“Dialanguages”’, trans. by Peggy Kamuf in Points, pp. 132-155 (p. 142). 
151 For Derrida, the idiomatic “is not necessarily on the order of language in the phonic sense  but may be on the 
order of a gesture, a physical association, a scene of some sort, a taste, a smell”, Derrida, The Ear of the Other, p. 
106.  
152 Derrida, Geneses, p. 53. 
153 Paul Ricoeur, ‘Philosophy after Kierkegaard’, in Kierkegaard: A Critical Reader, ed. by Jane Chamberlain and 
Jonathan Rée (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 9-25 (p. 21). 
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on a genre which is employed and examined repeatedly in Derrida’s later work; these are 
confession, dialogue, silence, and reason.   
 
Beginning with a review of three current readings of ‘Circumfession’, Chapter One focuses 
on Derrida’s engagement with the explicitly religious genre of confession, arguing that these 
exegeses, singularly philosophical, religious and literary, overlook both the importance of 
contamination in the text, and the significance of writing.  In contrast, I develop an 
interdisciplinary analysis which tracks Derrida’s ‘double reading’ of confession as it 
simultaneously reinforces and subverts the strictly maintained yet unsustainable economies 
of confessional structure, confessional subject and the figure of God.  This ‘double reading’, I 
contend, consists of a confession of deconstruction’s alliance with textuality, and a 
deconstruction of God and the subject, which are rewritten according to their dynamism 
and non-identity.  Consequently, the God which emerges from the text is not a stabilising 
figure of positive infinity, as inherited from the Judaeo-Christian tradition, but a God 
aligned with the shifting possibilities of language and grammar.  In the final part of the 
chapter, I turn to ‘Envois’, a text whose supplementary use of the confessional mode 
reinforces Derrida’s ‘double reading’, and begins to examine both the political implications 
of confession, and the relationships between ethics and politics, and interior and exterior.  
 
In the two central chapters of the thesis I explore deconstruction’s relationship with 
negative theology, beginning with a brief excursus in which I argue that current accounts of 
this relationship pay little attention to the crucial concerns of mode and genre.  The 
chapters, ‘Dialogue’ and ‘Silence’, look to remedy this problem, and in so doing, to develop a 
fuller understanding of what is at stake with these linguistic concerns.      
Chapter Two asserts the importance of dialogue in Derrida’s work, both in 
understanding the movements of deconstruction, and in formulating its impact on the 
relationships between ethics, politics and religion.  I begin by responding to the question of 
a religious ‘turn’, here exemplified by Slavoj Žižek’s claim that Derrida’s later work betrays 
différance.  I argue that the dialogical movements which comprise différance testify to a 
structural consistency which destabilizes the idea of a ‘turn’, undermining Žižek’s position, 
as well as Arthur Bradley’s more nuanced critique.  In the second part of the chapter I read 
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the “fictive dialogue”154 ‘Sauf le nom (Post Scriptum)’ as an expression of the similarities 
between deconstruction and negative theology, and as an examination of the possibility of a 
“post-writing”155 which would facilitate the articulation of non-ontotheological conceptions 
of God.  Finally, I return to the concerns articulated by Bradley and Žižek, arguing- contra 
these critics- that Derrida’s ‘post-writing’ and reconfiguration of God look to uphold the 
undecidability between ethics and politics without sacrificing the urgency of the political. 
Progressing from the dialogical mode to the complementary mode of silence, 
Chapter Three analyses ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ and The Gift of Death arguing 
that Derrida assumes the apophatic mode of ‘avoiding speaking’, a way of preserving silence 
through language.  This mode, I argue, which Derrida frames through the idea of the 
promise, draws out the similarities between negative theology and deconstruction, and 
enables Derrida to clarify the relationship between God and language.  Turning to The Gift 
of Death, I argue that Derrida again aligns himself with linguistic silence.  This mode is 
allied with the processes of being ‘in secret’ and of bearing witness to a conception of God 
which is rooted in the tensions and paradoxes of language itself.  In the final section I 
examine emerging tensions in Derrida’s account: within the concept of God; between public 
and private; and between ethics and religion, and ask to what extent these tensions are 
resolved by Derrida’s ‘double reading’.         
 
The final chapter, ‘Reason’, centres on ‘Faith and Knowledge: On the Two Sources of 
“Religion” at the Limits of Reason Alone’.  First, I track Derrida’s argument that the 
discourses of religion and reason are internally contaminated and mutually dependent and 
consider his revision of reason, in particular the contention that it names the irreducible, 
non-economic relationship between calculation and the incalculable and provides the 
impetus for the ‘Enlightenment to come’.  Next, I argue that Derrida’s emphasis on the 
political, through which he yokes together the futures of reason and religion in ‘Faith and 
Knowledge’, is accompanied by a suspension of the question of God.  This, I argue, results in 
an undeconstructive tension between the private and the political, potentially sustaining the 
disjunction between religion and politics.  Looking to respond to this tension, I turn to the 
work of Richard Rorty, outlining his defence of the division between public and private and 
his analysis of Derrida.  Assessing his claims, I contend that Derrida’s accounts of literature 
                                                             
154 Jacques Derrida, ‘Sauf le le nom (Post Scriptum)’, trans. by John P. Leavey Jr. in On the Name, ed. by Thomas 
Dutoit (Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 33-85 (p. 34).   
155 Derrida, ‘Sauf le nom’, pp. 35-85 (p. 53).  
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and of ‘post-writing’ offer a possible resolution to this tension, in both bridging the 
opposition between public and private, and challenging the very terms of the debate.            
 
In the concluding section of the thesis, I reiterate the mutual dependence of God and 
writing in Derrida’s later work, and the heterogeneity and non-sovereignty of the God 
which emerges from Derrida’s variant discourses.  Finally, I gesture towards some of the 
broader implications of this conception of God: for accounts of human and non-human 
subjectivity and relationality; and for the intersection between religion, ethics and politics 
in deconstruction and beyond.    
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Chapter One: Confession 
 
There is a memory, a history, and an archive of confession, a genealogy of confessions: of the 
word ‘confession’, of the rather late Christian institution that bears this name, but also of the 
works that, in the West, are registered under this title. 
Jacques Derrida 
 
The stroke of conversion is not one single blow delivered once and for all; it is not a shower 
of repeated blows either.  No, confessive writing bears the fissure along with it. 
Jean-François Lyotard 
 
… everything awaits the testimony of the self, of the other, of the self as other even to itself.  
This circumstance is exemplified by the homage Derrida seems to pay to the confessional 
genre in Glas, The Postcard, ‘Before the Law’, ‘Schibboleth’, and ‘Circumfession’. 
Hent de Vries 
 
1. Introduction 
 
“I have bared my secret soul as Thou thyself has seen it, Eternal Being!”156 Rousseau 
famously declares at the opening of his Confessions, a declaration which immediately 
addresses the questions of interiority, subjectivity and divine alterity which encircle 
confessional discourse and trouble Derrida in his reading of it.  Rousseau’s text, and the 
relationship between writing and subjectivity emerge as concerns in Of Grammatology, 
however it is in later texts, for example ‘Typewriter Ribbon: Limited Ink (2)’ and the self-
consciously autobiographical ‘Circumfession’, in which the confessional itself becomes the 
primary focus.  In this chapter, primarily through a reading of ‘Circumfession’, I shall 
examine Derrida’s engagement with this explicitly religious genre in order to perceive how 
Derrida inhabits and challenges confession, exposes its inner contradictions, and undertakes 
a deconstructive ‘double reading’ which simultaneously reinforces and destabilises the 
confessional economy.  Exploring this ‘double reading’, I shall consider the significance of 
confession for deconstruction, and consider how this discourse may illuminate a 
deconstructive understanding of God and religion.           
 First, assessing three current readings of ‘Circumfession’, I shall argue that singularly 
philosophical, religious or literary exegeses overlook both the importance of contamination 
in the text, and the significance of writing.  In contrast, I shall develop an interdisciplinary 
reading, which, for example, considers the ambivalent reliance of religious confession on 
                                                             
156 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Confessions, trans. by J. M. Cohen, rev. edn (London: Penguin Classics, 1970), p. 
17.  
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literary techniques.  My reading will track Derrida’s ‘double reading’ of confession as it 
probes the strictly maintained economies of confessional structure, confessional subject and 
the figure of God and reveals the confessional tendency to suppress inconsistencies and 
stabilise identities, as well as deconstruction’s own alliance with a certain textuality or 
“athetic writing”.157   
Analysing confession and circumcision as figures of purity, Derrida uncovers difference, 
impropriety and contamination and reveals the confessional tendency to suppress 
inconsistencies and present an inaccurate appearance of stabilised identities.  Despite 
striving for independence, consistency and unity, however, the confessional narrative is 
fragmented, and, as Jean-François Lyotard maintains, “bears the fissure along with it”.158  
This artificial closure is, ironically, antithetical to the coming of God, and Derrida’s 
alternative, excessive confession aims to discover that which is restricted by traditional 
models of confession.  This would include both a non self-identical subjectivity, and, 
correspondingly, a God other than the positive infinity of Judaeo-Christian tradition and 
time-honoured confessional narrative, a God aligned with the shifting possibilities of 
language and grammar.  For Derrida, I assert, the processes of writing are central to this 
reworking of both God and subject.  In the last part of this chapter, I shall turn to ‘Envois’, a 
text whose supplementary use of the confessional mode reinforces Derrida’s ‘double reading’ 
of the confessional, again associating a rethinking of God and the subject with a new way of 
writing.  Further, I consider ‘Envois’’ explicitly politicised assessments of the distinction 
between legal and religious confession, and “the public/private opposition”,159 and argue that 
although ‘Envois’ enacts the formation of the political, it leaves the relationships between 
ethics, politics and a new ‘athetic writing’ and conception of God, relatively unexplored.     
 
2. Reading ‘Circumfession’  
 
Forming part of a volume co-authored with Geoffrey Bennington, ‘Circumfession’ consists 
of 59 numbered entries which, explicitly autobiographical and unpredictably singular, are 
aimed to short-circuit Bennington’s attempt to formalise Derrida’s thought into a program 
or system.  Although the texts were not written collaboratively, the writers assert that the 
                                                             
157 Jacques Derrida, ‘Notices (Warnings)’, in The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, trans. by Alan 
Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 259-291 (p. 268). 
158 Jean François Lyotard, The Confession of Augustine, trans. by Richard Beardsworth (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2000), p. 49. 
159 Gregory Ulmer, ‘The Post-Age’, Diacritics, 11 (Autumn 1981), 39-56 (p. 46). 
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book “presupposes a contract”,160 however this ‘contract’ is competitive, with Derrida 
searching for “sentences fit to crack open the geologic program”.161 
 ‘Circumfession’ is strongly influenced by Augustine’s Confessions and challenges 
assumptions about the nature of confession throughout, yet critics remain divided as to 
whether it is essentially a confessional text.  David Farrell Krell’s insistence that “it is not 
meant to be a literary or theological confession... however much it may harp on divinity”,162 
contrasts with John Caputo’s claim that the text is “more radically confessional that 
Augustine’s Confessions,” Derrida’s words “more wounded”.163  Similarly, Jeremy Tambling 
suggests that “even if the confession is parodic, it still reads as confession”.164  It is Derrida 
himself who releases us from this critical deadlock in which a text must either wholly 
accept or reject a genre.  Speaking of genre elsewhere he argues that a generic label- there, 
the récit- names “a current mode of discourse, and it does so regardless of the formidable 
problems of structure, edge, set theory, the part and whole etc., that it raises in this ‘literary’ 
corpus”.165  So, rather than trying to conclusively establish whether or not ‘Circumfession’ is 
a confession, we might ask how and why it partakes in the confessional mode and what the 
implications of this might be.  
 
(a) Three Current Readings 
 
‘Circumfession’ both reproduces elements of familiar modes and strives towards an 
“idiomatic writing”166 to express the singularity of experience.  However, this desire for the 
“impure ‘purity’”,167 of the idiom, is, like the religious rituals of purity Derrida depicts, 
                                                             
160  Jacques Derrida and Geoffrey Bennington, Jacques Derrida, ed. and trans. by Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1999), p. 1.  
161 Jacques Derrida, ‘Circumfession’, in Jacques Derrida (as above), p. 124. Further references are given after 
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always undermined by contamination.  Consequently, ‘pure’ readings of ‘Circumfession’ 
which endeavour to interpret the text through one mode or genre are inevitably ineffective, 
and fail to respond to the interdependency and contamination between discourses, and, in 
particular, the significance of ‘writing’ in Derrida’s text.  I shall demonstrate this by 
examining three examples of ‘pure’ readings.  The first two, by Martin Hägglund and John 
Caputo, respectively focusing on the philosophical and theological elements of the text, 
overlook both the contamination of these elements and the function of ‘writing’.  The final 
reading, by Robert Smith, focuses on the literary and investigates the significance of 
‘writing’ for Derrida, without reading it in the context of Derrida’s broader political, ethical, 
philosophical and theological concerns.  Aiming to avoid the limitations of such readings, I 
shall try and situate Derrida’s ‘writing’ both within these wider concerns and through the 
contamination of discourses which ‘Circumfession’ reveals to be inevitable.    
 
First, I shall consider Martin Hägglund’s philosophical approach, which looks to regenerate 
philosophical interest in Derrida’s work and reclaim it from ethical and religious 
scholarship.168  Hägglund depicts Derrida’s work as the affirmation of mortal survival, a 
‘radical atheism’ which rejects even the desire for God and immortality, and is thus 
incompatible with “wrongheaded”169 religious readings.  Opposing himself to religious 
thinkers who stress the influence of Augustine, Hägglund’s reading of ‘Circumfession’ 
inverts this, claiming that Derrida deconstructs the Confessions and mobilizes the radically 
atheist elements already at work in Augustine’s text.  Hägglund’s approach is “analytical 
rather than exegetical”,170 and this philosophical focus, I contend, restricts his textual 
analyses, which overlook the contamination of deconstruction by other genres and 
discourses. 
Mistakenly characterising Derrida’s approach to Augustine as purely negative, 
Hägglund claims that by exposing how Augustine contravenes the notion of God as 
“timeless eternity”,171 Derrida reveals the ‘radical atheism’ at the heart of Augustine’s 
Christian position.  Similarly, whereas Augustine’s text dramatizes the tension between 
desire for mortal pleasure and survival, and desire for immortality, coming to favour the 
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latter, Hägglund perceives a simple reversal in ‘Circumfession’ depicting the text as an 
unrepentant display of mortal desires.  This is a reductive account of Derrida’s ambivalence 
towards Augustine’s text.   
Hägglund understands God as a ‘positive infinity’, external to the text and 
represented by the ‘theologic program’ which Bennington writes and ‘Circumfession’ aims 
to exceed.  Derrida, Hägglund claims, “glosses ‘God’ as the idea that death cannot put an end 
to the world- to the true and ultimate world- even if it puts an end to the mortal world of a 
singular living being”.172  This reductive definition is in fact inconsistent with Derrida’s 
extensive attempts to investigate the question of God in his later work.  Deconstruction’s 
disruption of the ‘positive infinity’ of God is a point of divergence between Derrida and 
Hägglund: whereas the latter perceives it as an endpoint for religious thinking, demanding a 
sharpened focus on and celebration of the desire for mortal survival, Derrida instead sees an 
opening or intensification of religious thinking for deconstruction.  Another 
oversimplification of Derrida’s approach is found in Hägglund’s discussion of mourning 
through the notion of “radical finitude”.173  He writes: “Derrida’s reflections on mourning 
always proceed from the absolute destructibility of life; from the ‘incinerating blaze’ and 
‘terrible light’ that reveals that the dead other is no longer and will never be again”.174  This 
is a distorted account of Derrida’s consideration of mourning, as it disregards the insistence 
of the trace and Derrida’s disruption of the Freudian economy of mourning.  
More broadly, in declining the narrative of an ‘ethical turn’, Hägglund promises a 
corrective to the simplistic conflation of Derrida and Levinas.  However, although he begins 
to consider their differing approaches to otherness, non-violence and the structure of the 
trace, Hägglund’s analysis is predominantly derived from ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ and 
fails to track the changing influence of Levinas on Derrida.  This, alongside his insufficiently 
supported claim that, despite Derrida’s use of “‘positively’ valorized” terms such as ‘justice’ 
and ‘hospitality’, alterity is an ethically neutral effect of the ultratranscendental status of  
différance, means that in Hägglund’s work, deconstruction’s complex relation to ethics 
remains unexpressed.175    
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Nathan Brown argues that “the admirable clarity of Hägglund’s book makes all too 
glaring how little remains when Derrida’s sprawling oeuvre is pared down to the core.”176  
Instead, I would argue that this paucity is due to Hägglund’s limited if rigorous 
philosophical reading of Derrida’s multidimensional oeuvre and that at work both in 
Hägglund’s book and Brown’s review- despite both in some ways being highly Derridean- is 
a concept of philosophy which remains narrow and untouched by Derrida’s writing. Despite 
endorsing Derrida’s rebuttal of sovereignty, Hägglund is either neglectful of or hostile 
towards the contamination of philosophy by other discourses and the ways in which this is 
examined and incorporated in varying ways throughout Derrida’s work, and specifically in 
‘Circumfession’.          
 
A contrast to Hagglund’s account is found in John D. Caputo’s inherently religious reading 
of Derrida’s work.  Caputo, who for Hagglund is “the most powerful proponent”177 of 
‘wrongheaded’ religious readings of Derrida,178 regards ‘Circumfession’ as “the most 
interesting and provocative of all of Derrida’s texts”,179 and makes it central to his claim that 
Derrida is a religious thinker.  He argues that ‘Circumfession’ forces us to “think out” 
Derrida’s “private religion”.180  However, noting the text’s “formidable difficulty”,181 Caputo 
retreats from offering an extended reading, shifting from strong claims182 to vague 
description183 and suggesting that such a reading would be impossible as “The text 
disseminates in so many directions... as to make nonsense of the idea of a definitive 
commentary”.184 He thus abdicates any responsibility for “getting this text right”.185  
Concepts such as ‘private religion’ and ‘Derrida’s religion’ are not explicitly developed, and, 
although evangelical about the religious in general, Caputo is reluctant to declare his own 
religious affiliations and to situate the claims he makes about Derrida.  Some elucidation is 
offered as Caputo concludes by allying Derrida’s God with that of the prophets.  He reveals:  
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I have all along been trying to cross the wires of deconstruction with this prophetic  
tradition, to ally Derrida’s passion for the impossible within a prophetic passion, to 
trace out a new alliance between the God of Derrida, ‘my God,’ with what Heschel 
calls the God of pathos, the passion of God...186 
 
Caputo’s intermittent yet insistent association between Derrida and the ‘prophetic tradition’ 
provides fodder for critics to assume his orthodoxy, yet is insufficiently developed to offer a 
full theological account of Derrida’s work.  
One important area, neglected by Hägglund, on which Caputo focuses, is the 
question of the ‘name of God’.  He repeatedly asks “What do I love when I love my God?”187 
the question he perceives as linking the confessions of Augustine and Derrida, and he 
acknowledges Derrida’s rejection of ontotheology, asserting that Derrida “by no means 
passes for an atheist about every God”.188  In tracking Derrida’s use of the ‘name of God’, 
Caputo imitates Derrida’s style, aiming to replicate the way ‘Circumfession’ interrupts 
totalising systems.  However, Caputo’s resistance to argumentative structure, or a working 
definition of terms- particularly God, ‘name of God’, and religion- isn’t combined with the 
performative ‘working through’ which motivates Derrida’s text, and merely results in a 
frustrating rejection of a clearly-defined position or argument.  Similarly, in repudiating a 
philosophical approach, Caputo favours description over analysis and his refusal to process, 
connect or question the dispersed ideas of God he presents, results in a lack of clarity.189  
Further, his definitions of God, and his focus on “praying and weeping”190 fail to verify the 
claim that Derrida is involved in the highly programmatic “project of the reconstitution of 
the structure of religion”.191  These sporadic attempts to associate Derrida with revelation or 
institutional religion are inconsistent with ‘Circumfession’s’ deconstructive tendencies.  
Caputo asserts that “the name of God is a way to keep things open, to open them up to what 
eye hath not seen nor ear heard, to hope for and believe impossible things...”192 yet here the 
‘openness’ of the name of God is rather restricted by the Scriptural reference to Corinthians.  
                                                             
186 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, p. 337.  
187 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, p. 286. 
188 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, p. 288. 
189 See for example, his description of God as “the nameless who-knows-what to whom one confesses plainly that 
one is cut adrift, destinerrant, a little lost, and maybe not a little”, Caputo, Prayers and Tears , p. 291.  
190 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, p. 292. 
191 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, p. 294. 
192 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, p. 287. 
39 
 
In fact, Caputo’s agenda, the conflation of Derrida’s God with that of Scripture impedes the 
openness inherent to Derrida’s work.193  
Caputo’s religious focus leads him to downplay both Derrida’s engagement with 
philosophical logic and the importance of writing, genre and language for Derrida’s 
understanding of God.194  His rejection of a philosophical approach leads to a sycophantic 
relationship with Derrida’s work which avoids a faithfully deconstructive examination of its 
tensions, for example the unresolved relations between ethics, religion and responsibility or 
the shifting sense of the name of God. This lack of emphasis on language and the literary is 
supplemented by an overemphasis on Derrida’s biography, for example whereas Caputo 
reduces Derrida’s interest to his complex relationship to his “mother tongue”,195 it is clear 
that the specificity of Derrida’s situation serves rather to demonstrate certain conditions of 
language in general. 
 
In contrast, Robert Smith’s literary reading starts from a perceived neglect of writing, 
which, he argues, has occurred “logically” and “historically”.196  He looks to challenge this, 
asserting: “Perhaps, incredibly, life has an essential link with writing; a thought of writing 
and the trace is the only condition on which life death can be thought out...”197  Smith 
perceives the fragmented self of Derridean autobiography as “an irritant” to philosophical 
reason, with his own text pursuing a self-consciously literary style.198   Whilst some critics 
regard Smith’s text as a philosophical response to Derrida, it seems to me that Smith’s 
philosophical gestures and interests are often deliberately compromised by his style.  199    
 Smith’s mode is expansive. Like ‘Circumfession’, his account looks to escape that 
which is programmatic and systematic, embracing tangent and exception and rejecting the 
hierarchical or structured revelation of information.  Writing is regarded as the possibility 
of chance, singularity and escaping the ‘program’.  In this, it represents for Smith the 
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impossibility of an ontotheological God, as such a structure “interrupts presence per se and 
with it the capacity for a god in perpetual presence to permeate it”.200  However, Smith, like 
Hägglund, has a reductive approach to the figure of God, and fails to examine the generative 
relationship between God and writing in Derrida’s late work, reducing God to ontotheology, 
and crudely perceiving religion as “the fantasy of the immortal parent”.201   
Smith’s assessment of Augustine’s role in ‘Circumfession’ highlights the tension 
between the literary and the religious within the genres of autobiography and confession.  
Whereas religious confession must be programmatic, predictable and controlled, simulating 
performativity and rejecting chance, the literary “emblematizes chance” and therefore, 
employing a literary mode entails “an assumed admission of the chanciness, the erroneous 
and wayward determination so lefthandedly governing one’s life” and thus necessarily 
challenges the narrative of a life determined by an omnipotent God.202   Similarly, Smith 
observes a dialectical structure in religious confessions, epitomised by Augustine’s text 
which “posits the (negative) sin that will be negated by the positive goodness of confessing it 
in order to be identified”.203  The purity and predictability of this resolution is sacrificed in 
the literary confession, which always maintains an openness to the other.  As a 
consequence, although Augustine employs literary devices and modes to enhance the 
Confessions, the literary as representative of alterity and chance, is demonised, and the text 
is paradoxically “a narrative that blames narrative (literature)”.204  By foregrounding this 
tension between the religious and the literary within the confessional, Smith reveals the 
importance of thinking through both when interpreting ‘Circumfession’, thus exposing the 
limitations of his own account.    
 Smith argues that autobiographical writing generates a rethinking of the subject in 
its relation to life and death.  Writing provides a place or enables a process in which the 
figures of power are immobilised or neutralised, disrupting the dominance of the writing 
subject and the Freudian account of mourning.205  Smith quotes David Wood:  
 
The words ‘life’ and ‘death’ are, in this very movement, transformed, and their 
opposition subverted.  Dispersion, différance, mark the end of a certain illusion of 
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life that we call self-presence.  What this opens up is the possibility of a re-
inscription, a re-working, of these values within the general problematic of 
writing.206   
 
The question of ‘writing’ therefore, cannot be reduced to the simply literary, but engages 
with and destabilises religious and philosophical assumptions, consequently disrupting 
singularly philosophical or religious interpretations of ‘Circumfession’, for example 
Hägglund’s reduction of the text to the ‘radically atheist’ desire for mortal survival.  Smith 
reveals how ‘Circumfession’ illustrates the power and potential of writing, yet the limited, 
literary nature of his reading cannot fully explore the ethical, political, philosophical and 
religious implications of this insight.  He claims that writing disturbs self-presence, self-
identity, and the human relation to death, thus challenging traditional conceptions of the 
subject.  He concludes that “The human must be reformulated according to the very thing 
which exceeds it, namely the autobiographic function of writing, which writes itself and 
whose structure takes the form of an inability to be reduced to an end”.207  Smith realises the 
significance of writing yet his imperative lacks the investigation of ethical and religious 
responsibility in ‘Circumfession’.  Further, his emphasis on the human both reinforces the 
unDerridean binary between human and non-human animals, and overlooks the religious 
element of the confessional, in particular, Derrida’s reformulation of the concept of God.     
 
The three readings that I have presented are all limited by their ‘pure’ accounts of a text 
which foregrounds the impossibility of purity and the dangers of pursuing it.  Beginning 
with confession and circumcision, “rites” which “owe it to themselves to resemble, 
belonging to the family, the genre” (132-3), and are thus associated with the proper, pure 
and self-same, and exploring them through the confessional genre, Derrida uncovers 
difference, impropriety and contamination.  His examination of the multivalent figure of 
confession and its philosophical, religious, legal and literary associations and implications, as 
well as that which it suppresses, requires a reading which tracks this contaminatory mode.  
Consequently, my reading of ‘Circumfession’ will focus on the way Derrida exposes 
contamination and difference, revealing the economy of confession to be inherently 
interruptive, therefore posing a challenge to its own structural closure.  Further, responding 
to the way in which the aforementioned readings overlook the centrality of ‘writing’, or fail 
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to situate it, I will demonstrate that ‘writing’ is crucial for Derrida’s development of both a 
subject and a model of God, which too are impure and non self-identical.  The relation 
between these, in part developed in ‘Circumfession’, is, I shall later argue, crucial for 
thinking through the relationship between politics and deconstruction.         
 
(b) Contamination and Non-Sovereignty: Rereading ‘Circumfession’ 
 
Focusing on Derrida’s treatment of the confessional mode, my reading will draw out both 
Derrida’s subversion or deconstruction of key features of the genre, and his own 
exploration, even confession, of deconstruction’s relationship with writing and textuality.  
The efficacy of confession depends on a tightly controlled, yet, as Derrida demonstrates, 
unsustainable, economy.  My reading will be divided into three sections, showing how 
Derrida’s text explores and questions this economy as it is expressed through the 
confessional structure, confessional subject, and finally, the God of confession.     
 
(i) The Confessional Structure   
The term ‘confession’ has wide-ranging associations, referring to elements as varied as a 
religious sacrament, a legal declaration and a written document, variously religious, literary, 
or philosophical.208  This multiplicity of meanings is one source of attraction for Derrida, 
who explores the tensions between the term’s different uses, for example the religious and 
legal in ‘Envois’, and the religious and literary in ‘Circumfession’.  Dependent on the 
context, the term ‘confession’ creates highly specific expectations, and it is these which 
‘Circumfession’ looks to challenge.    
 
In Without Alibi, Derrida defines religious confession as the “confession of sin and the 
profession of faith”.209  This depiction of confession as a bipartite process which pivots on a 
conversional moment or turn accords with the definitions of other thinkers, for example 
that of Jan Johnson, who observes “Confession followed by prayer”,210 and that of Dunstan 
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Adam, for whom confession is “the sacrament of return and renewal”.211  This model is 
found in Luther who claims that “Confession consists of two parts.  One is that we confess 
our sins.  The other is that we receive absolution or forgiveness from the confessor as from 
God himself…”212  This structure creates a strict confessional economy.   
Religious confession is always addressed to God, however, a representative of God 
may be required as confessor, be it a priest in the case of the sacrament, or the reading 
community in its reception of a written text.  The singular address to God is, therefore, 
more often divided.  In linking the individual subject to the religious community, the 
confessional process bridges the private and public elements of religion.  However, some 
critics have perceived an internalisation of the confessional process which has devalued the 
role of the community.  Jan Johnson, for example, critiques the “individualistic mindset 
inherent in Western culture”,213 and Terence Doody insists that “Confession is always an act 
of community”214 and, reading twentieth century fiction, suggests that “the ‘disappearance’ 
of the confessor from their [Camus, Sartre, Bellow and Ellison] narratives suggests how 
deeply narcissism infects the twentieth century”.215  I shall return to this question of the 
privatisation of religious experience when I examine the tension between religion and 
politics in Derrida.     
The confessional text enacts a process described in ‘Faith and Knowledge: On the 
Two Sources of Religion at the Limits of Reason Alone’. Derrida argues that there are two 
different but connected experiences of the religious: the idea of the proper or unscathed, 
which sustains its value and uniqueness by securing its purity and self-identity, and the 
experience of faith or belief which depends on the testimony of the other.216  Derrida goes 
on to describe how these two experiences of religion always contaminate each other, despite 
the fact that one is an experience of purity itself.  Likewise, Derrida shows how confession is 
both internally and externally contaminated.  The title, ‘Circumfession’, entails an explicit 
comparison and ultimately, contamination, between purifying rites from the Christian and 
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Judaic traditions.217  Both, Derrida says “…owe it to themselves to resemble, belonging to 
the family, the genre” (133).  However, the contamination suggested by the title is borne out 
in the text and is compounded by the contradictions which Derrida reveals as internal to the 
concepts of both confession and circumcision.  In the case of circumcision, these become 
evident in Derrida’s definition, given in ‘Shibboleth (for Paul Celan)’.  He describes:    
 
1. The cut, which incises the male sexual member, cuts into it, then turns around to 
form a circumvenient ring; 
2. A name given to the moment of covenant or alliance and of legitimate entry into 
the community: a shibboleth that cuts and partitions, then distinguishes, for 
example, by virtue of the language and the name given to each of them, one 
circumcision from another, the Jewish operation from the Egyptian operation from 
which it is said to derive, or indeed, the Muslim operation that resembles it, or 
many others. 
3. The experience of blessing and of purification218 
 
Derrida depicts circumcision as a liminal figure, operating between inclusion and exclusion, 
purity and contamination.  This divided significance is observed by Joseph Kronick, for 
whom circumcision is both “a mark of the eternal recurrence of the same” and “the elliptical 
sign of différance between self and other, the mark that the self falls short of self identity”,219 
and by John Caputo, who observes “…two kinds or figures of circumcision... a Ulyssean, 
circumnavigational circumcision, which closes the circle of the same, and an Abrahamic 
circumcision, which cuts the cord of the same in order to be open to the other”.220  This 
double movement, by which circumcision enacts both openness and closure recalls the 
doubling of deconstruction, and the motif of circling, which, as Derrida employs it in 
Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, illustrates the mutual dependence of the economic and non-
economic.221  Here, in ‘Circumfession’, Derrida demonstrates that confession and 
circumcision, both representative of purity, are inevitably internally contaminated. This 
internal contamination is compounded by the “heterogeneous modes” (154) of the text and 
the contamination between the rites.  Derrida acknowledges “the thousands of years of 
Judaism” (153) and that he writes from “deep in the history of penitence” (86), yet these 
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become merged and disrupted in the text, for example in the reference to circumcision in 
Eucharistic terms as “this incredible supper of wine and blood” (153).   
 
This contamination between confession and circumcision, and Derrida’s writing of a Jewish 
autobiography and confession,222 situate him on the very limits of both Jewish and 
confessional traditions.  With the latter, he is akin to Augustine, who “probably never 
confessed” (86) in the contemporary sense of the word.  Both writers however, are engaged 
in “working at the delivery of literary confessions, i.e. at a form of theology as 
autobiography” (86-7).  Derrida draws out this tension between the literary and the 
theological, the “contradiction between spontaneity and compulsion”,223 throughout his 
reading of Augustine.  It seems that the two poles are irreconcilable as the same writer 
asserts that “Confession must be from the unconscious” (233) whilst later considering “how 
to bring off a confession” (267).  This tension is exhibited in Derrida’s manipulation of the 
structure of the confessional narrative, which, as illustrated by the Confessions, orients 
around a conversional turn which is prefigured by other minor turns.  Jill Robbins claims 
that Augustine uses this structure to literary effect:    
 
Augustine understood his own conversion as an imitative relationship to previous 
pious models (of imitation).  His spiritual autobiography is organized- rhetorically as 
well as theologically- around internal correspondences: perversion, aversion, 
adversion, reversion, eversion.  These false turns serve to anticipate or ‘type’ 
Augustine’s eventual conversion, the decisive turn in the right direction.224 
 
Derrida imitates this structure, littering the text with ‘false turns’ and declaring his 
intention to “re-remember myself around a single event... the circumcision of me, the 
unique one” (59-60) and to “wait for the moment which is looking for me” (282).  The text 
suggests various events which may prove key or conversional, for example, the writer’s 
facial paralysis or the mother’s illness or death.  John D. Caputo even argues, as we have 
seen, that ‘Circumfession’ is ‘the surprising story of Derrida’s conversion from these secular 
texts and languages to a certain Hebrew, to his life of faith and passion, of prayers and tears’.  
                                                             
222 Michael Stanislawski offers an interesting and informative discussion of Jewish autobiography, asserting that 
“as far as we know, the genre of autobiography seems to have remained basically foreign to Jews throughout the 
centuries,” Michael Stanislawski, Autobiographical Jews: Essays in Jewish Self-fashioning (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2004), p. 12. 
223 Mike Hepworth and Bryan S. Turner, Confession: Studies in Deviance and Religion (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1982), p. 15. 
224 Jill Robbins, ‘Circumcising Confession: Derrida, Autobiography, Judaism’, Diacritics, 25.4 (Winter 1995), 20-
38 (p. 25-6). 
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However, Caputo’s reading again seems one-dimensional, reducing the various movements 
at work in the text to a transparent religious turn.  Rather, the reader, anticipating a 
conversional turn to anchor and illuminate the text, is disappointed.  In fact, Derrida 
manipulates this expectation, frequently presenting shifts and turns without endorsing any 
one as a principally significant ‘master event’.  This effectively demonstrates the 
contingency of Augustine’s ‘conversional turn’, and the arbitrariness of its adoption as 
pivotal moment.  The writer’s cynicism towards this ‘turn’ is underscored by his sarcastic 
reference to “SA sinning the more securely after conversion” (101).   
However, ‘Circumfession’ is not a straightforward parody of confession, its declared 
aim, to ‘re-remember myself around a single event’, simply a lie.  Rather, Derrida’s writing 
allows the contradictory elements of the confessional mode to emerge, depicting both the 
confessional economy and its relationship to that which exceeds it.  Similarly, considering 
“the duel” (26) between his text and Bennington’s, Derrida again depicts the non-dialectical 
relationship between the economic and the non-economic, with Bennington’s program at 
once successful: “Geoff, who remains very close to God, for he knows everything about the 
‘logic’ of what I might have written in the past, but also of what I might think or write in 
the future…” (16) yet also undermined by the singularity of the event, by “everything that 
all along this word vein lets or makes come the chance of events on which no program, no 
logical or textual machine will ever close” (15-16).   
In demonstrating the contingency of Augustine’s conversional turn, and in failing to 
endorse its own master turn or event, ‘Circumfession’ opens up the confessional structure to 
the demands of the other, acknowledging that “every responsibility is a conversion”.225  This 
suggests that conversion is an ongoing process rather than a single turn; thus, the writer 
aims “to repent, that is, to improve, to love, to transform my hatred into love, to transform 
myself, and to do so out of love”.226  This also accords with Lyotard’s claim, in his own text 
on Augustine, that “The stroke of conversion is not one single blow delivered once and for 
all; it is not a shower of repeated blows either.  No, confessive writing bears the fissure along 
with it”.227  Derrida’s deconstruction of confession exposes this previously disavowed fissure 
and aims to rethink the entire genre through it.   
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226 Jacques Derrida, ‘Composing “Circumfession”’, in Augustine and Postmodernism, as before, pp. 19-27 (p. 23). 
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Diverging from the expected structure and teleology of the confessional narrative in 
rejecting a central ‘turn’, ‘Circumfession’ explores numerous turns, shifts, openings and 
narrative digressions.  In this, its structure reflects the landscape of the mother’s body, “an 
archipelago of red and blackish volcanoes, enflamed wounds, crusts and craters, signifiers 
like wells several centimeters deep, opening here, closing there, on her heels, her hips and 
sacrum, the very flesh exhibited in its inside, no more secret, no more skin” (82).  Derrida’s 
use of textual terminology to describe the body is part of the widespread contamination 
between text and body within the text.  Whereas Augustine looks to detach the spiritual 
from the visceral, sidelining and objectifying the sinning, transgressive bodies, 
‘Circumfession’ presents active if fragmented bodies which relate symbiotically to the text’s 
structure.  For Derrida, the body is inescapable; in ‘Shibboleth (for Paul Celan)’ he asks: 
“And how can one circumcise a name without touching upon the body?”228  The body is 
mutable and non-identical, with no stable distinction between inside and outside, no 
distinction between the external sinning self which must be cast off, and a pure holy centre.  
Paralleling the changes to the mother’s body, and undermining the notion of a self-same 
subject, the writer describes the physical transformation caused by his own facial paralysis.  
Change rather than sovereignty defines this subject, who, he asserts, suffers from “the illness 
of Proteus” (198).  Again countering Augustine’s rarefied spiritual narrative with viscerality, 
he explains: “my face has been disfigured by a facial paralysis holding my left eye fixed open 
like a glass-eyed Cyclops, imperturbable vigilance of the dead man, eyelid stretched by the 
vertical bar of an inner scar” (98).  These external symptoms are inseparable from an 
internal change, as the writer describes: “I am no longer the same since the FP, whose signs 
seem to have been effaced though I know I’m not the same face, the same persona, I seem to 
have seen myself near to losing my face, incapable of looking in a mirror at the fright of 
truth, the dissymmetry of a life in caricature” (123).  Although this experience is triggered 
by a singular event, it testifies to the instability of all subjectivity.   
In endeavouring to disrupt Bennington’s programmatic rendering of deconstruction, 
‘Circumfession’ employs autobiography in order to guarantee singularity.  However, the text 
itself dramatises the way in which singularity, in its very expression, cedes to the general.  
Even the unique autobiographical details are reduced to type, as Derrida situates his texts in 
“the ‘writer and his mother’ series, subseries ‘the mother’s death’” (36-7).  Further, the 
imagery of doubling, dividing and multiplying which recurs in the text, not only 
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demonstrates the impossibility of a self-same subject but also the fragility of singularity.229  
Although the relationship between ‘Circumfession’ and Bennington’s systematization of 
deconstruction is depicted as a ‘duel’, the text as a whole complicates and investigates the 
relationship between the singular and the general beyond simple opposition.  As Derrida 
elsewhere assesses the possibility of thinking the event and the machine together, he 
responds: “For that, it would be necessary in the future (but there will be no future except 
on this condition) to think both the event and the machine as two compatible or even in-
dissociable concepts. Today they appear to us to be antinomic”.230  The aim of the 
deconstructive ‘project’ is no less than to rethink and rewrite these apparent antitheses in 
order to forge a new political and ethical future.  Such deconstructive rewriting consists in a 
painstaking adherence to the double reading.  In ‘Circumfession’ this is instantiated in 
Derrida’s simultaneous confession and deconstruction of the confessional economy.  
 
The confessional economy demands a reconciliatory conclusion to the subject’s narrative. 
Although ‘Circumfession’ contends that this economy is both contrived and closed to that 
which it claims to celebrate, it anticipates the completion of the economy and the closure of 
the text in various ways.  Perhaps most importantly, it looks towards the necessary 
“absolution at the end of a confession” (88), with the writer awaiting “the great pardon that 
has not yet happened in my life, indeed I am waiting for it as absolute unicity, basically the 
only event from now on” (55-6).  Other narrative elements which require resolution include 
the mother’s illness and, following the Confessions, her expected death, with the writer 
revealing: “I am no longer far from touching land at last, she is watching, she is waiting for 
me to have finished, she is waiting for me to go out, we will leave together…” (271). 
Throughout the text, the writer is preoccupied with kenosis, apocalypse and eschatology, 
considering himself the “last of the Jews” (190) and “the last of the eschatologists” (75).  This 
leads the reader to expect a dramatic, apocalyptic ending, or the text’s own annihilation as 
the writer’s discourses “grind up everything including the mute ash whose name alone one 
then retains, scarcely mine, all that turning around nothing” (273).  None of these expected 
resolutions of the narrative simply arrive, and in this, Derrida separates the deconstructive 
event or ‘to-come’ from the predictable salvific or redemptive eschatologies of Judaism or 
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Christianity.  Similarly, in ‘Schibboleth (for Paul Celan)’, he informs us that “The absolute 
to-come can only announce itself in the form of monstrosity…”231 
The expectation of absolution, reconciliation, or even, following the writer’s self-
presentation as sacrificial victim, resurrection, is not simply fulfilled or undermined but, 
through the double-movement, simultaneously fulfilled and destabilized.  The text 
therefore, finds itself “between two resurrections” (54), one redemptive, and the other, 
merely “the simulacrum of a resurrection” (313).  In the absence of a transcendent God, the 
writer cannot disclose “the name from which I expect resurrection” (303).  Further, the 
references to apocalypse and holocaust serve to associate completion with stabilisation and 
even violence.  Consequently, the text sustains this unresolved tension between completion 
or stabilisation, and infinite movement or difference, to the very end.  As the writer 
describes: “you see yourself beginning to overrun this discourse on castration… resurrection 
will be for you “more than ever the address, the stabilized realisation of a destination… not 
to be finished with a destinerrancy that was never my doing…” (313-4)  The doubling of 
these two incompatible movements, stabilisation and destinerrancy, and the impossibility of 
reducing them to the same provides the final thought of the text, as the writer closes: 
“…you the floating toy at high tide and under the moon, you the crossing between these 
two phantoms of witnesses who will never come down to the same” (315).  
An additional challenge to the closure of the confessional economy is provided by 
the writer’s ambivalent assumption of culpability and sin.  Demonstrating the way in which 
the confessional text values a rigid structure and economy more highly than justice, that 
“avowal, even for a crime not committed, simply secretes meaning and order” (296), the 
writer both accepts and questions the insistence that he must allow himself to “be charged” 
(301).  This stage is necessary, the writer “bending beneath the burden”, in order to deliver 
“to the world the very discourse of this impregnable inedible simulacrum” (306), or rather, 
to bring the confession to fruition.  This acceptance of culpability inscribes the writer 
within a sacrificial economy, as a Christ-like victim.  He explains:   
 
you my pardoner, who knows there’s nothing to pardon, and I am your absolved 
one, you need me as absolved, you would not love me if I were innocent or guilty, 
only innocent absolved of a fault which it seemed to me I had committed, before 
me, when it fell upon me like life itself, like death (299)   
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Whilst assuming the necessary role, the writer also questions the assumption of the 
inherently sinful nature of humanity.  Thus rather than simply accepting Augustine’s 
pessimistic claim that “it is not we who sin, but some unknown nature within us which 
sins”,232 he contests his earlier adoption of the position of sinner, informing us: “Whether 
they expelled me from school or threw me into prison, I always thought the other must 
have good reason to accuse me” (300).  Here we are reminded that confession and 
circumcision, as religious rituals of purity, are also political tools of exclusion.  The issues of 
culpability, sin and persecution cause the writer to foreground the intersection between 
individual and collective histories, here invoking the complexities and horrors of Jewish 
histories, disclosing : “…the Jews know nothing of confession, to which I reply that I am not 
confessing myself, rather I’m confessing the others for the imponderable and therefore so 
heavy secrets that I inherit” (187).  
The text’s challenge to Augustine’s acceptance of the narrative of original sin draws 
attention to Augustine’s paradoxical relationship with writing.  Derrida asserts that 
Augustine creates a literary confession, revealing a disjunction between the confessional 
economy which requires controlled and limited expression, and literature, the “institution 
of ‘saying everything’” (210).  The literary confession strives to “‘make’ truth in a style, a 
book and before witnesses” (47), overlooking the idea of a pre-existing God-given truth, or 
even the need for an external creator.  In the literary work, the writer himself appears as 
omnipotent creator.  In contrast, the confessional economy looks to access and represent an 
inaccessible and unpresentable truth.   Elsewhere, in Memoirs of the Blind, Derrida asserts: 
“Truth belongs to this movement of repayment that tries in vain to render itself adequate to 
its cause or to the thing”.233  In ‘Circumfession’, in a very different style, he describes the 
tension: 
 
Commotion of writing, give in only to it, do not make oneself interesting by 
promised avowal or refused secret, so no literature if literature, the institution of 
‘saying everything’ breathes to the hope of seeing the other confess and thereby you, 
yourself, confess yourself… (210) 
 
For Augustine, writing, as a divergence from objectivity and divine truth, or even as 
evidence of their impossibility, is itself sinful.  Consequently, “one always asks for pardon 
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when one writes”, (46) implying that one may need to ask pardon for the very act of writing 
(“the simulacrum of avowal” (46)) as much as for the crime one has committed.234  Following 
this assumption of the sinfulness of writing, Robert Smith emphasises the economical, even 
dialectical nature of religious confession, stressing: “Religious confessions seek the exchange 
of that diabolical other for a godly one, literature for scripture… Confession is a dialectics in 
so far as it posits the (negative) sin that will be negated by the positive goodness of 
confessing”.235  This is a significant point of divergence between Augustine and Derrida, for 
whom, the possibilities of ‘writing’, and literature in particular, are not ‘diabolical’ but are 
ripe with ethical and political potential.  As I shall examine in later chapters, literature is for 
Derrida, as Martin McQuillan acknowledges, “a space in which the impossibility of the 
democracy-to-come might be possible”.236  Despite this divergence, and the tension between 
the religious and literary models of confession, Derrida suggests that both imply the 
emergence of the subject and the calling into singularity.  He explains that the “essential 
truth of avowal” consists of “a request… asked of religion as of literature, before the one and 
the other which have a right only to this time, for pardoning, for pardon, for nothing” (48-
9).   
In its ambivalence to completion and absolution, ‘Circumfession’ plays out the 
dialogical, double movement of deconstruction.  A similar movement can also be perceived 
in the relationship between ‘Circumfession’ and Bennington’s text ‘Derridabase’.  The 
seeming antagonism between the texts gives way to a mutual dependence.  Not only does 
this relationship resemble the interaction between the economic and non-economic as 
illustrated by the movements of différance-237 the ‘law’ of ‘Derridabase’ as that “which 
presides over everything that can happen to me [Derrida] through writing” (32)- the texts 
also contaminate each other, with this ‘law’ internalised in ‘Circumfession’ as the mother, 
“the eternal survivress, to the theologic program or maternal figure of absolute knowledge” 
(46).  Equally, in Bennington’s text, the economy of deconstruction is disrupted not just 
from the outside, but from the inside, as it cannot escape “the ruin it will always have 
walled up inside it” (4-6).  Whereas the confessional economy is defined by closure, 
completion and self-identity, Derrida demonstrates a symbiosis between economy and 
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interruption; every matrix, he argues, “remains by essence, by force, nonsaturable, 
nonsuturable, invulnerable, therefore only extensible and transformable, always unfinished” 
(34).     
 
(ii) The Confessional Subject 
Just as Derrida’s deconstruction of the confessional economy exposes the contrived structure 
of the confessional narrative, it also reveals the fiction of the subject’s self-identity.  The 
didactic power of the confessional narrative depends on a convincing union between 
written and writing selves.  As Jill Robbins describes, the narrative achieves its unity “at the 
moment of conversion, its own constitution, when sinner and narrator coincide”, which 
would collapse the double perspective into a single voice.238  This suppression of difference 
in order to produce a single voice and identity is however, contrived, and, in the absence of 
complete authorial control, this single voice is haunted by other voices, identities and selves.  
This corresponds with Lyotard’s description of the never-ending confessional process.  He 
explains that the “Subject of the confessive work, the first person author forgets that he is 
the work of writing.  He is the work of time: he is waiting for himself to arrive, he is 
catching himself up…”239  According to James O’Rourke, these two subjects are 
irreconcilable as “The principle of indeterminacy in the confessional autobiography rests on 
the impossibility of reconciling these two narratives”.240  ‘Circumfession’ dramatises both 
this desire for self-identity, closure and completion and concurs with O’Rourke’s assessment 
of its impossibility.  Again interchanging physical and textual imagery, the writer describes 
this lack of closure as “the skin which does not want finally to close on its silence” (295).  
Derrida illustrates how the desire for a controlled confessional narrative and that for 
a linear and self-affirming account of the confessional subject are connected by the notion 
of a conversional turn which directs the progress of both narrative and protagonist.  Such an 
event is anticipated in ‘Circumfession’ as the writer aims “to re-remember myself around a 
single event” (59) and waits “for the moment which is looking for me” (282) however its 
fulfilment is deferred, denying the economic recuperation which would resolve both 
narrative ambiguity and subjective transgression.  Unlike Augustine’s text, which presents 
the conversional turn as an inexorable combination of divine predestination and human free 
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will, no external event or omnipotent narrator controls the course of ‘Circumfession’.  
Instead of contriving the unity of identity, Derrida aims to write a ‘free’ confession with an 
uninhibited writer, a “confession... from the unconscious” (233). The free flowing of 
discourse is illustrated by images of expression and release: “the superabundance of a flood” 
(4) and the recurrent motif of bloodletting, as Derrida observes: “The continuous flow of 
blood, absolute, absolved in the sense that nothing seemed to come between the source and 
the mouth” (7).  However, this unmediated movement is immediately disrupted by a “brutal 
intervention of the other” (7) be it through “another vein” or “another language” (4).  
Derrida uses the term “aspirating” (8), signifying both the flow (of breath or blood) and its 
interruption to demonstrate that these are integral parts of the same gesture.  The 
confessional discourse is inherently self-interrupting.    
Despite the chronological succession implied by the 59 sections, each section 
presents a new, non-progressive attempt to find the right vein or discourse to confess or 
locate the self; the writer describes: “ever, since, seeking a sentence, I have been seeking 
myself in a sentence” (13). The pun again suggests that to be a subject means to be subjected, 
and further, that such subjection is linguistic: language is always restrictive- it ‘sentences’- 
and exorbitant, it exceeds and outlasts the subject. The division of the self is also manifested 
in other ways. Speaking of confession, the writer describes “a sort of compulsion to overtake 
each second, like one car overtaking another, doubling it rather, overprinting it with the 
negative of a photograph already taken with a ‘delay’ mechanism” (39). Many more uses of 
doubling, splitting or multiplication persist throughout the text, for example, the variety of 
addressees, the division of the signature, and “the whole thematics of the twin” (138).  
‘Circumfession’ challenges the supposition that the subject is a discrete, self-
contained, and in some way consistent, entity which interacts with a detached exterior.  
Again utilising the imagery of blood, Derrida adopts Augustine’s notion of the exteriorized 
interior, his perception of the vial of his own blood as “the image of my own life exhibiting 
itself outside” (10) represents the process of confession itself, violent and invasive and 
productive of a simulacra of the inside, which develops an almost sinister life of its own: 
“the inside gives itself up and you can do what you like with it, it’s me but I’m no longer 
there” (12).  Writing undermines the idea of an unchanging kernel of selfhood by revealing 
the process of subjective formation and generating numerous incompatible selves and 
identities.  Here, the lack of consistent narrative voice or subjective centre is also glossed as 
kenosis.  The writer reveals:   
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I am trying to disinterest myself from myself to withdraw from death by making the 
‘I’, to whom death is supposed to happen, gradually go away, no, be destroyed before 
death comes to meet it, so that at the end already there should be no one left to be 
scared of losing the world in losing himself in it (190)  
 
This recalls the tension in the Confessions between Augustine’s construction of a literary 
identity and his insistence on the rejection of the ego as the path to God.  Further, whereas 
Derrida looks to demonstrate that fragmentation is the condition of selfhood and the unified 
self a fiction, Augustine reinforces the association of a unified self with purity and holiness.  
Describing his earlier self, he claims that “my own impiety had divided me against myself” 
(219), in contrast to conversion which is presented as a return to the self.  Succumbing at 
times to deviation, Augustine’s text illustrates the paradox of the Christian vision, which, as 
Jonathan Dollimore describes, claims “that man is created desiring that which is forbidden”, 
and, “that perversion originates in that which it subverts, in this case, the divine order”.241  
Despite this, Augustine reinforces the confessional trajectory towards a conclusive unity 
between writing and written selves, redeeming the sinner, closing the hermeneutic circle 
and eliminating deviant excess.  Again, it is evident that whereas Augustine perceives 
writing as potentially sinful, for Derrida it is the source of new possibilities.  ‘Circumfession’ 
expresses the desire to “invent a new language, (through simplicity rediscovered), another 
fluid, a new SENTENCE” (115), mirroring the “post-writing”242 to which Derrida aspires in 
‘Sauf le nom (Post Scriptum)’, and reiterating the significance of writing for Derrida, a 
significance disavowed by Hägglund and Caputo.  Here, in ‘Circumfession’, this ‘new 
language’ requires reformulations of both the subject and God.   
Part of the need for a ‘new language’ or “syntax to be invented” (128) is generated by 
the current use of language (like circumcision) to exclude and divide.  In contrast, 
‘Circumfession’, as “the interrupted autobiothanatoheterographical opus” (213) always looks 
to the other and to difference, reinscribing the aneconomic alongside the economic.243  This 
call for a ‘new language’ demands that we rethink the relationship between writing and the 
external events which it records.  This is exemplified by the writer’s account of his mother’s 
deteriorating health, which challenges the reader’s assumptions about the confessional 
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subject and the inscription of the exterior.  The writer explicitly opposes external events to 
language, with the text “a race against time between writing and her [his mother’s] life” 
(165).  The writer defers all power to the exterior: 
 
...knowing in advance the nonknowledge into which the imminent but 
unpredictable coming of an event, the death of my mother, Sultana Esther Georgette 
Safar Derrida, would come to sculpt the writing from the outside, give it its form 
and its rhythm from an incalculable interruption, never will any of my texts have 
depended in its most essential inside on such a cutting, accidental and contingent 
outside, as though each syllable and the very milieu of each periphrasis were 
preparing itself to receive a telephone call, the news of the death of one dying (206-
7) 
 
This deferral is disingenuous as the writer controls our access to and experience of external 
events, as well as the accuracy of their representation.  In foregrounding the figure of the 
mother, the writer highlights the permeable and shifting boundary of the text.  The mother 
also embodies the ‘other’, countering the sameness and purity of patriarchal religiosity; as 
David Farrell Krell expounds: “‘Circumfession’ thus revolves about the mother as other, the 
m(other) who speaks as the mouth of God, the (m)other as the immortal one who is 
nonetheless dying, the surviving (m)other of the writer who is driven to confess- 
circuitously”.244  The reader is led to anticipate the mother’s death as both the completion of 
her transformation and mythologization, and the fulfilment of the narrative and its 
relationship to the Confessions.  However, like many gestures towards textual completion, 
this one is thwarted, and the final reference to the mother is open-ended: 
 
Tuesday, May 1, 1990, 7 o’clock in the morning in Laguna Beach, she’s still alive for 
you, over there in Nice, 20, Parmentier, 4th floor… you will see her, perhaps you 
will still hear her when you get back, it’s enough to recount the ‘present’ to throw 
G’s theologic program off course… (311)               
 
Additionally, towards the end of the text, the identities of mother and writer begin to blur.  
“Nobody will ever know what is happening between us” (286), the writer maintains, and it 
is no longer clear whether the long-expected death is “hers or mine” (292).  This symbiosis 
seems to echo the relationship between life and writing; neither can be reduced to clear 
causal connections.  Further, the writer’s claim that “my [his] mother’s metaphasic chaos is 
becoming my [his] sentence” (193), punning on the meanings of metaphasia and aphasia, 
again recalls the contamination between text and body, emphasising the generation of new 
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ways of reading and writing.  This is evidenced in his re-reading of the Confessions; “I like 
to read right on the skin of his language” (241) he declares.  By blurring both mother and 
son, and narrative interior and exterior, Derrida, contra Augustine, claims that the “double 
perspective” of the “conversion narrative” can never be wholly collapsed into a single voice, 
perspective or subject.245  Yet the writing self too is subject to the work of writing, and the 
writer, an impossible figure of chance or singularity contrasting with the ‘geologic program’ 
of ‘Derridabase’, is himself, both inside and outside the text.  He reveals: 
 
…everything I venerate, not the unpredictable event I have supposedly written, 
myself, namely sentences fit to crack open the geologic program, no, that took place 
outside the writing that you’re reading, in my body if you prefer, this conversion 
ought to be the surprise of an event happening to ‘myself’ who am therefore no 
longer myself… but the fact that it is not decipherable here on the page does not 
signify any way the illegibility of the said ‘conversion’ (124-5)  
 
This ‘self’, be it external or internal to the text, becomes the only chance of a singularity 
which will thwart the program, although this too is in danger of being totalised and 
therefore, destroyed.  Here, chance itself is at risk of deification, of being instated as yet 
another ordering principle, demonstrating the inescapable relation between economy and 
excess which Derrida charts.  This however, reinforces the decentralised nature of the 
deconstructive confession, reminding us that stability cannot be sought either from within 
the subject or from an overarching principle or transcendent God.    
 
(iii) The God of Confession 
Such a God, and indeed other traditional theological and philosophical models of the divine 
are rejected by the Derrida of The Gift of Death as “idolatrous stereotyping”.246  This 
position is strengthened in ‘Circumfession’, with the text insisting that any understanding of 
God must be ascertained within and through the text as God can no longer be perceived as a 
fixed external reference point.  Linking ‘Circumfession’ and Lyotard’s own account of the 
Confessions, Geoffrey Bennington argues that “In both Derrida and Lyotard, then, the event 
of confession (as writing and as reading) makes something happen to the extent that it 
disrupts just the kind of positive infinity that we often call ‘God”.247  For both thinkers, this 
destabilization of the concept of God originates from the tensions in Augustine’s own text.  
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Lyotard suggests that Augustine uses the name God simply “because that is the custom of 
the day”.248  Derrida goes further, tracing the linguistic emphasis of his own account of God 
to Augustine himself, who, he argues, wanted “to bring it about that in arriving at God, 
something should happen to God, and someone happen to him who would transform the 
science of God into a learned ignorance, he says he has to do so in writing” (18).  Instead of 
positing a God who is external and unchangeable, and thus irrelevant, Derrida sees 
Augustine’s text as transgressing the strict confessional economy through an ambivalent 
openness to the coming of God, an openness which he endeavours to follow and develop in 
‘Circumfession’.          
The constitutive ‘fissure’ of confession, evident both in the nonsuturability of the 
confessional economy and in the non-identity of the confessional subject can also be traced 
to the non-identity, or even absence, of the God which confession presupposes.  Dennis 
Foster describes:  
 
Confession represses a knowledge of the inescapability of convention. That is, each 
narrator acts from within certain conventions of class, love, family and fatherhood 
that must be seen as having natural authority in order for him to continue acting… 
 But that founding father was never there…249  
 
The concealed economies which sustain the confessional are dependent on the existence of 
an external God, whose absence haunts ‘Circumfession’, an absence reflected by the lack of 
father figures within the text. Whereas the mother is foregrounded throughout, the 
influence of the father is experienced indirectly through the traditions and language of 
patriarchy.  This lack leads David Farrell Krell to observe the “relative absence of the father 
from the text”,250 and Gideon Ofrat to suggest that “Derrida’s overall philosophy thus 
emerges as an impossible encounter with the absence, or murder, of the father”.251 This is 
perhaps overly reductive, yet this absence is significant for ‘Circumfession’. The lack of a 
father signifies the absence of the proper or the purely familial, undermining any definitive 
origin and thus assuring the “chance or arbitrariness of the starting point” (50).  Further, the 
idea of an omnipotent God is parodied by the relationship to ‘Derridabase’, “the theologic 
program elaborated by Geoff, who remains very close to God, for he knows everything 
about the ‘logic’ of what I might have written in the past, but also of what I might think or 
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write in the future…” (16).  It is therefore unsurprising that ‘Circumfession’ contains 
Derrida’s most explicit declaration of atheism.  He asserts:  
 
the constancy of God in my life is called by other names, so that I quite rightly pass 
for an atheist, the omnipresence to me of what I call God in my absolved, absolutely 
private language being neither that of an eyewitness nor that of a voice doing 
anything other than talking to me without saying anything, nor a transcendent law 
or an immanent schechina, that feminine figure of a Yahweh who remains so 
strange and so familiar to me, but the secret I am excluded from… (155)        
 
Derrida’s ‘atheism’ rejects current conceptions of God in favour of another which defies 
fixed definition.  Such a God would not be a ‘given’, or object to be encountered, rather 
would be that which is continuously generated and discovered by the deconstructive 
process.  Derrida describes: 
 
when he says ‘you’ in the singular and they all wonder, who is he invoking thus… 
it’s you this god hidden in more than one, capable each time of receiving my prayer, 
you are my prayer’s destiny, you know everything before me, you are the god (of 
my) unconscious, we all but never miss each other, you are the measure they don’t 
know how to take and that’s why they wonder whom, from the depth of my 
solitude, I still address, you are a mortal god, that’s why I write, I write you my god” 
(9-4-81), to save you from your own immortality (263-4) 
 
In these familiar yet intimate gestures, Derrida associates God with activity, performativity, 
change and the act of writing.  The name signifies an excess which surpasses the ‘measure’ 
of the confessional economy.  God is repeatedly linked with textuality: he “must turn 
around his own unknown grammar” (287) and he is “weeping in me, turning around me, 
reappropriating my languages” (224), and with mortality and limitation: there is “a Nothing 
in which God reminds me of him” (273) and the writer refers to “the violence of the void 
through which God goes to earth to death in me” (272).  These active, even violent images 
contrast with the contrivance of performativity adopted within the traditional confessional 
economy, a contrivance which aims to disguise the irrelevance of God and the fixed 
trajectory of the writer.  It is this boldness which leads John D. Caputo to claim that 
“Derrida’s ‘Circumfession’ is more radically confessional than Augustine’s Confessions, his 
word more wounded,” a claim which is borne out by the text.252  In rejecting artificial 
performativity with a predetermined end, Derrida looks to rediscover the meaning of ‘God’, 
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and to enable the confessional process, a process through which the identities of both writer 
and addressee are detabilised.  At the start, the writer asserts: 
 
I am addressing myself here to God, the only one I take as witness, without yet 
knowing what these sublime words mean and this grammar, and to, and witness, 
and God, and take, take God, and not only do I pray, and pray to him, but I take him 
here and take him as my witness, I give myself what he gives me… (56-8)   
   
Derrida assumes God as paradigmatic witness and “the name of this absolutely unknown 
indeterminate addressee”,253 who is not a God of ‘constancy’ and ‘positive infinity’, but who 
emerges unclearly, associated with language, excess, contradiction and contamination.  By 
suspending certain confessional economies and enabling a new way of writing, 
‘Circumfession’ looks to discover what ‘God’ and the ‘subject’ might mean.  These do not 
become plainly and self-identically present as the confessional economies suggest, but are 
both dynamic, and bound in an impossible relationship created by their dependence on the 
figure of the other, as, “one always confesses the other” (147).  The significance of this 
‘other’, so embedded in the ethical, political and religious preoccupations of Derrida’s later 
work, is decisive yet not self-evident, influencing Derrida’s understanding of both God and 
the subject.  Next I shall turn to Derrida’s text ‘Envois’, which again reasserts Derrida’s 
‘double reading’ of confession, whilst beginning to address the political implications of the 
confessional mode.         
 
3. Reading ‘Envois’ 
 
(a) “Private or public correspondences”254 
 
‘Envois’, a “satire of epistolary literature... stuffed with addresses, postal codes, crypted 
missives, anonymous letters, all of it confided to so many modes, genres, and tones”255 is 
ostensibly “the remainders of a recently destroyed correspondence”,256 intimate love letters 
which have been made available for public view.  Although, unlike ‘Circumfession’, ‘Envois’ 
is not primarily a confessional text, confession is one of its ‘many modes’, and like 
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‘Circumfession’, it challenges the sureties of the confessional economy.  Here, I shall first 
demonstrate how, in its interaction with the confessional, ‘Envois’ reinforces Derrida’s 
rewriting, and secondly, responding to its explicitly politicised presentation of confession, 
and its aim of “effacing the public/private opposition”,257 I shall consider some of the 
implications of Derrida’s changing accounts of confession, religion and God.    
 
‘Envois’ and ‘Circumfession’ share numerous concerns and preoccupations.  Both texts 
explore the supplementary relationship between the proper and improper, and the 
subsequent necessity of contamination and illegitimacy,258 both associate the body with the 
text,259 employ imagery of division and doubling, and emphasise the instability of 
singularity.  Moreover, both expose the fiction of self-identity, revealing the plurality of 
identity as denied by the singularity of the name, which nevertheless signifies as any 
common noun. 260  Other similarities include a preoccupation with apocalypse, eschatology 
and holocaust, incorporating a desire to write “while erasing all the traits”,261 a blurring of 
the boundary between interior and exterior, a declaration that the text is written according 
to a “contract”,262 and an investigation of the relationship between the programmatic263 or 
technological, and singularity, the event, and the possibility of chance.  ‘Envois’ illustrates 
the pervasiveness of the confessional mode by showing how it resonates within this 
apparently secular text.  One expression of this is the connection between the ‘conversional 
turn’, as explored and subverted in ‘Circumfession’, and the trope of turning back, turning 
around, or turning one’s back in ‘Envois’.  
                                                             
257 Gregory Ulmer, ‘The Post-Age’, Diacritics, 11 (Autumn 1981), 39-56 (p. 46). 
258 See, for example, the claim: “I who am the purest of bastards leaving bastards of every kind almost 
everywhere”, Derrida, ‘Envois’, pp. 1-256 (p. 84).   
259 Examples of this include “I address myself in the way one arches oneself” (p. 58), and “This is my body” (p. 
99).  Quotations from Derrida, ‘Envois’, pp. 1-256. 
260  Instances of the multiple significance of the name and naming include Derrida’s assertion that “If I name me, 
myself, it’s only in order to add to the confusion” (p. 185), the familiar tracing of the name back to the name of 
God: “YHWH simultaneously demands and forbids, in his deconstructive gesture, that one understand his proper 
name within language, he mandates and crosses out the translation, he dooms us to necessary and impossible 
translation” (p. 165), and the failure of the name as a symbol of propriety and self-identity: “I regret that you [tu] 
do not very much trust my signature, on the pretext that we might be several” (p. 6). All quotations from 
Derrida, ‘Envois’, pp. 1-256.   
261 Derrida, ‘Envois’, p. 11. Glossing this, Gideon Ofrat writes: “Preserving the vitality of truth is thus setting it on 
fire, safeguarding it in the dual condition of revelation and perdition”, Ofrat, p. 98.  See also Robert Smith’s 
contrasting claim that “Derrida’s is the attempt, ‘against desire’, to save remains from the totalising holocaust of 
reason which would consume all genealogy into itself, the proper comprehended as proper, the improper as 
improper”, Robert Smith, p. 40.  
262 Derrida, ‘Envois’, pp. 1-256 (p. 4).  
263 The speaker suggests that the position of absences within the text may be calculated using a program but “this 
program is in question throughout this work”, ‘Envois’, pp. 1-256 (p. 5).   
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Identified by Gregory Ulmer as the “master trope in ‘Envois’”,264 turning back or 
turning one’s back is an interruptive gesture which, like the model of the postal system, 
demonstrates the way letters or meaning can “(sometimes) fail to arrive”.265  “Before all else 
it is a question of turning one’s back [dos]”,266 the writer insists.  The trope has multiple 
meanings, with Ulmer associating it with the Freudian fort: da and the Wolf Man, and the 
figures of apostrophe and antonomasia, and appearing in the text as “a pirouette”,267 
“reversibility”,268 and as the “perverformative”.269  It is also perceived as an interruption of 
economy, as Ulmer argues: “Derrida proposes instead an elaboration of enigmas rendering 
all conclusions problematic: truth gives way to secrets, closure to undecidability.  In short, 
he proposes a writing oriented towards thought rather than information…”270  This non-
logocentric writing, akin to the ‘new language’ of ‘Circumfession’, is, I shall demonstrate, a 
crucial part of Derrida’s deconstructive re-visioning of ethics and politics, as well as essential 
to his conception of God.  As in ‘Circumfession’, disruption of economy is always related to 
the restoration of connections and economies in a now-familiar double movement; even 
interruption, the possibility that “everything [will] derail”, follows “a rule”,271 instating 
another economy.   
In his predominantly psychoanalytic reading of ‘Envois’, Ulmer overlooks the 
significance of the ‘master trope’ of turning back or turning around to confession or religion, 
claiming that “The new autobiography has little to do with confession or expression”.272  
This trope, however, is part of the text’s secularization of the confessional, playing on the 
conversional ‘turn’ and the religious significance of the figures of adieu and apostrophe;273  
as Hent de Vries writes:  
 
To turn around religion also means here: to turn religion around.  All this is implied 
from the outset in the phrase à Dieu or adieu, in all its ambiguity of a movement 
toward God, toward the word or name of God, and a no less dramatic farewell  to 
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almost all the canonical, dogmatic or onto-theological interpretations of this very 
same ‘God’.274  
 
As de Vries suggests, Derrida’s repeated use of such a trope indicates a changing relationship 
between God and the text, and even within Godself.  In ‘Envois’, Derrida’s missives, 
ostensibly addressed to a lover but unsecured in their destination, often resemble entries 
from ‘Circumfession’ to an absent, unknown or unknowable God.  The writer discloses:    
    
Your absence is reality for me, I don’t know any other.  This is when I know that 
you are not there, that you are away from me, have gone away from me, are going to 
go away from me.  This is my reality principle, the most external necessity, all my 
impotence.  You mark for me both reality and death; absent or present moreover 
(you are always there, over there, in the course of going back and forth), all this 
amounts to the same, you mark me, you signify reality as death for me, you name 
them or show them with your finger.  And I believe in you, I remain attached to 
you.275 
 
Elements of ‘Envois’ are self-consciously confessional, yet, like ‘Circumfession’, which 
writes God, in order “to save you [God] from your own immortality” (264), ‘Envois’ 
repeatedly stresses the weaknesses and limitations of God.  This God “cannot absolve 
himself”276 and is “destined to violate himself, and this is his entire beauty, the sadness of his 
strength, the hopeless weakness of his all-powerfulness”.277  Yet, an omnipotent God 
rejected, the text seeks to retain a personal, confessional relationship with that which he 
addresses as “my God”.278  Echoing Augustine’s Confessions , the writer asks: “and when I 
call you my love, my love, is it you I am calling or my love? You, my love, is it you I thereby 
name, is it to you that I address myself?”279 suggesting that the identities of speaker and 
addressee are given by writing rather than pre-existing it, and in the assumed absence of an 
omnipotent God, transposing the confessional discourse into the interaction with an 
addressed lover, who too, is ultimately unknown and unknowable.  The text posits itself as 
“uninterrupted prayer”,280 prayer as that which is always addressed to the other.   
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 In the absence of a predetermined God and a predetermined self, ‘Envois’ 
undertakes a search for both the self who addresses and for an other to be addressed.  
Playing on the double meaning of ton, the writer reveals: “Ton, this for me is the name of 
God, my God, [mon Dieu] the one that I do not find”.281  Both senses of ton  associate God 
with difference, and the narcissistic overtones of ‘Envois’, its self-referentiality and the 
closed circuit of its missives, begin to imply that God may be a function of the self or of 
discourse about the self and its own inescapable otherness.  Challenging the distinction 
between public and private, ‘Envois’ comes to question what we understand as the limits of 
the political.   
 
(b) The Political Implications of Confession   
 
As I have shown, the efficacy of confession depends upon a tightly controlled, yet 
unsustainable economy of form and subject.  In practice, this can result in repression and 
subjection, consequences which have been thoroughly explored by Michel Foucault, who 
emphasizes the all-pervasiveness of the confessional mode:   
 
the confession became one of the West’s most highly valued techniques for 
producing truth.  We have since become a singularly confessing society.  The 
confession has since spread its effects far and wide.  It plays a part in justice, 
medicine, education, family relationships, and love relations, in the most ordinary 
affairs of everyday life, and in the most solemn rites; one confesses one’s crimes, 
one’s sins, one’s thoughts and desires, one’s illnesses and troubles; one goes about 
telling, with the greatest precision, whatever is most difficult to tell.  One confesses 
in public and in private, to one’s parents, one’s educators, one’s doctor, to those one 
loves; one admits to oneself, in pleasure and in pain, things it would be impossible to 
tell anyone else, the things people write books about.  One confesses- or is forced to 
confess.  When it is not spontaneous or dictated by some internal imperative, the 
confession is wrung from a person by violence or threat; it is driven from its hiding 
place in the soul, is extracted from the body.  Since the Middle Ages, torture has 
accompanied it like a shadow, and supported it when it could go no further: the 
dark twins.  The most defenseless tenderness and the bloodiest of powers have a 
similar need of confession.  Western man has become a confessing animal.282  
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Other critics, following Foucault, have also considered the ways in which confession can be 
used as a tool of repression and domination.  “Christian confession belongs with this new 
economy of the private self who must control and account for all expenditure”,283 Jeremy 
Tambling notes, revealing how the confessional structure reinforces the model of an 
internalized subject who is answerable to an external authority.  In assuming the existence 
of an intangible soul constituting this subject, religious confession denigrates the body, and 
is thus “the way in which the body is written upon, made subject to the demands of the 
reason which is committed to its eradication as something other”.284  Further, although 
confession presents itself as freely given, John Caputo and Michael Scanlon claim that “to 
confess is the act, not of an autonomous author but of a subjected subject, an act not of 
autonomy but of giving up this autonomy”.285  Such subjection extends to the confessors too, 
who, according to Tambling, are “‘interpellated’ (hailed, singled out by name), and are 
subjected, i.e. made to define themselves in a discourse given to them, and in which they 
must name and misname themselves…”286   
However, the confessor, often a figure of authority such as priest or legal 
representative, may also become an instrument of institutional control.  Stephen Haliczer 
asserts that “The priest’s power to grant or withhold absolution, to levy and control 
penance, and his superior education and social status made the confessional relationship 
inherently unequal”,287 and similarly, Mike Hepworth and Bryan Turner regard confession 
as “part of a moral-legal syndrome of practices and beliefs”288 which can only be validated by 
“a person with authority to hear”.289  Focusing on the constructed nature of confession, they 
argue that each one is “shot through with contradiction between spontaneity and 
compulsion, between disinterested confessions and confessions as part of ‘bargain justice’, 
between moral consensus and political force”.290  Although differing in their structural 
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apparatus, all modes of confession entail a certain “socializing of the interior processes”291 
and lead us to question assumptions about subjectivity, the relationship between interior 
and exterior and the ubiquity of the political.   
‘Envois’ recognises that the strict confessional economy can be repressive and 
authoritarian.  In the text, the word confession names a rigid, threatening and violent 
economy which blurs the boundary between legal and religious confessions.  Confession is 
inescapably institutional, thus reinforcing Tambling’s claim that “This belief in Law is at the 
heart of confession, police or church”.292  The contrived intimacy of ‘Envois’, written as if to 
a lover, mirrors that of the written religious confession.  Once transposed into this intimate 
correspondence, the fixed, external tenets of law (and similarly, of philosophical or 
theological ‘truth’) become absurd yet retain their power.  Consequently, confession, rather 
than being freely offered, is always extorted under physical or mental pressure, as the writer 
discloses:   
 
The truth, it is in its cursed name that we have lost each other, in its name only, not 
for the truth itself, if there were any, but for the desire for truth which has extorted 
the most terrifying ‘confessions’ from us, after which we were more distant from 
ourselves than ever…  All these secrets are false secrets, they merit only forgetting, 
and not at all confession.  Nothing of this concerns us.  After those miserable 
confessions that we have extorted from each other (extorted in appearance, but they 
could be only on the basis of a certain grasp offered by the one to the other, the 
compulsive urgency to confess under torture.293 
 
The confessional process, whose addressee is typically a distant and unknowable God, is 
here enlivened by its situation between the two lovers.  The process, consisting as Derrida 
describes, of a confession of sin followed by a profession of faith, focuses on the trauma of 
forced confessions, “this atrocious blackmail by true love”,294 and the exhausted urge to 
“confess, let us confess”.295  As in ‘Circumfession’, the demand for confession overwhelms 
the exigencies of justice, as “the situation is that of a confession without a crime”.296  There is 
merely a nod towards expiation, the question “When will we pardon each other my love?” 
left hanging and evidence of a transcendent pardoner notably absent.297  Even if absolution 
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were possible, it would require the reduction of love to a simulacrum of the confessional 
process, as the writer describes: “(you know, when I say “I love you,” it is really a 
confession- perhaps in the sense of classical tragedy- at the same time as the sublime 
absolution of every possible crime)”.298  That we are voyeurs of this most intimate of 
moments is highlighted ever more clearly, with the writer perceiving voyeurism 
everywhere, describing his desire to experience the “corpus platonicum” as if it were “a very 
refined brothel, with confessionals and peepholes everywhere”299 which not only draws 
attention to the link between sex and confession, it emphasises the trafficking of 
information within the text, the private made public, our own voyeuristic consumption of 
the writer’s correspondence, and the possible misinterpretation of these transactions.   
 
The boundary between public and private, so crucial in the allocation of political rights and 
responsibilities, is challenged in ‘Envois’ through the figure of the postal system, and the 
adoption of confessional and autobiographical modes.  In response to closed psychoanalytic 
economies and, in particular, to Lacan’s claim that the letter always reaches its destination, 
‘Envois’ demonstrates the possible non-arrival of the letter, and the inevitable deviation of 
signification.  As Derrida explains in a companion piece in The Post Card, “it belongs to the 
structure of the letter to be capable, always, of not arriving.  And without this threat... the 
circuit of the letter would not even have begun”, reinforcing the co-dependency of 
economy and excess.300  Arrival necessitates a pre-determined addressee, and although it 
presents itself as a collection of love letters, private correspondence made public, ‘Envois’’ 
emphasis on non-arrival and its use of the post card form, complicate the issue of addressing 
and the addressee, and our understanding of subjectivity.   
Derrida’s aim, to “leave the gender or number” of the addressee “indeterminate”301 in 
‘Envois’ is thwarted, and the apparent addressee, a female lover, is herself generated by the 
text, a consequence, David Wills asserts, of “the demands of the French language” which 
requires “that a gender be chosen sooner or later”.302  The text nonetheless reveals that 
“sender and addressee are artificial and structural categories”.303  Indeed, for Derrida, the 
structure of the trace renders the singular addressee impossible, every “mark”, he declares, 
                                                             
298 Derrida, ‘Envois’, pp. 1-256 (p. 41). 
299 Derrida, ‘Envois’, pp. 1-256 (p. 129). 
300 Jacques Derrida, ‘le facteur de la vérité’, in The Post Card, pp. 411-496 (p. 444). 
301 ‘Derrida’, ‘Envois’, pp. 1-256 (p. 144).  
302 David Wills, ‘Post/Card/Match/Book/"Envois"/Derrida’, SubStance, 13.2 (1984), 19-38 (p. 19).  
303 Wills, 19-38 (p. 38).  
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“divides itself, it is valid several times in one time: no more unique addressee”.304  The ‘mark’ 
is therefore destined “to be remarked, precisely, to be repeated, and therefore divided, 
turned away from address that makes it into a post card that multiplies, to the point of a 
crowd, my addressee, female...”305  These multiplied addressees include Derrida’s mother 
Esther, Socrates, God and, in a gesture which threatens to completely enclose the textual 
economy but instead demonstrates the heterogeneity of the self, the writer addresses 
himself.306  The result is “too many, too many addresses, too much address”,307 with the 
addressee, ultimately unknowable to the writer, and thus, “the absolute mystery”.308  For 
Derrida, the impossibility of ensuring a ‘unique addressee’ and a closed, private discourse 
undermines the writer’s control over his words, whose meaning cannot be assured prior to 
their arrival with the addressee.  Our relationships with others and with ourselves are 
mediated in this way, rendering private language impossible, and exposing discrete and pre-
linguistic subjectivity as a fiction.      
‘Envois’ emphasises the deviations of the postal system, with posting entailing “a 
halt, a relay, or a suspensive delay...”309 and this underpins the trope of turning back or 
around, thus diverging from the expected linearity of both confessional and 
autobiographical narratives.  The writer admits: “Would like to address myself, in a straight 
line, directly, without courier, only to you, but I do not arrive”.310  The very structure of the 
post card obscures the distinctions between public and private, and inside and outside, with 
the writer insisting that “(the post card is neither private nor public)”.311  David Wills 
expands on these ambiguities: 
 
With a postcard one can never be sure what is most important, the image or the 
text; the legend, the message, or the address. In this sense it has no distinct outside, 
and it is usually turned inside out in order to be pinned to the wall. But on the other 
hand, more than other texts, it has neatly prescribed borders, limits to what it can 
contain. Similar paradoxes occur with respect to a postcard's readability. Because it 
can be read by anyone, it adopts various devices and varying degrees of illegibility. 
                                                             
304 Derrida, ‘Envois’, pp. 1-256 (p. 192).  
305 Derrida, ‘Envois’, pp. 1-256 (p. 112).  
306 See, for example, the following: “What can this ciphered letter signify, my very sweet destiny, my immense, 
my very near unknown one?  Perhaps this: even if it is still more mysterious, I owe it to you to have discovered 
homosexuality, and ours is indestructible.  I owe you everything and I owe you nothing at all.  We are of the 
same sex, and this is as true as two and two are four or that S is P. Q.E.D.” Derrida, ‘Envois’, pp. 1-256 (p. 53).  
307 Derrida, ‘Envois’, pp. 1-256 (p. 25).  
308 Derrida, ‘Envois’, pp. 1-256 (p. 205). 
309 Derrida, ‘Envois’, pp. 1-256 (p. 65). 
310 Derrida, ‘Envois’, pp. 1-256 (p. 23).  
311 Derrida, ‘Envois’, pp. 1-256 (p. 185).  
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It inevitably becomes the apology and the substitute, a sign of deferral, for the letter 
one never gets to write...312 
 
And later:  
 
The postcard, as frail rem(a)inder of both the support and the possible sub-version of 
the postal system, rejoins that series of differances already listed by Derrida-the 
tympan and the hymen (especially in Glas), here also the timbre-tone of voice 
become postage stamp. These are the tiny differences which dis-rupt the logic, the 
objections which subvert the system at the same time as they contribute to its 
constitution, and which are, for that reason, either appro-priated or excluded or 
both. But it is only through the notion of order, of priority become control, that the 
system is able to effect such an appropriation or exclu-sion.313 
 
In Derrida’s double reading however, this excess is both inside and outside the system, both 
recuperable and irrecuperable, the post card an inescapably liminal figure.  In the same way, 
the opposition between public and private is challenged, yet also maintained and exploited.  
Of this distinction, Derrida writes: “you know that I do not believe in propriety, property, 
and above all not in the form that it takes according to the opposition public/private”,314 and 
he repeatedly demonstrates the impossibility of unmediated self-presence and of ‘privacy’.  
Nevertheless, ‘Envois’ refers to “the desire to pose or to post myself in a kind of absolute 
privatization”,315 and the writer describes himself as “the privé [the private, the deprived 
one], more than anyone else henceforth”.316   
Throughout his work, Derrida has questioned the self-presence and self-identity of 
the subject, arguing that one’s self experience is always mediated.  This, the complexity of 
the self-relation, he terms ‘auto-affection’.317  Writing of auto-affection in Of 
Grammatology, Derrida explains:  
 
That which is written remains, and the experience of touching-touched admits the 
world as a third party.  The exteriority of space is irreducible there... Auto-affection 
is a universal structure of experience.  All living things are capable of auto-affection.  
                                                             
312 Wills, 19-38 (p. 24-5). 
313 Wills, 19-38 (p. 26-7). 
314 Derrida, ‘Envois’, pp. 1-256 (p. 185).  
315 Derrida, ‘Envois’, pp. 1-256 (p. 144).  
316 Derrida, ‘Envois’, pp. 1-256 (p. 144).  
317 For a comprehensive discussion of the function of auto-affection in Derrida’s reading of Husserl, see Leonard 
Lawlor, Derrida and Husserl: the basic problem of phenomenology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2002).  
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And only a being capable of symbolizing, that is to say, of auto-affecting, may let 
itself be affected by the other in general.318        
     
Significantly, as well as applying beyond the human, and potentially, undermining its claims 
to uniqueness and superiority, auto-affection entails ‘hetero affection’, and the self is never 
discrete and sovereign, as Derrida discloses in The Animal That Therefore I Am:  
 
If autoposition, the automonstrative autotely of the ‘I’, even in the human, implies 
the ‘I’ to be an other that must welcome within itself some irreducible hetero-
affection (as I have tried to demonstrate elsewhere), then this autonomy of the ‘I’ 
would be neither pure or rigorous...319   
   
That the self is always ‘other’ is emphasised in ‘Circumfession’ and ‘Envois’ through the 
constitution of identities through language.  Derrida maintains that “The letter”, in both 
senses, is “‘interiorized’...”320 thus corresponding to what he describes as “the law of a 
writing become your body: ‘writing in (it)self’”.321  This otherness of the self is underlined 
by the technological prostheses of memory employed by the speaker in ‘Circumfession’, 
who reveals: “since the computer I have my memory like a sky in front of me, all the succor, 
all the threats of a sky, the pelliculated simulacrum of another absolute subjectivity...”322   
 ‘Envois’ and ‘Circumfession’ display both the impossibility of a self-contained 
subject, and the subsequent desires both for an absolute memory to instate and confirm 
one’s subjectivity, and for absolute annihilation.  The implications of this concept of 
subjectivity will emerge in later chapters as I consider its relationship both to Derrida’s 
shifting understanding of God and to a more explicitly politicised notion of religion.  Here, 
however, in ‘Envois’, Derrida’s exploration of the remit of the political feels somehow 
incomplete.  The text enacts the formation of the political, as that which develops between 
the tendency to disorder, impropriety and heteronomy- here the adestination of the letter 
and the otherness of the self- and reactionary responses to this awareness, the fearful 
enforcement of control and order in the form of repressive institutional structures, without 
however, illuminating the complex relationships between politics, ethics and religion.    
            
                                                             
318 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, rev. edn (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 165.  
319 Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, trans. by David Wills (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2008), p. 95. 
320 Derrida, ‘Envois’, pp. 1-256 (p. 195).  
321 Jacques Derrida, ‘Che cos’è la poesia?’ in Points, pp. 288-299 (p. 293). 
322 Derrida, ‘Circumfession’, p. 228.  
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(c) Conclusion 
 
I began this chapter by demonstrating the insufficiency of current philosophical, literary 
and religious exegeses to account for the contamination of discourses in ‘Circumfession’.  In 
my own reading, it became clear that the genre of confession depends on strictly maintained 
economies and structures which conceal implicit contradictions.  Derrida’s examination of 
confession demonstrates that despite their attempts to remain pure or to purify, discourses, 
sacraments and institutions are inevitably contaminated.  Examples of this which emerge in 
the text include the mutually dependent histories of Judaism and Christianity and the 
reliance of Augustine’s primarily religious Confessions on literary techniques.  This is 
reflected in the ‘heterogeneous modes’, of ‘Circumfession’, which were largely 
unrepresented by philosophical and theological accounts of the text, which still aimed to 
develop a linear and monolingual argument, the very thing that Derrida here problematises.  
It is the closed systematicity of unreflective philosophical and theological readings which 
Derrida challenges, observing in A Taste for the Secret, a constitutive paradox.  
Deconstruction, he contests, is: 
 
not a method for discovering that which resists the system; it consists, rather, in 
remarking, in the reading and interpretation of texts, that what has made it possible 
to effect a system is nothing other than a certain dysfunction or ‘disadjustment’, a 
certain incapacity to close the system.323   
 
Through the strategy of the ‘double reading’ both ‘Envois’ and ‘Circumfession’ focus on such 
a ‘disadjustment’, ‘fissure’, or ‘wound’, using it to rethink confession and to assess the limits 
certain discourses.324  Philosophy, for example, is characterised by Derrida as the disavowal 
of such a wound,325 a characteristic in which it is unlike deconstruction, as the latter, 
defined by Simon Critchley and Tim Mooney, proceeds from “the desire to keep open 
a dimension of alterity which can neither be reduced, comprehended, nor, strictly speaking, 
                                                             
323 Jacques Derrida and Maurizio Ferraris, A Taste for the Secret (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), p. 4. 
324 References to the ‘wound’ include: “I am wounded, wounded to death.” (p. 195), and “the same wound” (p. 
122). Quotes from Derrida, ‘Envois’, pp. 1-256.  
325 “I think that it is very rare that this wound, if there is a wound, is readable in a philosophical text”, Jacques 
Derrida, ‘Passages’, pp. 372-395 (p. 378-9). 
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even thought by philosophy”.326  Similarly, ‘Envois’ reveals the way in which psychoanalysis 
disavows the constitutive fissure or wound.327 
 A second problem with the philosophical and theological readings I introduced was 
their underestimation of the functions of writing and the choice of mode.  This too is 
connected to the constitutive gap or fissure which confession traditionally endeavours to 
close.  Whereas the confessional narrative looks to conflate written and writing selves, this 
proves impossible, as Jeremy Tambling describes:  “Confession itself opens the gap of which 
the grave is the symbol, between the desire to tell and the ability to make a completion…”328  
The infinitude of language thus denies the expected closure of the confessional narrative,    
necessitating a fresh understanding of life and living.  Following deconstruction, Dennis 
Foster writes:    
 
Life can move in only one direction, towards death, but the economy of the trace 
allows it to avoid the irreversible, unknowable investment in that end.  Though it 
does not alter the end, and in fact depends on death to orient desire, the effect of life 
is to discover all possible alternative routes. The detour is the swerving from death 
that is the very activity of life and of language.329    
 
Foster suggests that autobiographical or confessional writing exposes the fictions of 
linearity, closure and an oppositional relationship between life and death.  The gap between 
the confessional economy and these excesses generates the double reading which drives 
Derrida’s account of confession in both ‘Circumfession’ and ‘Envois’, as textuality “threatens 
itself from two contradictory imminences”.330  This doubleness is, for Derrida, inherent in 
confession, rendering confession a discourse which is responsive to the gestures of 
deconstruction.  In a similar vein, Jeremy Tambling argues that “all dialogue, all 
                                                             
326 Simon Critchley and Timothy Mooney, ‘Deconstruction and Derrida’, in Continental Philosophy in the 20th 
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330 Derrida, ‘Circumfession’, p. 51. See also the contention that the protagonist of ‘Envois’ writes whilst “folded in 
two with a double, bifid, perfidious, perjuring instrument”, Derrida, ‘Envois’, pp. 1-256 (p. 143).  
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interchange, which therefore suggests all forms of writing which expect to find an audience 
are confession, if not openly, then systematically, by virtue of their dialogic nature.”331  For 
Derrida too, the movements of confessional discourse illuminate language more generally.   
Derrida’s interest in the double or dialogical gestures of confession is also connected 
to his search for a new way of writing which is not controlled by hierarchy, logocentrism 
and homogeneity, but by the structure of the trace.  This writing, here stimulated by 
Derrida’s liberation of the excesses of confessional writing from their restricted economies, 
haunts the system, and is enabled by specific tropes and images, for example the post card 
itself, as Derrida reveals: “when one sends oneself post cards (or the dialogues of Plato)”, 
Derrida explains, “in order to communicate on the subject of post cards, the collection 
becomes impossible, one can no longer totalize, one no longer encircles”.332  This proposed 
writing, which, as Gregory Ulmer asserts, is “oriented towards thought rather than 
information…”333 underpins ‘Envois’ and is named in an accompanying essay as an “athetic 
writing”.334  Such a writing would challenge the theoretical grounding of repressive 
structures and institutions, and would enable Derrida to rethink both God and subjectivity, 
which, it becomes evident in these texts, should be rethought together, as dynamic, non-
self-identical, open to otherness, and part of a broader understanding of ‘life’ itself.  
In the following two chapters, I shall examine how Derrida engages with this new 
way of writing through the interrelated discourses of dialogue and silence, looking to 
discover what these discourses reveal about the changing concepts of God and subjectivity, 
their interrelation, and their ethical and political implications.  Prior to that however, I shall 
turn to the relationship between deconstruction and negative theology, as the texts of 
negative theology directly influence Derrida’s writing on dialogue and silence.        
                                                             
331 Tambling, p. 206.  
332 Derrida, ‘Envois’, pp. 1-256 (p. 207).  
333 Ulmer, 39-56 (p. 45). 
334 Derrida, ‘Notices (Warnings)’ in The Post Card, as before, pp. 259-291 (p. 268). 
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Excursus: Deconstruction and Negative Theology 
 
Writing in 2000, J. P. Williams identified a “budding renaissance of apophatic theology”.1  
This resurgence of interest in apophatic or negative theology, a mode which demands “the 
denial of all descriptions and attributes as predicated of God”,2 extends beyond theology, 
becoming, for William Franke, “a major topic in all the disciplines of the humanities”,3 and 
providing a source of interest and exploration for Derrida’s own work.  In the two central 
chapters of this thesis, ‘Dialogue’ and ‘Silence’, my examination of Derrida’s understanding 
of the concept of God will frequently engage with the questions and problems raised by 
negative theology.  In this preliminary section, I shall briefly discuss what is understood by 
the term negative theology and begin to explore its relationship with, and implications for, 
deconstruction.          
 
Negative theology is an inclusive term for beliefs, theories and practices which proceed 
from divine transcendence to the conclusion that every theological saying must also involve 
as unsaying.  As Derrida himself explains in a “provisional hypothesis”, “negative theology 
consists in regarding every predicate, or even all predicative language, as inadequate to the 
essence, that is, to the hyperessentiality of God, and that, consequently, only a negative 
(‘apophatic’) attribution can claim to approach God”.4  Sketching a skeletal history of 
negative theology at the opening of ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’, Derrida asserts that 
“the unity of its archive is difficult to determine”,5 thus problematising any treatment of 
negative theology as a ‘subject’.  Raising yet bypassing some of the historical, sociological, 
philosophical, religious and psychological issues, here he approaches negative theology 
through its complex relationship with deconstruction.  
             Basically a bipartite text, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ consists of a 
consideration of this relationship alongside the familiar deconstructive concerns of secrecy, 
the promise and silence, followed by an historical reading of apophaticism through an 
                                                             
1 J. P. Williams, Denying Divinity: Apophasis in the Patristic Christian and Soto Zen Buddhist Traditions 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 2. 
2 William Franke, On what Cannot be Said: Apophatic Discourses in Philosophy, Religion, Literature and the 
Arts. Volume 1: Classic Formulations, ed. by William Franke (Notre Dame, IA: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2007), p. 1. 
3 Franke, p. 3. 
4 Jacques Derrida, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’, trans. by Ken Frieden and Elizabeth Rottenberg in Psyche: 
Inventions of the Other, Volume 2 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 143-195 (p. 144). 
5 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 143). 
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analysis of three paradigms of ‘avoiding speaking’: Greek, Christian and Heideggerian.  
‘Denials’ draws attention to the procedural similarities between the “textual practice”6 of 
negative theology and deconstruction, referring to “the family resemblance of negative 
theology, in every discourse that seems to have recourse in a regular and insistent manner to 
this rhetoric of negative determination”.7  The two discourses are also similar in other 
respects: both are reflexive, performative,8 and self-regulating,9 both use the structure of the 
address, employ the form of the ‘without’ which “deconstructs grammatical 
anthropomorphism”,10 both rethink the function and meaning of negativity non-
dialectically, and both relate to a promise which is presented as both historical and 
ahistorical.  Both discourses are concerned with the status and function of prayer.  Defining 
prayer as “the address asking the other- perhaps beyond request [demande] and gift- to give 
the promise of its presence as other”11 and questioning the possibility of separating “the 
prayer, the quotation of prayer, and the address to the reader”,12 Derrida presents his own 
text as inherently prayerful.  However, like every performative address, prayer is necessarily 
“perverformative”,13 and therefore subject to distortion and redirection.   
Further links between the two discourses are suggested by Don Cupitt’s analysis of 
mysticism, negative theology and contemporary atheism.14  Both deconstruction and 
negative theology are radical counter movements which challenge institutional norms;15 
Cupitt insists that “the mystic was compelled to deconstruct orthodoxy”,16 describing how 
the immediacy of the mystical encounter disrupts the dogma of deferred union with God 
and undermines the Church’s assumption of unassailable authority.  This is reinforced by 
Derrida’s own account of negative theology as a “subversive marginality” 17  which “launches 
                                                             
6 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 143).  
7 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 144).  
8 Hent de Vries: “Religion is to be conceived of as the problem of performative utterance ‘as such’”, de Vries, p. 
11. 
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13 Derrida, ‘Envois’, p. 136. 
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17 Derrida, ‘Sauf le nom (Post Scriptum)’, pp. 35-85 (p. 71).   
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or carries negativity as the principle of auto-destruction in the heart of each thesis”.18  
Further, negative theology and deconstruction both explore the relationship between 
language and event, with Cupitt claiming that “Language goes all the way down” and, 
consequently, that “the very composition of the poem was itself the mystical experience… 
Writing is redemption”.19  Further, negative theology, like deconstruction, is “a second-
order discourse”; neither discourse looks to make truth claims, but rather to examine the 
conditions and premises of such claims.  Consequently, as J.P. Williams asserts, negative 
theology does not focus on “the divine subject, but the discourse which addresses the divine: 
it generates no statements about God, but statements about theological language.”20  
Therefore, when approaching the issue of ‘God’, both discourses suspend the question of 
God’s existence, instead focusing on the nature and power of the discourse surrounding 
these questions, and what we can learn from them.21     
It is clear from these instances that there are many, often methodological similarities 
between the two discourses, however, the precise nature of the relationship between 
deconstruction and negative theology requires further investigation.  In the introduction to 
their recent collection Apophatic Bodies, Chris Boesel and Catherine Keller consider the 
implications of deconstruction for negative theology:  
 
Deconstruction, for example, brings to the surface the hyperousiology, the 
Neoplatonic hierarchy, the ontotheology that leaves its traces even in the beyond-
being.  It ceaselessly searches out the radical limits of an epistemic certainty lodged 
somewhere near the top, under the cover of that luminous dark.  Deconstruction, 
then, can be, and has been, interpreted theologically as a structural movement that 
performs the corrective service of saving the name of God from theology itself- a 
postmodern, non-appropriable apophatic gesture ridding us of God for the sake of 
God.  However, it can be, and has been- earlier and more widely- interpreted as a 
structural movement that simply rids us of God, or rids us of notions of a God 
behind ‘God’, such that the sign ‘God’ can now be employed more appropriately and 
less toxically as a name we use for the structural conditions of possibility.22 
 
                                                             
18 Derrida, ‘Sauf le nom’, p. 67.  
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20 J. P. Williams, p. 4 
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If the division between the two readings of Derrida is perhaps a little too clearly defined, 
Boesel and Keller’s account nevertheless highlights both the significance of deconstruction 
for negative theology and vice versa, and the lack of critical consensus as to what this 
significance entails.   
Identifying the similarities between the two discourses in the essay ‘Différance’, in 
which Derrida admits that “the detours, locutions, and syntax in which I [he] will often 
have to take recourse will resemble negative theology, occasionally even to the point of 
being indistinguishable from negative theology”,23 he nevertheless denies that 
deconstruction is a form of negative theology.  Yet these formal similarities persist, not least 
in Derrida’s attempt to define deconstruction in his 1983 ‘Letter to a Japanese Friend’, in 
which his approach recalls the gestures of negative theology; “Deconstruction is neither an 
analysis nor a critique... Deconstruction is not a method and cannot be transformed into 
one... What deconstruction is not? everything of course! What is deconstruction? nothing of 
course!” he declares.24  As I have shown, Derrida begins to explore the similarities between 
the two discourses at length in ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’, first delivered in 1986, 
and in the later text ‘Sauf le nom (Post Scriptum)’, first published in English in 1992.  
 Critical assessments of the relationship between the two discourses are diverse, 
however, it is clear that commentators tend to overlook the importance of Derrida’s mode 
when assessing his writing on negative theology, an oversight I shall address in my own 
readings.  Toby Foshay observes the differences in critical approaches, revealing that even 
those who seek to emphasise the similarities between negative theology and deconstruction 
do so with different aims.  He describes:  
 
The attempt of Derrida’s critics to turn the analogy of negative theology and 
deconstruction into an equation and the family resemblance into a filiation is itself 
conducted from two opposing fronts.  On the one hand, there are those who accuse 
Derrida of being a ‘mere’ negative theologian, simply negating and turning on its 
head the ontotheological tradition, and thus as contained within the dialectical play 
of the logocentricity which he purports to deconstruct.  On the other hand are 
negative theologians themselves, such as Jean-Luc Marion, cited by Derrida, who 
challenge Derrida’s analysis of the God of apophatic theology as a hyperessentiality, 
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which, as a ‘beyond being’, can only be grasped in its relation to classical cataphatic 
ontotheology.25 
 
Derrida acknowledges that deconstruction “has been called...a type of negative theology”,26 
yet this is inverted by thinkers including Graham Ward, Morny Joy and Kevin Hart who 
suggest that “negative theology is a form of deconstruction”.27  Similarly, Arthur Bradley 
contends that, “deconstruction is not a form of negative theology because negative theology 
is already in a state of deconstruction”.28  Bradley’s argument is convincing, yet these 
attempts to determine which discourse is prior or pre-eminent seem to add little to our 
understanding of the relationship between deconstruction and negative theology.  Similarly, 
looking to distance Derrida’s work from scholars looking to incorporate it within Christian 
frameworks, Shira Wolosky asserts that “Derrida is resolute in distinguishing himself from 
the tradition of negative theology which he associates with a Greek heritage”.29  Rather, she 
insists that Derrida’s work should be approached through a specifically Hebraic 
understanding of negative theology.   
 Derrida’s dismissal of negative theology as ontotheological in his early work leads 
Kevin Hart to argue that “Derrida fails to recognise that negative theology has 
deconstructive power”,30 a claim which overlooks Derrida’s demonstration of the 
contamination between negative theology and deconstruction in ‘Sauf le nom’, perhaps as a 
consequence of ignoring its dialogical mode.  Hart’s subsequent assertion that any similarity 
between the two discourses is structural rather than thematic reinforces the “problematic 
opposition between form and content” (49), a division which, as Derrida acknowledges, 
“negative theology will have powerfully contributed to calling into question” (49).  A more 
challenging critique from within theology is enunciated by Denys Turner, who argues that 
by reducing negative theology to “such extremes of apophaticism” in order to evacuate it of 
any “‘hyperessentiality’”, Derrida changes, or misrepresents it.  Turner observes: “this 
Derridean wholesale deconstruction of theological metaphysics, this concession to a 
                                                             
25 Toby Foshay, ‘Introduction: Denegation and Resentment’, in Derrida and Negative Theology, ed. by Harold 
Coward and Toby Foshay (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), pp. 1-24 (p. 3). 
26 Derrida, ‘Letter to a Japanese Friend’, pp. 1-5 (p. 3).  
27 Hart, Trespass, p. 186. Joy asserts: “rather than deconstruction being a form of negative theology, negative 
theology is itself a form of deconstruction”. Morny Joy, ‘Conclusion: Divine Resevations’, in Derrida and 
Negative Theology, ed. by Harold Coward and Toby Foshay (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 
pp. 255-282 (p. 279). 
28 Bradley, Negative Theology, p. 30. 
29 ‘Shira Wolosky, ‘An “Other” Negative Theology: On Derrida’s “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials”’, Poetics 
Today, 19.2 (Summer 1998), 261-280 (p. 263). 
30 Kevin Hart, Trespass, p. 198. 
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‘theology’ which is the ultimate agent deconstructive of metaphysical theism, is in fact 
unrecognisable in the mirror of medieval apophaticism...”31  However, it is Arthur Bradley’s 
account of the relationship between deconstruction and negative theology which is most 
revealing.  Bradley contends that “Derrida neither simply attacks nor defends negative 
theology but attempts- in an apparently paradoxical fashion that will again need to be 
defined carefully- to repeat it differently”.32  For Bradley, Derrida reveals tensions in 
negative theology’s account of itself; its desire not to speak of the unspeakable is 
compromised by the “pre-originary ‘promise’ of language”,33 which demonstrates that 
“negative theology is itself not simply negative theological all the way down”.34  
Consequently, negative theology maintains a certain openness to alterity within the 
logocentric discourses of theology.  Bradley describes:     
 
Negative theology becomes a privileged name for a linguistic force, excess or 
opening in the direction of the other traced in other contexts under the figure of the 
messianic (Caputo 1997) or the adieu (de Vries 1999) – that refuses to be locked 
within any particular theological or philosophical determination.  Negative 
theology’s ambiguous status thus exceeds the distinctions between the Christian and 
the non-Christian, the theological and the secular, and the transcendental and the 
empirical.35 
 
Two things are of particular significance here: first, that the questions raised by negative 
theology may provide a significant point of access to Derrida’s conceptions of, and 
relationships with, God and religion, and secondly that, in challenging perceptions about 
transcendence and empiricism, negative theology might have wider implications for our 
understanding of deconstruction.  A key example of this would be the ethical and political 
significance of deconstruction.  Rather than serving as a retreat from politics as Richard 
Beardsworth suggests,36 negative theology would be, according to Bradley’s reading, a 
“privileged name for the relation to the other as absolutely other that constitutes the basis 
for all responsible thought and action”.37  If negative theology’s identity is neither purely 
transcendental nor empirical but rather given “in the aporetic oscillation or ‘trembling’ 
                                                             
31 Denys Turner, ‘Apophaticism, Idolatry and the Claims of Reason’, in Silence and the Word: Negative Theology 
and Incarnation, ed. by Oliver Davies and Denys Turner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 11-
34 (p. 21).  
32 Bradley, Negative Theology, p. 2. 
33 Bradley, Negative Theology, p. 31. 
34 Bradley, Negative Theology, p. 36. 
35 Bradley, Negative Theology, p. 3. 
36 Richard Beardsworth, Derrida and the Political (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 19. 
37 Bradley, Negative Theology, p. 189. 
79 
 
between the two”, this serves to “uphold the basic undecidability between the ethical and 
the political, to stop, in other words, the ethical from ossifying into the merely ethical and 
the political into the merely political.”38  Both negative theology and deconstruction operate 
at the intersection of ethics and politics, and theory and practice, an issue I shall consider in 
the final chapter of the thesis.  In the case of negative theology, as Gregory Rocca points out, 
a gap has opened between its significance as a subject of a study and as a practice in the form 
of the via negativa.  Rocca explains:       
 
the so-called ‘negative way’ (via negativa) and negative, apophatic theology, though 
closely related, are not exactly the same.  Negative theology often refers to a theory 
about how the divine predicates signify in the discipline of theology, even 
academically understood; and while via negativa can sometimes function as a 
synonym for negative theology so understood, it can also refer to a spiritual way or 
method by which one lives and thinks in order to arrive at union with God, and in 
this case it is not merely of academic interest but amounts to a life program with 
ascetic, moral, mystical, and spiritual elements.39 
 
This tension between negative theology as a source of academic study and as a religious way 
of life, and the equivalent tension between deconstruction as a theoretical concern and a 
mode of political practice, provide a focus for the text ‘Sauf le nom (Post-Scriptum)’, 
Derrida’s final text on negative theology, to which I shall now turn.  
 
Regarding Derrida’s earlier and later engagement with negative theology, Stephen D. Moore 
perceives a distinct shift in position, asserting that Derrida’s “cold suspicion” has “warmed 
into outright infatuation”.40  Moore’s claim is perhaps an overstatement, however, ‘Sauf le 
nom (Post-Scriptum)’, an imagined dialogue between two speakers, is Derrida’s most 
sustained and deferential text towards the genre.  In it, Derrida enacts the processes of 
negative theology and emphasises its affiliation with deconstruction.  Like deconstruction, 
negative theology is, “briefly, a critique of ontology, of theology and of language” (50).  ‘Sauf 
le nom’ proceeds from enquiries about the nature, function and relevance of negative 
theology, asking how these might be appropriately broached.  “How, today”, the speaker 
asks, “can one speak- that is, speak together, address someone, testify- on the subject of and 
in the name of negative theology?”(46)  Whereas ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ is 
                                                             
38 Bradley, Negative Theology, p. 212. 
39 Gregory P. Rocca, O.P., Speaking the Incomprehensible God: Thomas Aquinas on the Interplay of Positive and 
Negative Theology (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004), p. 4. 
40 Stephen D. Moore, Poststructuralism and the New Testament: Derrida and Foucault at the Foot of the Cross, 
(Minneapolis, Fortress Press: 1994), p. 41.  
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concerned with apophaticism in general, ‘Sauf le nom’ narrows its focus to the history and 
meaning of negative theology.   
The text’s observations in this area are constellated around readings of Meister 
Eckhart, Angelus Silesius and Pseudo-Dionysius, figures defined by Don Cupitt as “hard-
core literary mystics”.41  Dionysius, in particular, is a crucial threshold figure in the history 
of negative theology, bridging between the Greek tradition of apophaticism deriving from 
Plato’s Parmenides and developing through the work of Neoplatonists Plotinus and Proclus, 
and Christian thought, in his writings at the start of the sixth century A.D.  For William 
Franke, Dionysius’s work begins “the reinterpretation of the ineffable Neoplatonic One in 
terms of the transcendent God of monotheistic religion”,42 a reinterpretation, or rather, a 
dialogue between traditions, which is central to the development of negative theology.  
Similarly, Arthur Bradley highlights the importance of this synthesis, asserting:  “Negative 
theology, as we understand the term today, is the result of an imaginative philosophical 
synthesis between the Christian concept of the revelation of Christ and the Neoplatonic 
concept of the transcendence of the One”.43  Deeply interested in Dionysius, the writer of 
‘Sauf le nom’ looks to perform a similar ‘imaginative synthesis’ between the discourses of 
deconstruction and negative theology.   
In light of Derrida’s own work, Pseudo-Dionysius’s writings have been considered 
proto-deconstructive; Jeffrey Fisher argues:  
   
Dionysius gambles with high stakes, rising nihilism on the one hand and the 
semantic reinscription of affirmative theology on the other.  He engages in a 
deconstructive maneuver both daring and deft: opening the door to nihilism while 
at the same time refuting even that form of closure to the mystical project.44 
 
Arguing also that “the différance of God is played out by Dionysius in The Mystical 
Theology”,45 Fisher perhaps goes too far in his attempt to align Dionysius with Derrida, and 
overlooks important differences between the two figures.46  Mary-Jane Rubenstein observes 
a disjunction between the “political vision” of Dionysius and Derrida’s work, asserting that 
                                                             
41 Cupitt, Mysticism, p. 6. 
42 Franke, p. 14. Franke’s two volume text provides a comprehensive history of apophatic thought.  Other 
accounts of the histories of apophasis and negative theology can be found in Rocca, p. 3-26, and in Raoul 
Mortley, From Word to Silence (Bonn: Hanstein Verlag, 1986).  
43 Bradley, Negative Theology, p. 13.  
44 Jeffrey Fisher, ‘The Theology of Dis/similarity: Negation in Pseudo-Dionysius’, The Journal of Religion, 81.4 
(October 2001), 529-548 (p. 535). 
45 Fisher, 529-548 (p. 540). 
46 See Turner, pp. 11-34 (p. 21). 
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Dionysius may be perceived as “radically elitist” as well as “radically welcoming”.47  She 
contends that this, rather than any sense of Dionysius’s attachment to ontotheology, 
accounts for the times when Derrida “pulls back from Dionysius”.48  In contrast, it is such a 
perceived attachment to ontotheology which results in Derrida’s ambivalence towards the 
work of Meister Eckhart.   
Derrida’s early interest in negative theology is tempered by his belief that “negative 
theology is still a theology”,49 and therefore, still ontotheological.  For Don Cupitt, this 
position persists throughout Derrida’s work, becoming evident in his reading of Eckhart.  
Cupitt argues: “Derrida is reading Eckhart only in order to sniff out precisely what 
metaphysical dogma he teaches, and then consigning him to one camp or another 
accordingly”,50 thus Derrida fails to see that “The mystic has to be a deconstructor”.51  
However, Derrida’s position is rather more nuanced than this.  Whilst distancing himself 
from the ontotheological elements of Eckhart’s writing, he is fascinated by Eckhart’s 
“dazzling games with language”,52 his subversion of institutional norms and his ambivalence 
towards language.  Oliver Davies notes that language is, for Eckhart, both “the obstacle” and 
“the place of our redemption”,53 a double functioning which parallels Derrida’s own 
approach to language, and also observes in his work, a “constant fluctuation of 
perspective”.54  Similarly, Denys Turner foregrounds Eckhart’s performativity, the way that 
“the language performs rhetorically what it says technically”,55 and his desire that each 
linguistic instance should “contain all the paradoxical tensions of the theological project”.56  
It is similarities such as these, particularly concerning textuality, which enable Derrida to 
sketch the relationship between negative theology and deconstruction, and in so doing, to 
clarify the relationship between deconstruction, religion and the figure of God.      
 
                                                             
47 Mary-Jane Rubenstein, ‘Dionysius, Derrida and the Critique of “Ontotheology”’, in Re-thinking Dionysius the 
Areopagite, ed. by Sarah Coakley and Charles M. Stang (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 195-211 (p. 
206). 
48 Rubenstein, pp. 195-211 (p. 205). 
49 Jacques Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics: An essay on the thought of Emmanuel Levinas’, inWriting and 
Difference, trans. by Alan Bass, 2nd edn. (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 97-192 (p. 183). 
50 Cupitt, Mysticism, p. 97. 
51 Cupitt, Mysticism, p. 4. 
52 Cupitt, Mysticism, p. 95. 
53 Oliver Davies, ‘Introduction’, in Meister Eckhart, Selected Writings, trans. by Oliver Davies (London: Penguin, 
1994), pp. xi-xxxviii (p. xxxv). 
54 Oliver Davies, God Within: The Mystical Tradition of Northern Europe, rev. edn (London: Darton, Longman 
and Todd, 2006), p. 42. 
55 Turner, pp. 11-34 (p. 32). 
56 Turner, pp. 11-34 (p. 33). 
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In the following two chapters, ‘Dialogue’ and ‘Silence’, I shall draw out the ways in 
Derrida’s use of these two discourses helps to develop his concept of God, and illuminates 
the  ethical, religious and political implications of this concept.  Containing readings of texts 
which engage with negative theology, these chapters will respond to what I perceive as the 
lack of attention to mode and genre in critical accounts of the relationship between negative 
theology and deconstruction.  They will do this by demonstrating that Derrida’s choice of 
mode is inextricably linked to the insights and tensions within the text, and that mode is 
particularly significant for Derrida’s investigation of negative theology, a discourse which, as 
Hent de Vries contends, “reveal[s] the most significant modalities of language, meaning and 
reference ‘as such’”.57  Paralleling the relationship between apophatic and kataphatic 
theologies, the discourses of dialogue and silence are modes adopted by negative theology 
itself, which both complement and challenge each other.        
 
 
 
                                                             
57 De Vries, p. 41. 
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Chapter Two: Dialogue 
 
Even there where there are dialogues, in Plato... these dialogues remain in the service of the 
monologic thesis.  In my case - and I’m not going to compare myself with Plato! – 
monologism, univocity, a single voice- is impossible, and plurivocity is a non-fictional 
necessity, a necessity that I put to work in a fictional fashion of course but that is not 
feigned... 
Jacques Derrida 
 
Two texts, two hands, two ways of listening. Together simultaneously and separately. 
Jacques Derrida 
 
There are several voices already in the word. 
Jacques Derrida 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Well-known for his adoption of unconventional writing modes, Derrida frequently 
incorporates dialogical elements, or “plurivocity”1 into his writing.2  He contends that 
dialogue enables the expression of the multiplicity of language; rather than being a mode 
which he imposes on a text, he insists that “the plurality of voices imposed itself in some 
way and I had to let it through”.3  This emphasis on plurality, difference and dialogue, is in 
part a challenge to the “authoritarian norm”4 which commands that philosophy employ a 
linear, univocal and apparently transparent mode in order to preserve the appearance of 
privileged access to ‘truth’, and which Derrida reveals as a disavowal of philosophy’s 
inescapable entanglement with language.  The result, however, is not a rejection of 
philosophy by Derrida, but a discourse which emphasises both “the philosophical 
experience and the poetic experience of the language”, and, through the assumption of 
heterogeneous modes, voices and registers, “causes one to think and causes the language to 
think, or philosophy in the language”.5   
 
In this chapter, I shall analyse two key expressions of the dialogical in Derrida’s writing.  
First, I shall summarise two critical accounts of Derrida’s ‘turn’: one authored by Slavoj 
                                                             
1 Jacques Derrida, ‘Passages’, pp. 372-395 (p. 392). 
2 Texts which are dialogical in some form include ‘Tympan’, ‘The Double Session’, ‘Pas’ , Glas, The Truth in 
Painting, ‘Envois’ in The Post Card, ‘At This Very Moment In This Work Here I Am’, Cinders, and Right of 
Inspection.   
3 Derrida, ‘Passages’, pp. 372-395 (p. 393). 
4 Jacques Derrida, ‘Unsealing’, pp. 115-131 (p. 130). 
5 Derrida, ‘Passages’, pp. 372-395 (p. 375). 
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Žižek who looks to separate and recover the “earlier Derrida of différance”6 from the 
“‘postsecular’ Messianic turn of deconstruction”,7 and the other presented by Arthur Bradley 
who argues that the theological emphasis of Derrida’s later work privileges the 
transcendental resulting in an “empirical deficit”.8  Suspending a response to the 
particularities of these critiques and their political implications until the end of the chapter, 
I will maintain that both critiques arise from the mistaken assumption of inconsistency in 
Derrida’s work, which, I will argue, is undermined by the consistently dialogical nature of 
the work.  I will develop this claim by using examples from all stages of Derrida’s work to 
demonstrate that the deconstructive process takes place dialogically as movements between 
unstable poles.  These are informed by the economic and non-economic elements which 
render différance “irreducibly polysemic”,9 and recur in the later work through 
relationships such as that between law and justice or within the concept of hospitality, 
which incorporates conditional and unconditional elements.  I will argue that despite any 
thematic shifts in Derrida’s work, this structural consistency is retained throughout 
Derrida’s work, and maintains the aporetic relationship between the empirical and the 
transcendental.        
Secondly, I shall examine the “fictive dialogue”10 ‘Sauf le nom (Post Scriptum)’, and 
make the following claims.  First, that the text is enabled by the dialogical mode, exhibiting 
dialogue between two apparently opposed speakers, between deconstruction and negative 
theology, and between the kataphatic and apophatic.  In this way, the text manifests the 
“braided polyphony”11 of all language, liberating the heterogeneity which is inhibited by 
logocentrism and in turn, generating new political possibilities.  Further, I shall show that 
this dialogical mode draws out the similarities between deconstruction and negative 
theology, connecting them through their performativity, their attention to singularity, their 
preoccupation with language and its limits, and their negotiation of aporetic relationships 
between faith and critique and excess and economy.  Consequently, I will argue that 
dialogue enables Derrida to begin to formulate a new type of non-logocentric writing or 
“post-writing” (53) which facilitates the articulation of a non-ontotheological God.  Such a 
                                                             
6 Slavoj Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
2003), p. 141. 
7 Žižek. The Puppet and the Dwarf, p. 3. 
8 Bradley, ‘Derrida’s God’, 21-42 (p. 32). 
9 Jacques Derrida, ‘Différance’, in Margins of Philosophy, trans. by Alan Bass (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
1982), pp. 1-27 (p. 8). 
10 Derrida, ‘Sauf le le nom (Post Scriptum)’, pp. 33-85 (p. 34). Further references are given after quotations in the 
text.  
11 Jacques Derrida, ‘Voice II’, trans. by Verena Andermatt Conley in Points, pp. 156-170 (p. 162). 
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God embodies the paradoxes in, and limits of, language, endlessly challenging and 
overcoming the boundaries of comprehension and translatability.   
Finally, drawing upon these claims, I will return to the critiques of Žižek and Bradley, 
both of whom perceive Derrida’s later religious focus to entail a depoliticization of 
deconstruction.  Although their accounts are divergent, I will argue that both are restricted 
by their own political agendas.  Articulating his own materialist relationship to Christianity, 
Žižek looks to dissociate himself from Derrida’s Judaic heritage and deconstruction’s meta- 
or ultra-political focus.  Similarly, Bradley’s focus on the technical and materialist futures of 
Derrida’s work and his insistence on “operative value”12 defy his affirmation of 
deconstruction.  In contrast, I will suggest that the dialogical mode of deconstruction 
constantly reaffirms the essential undecidability of the relationship between ethics and 
politics, as well as that between politics and meta-politics, and insists upon our ethical and 
political responsibility to give due recognition to such undecidability.  Further, in the case 
of ‘Sauf le nom’, the potential for a progressive politics derives from its religious focus, its 
suggestion that a ‘post-writing’ which rewrites the significance of the name of God may 
facilitate the possibility of a non-totalising community and the dissociation of 
unconditionality and sovereignty. 
 
2. The ‘Turn’: Critical Responses and the Dialogical Nature of Différance 
 
As I noted in the ‘Introduction’, although Derrida acknowledges a certain change “in the 
strategy of the text”13 of his work, this is perceived as a development of earlier material and 
as an experimentation with style and mode, rather than as a decisive ‘turn’ away from, or 
contradiction of, previous texts.14  Certain critics, however, reject this account, arguing that 
a ‘turn’ can be observed in Derrida’s work, and that it should lead us to challenge or even 
reject either the earlier or the later work.  One such critic is Slavoj Žižek.     
Dismissing the contemporary re-emergence of religious interest as a “massive 
onslaught of obscurantism”,15 Slavoj Žižek looks to separate and recuperate the “earlier 
                                                             
12 Bradley, ‘Derrida’s God’, 21-42 (p. 34).  
13 Derrida, ‘Epoché and Faith’, pp. 27-50 (p. 37).  Derrida is here referring specifically to his approach to the 
name of God.   
14 An earlier version of some of the material in this chapter can be found in Danielle Sands, ‘Thinking Through 
Différance: Derrida, Žižek and Religious Engagement’, Textual Practice, 22.3 (2008), 529-546. 
15 Slavoj Žižek, The Fragile Absolute or, Why is the Christian legacy worth fighting for? (London: Verso, 2000), 
p. 1. 
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Derrida of différance”16 from what he terms the “‘postsecular’ Messianic turn of 
deconstruction”.17  Žižek’s aim to reclaim the ‘earlier Derrida’ is accompanied by an attempt 
to align différance, to which he acknowledges a debt, with his own concept of “minimal 
difference”,18 whilst disassociating himself from the religious and political elements of 
Derrida’s later work.  However, I shall argue that Žižek mistakenly conflates différance with 
his own ‘minimal difference’ and consequently overlooks the dialogical nature of différance 
and its consistency throughout Derrida’s work.   
It is only in the 2006 text The Parallax View that Žižek admits the, by now obvious, 
structural similarities between his work and deconstruction.19  His approval of différance 
however, was suggested in a more critical context in 2003’s The Puppet and the Dwarf.  
Here Žižek declares:  
I am tempted to suggest a return to the earlier Derrida of différance. What if 
Derrida’s turn to ‘postsecular’ messianism is not a necessary outcome of his initial 
“deconstructionist” impetus? What if the idea of infinite messianic justice which 
operates in an indefinite suspension, always to come, as the undeconstructible 
horizon of deconstruction, already obfuscates ‘pure’ différance, the pure gap which 
separates an entity from itself?20    
This is Žižek’s formulation, by way of caricaturing the religious themes, of the question of 
whether Derrida’s later work ‘transcendentalizes the aporia’.  However, Žižek’s claim that 
the later work obscures “‘pure’ differance” is fallacious, as “‘pure’ differance” refers rather to 
Žižek’s “minimal difference” than to the dialogical movements of différance.  “Minimal 
Difference” is a phrase used by Žižek in The Parallax View to account for his reformulation 
of the concept of parallax. He takes a familiar definition: “the apparent displacement of an 
object (the shift of its position against a background), caused by a change in observational 
                                                             
16 Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf, p. 141. 
17 Žižek. The Puppet and the Dwarf, p. 3. 
18 He asserts that “now- when the Derridean fashion is fading away- is perhaps the moment to honor his memory 
by pointing out the proximity of this ‘minimal difference’ to what he called différance”, Žižek, The Parallax 
View, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006), p. 11. He reiterates this claim (almost to the letter) in the article 
‘A Plea for a Return to Différance (With a Minor Pro Domo Sua)’, Critical Inquiry, 32 (Winter 2006) 226-249, a 
text which, despite its reference to Derrida in the title, pays remarkably little attention to Derrida, with any 
critique of the later Derrida derived directly from The Parallax View and The Puppet and the Dwarf.  One 
cannot help thinking that Žižek invokes Derrida’s name to attract the interest that seems to follow it.     
19 See, for example, the description of Žižek’s work as “an endless enquiry into its own discursive conditions”, 
Rex Butler and Scott Stephens in Slavoj Žižek, Interrogating the Real, ed. by Rex Butler and Scott Stephens 
(London: Continuum, 2005), pp. 1-18 (p. 4). Žižek is also engaged in the suspiciously deconstructive practice of 
“the inherent decentering of the interpreted text, which brings to light its ‘unthought’, its disavowed 
presuppositions and consequences,” Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf, front matter.  
20 Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf, p. 141. 
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position that provides a new line of sight”21 and amends it to suggest that the shift in 
perspective isn’t merely a subjective shift, but a shift which is constitutive of the object 
itself.  He asserts: “it is at the very point at which a pure difference emerges- a difference 
which is no longer a difference between two positively existing objects, but a minimal 
difference which divides one and the same object from itself.”22  This ‘pure’ or ‘minimal’ 
difference is elsewhere equated with différance as the latter is described as “the pure gap 
which separates an entity from itself.”  However, as I shall demonstrate, Žižek’s idea of 
‘pure’ différance is inconsistent with the conflicting, dialogical movements which constitute 
différance, and overlooks the importance of movement and force in thinking différance. 
Différance is “polysemic”23 and names a dialogical relationship between two apparently 
oppositional poles or movements.  This dialogical relationship, I shall argue, provides the 
model for the deconstructive process throughout Derrida’s work.  Examining three of 
Derrida’s texts, typically early, middle and late, in which différantial movements are 
foregrounded, I shall demonstrate the dialogical nature of différance as it is expressed 
throughout Derrida’s oeuvre, arguing that this consistency undermines Žižek’s assertion that 
the later Derrida betrays différance. 
 
The essay ‘Différance’ offers Derrida’s most sustained discussion of the non-concept of 
différance, which is immediately spoken of in terms of movement and movements.  There is 
not even a fixed position from which to begin speaking as différance disrupts this possibility: 
“Différance is the non-full, non-simple, structured and differentiating origin of differences.  
Thus, the name ‘origin’ no longer suits it,”24 Derrida alleges.  He describes différance 
through two interactive, dialogical, and apparently conflicting, movements.  The word 
itself, he suggests, resonates with the two meanings of the Latin differe, to differ and to 
defer, it is “immediately and irreducibly polysemic.”25  The first movement suggests the non-
identical, intervals, separation and otherness, it is playful and blind in its progression, it 
doesn’t seek a return to self.  This is the movement of spacing.  The second movement, from 
differe, to defer, implies a detour or delay an economical “taking into account,”26 in 
particular of time, and an inevitable return to the same.  Derrida describes this as 
                                                             
21 Žižek, The Parallax View, p. 17. 
22 Žižek, The Parallax View, p. 18. 
23 Jacques Derrida, ‘Différance’, in Margins of Philosophy, trans. by Alan Bass. (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
1982), pp. 1-27 (p. 8). 
24 Derrida, ‘Différance’, pp. 1-27 (p. 11). 
25 Derrida, ‘Différance’, pp. 1-27 (p. 8). 
26 Derrida, ‘Différance’, pp. 1-27 (p. 8). 
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temporization.  These movements can be thought of as the non-economic and economic 
movements of différance, and Derrida goes on to expand them in Freudian terms.   
The economic element of différance finds its equivalent in the pleasure principle 
(and later the reality principle) which strives for circularity, always seeking to return to the 
origin or same, to reinstate the presence which has been deferred by the différantial 
movement.  Accordingly, the non-economic aspect of différance relates to the death drive, 
in which full presence is recognised as impossible and the movement, instead of being 
circular in an attempt to recover presence, is pure excess and expenditure.  It is, Derrida 
describes: “the entirely other relationship that apparently disrupts every economy.”27  For 
Derrida, to deconstruct is to acknowledge the impossibility of self sameness and self 
presence, “to hold that no indivisibility, no atomicity, is secure”.28  Thus same and other are 
always already implicated in a dynamic and dialogical relationship.   
If, as ‘Différance’ insists, différance comprises two conflicting movements, which 
makes it ‘unthinkable’, this renders Žižek’s idea of “pure” différance meaningless; différance 
is internally impure, it is always already contaminated.  Returning to Žižek’s definition of 
‘pure’ différance as “the pure gap which separates an entity from itself,”29 another 
discrepancy between différance and Žižekian “minimal difference” becomes evident.  
Žižek’s ‘pure gap’ is static, it mistakes différance, the movement which effects differences, 
for difference.  Whenever Derrida emphasises this gap it is always as part of an energetic 
and interactive process, for example, he refers to “the displaced and equivocal passage of one 
different thing to another”30 and explicitly states, when discussing Nietzsche, that 
“différance is the name we might give to the ‘active’, moving discord of different forces.”31  
Consequently, Žižek’s conception of ‘pure’ différance obscures Derrida’s own presentation 
of difference and clouds Žižek’s reading of Derrida’s later work. ‘Pure’ différance is itself 
meaningless and obfuscates Derridean différance.  By looking at two later texts which 
explore the ethical and religious resonances of différance and replicate its dialogical 
movements, I shall demonstrate the consistency of différance throughout Derrida’s work 
and undermine Zizek’s claim of a “religious turn” which betrays différance.  The texts I shall 
discuss are ‘Force of Law: On the Mystical Foundation of Authority’, first presented in 1989, 
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therefore representing the middle period, and a later work, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, 
published in 2005. 
The description of the two movements within différance in the text ‘Différance’ finds its 
structural equivalent in the relationship between law and justice in ‘Force of Law’.  This text 
explores one of the ways in which différantial movements function, demonstrating that 
they are always situated in an ethico-political context.  I will focus on the first part of the 
text, ‘Of the Right to Justice/From Law to Justice,’ which considers the necessary violence in 
the process of founding laws and the way in which justice is implicated in this process.   
The distinction with which Derrida begins is between law, as calculable, measured 
and determined, and justice as that which exceeds it, being, “without economic circularity, 
without calculation and without rules…”32  For Derrida, it may be possible to accurately 
describe something as legal, but it is always impossible to label something just; justice is too 
shifting, too difficult to place.  Not only do these movements of law and justice as economic 
and non-economic recall us to the différantial movements, they are also, Derrida claims, 
both necessary for deconstruction.  Deconstruction therefore, takes place between the 
deconstructible strictures of law and the undeconstructible and unlocatable idea of justice.  
The binary between law and justice which Derrida posited at the start of the text is 
definitively undermined by the inextricability of the relationship between law and justice, 
reflecting the double movement of différance and undermining Žižek’s claim to a “pure” 
différance.      
For Derrida, justice is already implicated in the process of instituting law; he 
maintains that “The very emergence of justice and law, the instituting, founding and 
justifying moment of law implies a performative force, that is to say always an interpretive 
force and a call to faith.”33  Derrida further expands this by elucidating Pascal’s claim: “La 
justice sans la force est impuissante,” by suggesting that “justice is not justice, it is not 
achieved if it does not have the force to be ‘enforced’; a powerless justice is not justice, in 
the sense of law.”34  Within the conditions of possibility of justice is the assumption that it 
too relies on the necessary force of law, thus reinforcing the necessity of their dialogical 
relationship.  This is elucidated by Derrida’s earlier emphasis on the link between différance 
and force, to the ‘‘active’ moving discord of different forces, and of differences of forces.’  He 
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recalls his usage of the word in ‘Force of Law’, noting that it is always used with vigilance, 
and that it must be recognised with regard to its own reversibility.  He suggests: “What must 
be thought, therefore, is this exercise of force in language itself, in the most intimate of its 
essence, as in the movement by which it would absolutely disarm itself from itself.”35  This 
movement will reappear in Rogues, as the autoimmune pervertibility, or self-interruption of 
democracy.   
This force of law relates to what Derrida, following Pascal, terms the mystical 
foundation of authority.  This refers to the groundless nature of law and the performative 
violence which inaugurates it.  This force through which a law is established can have no 
foundation to legitimise it, and equivalent force exercised after the construction of the law 
would be deemed illegal.  Here, Derrida is remarkably close to Žižek, who insists on the 
contingency at the heart of the apparent necessity of law, and, “a certain reality of violence, 
which coincides with the very act of the establishment of the law.”36  Both thinkers insist 
that this contradiction within the concept of law must be concealed in order to retain the 
authority of the law; as Žižek explains: “what is ‘repressed’ then, is not some obscure origin 
of the Law but the very fact that the Law is not to be accepted as true, only as necessary- the 
fact that its authority is without truth.”37   
Throughout my discussion of ‘Force of Law’ I have been seeking to show how the 
relationship between law and justice reinscribes the dialogical movements of diffërance, and 
to thus disprove the Žižekian critique that the relationship between law and justice 
demands the introduction of something external to différance.  Žižek’s own attempt to 
escape the dialectic comes via the claim that “the absolute excess is that of the Law itself”38 
and is mirrored by the dynamic relationship between law and justice.  “In their very 
heterogeneity,” Derrida observes, “these two orders are indissociable.”39  Any strict binary 
between law and justice fails to account for the complexity of the relationship, for example 
the way in which the excessive origins of law mean that it too partakes in the incalculability 
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of justice.  Further, contrary to Žižek’s argument, there is no protective gesture which 
guards against the unpredictability of deconstruction, as the two movements are 
‘indissociable’.  Derrida at no point advocates putting an external limit on the non-
economical or incalculable element of différance.  He says: 
Abandoned to itself, the incalculable and giving [donatrice] idea of justice is always 
very close to the bad, even to the worst for it can always be reappropriated by the 
most perverse calculation… An absolute assurance against this risk can only saturate 
or suture the opening of the call to justice.40       
However, as we have already seen, the calculable is not something which can be made to 
‘step in’ after the event to limit its consequences.  This comes right back to différance, and to 
how and why ‘Force of Law’ is an analysis of différantial forces in a particular context, 
rather than a misuse of différance as Žižek would argue. ‘Force of Law’ opens with a strict 
binary between law and justice which is then displaced, différance of course, being “the 
displacement of this oppositional logic,”41 a movement of destabilizing and questioning 
which can never be apolitical. When Derrida declares that “Deconstruction is Justice,”42 he 
refers to the différantial movement in itself, rather than any additional “content” which 
may be added to it. 
Just as the différantial movements first presented in ‘Différance’ are exemplified by the 
relationship between law and justice in “Force of Law,” différance also figures through the 
internal tension in the concept of democracy in Derrida’s 2005 text Rogues.  Derrida offers 
two differing readings of democracy which correspond with the dialogical movements of 
différance.  Playing on tropes of circling and revolving, he identifies the first movement or 
truth of democracy as an economic movement which aspires to a return to same or self.  A 
more concrete example of this is the way that democracy measures itself out, offering equal 
rights and equal access to opportunities.  Derrida maintains: “it seems difficult to think such 
a desire for or naming of democratic space without the rotary motion of some quasi-circular 
return or rotation toward the self, toward the origin itself.”43  This movement often figures 
as a withdrawal into silence in order to preserve its sovereignty.  There is, Derrida insists, no 
sovereignty without force (as there is no justice without the necessary “force of law”) and 
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therefore, “democracy would be precisely this, a force (kratos), a force in the form of a 
sovereign authority….”44  There is however, no force without “differences of forces” and 
this reading of democracy is described alongside another truth of democracy.  Derrida 
asserts that “the relationship between the commensurable and the incommensurable is what 
is at stake in democracy,”45 evidently recalling the economic and non-economic movements 
of différance.  The movement I have already described is that of the commensurable. 
The second movement, that of the incommensurable, consists of heterogeneity, 
license and openness to the other.  The passage to democracy often involves the taking of 
too many liberties and democracy itself gives freedom and indetermination rather than 
measured equality.  Derrida suggests that freedom and equality “are reconcilable, so to 
speak, only in a turning or alternating fashion.”46  These two movements are both 
constitutive of democracy yet cannot be thought together, as with the movements of 
différance.  Derrida takes up Plato’s claim that democracy can never name a regime or 
constitution, and suggests that it can never be a concept either, as this schism between its 
two modes denies it a ‘proper’ or self-same identity.  
This is not to be confused with a gap between the theory and practice of democracy; 
for Derrida, the “opening of indetermination and indecidability” is “in the very concept of 
democracy.”47  Derrida refers to the aporia at the heart of democracy as the “autoimmune 
pervertibility of democracy.”48  This describes the way in which democracy must, by its very 
nature, leave itself open to attacks on democracy in the very name of democracy.  This 
double bind is akin to the structural flaws in democracy which Žižek describes in The 
Sublime Object of Ideology: “the universal notion of ‘democracy’ is none the less a 
‘necessary fiction’, a symbolic fact in the absence of which effective democracy, in all the 
plurality of its forms, could not reproduce itself.”49  
Rogues itself brings us back to différance, describing it in terms virtually identical to 
those it used for one of the movements of democracy.  Derrida affirms différance as 
“undeniable experience of the alterity of the other, of heterogeneity, of the singular, the 
not-same, the different, the dissymmetric, the heteronomous”50 and refers to democracy 
through the ideas of differing and deferring which he used to lay out the structure of 
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différance.  Here he states that “the democratic renvoi spaces and diffracts more than one 
logic and more than one semantic schema,”51 as demonstrated by the movements of 
commensurable and incommensurable previously described, and therefore “In both senses 
of différance, then, democracy is différantial; it is différance, renvoi, and spacing.”52  In 
‘Différance’, Derrida refers to the interval which divides the present from what it is not as 
also dividing the present within itself thus creating the spacing of différance, and initiating 
what he calls “the becoming-space of time or the becoming-time of space.”53  Derrida uses 
the same formula to describe the democratic in Rogues, thus demonstrating that the 
dialogical movements of différance recur throughout Derrida’s work, unsettling Žižek’s 
account of a ‘turn’ which betrays différance.   
 
Žižek’s somewhat limited critique of Derrida’s ‘turn’ is rendered unsustainable by the 
structural consistency of Derrida’s work and the dialogical movements of différance, 
however, a  more nuanced and challenging critique is offered by Arthur Bradley, who 
claims, following Bernard Stiegler, that Derrida’s later work displays a 
“transcendentalization of the aporia”.54  Shifting considerably from his 2004 argument that 
Derrida’s use of negative theology provides a way to think the aporia between ethics and 
politics, Bradley’s 2006 article ‘Derrida’s God: A Genealogy of the Theological Turn’ 
contends:  
 
To understand Derrida’s work in terms of a quasi-religious vocabulary of the 
promise, the impossible or the messianic is... to reduce the material and historical 
scope of his work and even to evacuate the ethico-political dimension of 
deconstruction.55 
 
To some extent, acknowledging Derrida’s consistency and dismissing accounts of a radical 
and unexpected ‘turn’ in Derrida’s work, Bradley offers an alternative narrative of Derrida’s 
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“passage from the material to the transcendental and ultimately the theological”.56  
Assenting to Stiegler’s assumption that Derrida’s work aims to articulate “an originary point 
of aporia that precedes and determines the oppositions between the transcendental and the 
empirical upon which the metaphysics of presence seeks to institute itself”,57 Bradley argues 
that the later Derrida risks depicting this aporia as “entirely independent of the empirical”,58 
indeed as a transcendental condition.  Bradley identifies three ways in which Stiegler 
critiques Derrida: first, Stiegler rejects Derrida’s “avowedly philosophical approach”59 as 
retaining too close a link to the position to be deconstructed; secondly, Stiegler suggests that 
the historical expression of différance is underemphasised, leaving it at risk of interpretation 
as a “purely transcendental concept”;60 and finally, these problems are intensified by 
Derrida’s ‘quasi-religious vocabulary’, which repeats the “de-fault” of metaphysics, “the 
disavowal or repression of its own technical finitude”.61  This final point, expressed most 
fully in Stiegler’s essay ‘Fidelity at the Limits of Deconstruction and the Prosthesis of Faith’ 
forms the basis of Bradley’s own argument.   
 Bradley alleges that “over the course of Derrida’s career the empirical context and 
history of the aporia of origin is effaced as he resorts to increasingly transcendental means of 
articulating it,”62 resulting in a “‘top downwards’ bias”.63  Whereas the aporia is expressed 
through the “historical, material or technical processes”64  in the earlier work, Derrida’s later 
work prefers “to translate the aporia through such concepts as the immemorial promise, 
originary hospitality to the other, or, increasingly, messianic time”.65  Bradley, somewhat 
reductively, allies these two with Beardsworth’s ‘technical’ and ‘religious’ tendencies of 
deconstruction.  Bradley’s argument has two key components.  First, he uses examples of 
Derrida’s work on the gift, sacrifice and hospitality to illustrate the gap between the earlier, 
‘material’ work, and the later, ‘theological’ work, reasoning that the latter privileges the 
transcendental in the expression of the aporia of origin, resulting in an “empirical deficit”.66  
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Secondly, Bradley disagrees with Derrida’s approach to technics.  Whereas Stiegler regards 
technics as a privileged way of understanding the aporia, Derrida is, according to Bradley, 
“constantly trying to avoid the simple or positivistic equation of the aporia with technics as 
if the latter were its proper name”.67  Bradley, along with other ‘materialist’ critics, is 
frustrated by the abstractions of Derrida’s engagement with “history, matter or 
technology”.68  The latter is clearly the motivating force behind Bradley’s critique, with the 
first element, the accusation of ‘transcendentalization’, expressed with surprising hesitancy.  
He cautions that the division between early and late Derrida, on which his argument 
depends, “should not be exaggerated”,69 only tentatively suggesting that “it seems to me that 
there is at least a danger that the theologically-inflected work begins to make the aporia 
look like a transcendental concept or logic that simply exists before, or outside of, history”.70   
Admittedly, Derrida’s references to “an immemorial promise”71 or “absolute past”72 do raise 
the spectre of the transcendental, however, like Žižek’s critique, Bradley’s position doesn’t 
fully acknowledge the structural consistency of Derrida’s work.  This means that the 
‘immemorial’, ‘absolute’ or unconditional is always experienced “through empiricity”.73  In 
addition to the examples I have already used, I want to reinforce this using two of Bradley’s 
own examples: the gift and hospitality.   
In Derrida’s Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, in part a corrective to Mauss’s economic 
model of the gift, Derrida maintains that the excessive and unconditional nature of the gift 
means that once it enters circular economy of gift giving and return, it is annulled.  
However, despite being “aneconomic”,74 the gift “would no doubt be related to economy”.75  
As we have seen, this would not be an economical or dialectical relation, rather the two are 
connected dialogically.  Derrida explains: “the overrunning of the circle by the gift, if there 
is any, does not lead to a simple, ineffable exteriority that would be transcendent and 
without relation. It is this exteriority that sets the circle going, it is this exteriority that puts 
the economy in motion”.76  Although it is reductive to associate the gift, as incalculable or 
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unconditional, with the transcendental and economy, as the conditional or calculable, with 
the empirical, it is clear that, for Derrida, the unconditional can never be expressed outside 
the limitations of empiricity.  Similarly, in Of Hospitality Derrida argues that hospitality 
“marks the collision between two laws”: the first law is a law of “unlimited hospitality” 
which has no conditions, and the second describes the “conditions... norms... rights... and 
duties” which define our understanding of hospitality.77  Thus the first is an absolute 
hospitality imagined outside of any social framework and the second illustrates the social 
and political elements which come into play when we situate hospitality experientially.  
Derrida insists that these two laws are indissociable: the demand of one for the other is 
constitutive of the concept of hospitality, which is formed by negotiation and dialogue 
between the terms, rather than a dialectical resolution.  Derrida’s increased exploration of 
concepts and terms which Martin Hägglund deems ‘positively valorized’ causes critics such 
as Žižek to assume that Derrida’s philosophical or political position has shifted over time.  
Such an assumption, is, I have shown, undermined by the consistency of Derrida’s approach 
to such terms, an approach which reveals the dialogical relationship between the 
economical and non-economical, or conditional and unconditional elements which 
constitute each term or concept.  Turning now to ‘Sauf le nom (Post Scriptum)’, a text in 
which the dialogical nature of deconstruction is rendered explicit through Derrida’s use of 
different speakers and voices, I shall explore some of the implications of this dialogical 
mode, in particular, its impact on Derrida’s understanding of ‘God’.    
 
3. Reading ‘Sauf le nom (Post Scriptum)’ 
 
(a) Dialogue, Deconstruction and Negative Theology 
 
Inspired by the “pluralized chorus” of negative theology,78 Derrida asserts that the dialogical 
mode adopted by ‘Sauf le nom (Post-Scriptum)’ is “necessary” (35) if he is to speak at all, 
and, in particular, if he is to speak of God.79  In my reading of this ‘fictive dialogue’, I shall 
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demonstrate the importance of dialogue in the text, and argue that it enables Derrida to 
develop a “post-writing” (53) through which he can envisage a non-ontotheological God.       
 
‘Sauf le nom’ takes place between two speakers discussing, and even enacting, the gestures 
of negative theology.  At the start of the text, the speakers are largely distinguishable by 
their different concerns and perspectives, with one voice frequently linking the issues under 
consideration to deconstruction (43) and sustaining the vigilant critical questioning 
consonant with deconstruction, asking, for example, “By what right are these aphorisms, 
these sententious fragments, or these poetic flashes linked together, as if they formed the 
continuous tissue of a syllogism?” (42)  The other voice endeavours to return the 
conversation to mysticism and negative theology, towards which s/he is generally credulous 
rather than critical.  S/he looks to inform and discover rather than deconstruct and uses 
terms such as “essential” (36) and “proper” (37) rather more freely than her deconstructive 
counterpart.  However, demonstrating that dialogue generates a cross-pollination of ideas, 
during the course of the text these positions shift, converge and even swap over.   
For Arthur Bradley, the dialogical nature of the text is a response to negative 
theology; ‘Sauf le nom’ is thus “an attempt to bring out the plurality, the multiple voices at 
work behind and within the deceptively singular name and restricted tradition of negative 
theology”.80  Often associated with a “voiceless voice” (35), or what I shall identify in the 
next chapter as ‘linguistic silence’, Derrida looks to assert that negative theology also speaks 
in divided and contradictory voices; it “says one thing and its contrary, God that is without 
being or God that (is) beyond being” (35).  These voices form an exploratory dialogue, and 
so, reflecting this, the utterances of Derrida’s ‘theological’ speaker are themselves dialogical; 
s/he both speaks in the first person and rearticulates the aphorisms of Silesius and others.81  
This “unusual alliance of two powers and of two voices ” (66) challenges the assumed ipseity 
of the experiencing subject and suggests that the identities of both God and subject are no 
longer restricted by “the proper or the self-same” (65).  Negative theology “radically 
dissociates being and knowing, existence and knowledge.  It is, as it were, a fracture of the 
cogito” (65-6).   
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‘Sauf le nom’ stages a dialogue between two interpretations of negative theology: first, that it 
has a fixed, transcendent “essence” (48) which is revealed through its historical 
manifestations, and secondly, that negative theology names only the totality of these 
instances and inscriptions, and is therefore a changeable, historical phenomenon.  In 
performatively negotiating this question, and in rejecting the idea that negative theology is 
simply “a ‘topic’”? (47) to be objectively analysed, the text also looks to clarify negative 
theology’s relationship with deconstruction.    
The historical manifestations of negative theology are received as a linguistic corpus, 
immediately raising the question of negative theology’s relationship with language.  In 
response to this, one of the speakers proposes that “What is called ‘negative theology’, in an 
idiom of Greco-Latin filiation, is a language [langage]” (48), a proposition that is 
nevertheless rendered provisional by the dialogical nature of the text and the constantly 
shifting positions of the two speakers.82  The other speaker in turn responds that negative 
theology is rather that which questions and exceeds language, and that its essence remains 
outside language.  The first speaker accepts these features of negative theology, but asserts 
that these are features of it as a language, asking “How does one leap out of this circle?” (48), 
a question which preoccupies Derrida throughout his work.     
 Negative theology’s status as a language is complicated by its reflexivity, a reflexivity 
which, according to J. P. Williams, enables it to “escape the one-sidedness of either 
dogmatism or nihilism”.83  Here, the speaker describes negative theology as “the most 
intractable experience of the “‘essence’ of language” (54) in which “language and tongue 
speak for themselves” (54) as its “formalizing rarefaction” (49) is countered by a “poetic or 
fictional dimension” (54).  Although evidently both post-scriptum and dialogue, the genre of 
‘Sauf le nom’ is not clearly defined and thus, questions of reading and interpretation remain 
open.  The first speaker’s chastisement of the other’s attempt to form a consistent, linear 
narrative from Silesius’s aphorisms may be applied to our own reading practices with regard 
to ‘Sauf le nom’.  The speaker declares: “You cannot treat this peregrination of writing as a 
treatise of philosophy or theology, not even as a sermon or a hymn” (42), foregrounding 
both the performativity of the text and, as I shall demonstrate with regard to God, the 
                                                             
82 It is interesting to compare this to the opening of ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ whose content, although 
apparently similar, is expressed through a single speaker: “Under the very loose heading of ‘negative theology’, as 
you know, one often designates a certain form of language, with its mise en scène, its rhetorical, grammatical, 
and logical modes, its demonstrative procedures- in short a textual practice attested or even situated ‘in history’, 
although it does sometimes exceed the predicates that constitute this or that concept of history.” Derrida, 
‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 143).  
83 J. P. Williams, p. 9. 
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importance of space and place.  This link between writing and performativity also connects 
to ideas of subjectivity and kenosis which are explored in the text.  Rejecting a writing 
which creates and preserves the sovereignty of the self, the speakers observe the way in 
which Silesius conflates becoming writing and becoming divine, in aphorisms such as “Go 
and become yourself the writ and yourself the essence”(41).  The development, or rather 
dissolution of subjectivity, “this becoming-self as becoming-God- or Nothing”(43) is enabled 
by a writing which becomes inseparable from subjectivity “in writing itself, in scripting 
itself [en s’écrivant, en s’écriturant]” (42).    
Negative theology’s aim to avoid misleading, ontotheological designations for God 
leads the speakers to question its own ontological status and whether it is “a modality of 
‘being’” (55).  The problem of representing negative theology if it is not “something 
(determinable)” (55) recalls Derrida’s own earlier use of apophatic language.  For Derrida, 
the structure of the trace enables language to bear witness to that which has no ontological 
essence.  Thus, negative theology “would be nothing, very simply nothing, if this excess or 
this surplus (with regard to language) did not imprint some mark on some singular events of 
language and did not leave some remains on the body of a tongue...”(55).  Consequently, it 
seems that negative theology is both within and without language.  The theological 
speaker’s bold assertion that negative theology takes place “over the edge” (60) of language, 
and the deconstructive speaker’s affirmation that negative theology is always rooted within 
language, as “this jealous anger of language within itself and against itself” (59-60) are not 
resolved dialectically, rather the text’s dialogical mode enables both positions to be 
maintained simultaneously.  The text as post-scriptum i.e. writing both after the event and 
as the event, resists a fixed resolution of this problem, instead, “It announces in a double 
sense: it signals an open possibility, but it also provokes thereby the opening of the 
possibility.  Its event is at once revealing and producing, post-scriptum and prolegomenon, 
inaugural writing” (64).  In this way, ‘Sauf le nom’ both reinforces the traditional gestures of 
negative theology, and, as Arthur Bradley asserts, repeats them otherwise.  Bradley contests 
that “Derrida seeks to listen to negative theology’s other voice, then, the voice that 
questions every certitude including its own, that refuses to remain content within any 
theological, institutional or political doctrine or body and surrenders itself to an 
unknowable object”, a voice which acknowledges “the alterity of the other ”.84  However, 
this voice which “radically contests the tradition from which it seems to come” (67), 
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remains in dialogue with this tradition, creating a deconstructive double movement, an 
“uprooting rooting” (67), or “double truth of filiation” (73) which situates negative theology 
both inside and outside tradition.  This parallels Derrida’s own relationship to his 
philosophical predecessors, characterised as a “filial lack of piety.”85  Consequently, 
deconstruction and negative theology are again linked by the methodological similarity of 
this insistent plurality of voices or double movement which generates both a “rupture” (67) 
and “a countersignature, even if it denies this” (68).     
The speakers stress the elements of tension and dialogue within the history and 
practice of negative theology, recalling the interaction between the Greek philosophical and 
mystical Christian traditions, which produced the current understanding of negative 
theology.  These two different but conversant approaches are echoed by the theological and 
deconstructive positions which intersect in ‘Sauf le nom’, and are described by the speaker 
as “these two trajectories, these two paths [trajets] thus arrowed would cross each other in 
the heart of what we call negative theology” (62).86  A similar dialogue or tension is also 
exposed within the Christian tradition, between negative theology as a constitutive part of 
institutional Christianity, and, like deconstruction in its relation to philosophy, as a parasitic 
practice of constant critique; as such, “two concurrent desires divide apophatic theology” 
(83).  In addition to exploring the tensions within apophaticism, ‘Sauf le nom’ also engages 
in a broader theological debate, considering the interaction and dialogue between the 
apophatic and the kataphatic.    
 
‘Sauf le nom’ maintains that the “purely apophatic instance” (51) is always counterbalanced 
by the plenitude of a prayer, hymn or other affirmative utterance.87  Thus the speaker 
describes, “the measure of a relation, and this relation is stretched between two poles, one of 
which must be that of positivity de-negated” (51).  The tension between affirmation and 
negation is inevitable when speaking of God, and William Franke describes the 
contradiction between the “strict unsayability of God according to his essence” and “the 
prolix languages about him in relation to the created universe”.88  Derrida’s response is to 
                                                             
85 Derrida, ‘Dialanguages’, pp. 132-155 (p. 151).  
86 This cross or chiasmus is itself a symbol which brings together Christianity and deconstruction. For a 
discussion of the significance of the chiasmus for deconstruction see Rayment-Pickard. 
87 See also Oliver Davies’s alternative view that whereas ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ intertwines the 
negative with the positive, ‘Sauf le nom’ separates the two: Oliver Davies, A Theology of Compassion, (London: 
SCM Press, 2001), p. 126. 
88 Franke, p. 16. Franke argues that this tension is to some extent resolved by Dionysius’s claim that we can come 
to know God through Creation.  He explains: “The purely transcendent One and the existing One are actually a 
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underline the dynamic relationship between affirmation and negation, and to use the term 
‘de-negation’ rather than reinforcing a simplistic binary.  In this way, he looks to 
demonstrate both that the ‘apophatic instant’ is not purely mechanical, and that the 
connection between apophatic and kataphatic theologies cannot be reduced to dialectic.        
 Following Aquinas, the relationship between kataphasis and apophasis is often 
characterised as dialectical.89  Proponents of this view include Jeffrey Fisher, who sees the 
emergence of theological language “in the transcendence of the conjunction” between the 
two terms,90 Kevin Hart,91 and Denys Turner, who asserts: “The apophatic therefore 
presupposes the cataphatic ‘dialectically’ in the sense that the silence of the negative way is 
the silence achieved only at the point at which talk about God has been exhausted”.92  
Turner traces this back to the interdependence of the kataphatic and apophatic in Pseudo-
Dionysius’s works The Divine Names and The Mystical Theology; arguing that Dionysius’s 
work “shows the dialectical pulsation between affirmations and negations that characterises 
the enterprise of Christian negative theology as a whole”.93  Derrida roundly rejects this 
dialectical interpretation of negative theology, insisting in ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ 
that “this de-negation does not give dialectic a chance”.94  Such a rejection has its theological 
roots in Eastern Orthodox tradition, with Rowan Williams expressing Orthodox theologian 
Vladimir Lossky’s view that “the conventional Western view of the apophatic method as 
essentially a corrective to cataphatic theology, a qualification which acts as a necessary 
dialectical stage between the via affirmitiva and the via eminentiae, is a misunderstanding of 
its real nature.”95  Lossky instead insists upon the superiority of apophaticism to 
kataphaticism, a position he ascribes to Dionysius himself.96  This results in two different 
types, or interpretations of negative theology.  J. P. Williams elucidates:     
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
unity in Dionysius- like the negative and affirmative methods of theology, which necessarily work together”, 
Franke, p. 20.  
89 See Gregory P. Rocca, O.P., Speaking the Incomprehensible God: Thomas Aquinas on the Interplay of Positive 
and Negative Theology (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004). 
90 Fisher, 529-548 (p. 548). 
91 Kevin Hart, The Trespass of the Sign: Deconstruction, Theology and Philosophy (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 193. 
92 Denys Turner, ‘Apophaticism, Idolatry and the Claims of Reason’, in Silence and the Word: Negative Theology 
and Incarnation, ed. by Oliver Davies and Denys Turner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 11-
34 (p. 18). 
93 Turner, p. 3.  
94 Derrida, ‘Denials, pp. 143-195 (p. 163). 
95 Rowan Williams, Wrestling with Angels: Conversations in Modern Theology, ed. by Mike Higton (London: 
SCM Press, 2007), p. 2. 
96 Franke reinforces this, asserting that “Dionysius accords priority to the negative way”, Franke, p. 16.  
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In summary, the two competing theories of apophasis are: first, a negation which is 
complementary to affirmation and is anterior to a transcendent or superlative 
affirmation about the divine; or second, a negation which is posterior to both 
affirmations and first-order negations about the divine97   
 
Similarly, tracing this division back to Pseudo-Dionysius, Gregory Rocca asserts:  
 
It is hard to escape the conclusion that to some degree Dionysius recognizes two 
kinds of negative theology: one is exoteric and forms a dialectic with the assertions 
of affirmative theology, while the other is an esoteric mystical unknowing based on 
the dark ascents.  This second type is not a part of discursive theology at all since its 
primary act is silence and its object is the God beyond reason.98 
 
Derrida is alert to such a division within negative theology, and his rejection of dialectic 
appears to align him with the second position, of which J. P. Williams goes on to explain:      
 
The apophatic negation of negation offers a different approach to the divine.  
Through its dialectical affirmation, negation and subsequent negation of both 
preceding stages, it creates a contradiction which cannot be resolved in favour of 
either of the contradictory positions, or of a third position, even that of no-position.  
Now the mind can only ‘hover’ between the poles of the contradiction, affirming 
both and neither, negating both and neither.99 
 
Here, rather than describing two different views or types of negative theology, Williams 
argues that they are two stages of the same process which are, therefore, not opposed and 
cannot be resolved dialectically, particularly as the second stage consists of transcending 
dialectical modes of thought and expression.  The tension which emerges in the second 
stage, that “apophasis can actually be apprehended only in discourse- in language insofar as 
it negates itself  and tends to disappear as language”,100 is a primary focus for ‘Sauf le nom’.   
Denying a dialectical resolution to the two stages of the apophatic process as it would 
necessitate a reduction of difference to the same, Derrida maintains his dialogical approach, 
aiming for the development of a discourse which would be irreducible to binary terms and 
dialectic.  Here again, negative theology provides the model, with Derrida linking 
                                                             
97 J.P. Williams, p. 5. 
98 Rocca, p. 21.  
99 J. P. Williams, p. 8.  See also John Jones’s similar definition: “On the one hand, negative theology functions 
within affirmative theology or, more specifically, metaphysical to express the pre-eminence of the divine cause.  
Here, if you will, the negations are ‘super affirmations’.  On the other hand negative theology provides for 
mystical unity with the divinity.  Here negative (mystical) theology denies all that is and all reference to beings 
and, by my interpretation, ultimately denies all affirmative theology and hence, all metaphysics”, John Jones 
cited in Hart, Trespass, p. 200.   
100 Franke, p. 1. 
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deconstruction, “the very experience of the (impossible) possibility of the impossible”, to 
Angelus Silesius’s use of ‘de-negation’ to introduce “an absolute heterogeneity in the order 
and in the modality of the possible”, thus conceiving, “what appears impossible, more than 
impossible, the most impossible possible, more impossible than the impossible if the 
impossible is the simple negative modality of the possible” (43).  In the next section, I shall 
consider how negative theology’s challenge to the limits of expression motivates Derrida’s 
mode of “post-writing” (53).       
 
(b) ‘Post-writing’ and Rethinking God  
 
In ‘Sauf le nom’, Derrida draws out the plurivocity of both deconstruction and negative 
theology, and places them in dialogue with each other.  The dominance of the dialogical 
mode is for Derrida, not a contrivance but a ‘non-fictional necessity’ which develops from 
attentive listening and enables an alternative form of thought or writing, unbound by 
logocentric norms.  This singular or idiomatic mode, which would exceed “the irresponsible 
unfolding of a program” (59), he terms ‘post-writing’.101  In this section, I shall examine this 
idea of ‘post-writing’ and draw out its connections to Derrida’s understanding of God.   
 
In ‘Sauf le nom’, Derrida speaks of the “end of monologism- and of what follows...” (35) and 
it is clear that his use of the dialogical mode in the text, or rather his lifting of the 
prohibition on plurivocity, directly enables ‘post-writing’, recalling the ‘athetic writing’ I 
discussed in Chapter One.  This idea of liberating writing from certain imposed constraints 
recalls his discussion of the end of the book in Of Grammatology.  There, Derrida explained, 
“the idea of the book, which always refers to a natural totality, is profoundly alien to the 
sense of disruption of writing, against its aphoristic energy, and [...] against difference in 
                                                             
101 It is important that the ‘post’ of ‘post-writing’ is not understood as reinforcing familiar notions of closure and 
chronology, but as both challenging such notions and as signifying a certain otherness.  Recall Derrida’s 
insistence in ‘In Discussion with Christopher Norris’: “As you know, I never use the word ‘post’, the prefix ‘post’; 
and I have many reasons for this. One of those reasons is that this use of the prefix implies a periodisation or an 
epochalisation which is highly problematic for me. Then again, the word ‘post’ implies that something is 
finished- that we can get rid of what went before Deconstruction, and I don’t think anything of the sort”, 
Jacques Derrida, ‘In Discussion with Christopher Norris’, in Deconstruction: Omnibus Volume, ed. by Andrew 
Benjamin, Catherine Cooke and Andrea Papadakis (London: Academy Editions, 1989), pp. 71-5 (p. 72). For a 
comparable scepticism towards the “linear chronology” implied by the prefix ‘post’, see Jean-François Lyotard, 
‘Note on the Meaning of ‘Post-‘, in Postmodernism: A Reader, ed. by Thomas Docherty (Harlow: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1993), pp. 47-50 (p. 48). 
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general”.102  In this way, Derrida’s appeal to ‘post-writing’, and his alliance with negative 
theology, that which challenges the institutional sureties of theology from within, and 
explores ambiguity and heterogeneity, are consistent with his life-long attention to 
difference.     
 Following this prediction in Of Grammatology, ‘Sauf le nom’ explicitly rejects the 
totality of the book.  It presents itself as a post-scriptum, self-consciously referring to its 
own false starts, pretexts, prolegomena and post-scripta, undermining its own autonomy and 
sovereignty and rendering itself strangely absent or aporetic.  It appears as a 
decontextualised fragment which celebrates its own contrived artificiality as inscription of a 
‘fictive dialogue’.  This act of ‘post-writing’ challenges the primacy of speech over writing, 
the assumption of linear temporality, the possibility of distinct, uncontaminated genres, the 
boundaries between inside and outside, and our understanding of the event as that which 
precedes its inscription.  ‘Post writing’ is excessive, exceeding familiar limits.  It has no 
absolute beginning; in the case of negative theology, it proceeds from “this astonishing 
fact[fait], this already done [déjà fait], this all done [tout fait]” (53) and engages in 
“repeating, continuing, importing and transporting” (52).  In recording the events of 
negative theology, a discourse which is formed and sustained by the inscription and 
transmission of experiences which exist on the limits of comprehension and language, this 
‘post-writing’, is always challenging the limits of expression, as well as the infinity of 
signification.  Always performative, uninhibited, the destination of this writing can never be 
secured, rather its address is always divided, multiplied, echoing the passage of the 
apophatic apostrophe which is, “at once vertical and horizontal”.103 
 The concept of ‘post-writing’ is developed through its links to translation and 
prayer, both of which engage with the limits of language.  Translation is determined by the 
limits between and beyond language, and thus, “the untouchable (unberhrbar) is what 
fascinates and orients the work of the translator”.104  Negative theology is understood as “the 
chance of an incomparable translatability without limit” (47) and the colloquium which 
generates the post-scriptum is itself inspired by experiences of translation.  Derrida 
understands translation not as a step towards “a universal tongue” (47) or the diminution of 
difference, but as negotiating the passage between the singular and the general, without 
                                                             
102 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, rev. edn (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1997), p. 18.  
103 Rubenstein, pp. 195-211 (p. 205). 
104 Jacques Derrida, ‘Des Tours de Babel’, trans. by Joseph F. Graham in Acts of Religion, ed. by Gil Anidjar 
(London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 104-134 (p. 124). 
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ever losing sight of the singularity of the idiom.  Derrida describes how negative theology 
similarly negotiates this limit, relying on affirmation and prayer to prevent the discourse 
becoming wholly formalisable and mechanically replicable.  He asserts in ‘How to Avoid 
Speaking: Denials’: “I will try to show how negative theology claims, at least, not to be 
assimilable to a technique that is exposed to simulacrum and to parody, to mechanical 
repetition.  It escapes from these by means of the prayer that precedes apophatic 
utterances.”105  Derrida also emphasises the performativity of prayer; it is a practice which 
incorporates both faith and scepticism and thus “has more than one edge at the same 
time”.106  Its “suspension of certainty”107 renders it challenging and exploratory, rather than 
functioning as a simple reinforcement of institutional norms and discourses, making it a 
discourse suited to both theist and atheist.  
 Unlike the book, which masquerades as a completed totality, ‘post-writing’ draws 
attention to its status as unfinished or in process; it is “a tongue to come” (47), which is 
“always on the way” (68).  Such a writing is therefore, open to dissonant modes and voices 
and always plurivocal; it “cannot be a simple mark identical to self” (61) and it allows 
“language and tongue [to] speak for themselves” (54).  It is this incursion of ‘post-writing’ 
into ‘Sauf le nom’ which triggers the blurring of boundaries between speaking subjects, 
between public and private and between Derrida’s text and those of others.  Here, in this 
post-scriptum which enacts “the coming of a writing after the other” (61), recalling 
Derrida’s claim in ‘Circumfession’ that ‘one always confesses the other’ it seems particularly 
apt that Derrida’s text overlaps with Augustine’s Confessions, as in the midst of 
philosophical enquiry, the speaker describes, “this place of retreat you invited me to, in this 
town of familial exile where your mother has not finished dying, on the shore of the 
Mediterranean...” (40-1).  It is clear from such examples that ‘post-writing’ is inescapably 
contaminated, plurivocal and impure; it embraces difference and non-sovereignty.  This 
writing is the inevitable consequence of the realisation, expressed so firmly in 
‘Circumfession’, that:  
 
it is the idea itself of an identity or a self-interiority of every tradition (the one 
metaphysics, the one onto-theology, the one phenomenology, the one Christian 
revelation, the one history itself, the one history of being, the one epoch, the one 
                                                             
105 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 144). 
106 Jacques Derrida, ‘Epoché and Faith’, pp. 27-50 (p. 30). 
107 Derrida, ‘Epoché and Faith’, pp. 27-50 (p. 31). 
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tradition, self-identity in general, the one, etc.) that finds itself contested at its root. 
(71)    
 
In ‘Sauf le nom’ Derrida draws on negative theology because it “is one of the most 
remarkable manifestations of this self-difference” (71).  This self-difference emerges through 
the dialogical mode of the text and its exploration of the divided aims of the discourse, 
which is both central to Christian history and “anxious to render itself independent of 
revelation” (71).  Nonetheless, negative theology often denies this difference.  The 
theologically-focused speaker in ‘Sauf le nom’ recounts negative theology’s persistent 
emphasis on sovereignty and propriety in its “Desire to say and rejoin what is proper to 
God” (69).  This desire is rendered absurd by negative theology’s own insight that God must 
precede and exceed such ontological categories; as the other speaker rejoins: “-But what is 
this proper, if the proper of this proper consists in expropriating itself, if the proper of the 
proper is precisely, justly [justement], to have nothing of its own [en propre]? What does ‘is’ 
mean here?” (69).  This questioning of the limits of ontology, and in turn, rejection of the 
God of ontotheology, generates many questions regarding the nature and significance of 
God.     
 
Following Derrida’s engagement with the question of ‘God’ in his texts on negative 
theology, Oliver Davies observes that “the radical otherness of God can at any point emerge 
as address from within language itself: ‘God’ can again become ‘word’”.108  Davies continues: 
“God as presence-absence is already inscribed within the language, as trace and memory, 
and, once thought, cannot easily be set aside”.109  This inescapable theocentrism of language 
is Derrida’s starting point with regard to the question of ‘God’ in ‘Sauf le nom’.  Given the 
impossibility of eliminating every trace of ‘God’ within language, and the possibility that 
any attempt to doing so could lead to ontotheological recuperation, Derrida looks for other 
ways of interpreting and approaching the name of God, even of ‘saving the name’ of God.      
 
The question of God arises as the speakers discuss negative theology and language.  God is 
akin to a “certain absolute secret” (59) within language, the “unnameable nameable” who 
lies “beyond the name” (59).  The speakers disagree as to whether God can and should be 
revealed or unveiled, as language is “sealed with an indecipherable signature” (60) which is 
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“legible-illegible” (60).  In navigating this question of God, which gestures to the limits of 
language, the speakers themselves traverse these limits, the text “withdrawing and 
overflowing” (60), and the speakers still divided as to whether such linguistic movements 
can ever be transcended, whether language, which “prescribes overflowing this 
insufficiency”, and “necessitates going (Geh, Go!) there where one cannot go” (59), is 
condemned to repeat the same gestures.110  Here, the theological speaker is consistently 
orthodox, insisting that negative theology speaks “in the name of a way of truth” (69), 
providing a mode ‘proper’ to God through which “the forgotten secret” may be “unveiled” 
(69).  Paradoxically, the frequent negotiation and re-inscription of limits which looks to 
clarify positions, serves only to blur the division between inside and outside, and the 
perspectives of the two speakers.  
Throughout the text, Derrida exploits the ambiguity of ‘saving’ the name as both 
retaining and excepting it.  The name of God is a marker of the exterior of language 
functioning within language, and thus “effaces itself in front of what it names” (68).  
However, ‘Sauf le nom’ again complicates this division between interior and exterior, with 
Graham Ward asserting that: “there is no pure outside, and therefore no experience of the 
outside as such”.111  The ‘exterior’ is instead reproduced and secreted on the inside, even the 
limit of language itself, the edge “between language and the world”, as Oliver Davies 
describes, “becomes internalized, taken into language, as the ‘asceticism’, ‘kenosis’, or 
‘passion’ of language itself”.112  As such, language becomes condemned to a certain 
reflexivity, and the name of God, previously signifying the originary creator of language and 
“absolute witness”,113 outside of language, now represents an incomprehensible trace of an 
inaccessible exterior, lodged firmly on the interior.  Consequently, Arthur Bradley argues 
that Derrida reveals negative theology’s God to be “nothing other than this essential 
openness or incompleteness of language which has always already started and will never be 
absolutely finished.”114  This ‘incompleteness of language’ sees the distinction between 
                                                             
110 On this point, Shira Wolosky claims that “Instead of confirming the apophatic intuition against language, 
Derrida’s analysis implies that apophasis itself takes place within language and can never be disengaged from it” 
Wolosky, 261- 280 (p. 268). 
111 Graham Ward, ‘“In the Daylight Forever?”: language and silence’, in Silence and the Word, as before, p. 178. 
On this, see also Mark Taylor’s assertion that “The analysis of divine scripture discloses the interiority of 
exteriority”, Mark C. Taylor, Erring, p. 15. 
112 Davies, A Theology of Compassion , p. 128. 
113 Derrida, ‘Faith and Knowledge’, pp. 42-101 (p. 65). 
114 Bradley, Negative Theology, p. 32. 
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interior and exterior internalised, producing “transcendence in immanence”115 or “an 
absolute transcendence that announces itself within” (70).  Further, as Oliver Davies asserts 
of Derrida, the enclosure of language “creates in him (or in language, as he would say) a 
deep longing for the other, the impossible exterior”,116 which is expressed as a personal, 
individual desire as he “invests language itself with the properties of subjectivity”.117  This 
interiorised exterior is sometimes expressed through the Platonic non-concept of khōra, for 
Davies, an inscription of “the extra-linguistic real... drifting as a non-spatial entity across 
and over the boundaries of language (world) and world (language).”118   
In ‘Sauf le nom’, khōra, the place wherein the demiurge inscribed the Forms in 
Plato’s Timaeus, emerges as an example of the connections between “the experience of 
place” (57), God, and that which defies conceptualization and can only be expressed 
negatively.  Preceding the distinctions between sensible and intelligible, mythos and logos, 
khōra forms an aporia or “irreducible spacing”119 within the Platonic system, and is 
described using dialogical languages in order to approach its radical otherness.  Khōra is also 
linked to God as both foreground the problem of naming and are thus reflexive or “sur-
names” (84).  In addressing God, negative theology looks “toward the beyond of the name in 
the name” (59), and khōra, as the “singular without concept” (40), has an “impossible 
relation to the possibility of naming”.120  Both God and khōra displace “all our onto-
topological prejudices” (56) and demand of us a mode of address which is not idolatrous or 
anthropomorphic.  However, as Derrida explores in ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’, 
unlike the name of ‘God’ and negative theology, khōra initiates a mode of apophasis which 
is not delimited by “a history and an anthropo-theological dimension”.121  Instead khōra is: 
 
The name for place, a place name, and a rather singular one at that, for that spacing 
which, not allowing itself to be dominated by any theological, ontological or 
anthropological instance, without age, without history and more ‘ancient’ than all 
oppositions (for example that of sensible/intelligible) does not even announce itself 
as ‘beyond being’ in accordance with a path of negation, a via negativa.  As a result, 
chora remains absolutely impassable and heterogeneous to all processes of historical 
revelation or of anthropo-theological experience, which at the very least suppose its 
                                                             
115 Jacques Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, trans. by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1999) p.  99. 
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119 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 172). 
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abstraction.  It will never have entered religion and will never permit itself to be 
sacralized, sanctified, humanized, theologized, cultivated, historicised.122    
 
In the Introduction I discussed John Caputo and Richard Kearney’s contention that Derrida 
must, and does, choose between ‘God’ and the “absolute exteriority”123 of khōra.  In ‘Sauf le 
nom’ however, the two terms are not presented oppositionally, rather the latter is a 
condition of the former; as Hugh Rayment-Pickard maintains, “the vacation, kenosis, 
desertion or Gelassenheit of khōra ‘opens up the play of God’”.124  As Graham Ward 
perceives, the subsequent ‘play’, “between the trace as God and the trace as absolute 
instability, the play between plenitude and void”,125 is interminable.  Further, in ‘Sauf le 
nom’, Derrida’s invokes khōra as part of the search for a language for God which avoids the 
idolatry and anthropomorphism of historical accounts, as khōra  names “a site [lieu] where 
the proper no longer has any meaning”.126   
Such a language would be, for Derrida, profoundly rooted in the body.  “The event 
remains in and on language”, he discloses, “in and on the mouth”, more specifically, “on the 
tip [bout] of the tongue” (58).  These images again focus on limits and edges: of language, of 
the body and of the subject; the surface is “exposed, overflowed, outside of itself” (58).  This 
excess and exposure in turn leads to the blurring of distinctions, not only between speakers 
but between subject and object, as the movements of language “name God, speak of him, 
speak him, speak to him, let him speak in them, let themselves be carried by him...” (58).  
These movements, the opposite of a clearly apportioned monologue, undermine any 
discernible agent or agency and gesture towards a less rigid conception of subjectivity.  
Likewise, when the speaker refers to “the desire of God” (37), its equivocity, in short “does it 
come from God in us, from God for us, from us for God?” (37), leads the speaker to consider 
the effect of the genitive, here erroneous, as they are endeavouring to think about the origin 
of subject and object before these are reified in language, before “the grammatical or 
ontological upsurge of a subject or an object”(37).  Consequently, ‘God’, or, ‘the desire of 
God’, appears to name the structure of subject formation; no self-relation precedes the 
‘desire of God’, which is here glossed as the “relation to the other” (37).   
                                                             
122 Derrida, ‘Faith and Knowledge’, pp. 42-101 (p. 58).  
123 Derrida, ‘Faith and Knowledge’, pp. 42-101 (p. 57).  
124 Rayment-Pickard, p. 161. 
125 Graham Ward, Barth, Derrida and the Language of Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995), 
p. 189. 
126 Derrida, ‘Khōra’, pp. 89-127 (p. 105). 
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Acknowledging that both apophaticism and atheism testify to this ‘desire of God’, 
the speaker suggests that even the atheist requires the structural function of the witness to 
be fulfilled.  Looking to clarify the relationship between ‘God’ and language, the first 
speaker declares that “‘God’ is the name of this bottomless collapse, of this endless 
desertification of language” (55-6).  This figure of desertification signifies a double 
movement which both enacts the reduction to a skeletal language, in essence a “negative 
operation” (56), whilst ensuring that this is “inscribed in and on and as the event” (56), and 
therefore persists through the trace.  This becoming-event is a process which “finds in this 
kēnosis the most decisive condition of its coming or its upsurging” (56), and this suggests 
that we rethink God as movement or verb, rather than fixed noun, as well as exceeding 
ontological categories, as  “it is said that he names nothing that is, neither this nor that”(56).  
Elsewhere, Derrida suggests that language “is the name of God naming itself through the 
voice of God”,127 suggesting that it is the very reflexivity of language which foregrounds its 
simultaneous otherness, the inaccessible trace enclosed within it.        
Such definitions diverge from the concept of God as discrete, transcendent, self-
same and self-sufficient, facilitating instead, a plurality of definitions of God in dialogue 
with each other, definitions which include God, as the ‘desertification of language’ or “the 
divinity of God as gift or desire of giving” (56).  The adoption of conflicting utterances- here, 
figures of emptiness and plenitude- to describe God, is a familiar apophatic device, for 
example, Oliver Davies refers to Eckhart’s “tendency to contradict himself when presenting 
a theology of God”.128  This tendency serves as a reminder of God’s transcendence, and 
echoes Pseudo Dionysius’s refusal to conceptualize God in his writing.129  Here, Derrida 
directly follows the precedent of negative theology, endeavouring “to save the name of God, 
to shield it from all onto-theological idolatry” (62).  Here however, the deviation of such 
definitions of God from that which is ‘proper’, self-same or sovereign also has political 
implications.  As Derrida describes at length in the seminars published as The Beast and the 
Sovereign, the figure of the sovereign which sustains the tyranny of modern political 
sovereignty is grounded in an “anthropo-theological”130 model which derives from the figure 
of an eternal and all-powerful God.  Consequently, a shift in thinking about God could 
inaugurate a new perception of power.  Similarly, in ‘Epoché and Faith’, he explains:         
                                                             
127 Derrida, ‘The Eyes of Language’, pp. 189-227 (p. 207-8). 
128 Meister Eckhart, Selected Writings, trans. by Oliver Davies (London: Penguin, 1994), p. xxxiii. 
129 Rubenstein, pp. 195- 211 (p. 201). 
130 Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, p. 14. 
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I have tried again and again to dissociate two concepts that are usually indissociable: 
unconditionality and sovereignty... If I think of God on the side of grace, 
forgiveness, hospitality, unconditional law, then in order not to have to agree with 
what I call the onto-theological tradition of sovereignty, one has to dissociate God’s 
sovereignty from God, from the very idea of God.  We would have God without 
sovereignty, God without omnipotence.  If one thinks of this possibility of the name 
of God being dissociated from the absolute power, then this would be a strategic 
political lever to think of unconditionality without sovereignty, and to deconstruct 
the political concept of sovereignty today, which I would argue is a heritage of onto-
theology.131 
 
Here Derrida directly asserts the political import of his re-conceptualization of God, which 
is at the root of how we might rethink notions of power and identity, as well as ethical 
concepts such as commitment and responsibility.  The name of God is, he says, ‘a strategic 
political lever’.  Such a claim would appear to challenge the critiques by Žižek and Bradley 
that the religious focus of Derrida’s later work is depoliticising, or even Beardsworth’s 
assertion that these elements are allied with right-wing possibilities for deconstruction.  In 
the final section of this chapter, I shall return to those critiques, and to the question of the 
political potential of deconstruction.   
 
4. Responding to Derrida’s Critics: Political and Religious Futures of 
Deconstruction  
 
Although dissimilar in motivation and expression, the critiques of Derrida presented by 
Žižek and Bradley both include the mistaken claim of Derrida’s inconsistency and the 
assertion that the messianic focus of Derrida’s later work depoliticizes deconstruction.132  
Both look to advance an alternative understanding and practice of the political.  In the final 
section of this chapter, I shall address the question of depoliticization, arguing that, 
restricted by their own political agendas, Žižek and Bradley present rather unbalanced 
accounts of the relationship between the religious or messianic and the political in Derrida’s 
later work which renders their critiques unconvincing.  However, as Derrida’s engagement 
                                                             
131 Derrida, ‘Epoché and Faith’, pp. 27-50 (p. 42).  
132 This is slightly different from Beardsworth who, in addition to associating the religious elements of Derrida’s 
work with depoliticization, suggests that these elements are allied with right-wing politics. Here I shall focus on 
depoliticization, however, following Derrida’s claim that the name of God may function as a ‘a strategic political 
lever to think of unconditionality without sovereignty’, there is doubtless a case to be made against 
Beardsworth’s proposed alliance.    
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with the discourses of negative theology and dialogue demonstrates, their critiques gesture 
towards a residual tension in Derrida’s work between the private nature of religious 
experience and the public experience of the political.       
 
Žižek’s critique of Derrida is selective and sporadic.  It aims to contrast Derrida’s 
“postsecular messianism”- perceived as part of a trend of “‘suspended’ belief”,133 and 
therefore ineffective and apolitical- with Žižek’s own ‘religious turn’ which is presented as 
active and radical.  Žižek’s depiction generalises and parodies Derrida’s position and 
mistakenly conflates Levinas and Derrida.134  Like Bradley, Žižek perceives an appeal to the 
transcendental in the later work, arguing that, “as Derrida himself has realized in the last 
two decades, the more radical a deconstruction is, the more it has to rely on its inherent 
undeconstructible condition of deconstruction, the messianic promise of justice.”135  As we 
have seen, the différantial movements have remained consistent through Derrida’s work, 
and any protective gesture to limit the incalculable element would disrupt the dynamism 
between the two movements, and “suture the opening of the call to justice.”136  The 
undeconstructible has always been both cause and effect of différance, whilst disrupting the 
idea of both.  Similarly, as early as ‘Différance’, in which différance is ‘unthinkable’ in its 
juxtaposition of two different movements, and ‘unnameable’ by virtue of preceding and 
engendering the possibility of naming, Derrida is alert to the possibility of such terms being 
interpreted as evidence that différance is transcendent or divine.  Concerning the 
description of différance as unnameable he maintains that: “The unnameable is not an 
ineffable Being which no name could approach: God for example.  This unnameable is the 
play which makes possible nominal effects…”137  Although I suspect that this is a point 
where Žižek would take issue with Derrida, perceiving in this structure the elevation of the 
unnameable to originary status, this would be to overlook the paradoxical role of the 
unnameable both as enabling naming and existing by virtue of naming, or in Žižek’s terms, 
                                                             
133 Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf, p. 6. 
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the economy of the same”. Derrida, ‘Différance’, pp. 1-27 (p. 17). 
135 Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf, p. 139.  
136 Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, pp. 230-298 (p. 257). 
137 Derrida, ‘Différance’, pp. 1-27 (p. 26). 
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“an effect of language.”138  These two possibilities cannot be thought ‘presently’ together and 
this illustrates how deconstruction questions the presence of the present, with Derrida 
claiming in ‘Différance’ that “One cannot think the trace- and therefore, différance - on the 
basis of the present, or of the presence of the present.”139  The reason for this, as Derrida 
explains in ‘Différance’, is that the spatio-temporal is an effect of différantial dispersion and 
consequently différance does not have a spatio-temporal origin; the idea of an origin is an 
effect rather than a cause of différance.  Equally, the unnameable is a ‘non-originary origin’, 
seemingly both cause and effect whilst deracinating the logic of presence on which this 
depends.  It is never presented as a transcendental supplement to the logic of 
deconstruction.     
 
Bradley argues that “Derrida’s re-articulation of the political in terms of a messianic future 
or justice which remains to come (l’à-venir) is perhaps the defining gesture of his later 
work”.140  It is this ‘to come’ which marks the divergence of both Bradley and Žižek from 
Derrida’s thought, however, whereas Bradley affirms “deconstruction’s resistance to 
demands for immediate political gratification”,141 rejecting Derrida’s own late articulation of 
the political, Žižek doubts the importance of deconstruction at all for a practical politics.    
 Bradley’s perception of an ‘empirical deficit’ in Derrida’s later work is in part 
produced by what he sees as Derrida’s increased attachment to “an absolute past”142 and “an 
absolute future”143 at the expense of the actual historical instance.  The latter term 
constitutes, for Bradley, the problem with Derrida’s ‘messianic, that is, it “risks foreclosing 
history as the site in which political invention must take place”,144 and in effect, 
depoliticizes history.  This term, on which Bradley’s thesis is grounded, is, I shall argue, a 
misrepresentation of the political thrust of Derrida’s ‘to come’.  Derrida insists that we have 
a responsibility to “rigorously distinguish”145 the ‘a-venir’ or ‘to come’ from the avenir as 
future, which, according to Derrida in ‘Force of Law’ “loses the openness”146 and which, in 
offering a distinct horizon, is as much a limit as an opening.  Considering the ‘to-come’ in 
temporal terms is misleading, it is not part of the future, nor is it infinitely deferred, a point 
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139 Derrida, ‘Différance’, pp. 1-27 (p. 21).  
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141 Bradley, ‘Derrida’s God’, 21-42 (p. 33). 
142 Bradley, ‘Derrida’s God’, 21-42 (p. 29).  
143 Bradley, ‘Derrida’s God’, 21-42 (p. 35). 
144 Bradley, ‘Derrida’s God’, 21-42 (p. 36).  
145 Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, pp. 230-298 (p. 256). 
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114 
 
which Derrida explicitly denies in Rogues, arguing that “democracy will never exist… not 
because it will be deferred but because it will always remain aporetic in its structure.”147  
This is due to the very structure of différantial temporality as, “One cannot think the trace- 
and therefore, différance - on the basis of the present, or of the presence of the present.”148  
This destabilizes Bradley’s rigid distinction between ‘absolute future’ and historical event 
and Žižek’s oversimplification that, for Derrida, “the act never happens” as “it is always 
deferred.”149  Bradley’s critique of Derrida’s ‘absolute past’ also overlooks Derrida’s frequent 
invocation of the ‘it will have been’ of the future anterior, a tense which, used in order to 
avoid imposing the concept of presence onto the movement of the trace, reinforces the 
empiricity of temporality.  Both Bradley and Žižek suggest that Derrida’s ‘messianic’ detracts 
from political urgency.  However, terms such as undecidable, incalculable and impossible do 
not signify a foreclosure of political possibility, rather undecidability is the very condition of 
the decision, and impossibility demands that one “should force oneself to achieve it.”150  As I 
demonstrated earlier, the incalculable element in the movement which constitutes 
deconstruction is unavoidably in dialogic relationship with the calculable element: “the 
infinite promise” is inseparable from “the determined, necessary, but also necessarily 
inadequate forms of what has to be measured against this promise”.151  In his defence of 
Derrida against the critique of Stiegler and Beardsworth, Ben Roberts insists on the political 
urgency this structure creates, citing Derrida in ‘Force of Law’: “justice, however 
unpresentable it remains, does not wait.  It is that which must not wait.  To be direct, simple 
and brief, let us say this: a just decision is always required immediately, right away, as 
quickly as possible”.152  This, in short, is the aporia of politics, and is what is meant by 
Derrida’s ‘impossibility’.   
It is this aporia which Žižek hopes to escape in his own account of a ‘religious’ 
politics.  In recent texts, Žižek argues that dialectical materialism and what he terms “the 
Christian experience”,153 defined by its “perverse core”,154 are mutually dependent.  The 
contradictions which form this ‘core’ are exemplified by Godself, which, through the 
                                                             
147 Derrida, Rogues, p. 86. 
148 Derrida, ‘Différance’, 21-42 (p. 21). 
149 Slavoj Žižek, On Belief (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 83.  
150 Derrida, Rogues., p. 74. 
151 Derrida, Specters of Marx, p. 65.  
152 Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, pp. 230-298 (p. 255) and Roberts, (para. 32 of 37). 
153 Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf, p. 6. 
154 According to Žižek , this refers to a series of necessary and constitutive internal betrayals such as the way that 
Adam and Eve were lured into transgressing in order to be saved, or even more dramatically, Christ’s 
manipulation of Judas to bring about his own betrayal.  
115 
 
Incarnation, instantiates radical difference.  “Christ,” Žižek asserts, is “the gap as such, the 
gap which simultaneously separates God from God and man from man,”155 and with 
limitation and difference shifted from without to within God, the possibility of a 
transcendent God is removed: “Christ’s appearance itself effectively stands for God’s 
death.”156  In The Parallax View, he even offers a definition of God in which he could almost 
be describing God as différance:          
 
Perhaps ‘God’ is the name for this supreme split between the Absolute as the 
noumenal Thing and the Absolute as the appearance of itself, for the fact that the 
two are the same, that the difference between the two is purely formal.157 
 
Žižek’s reclamation of Christianity is informed by Alain Badiou, who takes Saint Paul’s 
revolutionary adoption of “the Christ-event”158 as one of the originary paradigms for his 
theory of the event and truth procedure.  Žižek in turn, embraces not only Saint Paul’s 
political urgency, but the “Christ event” itself as the grounding of a transcendent God; he 
affirms: “there is nothing to wait for, we do not have to wait for the Event, for the arrival of 
the Messiah….”159 and emphasises that in Christianity, everything is already revealed.  The 
status of the Messiah is of course, one of the key distinctions between Judaism and 
Christianity.  Žižek’s materialism enables him to reclaim the Christian event as something 
that has already happened leaving us with “an extreme urge to act.”160  On the other hand, 
his rejection of  the ethical and religious consequences with which différance is always 
bound in Derrida represents a denunciation of the Judaic structure in which the event is still 
to come or can never be historically completed.161  For Žižek: “It is waiting for the Messiah 
which constrains us to the passive stance of, precisely, waiting, while the arrival functions as 
a signal which triggers activity.”162  This reading clearly overlooks Derrida’s insistence that 
the ‘to’ of the ‘to come’ oscillates between the patient perhaps which merely awaits, and the 
performative, which urgently brings it about.  And, as we have seen, the Derridean event 
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cannot be confined to what is perceived as a Judaic structure, with a conceivable and hoped-
for event in the future.   
 
Žižek claims that his reappraisal of Derrida aims “to draw an even stronger line of 
demarcation from the usual gang of democracy-to-come-deconstructionist-postsecular-
Levinasian-respect-for-Otherness suspects”163 but what he actually tries to do is write off the 
later work under the guise of retrieving Derrida from these religious ‘suspects’.  By opposing 
a parody of later Derrida as passive and ‘postpolitical’ to his own interpretation of 
Christianity (revealed, revolutionary and with St Paul as its figurehead), Žižek seeks to show 
just how radical and politically active his own work is.  Aside from the publicity garnered 
by adopting such a high-profile target, Žižek insists on opposing himself to Derrida because 
the Derridean position is still perceived as a challenge to the thinking of ethics and politics.  
Derrida asserts: 
 
there never was in the 1980s or 1990s, as has sometimes been claimed, a political 
turn or ethical turn in “deconstruction”, at least not as I experience it.  The thinking 
of the political has always been a thinking of différance and the thinking of 
différance always a thinking of the political, of the contour and limits of political, 
especially around the enigma or the autoimmune double bind of the democratic.164 
 
Deconstruction thus questions the boundaries between theory and practice, and ethics and 
meta-ethics, with the infinite yet immanent movements of différance staging the shifting 
relationship between calculable and incalculable, ethical and political, and challenging the 
meaning of familiar terms such as ‘politics’ and ‘the political’.165  Similarly, democracy can 
only be found “at the unstable and unlocatable border between law and justice, that is 
between the political and the ultrapolitical.”166  Therefore, the ‘to-come’ which demands 
that one “should force oneself to achieve it”167 can only be brought about by thinking 
through différance, as the relationship between ethics and politics is ultimately 
deconstructible.  Yet this is something that Žižek, having read Derrida, already knows, 
admitting that “politics proper always involves a kind of short circuit between the Universal 
and the Particular.”168  This seems to signify a short circuit in Žižek’s own work between 
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117 
 
this deconstructive position and that of the “true dialectical materialist”169 with “an extreme 
urge to act.”170   
 
Whereas Žižek is frustrated by the deconstructive emphasis on the aporetic nature of 
politics, preferring the presence and prescriptions of dialectical materialism, Bradley is more 
ambivalent to deconstruction’s essential inability to ground a politics.  Repeatedly 
acknowledging that deconstruction “cannot by definition form the basis of a political 
theory, programme or manifesto”,171 Bradley nevertheless looks to assess the “operative 
value”172 of Derrida’s thinking of the political.  Siding with what he tentatively names “a 
new ‘materialist’ turn in deconstruction”,173 he follows Stiegler in apparently privileging the 
technical and the empirical in the expression of the aporia.  Here, his own frustration is 
remarkably like that of Žižek, and seems, despite his argument, to be directed at 
deconstruction’s resistance to forming a politics.   
It is the dialogical relationship comprising deconstruction and forming the subject of 
this chapter which generates and sustains this resistance to a fixed politics and renders the 
work of deconstruction interminable.  This dialogical relationship, known also as a double 
movement, “double strategy,”174 or “double reading”175 resists philosophical and political 
closure.  In this, it marks a deviation from dialectic; as Derrida remarks in Positions: “If 
there were a definition of différance... it would be precisely the limit, the interruption, the 
destruction of the Hegelian relève wherever it operates."176   
 
5. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I have shown that the structural consistency of these dialogical movements 
undermines any simplistic claims of a depoliticizing religious or theological turn in Derrida’s 
work.  However, the earlier part of the chapter, in which I demonstrated the way in which 
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173 Bradley, ‘Derrida’s God’, 21-42 (p. 37). 
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the discourses of dialogue and negative theology enable Derrida to rethink God through a 
non-logocentric writing also connects to the problematic relationship between the political 
and religious in Derrida’s later work.  In his earlier work, Arthur Bradley claimed:         
 
If the via negativa has a meaningful contribution to make to any current debates on 
hospitality, then, it is not to sponsor this or that position, but to uphold the basic 
undecidability between the ethical and the political, to stop, in other words, the 
ethical from ossifying into the merely ethical and the political into the merely 
political.177 
 
It is through his adoption of both the dialogical mode and apophatic gestures that Derrida 
reinforces this undecidability in ‘Sauf le nom’.  However, negative theology, so prevalent 
within the text, also raises a different tension, apparently internal to religion, between the 
private individual experience of faith or religion, often exemplified by the mystic or 
negative theologian, and its public, community, or institutional, counterpart; as Mary-Jane 
Rubenstein observes, the “separation of the mystical from the political echoes a common 
enough perception of the apophatic voyager”.178  By presenting negative theology as both a 
personal experience which interpellates the subject, and as a politically active mode which 
destabilises institutional dogma, Derrida goes some way to dispelling this one-sided view.  
He also begins to conceive of a non-totalising community or “gathering-together of 
singularities” (46) and a new way of approaching the political; as Arthur Bradley asserts, 
“what passes under the name of ‘negative theology’ might even provide the basis for a 
politics of decision-making that addresses both the conditional and the unconditional 
demands of justice”.179  Nevertheless, this tension between private and public, or singular 
and general, continues to resurface and is not resolved in ‘Sauf le nom’.  In Chapter Three, I 
shall examine how the discourse of silence enables Derrida to approach the question of 
‘God’, and whether it provides a means of resolving this tension.            
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179 Bradley, Negative Theology, p. 43. 
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Chapter Three: Silence 
 
 We must find a speech which maintains silence. 
         Jacques Derrida 
 
If I go further I always run up against the paradox, the divine and the demonic: for silence is  
both of these. It is the demon’s lure, and the more silent one keeps the more terrible the 
demon becomes; but silence is also divinity’s communion with the individual.   
Søren Kierkegaard  
 
Even if I decide to be silent, even if I decide to promise nothing, not to commit myself to 
saying anything that would confirm once again the destination of speech, and the 
destination to speech, this silence still remains a modality of speech: a memory of promise 
and a promise of memory. 
Jacques Derrida 
  
 
1. Introduction  
 
In Of Grammatology, Derrida insisted that it was futile to search for an absolute beginning; 
rather, “We must begin wherever we are”,1 already within signification, already implicated 
and entangled.  Over twenty years later, with regard to the possibility of silence, Derrida 
reinforces this, writing: “It is no longer a question of not speaking.  Even if one speaks so as 
not to say anything, even if an apophatic discourse deprives itself of meaning or of an object, 
it takes place.  What initiated or made it possible has taken place”.2  In this sense, absolute 
silence as impossible.  Further, for Derrida, silence should not simply be regarded 
negatively, as “a cut, a suspension or interruption”,3 a “mere ‘structural fault’ in the 
everlasting flow of noise”,4 or, as George Kalamaras claims, “a ‘primitive’ and ‘prelogical’ 
condition of nihilism.5  Rather, silence figures as an expressive and communicative mode 
within discourse, a ‘linguistic silence’ which is a “modality of speech”6 and a way of bearing 
witness.  
 
In this chapter, I shall track the significance of this ‘linguistic silence’ as Derrida both 
discusses and employs it in the texts ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ and The Gift of 
                                                             
1 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 162. 
2 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-95, (p. 164).  
3 Bernard P. Dauenhauer, Silence: The Phenomenon and its Ontological Significance (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1980), p. 81. 
4 Max Picard, The World of Silence, trans. by Stanley Godman (London: The Harvill Press, 1948), p. 92. 
5 George Kalamaras, Reclaiming the Tacit Dimension: Symbolic Form in the Rhetoric of Silence (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1994), p. 202.  
6 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 153).  
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Death.  Reading ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’, I shall argue that in this examination of 
apophatic procedures and gestures, Derrida assumes the apophatic mode of ‘avoiding 
speaking’, a way of preserving silence through language.  I shall demonstrate that ‘Denials’  
identifies various methodological similarities between deconstruction and negative 
theology, linking the discourses through their shared espousal of a linguistic or relativistic 
silence, whereby silence is perceived as a “modality of speech”,7 and is that to which the text 
bears witness.  This witnessing, I shall show, is described in terms of keeping or fulfilling a 
promise, a process or act which is directly related to Derrida’s reconception of divinity.  
Consequently, in this text, ‘God’ comes to name either the inherently promissory nature of 
language itself or the infinite movements of language as it relates to its exterior.  Thus, for 
Derrida, keeping this promise through the preservation of linguistic silence is a way of 
retaining what Derrida understands by ‘God’, within language.    
I shall contend that a similar structure can be perceived in The Gift of Death, in 
which bearing witness is enabled by an accretion of linguistic silences. Tracking the silences 
of Abraham, Kierkegaard and others through a palimpsestic account of the ‘Binding of 
Isaac’, Derrida describes how these silences point towards the state of being ‘in secret’, 
which names a structural indecipherability within language rather than a specific content.  
My account will show that, like the preservation of the promise, being ‘in secret’ entails 
bearing witness; both are inherently linguistic, and entail some kind of ethical, political or 
religious responsibility.  Further, being ‘in secret’ names a singular responsibility, a process 
of “subjectivizing interiorization”8 which calls the subject into being, and is also allied with 
the name of God.  In the final part of the chapter I shall consider the tensions which come 
to light in these accounts of divinity and subjectivity.  These tensions include those between 
the different accounts of God and between the singularity of religious commitment and the 
universality of ethics.  The latter tension is to some extent resolved by Derrida’s adoption of 
a ‘double reading’, informed by the different perspectives of Genesis 22 held by Levinas and 
Kierkegaard. Nevertheless, I shall argue that Derrida doesn’t go far enough in designating 
his own reconfiguration of God and his inscription of a ‘post-writing’ as a practical response 
to the inescapably aporetic relationships between religion and ethics, and ethics and politics.  
 
                                                             
7 Jacques Derrida, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’, trans. by Ken Frieden and Elizabeth Rottenberg in Psyche: 
Inventions of the Other Volume 2 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 143-95 (p. 153).  
8 Derrida, The Gift of Death, p. 13. 
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2. Reading ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’: Silence as a ‘modality of 
speech’ 
 
Observing Derrida’s adoption of juridical language in ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’, 
David E. Klemm argues that “Derrida engages in a subtle parody of the apology or legal 
defense before the deme in ancient Greece”,9 as if having been charged with engaging in 
negative theology.  As I have already briefly discussed, one element of Derrida’s response to 
this ‘charge’ is to examine the relationship between deconstruction and apophaticism.  As 
the second half of the text- an account of three paradigms of ‘avoiding speaking’- 
particularly demonstrates, in contrast to ‘Sauf le nom’, ‘Denials’ here looks beyond negative 
theology to examine the linguistic strategies and modes of apophaticism, negativity and 
‘avoiding speaking’ more broadly.  In my analysis of the text, I shall focus on Derrida’s 
concept of ‘avoiding speaking’, arguing that it adheres to the concept of linguistic or relative 
silence.  As a way of maintaining silence within language, ‘avoiding speaking’ is also, I 
argue, a way of preserving the ‘promise’ in language, which names for Derrida, the 
inescapable relationship between God and language.  In this way, deconstruction figures as a 
fourth paradigm of ‘avoiding speaking’, following its apophatic predecessor negative 
theology in the search for a discourse to discover, and speak of, what is understood by ‘God’.   
 
(a) Silence as ‘Avoiding Speaking’ 
 
Derrida’s concept of ‘avoiding speaking’ can be broadly aligned with the understanding of 
silence not as absolute, invariant and opposed to speech, but as part of a continuum.  Such a 
concept of silence, defined by Adam Jaworksi as the relativistic view,10  and espoused by 
other thinkers such as Rachel Muers, for whom “A ‘silence’ set in unmediated opposition to 
speech and other communicative activity... can rightly be criticized as ethically, politically, 
                                                             
9 David E. Klemm, ‘Open Secrets: Derrida and Negative Theology’, in Negation and Theology, ed. Robert P. 
Scharlemann (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1992), pp. 8-24 (p. 19).  For Klemm, Derrida 
“reduce[s] the charges to absurdity by showing that no one can write negative theology, because not even the 
negative theologians can write negative theology”, Klemm, p. 19.  
10 Adam Jaworski, The Power of Silence: Social and Pragmatic Perspectives (London: Sage Publications, 1993), p. 
43. 
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and theologically inadequate”,11 contrasts with the traditional position, articulated by Max 
Picard, that “Speech is... opposed to silence”.12    
Derrida’s contention that silence is ‘a modality of speech’ and his subsequent 
exploration of practices of ‘avoiding speaking’ can be understood as an attempt to fulfil his 
earlier imperative in ‘From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism without Reserve’ 
that “We must find a speech which maintains silence”,13 and as a reaffirmation of his 
statement in ‘Force of Law’ that “There is here a silence walled up in the violent structure of 
the founding act; walled up, walled in because this silence is not exterior to language”.14  
Here, in ‘Denials’, self-consciously enacting familiar apophatic gestures, he considers what 
‘avoiding speaking’ might be:    
 
 ‘Comment ne pas dire?’ can mean: how to be silent, how not to speak in general, 
how to say nothing, how to avoid speaking; but it can also mean: how, in speaking, 
not to say this or that, in such and such a way, which is both transitive and 
modalized?  In other words: how, in saying and speaking, to avoid this or that 
discursive, logical, rhetorical mode?  How to avoid a particular predicate, and even 
predication itself?  For example: how to avoid a negative form, or how not to be 
negative?  How to say something finally?  Which comes back to the apparently 
reverse question: how to say, how to speak?  Between the two interpretations of 
‘Comment ne pas dire?’ the meaning of the uneasiness thus seems to get reversed: 
from ‘How to be silent?’ (How to avoid speaking at all?) one passes)- moreover, in a 
completely necessary way and as if from within- to the question, which can always 
become the prescriptive heading of a recommendation: How not to speak, what 
words to avoid, in order to speak well? How to avoid speaking is thus at once or 
successively: how is it necessary not to speak, and so on.  The ‘how’ always shelters a 
‘why’, and the ‘it is necessary’ has the double value of a ‘should’ or ‘ought’ and a 
‘must.’15   
 
‘Avoiding speaking’ can therefore signify both absolute and relative silence.  Derrida’s 
reference here to speaking ‘well’ suggests that there may be ethical, religious or political 
                                                             
11 Rachel Muers, Towards a Theological Ethics of Communication (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), p. 15. See also 
Kalamaras and Franke, p. 2.   
12 Picard, p. 27. Other adherents of this position include Peter Bien who claims that  “language sounds as an 
impediment whereas silence is a perfect ritualistic means to renew our connection with true reality”, and 
Bernard P. Dauenhauer who looks to reverse the familiar prioritising of speech over silence, asserting: “There is 
no good reason for assigning language ontological priority over silence”, see Peter Bien, Words, Wordlessness 
and the Word: Silence Reconsidered from a Literary Point of View (Wallingford, PA: Pendle Hill Publications, 
1992), p. 20,  and Dauenhauer, p. 106.  For a different perspective on the differences between relative and 
absolute, and linguistic and non-linguistic silence, see Stefan Hertmans, ‘A hole in speech’, trans. by Peter Vosch 
in Wordlessness, ed. by Bart Verschaffel and Mark Verminck (Dublin: Lillipt, 1993), pp. 25-35. 
13 Jacques Derrida, ‘From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism without Reserve’, in Writing and 
Difference, trans. by Alan Bass, 2nd edn (London: Routledge, 2003), pp 317-50, (p. 332). 
14 Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, pp. 230-298 (p. 242). 
15 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 154).  
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implications to the choices surrounding linguistic expression.  Indeed, the complexity and 
ambiguity of the apophatic gestures Derrida follows is underlined by Mark Taylor’s 
discussion of the problems created by translating even the title of the text ‘Comment ne pas 
parler: Dénégations’.  Taylor explains:  
 
The duplicity of the title is repeated in the single word that serves as the subtitle of 
the essay: dénégations.  At this point, translation becomes impossible. Dénégation is 
the word the French translators of Freud use for the German Verneinung.  There is 
already a certain duplicity in Verneinung.  The prefix ver- can mean: removal, loss, 
stoppage, reversal, opposite, using up, expenditure, continuation to the end, 
alteration.  Ver-nein-ung, then, suggests both the presence and absence of negation, 
both the continuation and end of the not. The complexity of Verneinung is not 
captured in the standard English translation of Freud’s term as ‘negation.  
Difficulties are compounded by the choice of ‘Denials’, for the English translation of 
Derrida’s dénégations.  ‘Denial’ is one of the English words (the other is ‘disavowal’) 
used to translate Freud’s Verleugnung.  Though closely associated, Verneinung and 
Verleugnung are not equivalent. To translate dénégations by denials is, therefore, a 
mistranslation.  However to translate dénégations ‘properly’)by way of Verneinung) 
by negations would also be a mistranslation.  Moreover, the ‘proper’ translation 
would be more misleading than the ‘mistranslation’.  Here, as elsewhere, 
mistranslation, it seems, is unavoidable. 
Dénégations captures the irresolvable duplicity of Verneinung in which 
affirmation and negation are conjoined without being united or synthesized. 
Verneinung is an affirmation that is a negation and a negation that is an affirmation.  
To de-negate is to un-negate; but un-negation is itself a form of negation.  More 
precisely, denegation is an un-negation that affirms rather than negates negation.  
The affirmation of negation by way of denegation subverts the dialectical 
affirmation of negation by way of the negation of negation.  To think or rethink 
negative theology with Derrida, it is necessary to think the negative undialectically 
by thinking a negative that is neither both negation and affirmation nor either 
negation or affirmation.16   
 
Derrida’s use of the term dénégation both stresses the impossibility of a dialectical resolution 
to the movements of negative theology, and underlines the fact that the “silent union with 
the ineffable”17 towards which negative theology strives is always constructed through 
language itself, through the layers of negation and affirmation which Derrida himself 
adopts.  As such, both deconstruction and negative theology name heterogeneous and 
interminable processes; both, as we saw in the last chapter, are inescapably dialogical.  Here, 
for example, negative theology incorporates “a massive and indistinct multiplicity of 
                                                             
16 Mark Taylor, Nots (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 36.   
17 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 150). 
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possibles”.18  Despite negative theology’s aim to transcend the linguistic strategies through 
which it proceeds, “it cannot contain within itself the principle of its interruption.  It can 
only indefinitely postpone the encounter with its own limit”, and is consequently, and 
paradoxically, “Alien, heterogeneous... to this experience of the ineffable and the mute 
vision that seems to orient this apophatic”.19  Consequently, in practice, ‘avoiding speaking’ 
refers not to an absolute silence but to a linguistic silence which always looks to transcend 
its own limitations.  This is, therefore, a sort of dialogical silence.   
Derrida’s vehement and repeated rejection of dialectical resolutions in ‘Denials’ is a 
consequence of his perception that dialectic homogenizes difference,20 and his assertion 
instead, of a dialogue which thinks beyond dialectic, of a deconstructive double movement 
which preserves rather than suppresses contradiction, and of “a trace whose affirmation is 
not symmetrical”.21  In Derrida’s discussion of apophaticism, dialogue and silence are always 
intertwined.  In fact, the dialogical movements discussed in the last chapter are clearly 
evident within ‘Denials’, first in Derrida’s discussion of the Platonic khōra, which, Derrida 
describes, is depicted according to two concurrent, conflicting and dialogical languages.  The 
first of these incorporates khōra within the Platonic system using metaphors and negations, 
whereas the second is more interruptive, locating khōra as an “an irreducible spacing”,22 an 
unknowable silence, within the Platonic system. 
 An even more explicit example of this relationship between dialogue and silence is 
provided by Derrida’s discussion of Pseudo-Dionysius.  Derrida claims that “the theologian 
must practice, not a double language, but the double inscription of his knowledge”, and thus 
that “Dionysius evokes a dual tradition, a dual mode of transmission (dittēn paradosin)” 
which is on one hand “ineffable, secret, prohibited, reserved, inaccessible (aporrhēton)” and 
on the other “philosophical, demonstrative (apodeiktikēn)”.  These two languages intersect 
and at this point, each language “bears the silence of the other”,23 with the inexpressible 
intersecting the expressible.  Here, again, silence refers to something which is expressed, or 
insists, within language. The double or dialogical mode is also evident in Derrida’s own 
                                                             
18 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 151). 
19 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 150).  
20 For examples of such rejections, see Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 144), (p. 163) and (p. 167). 
21 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 156).  
22 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 172).   
23 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 162).  
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divided approach to the text which is presented both as a philosophical and pedagogical 
tract and as the performative fulfilment of a promise.24 
 
(b) Language and the Promise 
 
For Derrida, these strategies of linguistic silence or ‘avoiding speaking’ provide an 
opportunity to fulfil his promise that, “one day I will stop deferring, one day I will try to 
explain myself directly on this subject, and at last speak of ‘negative theology’ itself, 
assuming that some such thing exists.”25  The fulfilment of this promise, however, is 
repeatedly deferred, and twenty three pages into the essay, Derrida states: “We are still on 
the threshold”.26  This apparent evasion is however, a consequence of the nature of the 
promise, which can never be fulfilled in the present tense.  Derrida explains: 
 
Will I do it?  Am I in Jerusalem? This is a question to which one will never respond 
in the present tense, only in the future or in the past anterior. 
Why insist on this postponement?  Because it appears to me neither 
avoidable nor insignificant.  One can never decide whether it does not give rise, as 
postponement, to the very thing it defers.  It is not certain that I will keep my 
promise today; but nor is it certain that in further delaying its fulfilment, I have not, 
nevertheless, already kept it.27  
 
The impossibility of responding wholly within the present refers to both the grammar of 
biblical Hebrew, which “does not employ a present-tense form of the verb to be”,28 and to 
deconstructive temporality which reminds us that: “One cannot think the trace- and 
therefore, différance- on the basis of the present, or of the presence of the present”.29  When 
Derrida speaks of the promise, he integrates the familiar understanding of a promise, as a 
pledge, vow or assurance, with another understanding of it as a state of being, akin, as we 
                                                             
24 The ‘double movement’ also figures in ‘Denials’ in the form of the apostrophe, as Derrida speaks of that which  
“turns the discourse away in the same direction”, Derrida, ‘Denials, pp. 143-195 (p. 182).  This is illuminated by 
Sinaro Kamboureli’s discussion of the apostrophe: “the rhetorical figure of the sacred is that of apostrophe… 
Apostrophe in Greek, however, means something more than simply addressing someone.  Apostrophe also means 
to avert one’s face from someone or something, to turn away.  This turn, this rhetorical trope, seems to sum up 
what is unsummable.  Unreadability: turning toward and away from divine locution”, Sinaro Kamboureli, ‘St. 
Teresa’s Jouissance: Toward a Rhetoric of Reading the Sacred’, in Silence, the Word and the Sacred, ed. by E. D. 
Blodgett and H. G. Coward (Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1989), pp. 51-65 (p. 62).  
25 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 151). 
26 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 164). 
27 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 152). 
28 Ken Frieden in Jacques Derrida, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’, trans. by Ken Frieden in Derrida and 
Negative Theology, ed. by Harold Coward and Toby Foshay (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 
pp. 73-142 (p. 134).  Footnote not found in later translation.    
29 Derrida, ‘Différance’, pp. 1-27, (p. 21).  
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shall see, to being ‘in secret’.  Here he declares: “I will speak of a promise but also within the 
promise”.30  Speaking ‘within the promise’ entails acknowledging and responding to the 
promissory nature of language, whose temporal and significatory structures ensure that 
meaning cannot be fully realised in the present, rather signification always gestures “toward 
a past and toward a future that are still unpresentable”.31  This guarantees that the full 
significance of an event is never presently realised as its disclosure is dependent on both past 
and future.  Consequently, the promise, which, paradoxically, “must be made in the 
present”,32 is ‘kept’ or preserved by acknowledging its structure of non-closure and rejecting 
attempts at present realisation.  In this sense, Derrida’s endorsement of linguistic or 
relativistic silence, of a mode of ‘avoiding speaking’ through language, acknowledges and 
responds to the promissory nature of language.  
Derrida’s discussion of the promise is often topological and links the promise to the 
event, even, “the event of the event, history, the thinking of an essential ‘having-taken-
place’, of a revelation, of an order, and a promise”.33  This spatial focus reiterates a familiar 
association between silence and the creation of space, illustrated by scholars such as Rachel 
Muers,34 George Kalamaras,35 Cheryl Glenn,36 and Stefan Hertmans.37  Reasserting his 
interest in linguistic or relative, rather than absolute silence, Derrida insists that the 
question of ‘how to avoid speaking’ is “the question of place as place of writing, of 
inscription, of the trace”,38 a point underlined by Hent de Vries, for whom ‘Denials’, “is just 
as much a treatise on place- that is to say on the trope, the topos, topology- as an inquiry 
into the specifically linguistic problem of ineffability”.39  Through the figure of the promise, 
the text connects ‘avoiding speaking’, topology, and even divinity.      
             ‘Avoiding speaking’ and remaining ‘within the promise’ are inherently linguistic 
actions, however, it is clear from Derrida’s experimentation with language and his, here 
disparaged, urge “to experience speech”,40 that he perceives the wider effects of such actions.  
He asserts this explicitly later in the text, revealing: “I am not certain that only rhetoric is at 
                                                             
30 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 153).  
31 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 150).  
32 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 153). 
33 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 175).  
34 “To fall silent is, after all, to create a space…”, Muers, p. 149. 
35 “Silence is a condition of emptiness”, Kalamaras, p. 1. 
36 “Silence [is]… a space that draws us forth”, Cheryl Glenn, Unspoken: A Rhetoric of Silence, (Carbondale, IL: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 2004), p. 160. 
37 “Silence as a space in which history can reflect on itself”, Hertmans, p. 35. 
38 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 168). 
39 De Vries, p. 94. 
40 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143- 195 (p. 145).  
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stake”,41 and presenting non-disclosure through ‘avoiding speaking’ and the promise as an 
ethical imperative “to protect access to a knowledge that remains in itself inaccessible, 
untransmissible, unteachable”.42  Not only is there an ethical imperative in ‘avoiding 
speaking’, Derrida also links this linguistic silence and his understanding of the promise to 
his re-conception of the figure of ‘God’.   
 
(c) Silence as a ‘distinctively religious sign’?: Rewriting God 
 
The association between silence and religion or God is long-standing, however recent 
theologians and religious thinkers have tried to rethink this connection in contemporary 
terms.  Such thinkers include Oliver Davies and Rachel Muers who, like Derrida, adopt a 
relativistic approach to silence, reframing it as dialogical, generative and internal to 
language.  For Davies, silence, a “distinctively religious sign”,43 is “the primordial and 
generative ground”,44 and he emphasises communication between God and creation, 
claiming that Christianity “necessarily promotes a metaphysics and linguistics of address”.45  
Within this framework, Davies depicts silence as “the possibility of discourse and utterance, 
and with that, the possibility of a new way of speaking and of understanding the world”.46  
Following Derrida, he maintains that more than language is at stake, and that understanding 
and employing silence equips both the individual and the community to listen to the ‘other’.   
Again insisting that silence is both relative and dialogical, Rachel Muers asserts that 
silence is “the best communicative ‘likeness’ for the God who transcends all the distinctions 
between created things”.47  Perceiving a dynamic relationship between speaking and 
listening, and informed by both Eberhard Jungel’s “theological reaffirmation of God as the 
one who constitutes the world by speaking”48 and Nelle Morton’s suggestion that God “hears 
us to speech”,49 Muers advocates ‘keeping God’s silence’.  This would refer to an active, 
open, and interruptive silence which acknowledges and enables the “irreducible otherness 
                                                             
41 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 193). 
42 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143- 195 (p. 161). 
43 Oliver Davies, ‘Soundings: Towards a Theological Poetics of Silence’, in Silence and the Word: Negative 
Theology and Incarnation, as before, pp. 201-222 (p. 202). 
44 Davies, ‘Soundings’, pp. 201-222 (p. 203). 
45 Davies, ‘Soundings’, pp. 201-222 (p. 210). 
46 Davies, ‘Soundings’, pp. 201-222 (p. 222). 
47 Muers, p. 11. 
48 Muers, p. 29. 
49 Muers, p. 51. 
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of the other”.50  Endorsing Derrida’s dictum that “tout autre est tout autre”,51 Muers suggests 
that silence makes it impossible to distinguish the other as God from the human other.  In 
Chapter Two, I asked what it might mean for Derrida to ‘save the name’ of God.  Here, in 
light of the clear parallels between theological approaches and deconstructive approaches to 
‘avoiding speaking’ or being silent, I shall explore whether Derrida may be looking to ‘keep 
God’s silence’. 
 
I have already shown that, as Hent de Vries attests, the gestures of negative theology ‘reveal 
the most significant modalities of language, meaning and reference “as such”’, and that the 
preoccupation with the structures, possibilities and limits of language, and the adoption of 
‘avoiding speaking’ are key similarities between the second-order discourses of negative 
theology and deconstruction.  In ‘Denials’, Derrida uses such apophatic gestures in order to 
speak of God and the name of God.  However, looking to challenge accepted notions of 
‘God’ and to re-think ‘God’, Derrida’s use of the apophatic mode seems to find him 
frustrated, as it ensures that the name ‘God’ remains recuperable by theology.  Here he 
acknowledges that even when he uses the name ‘God’ to refer to a specific state or function 
of language, his citation immediately becomes an invocation; he asks:  “I do not say God, but 
how to avoid saying God here, from the moment that I say the name of God?”52  Similarly, 
his attempt to speak of the ‘name of God’ rather than ‘God’, and to separate the two by 
means of the apophatic mode,53 is thwarted, as the ‘name of God’ always remains haunted by 
theological conceptions of ‘God’.   
 However, given the fact that all language is haunted by ‘God’, or “the becoming-
theological of all discourse”,54 Derrida chooses to adopt apophatic discourse in order to 
employ its potential for subversion and suspension, and its cultivation of a space in which 
the nature and significance of ‘God’ is not already assumed.  Derrida suggests that apophatic 
discourse may lead to the association of all negativity with God,55 and tracks the connection 
between God and language, stating that God names “the trace of the singular event that will 
have made speech possible…”56 and that “language has begun without us, in us, before us.  
                                                             
50 Muers, p. 66. 
51 Derrida, The Gift of Death, p. 82.  
52 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 163). 
53 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 146). 
54 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 145). 
55 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 146). 
56 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 165).  
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This is what theology calls God”.57  Speaking of the inevitable possibility of the 
“ontotheological reappropriation” of language and meaning, he insists that “this question 
remains at the heart of a thinking of differance or of a writing of writing”.  58  In ‘Denials’ 
Derrida repeatedly reminds us that language is suffused with theology, and, in 
foregrounding these issues, looks not to eliminate the question of God- to his mind, 
impossible- but to respond to it otherwise and, following the apophatic precedent, to reject 
the “subtle or perverse idolatry”59 of ontotheology in favour of other conceptions of God.  
Here God becomes nothing other than the trace within language which renders language 
and signification both possible and impossible, as well as a name for the historical 
relationship between name and referent, and, most importantly, the inescapably promissory 
nature of language itself.  Derrida follows negative theology in its use of ‘avoiding speaking’ 
in order to fulfil, or at least retain, a certain promise,60 and in endowing this promise- which 
is always found within language- with a sense of religious or ethical responsibility.  He 
repeatedly speaks of his commitment, and, both following and deviating from negative 
theology, links this promise to God, insisting that it “inscribes us with its trace in language- 
before language”.61  For both discourses, ‘avoiding speaking’ and the retention of the 
promise, provide a way of, in Muers’ terms, ‘keeping God’s silence’.        
 
Negative theology and the language of the promise go some way to enabling Derrida to find 
a non-ontotheological discourse through which to speak about God, a discourse which, in 
‘Sauf le nom’, he speaks of as “post-writing”.62  Here this is signalled by his assertion that 
“The promise of which I will speak will have always escaped this demand for presence”,63 
his claim that negative theology “deconstructs grammatical anthropomorphism”,64 and his 
reiteration that, for deconstruction, “X (for example, the text, writing, the trace, 
différance...)... calls for another syntax... It is written completely otherwise”.65  Such a 
language, echoing ‘post-writing’, and what Marius Timmann Mjaaland refers to as an 
                                                             
57 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 166). 
58 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 148).  
59 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 158). 
60 He asserts that “The experience of negative theology perhaps holds to a promise”, Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-
195 (p. 153). 
61 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 153).  
62 Derrida, ‘Sauf le nom’, pp. 33-85 (p. 53).  
63 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 153).  
64 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 148).  
65 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 144). 
130 
 
“alternative logos”,66 would, however, reject negative theology’s capitulation to “the 
authority of the noun or the name [nom]”,67 turning instead to the conception of naming 
offered by Plato’s khōra, “not a question of a proper name, but rather of appellation, a way 
of addressing oneself”,68 a mode of naming which challenges the self-identity and 
sovereignty of the bearer of the name.   
 In light of the numerous similarities between negative theology and deconstruction, 
and the fact that, even in its differences from deconstruction, it remains faithful to a 
seemingly deconstructive dialogical or double mode, it becomes increasingly difficult to 
separate the two discourses.  Oliver Davies explains:     
 
Indeed, his [Derrida’s] view that it is only the intentionality of the speaker which 
divides deconstruction and Christian apophatic theology may already contain a tacit 
admission that he now finds himself situated on a ground which is defined as much 
by the theological object of his critique as it is by his deconstructionist reflections 
upon it.69 
 
Within ‘Denials’, Derrida both emphasises the differences between the discourses, notably 
negative theology’s residual attachment to “some superessentiality, a being beyond being”,70 
and the seeming insignificance of such discrepancies, revealing:  
 
But since the structure of the trace is in general the very possibility of an experience 
of finitude, the distinction between a finite cause and an infinite cause of the trace 
appears- let us venture to say- secondary here.71 
 
It is perhaps the status of both negative theology and deconstruction as second-order 
discourses which makes it impossible to demarcate a clear distinction between the two.   
Merold Westphal argues that “Deconstruction is not able and does not try to settle the 
question of the reality of God”,72 and thus, in an important sense, Derrida’s texts remain 
inescapably agnostic.  However, in another sense, deconstruction accounts for God, 
rendering traditional accounts of God unnecessary explanations for both the insufficiency 
and excess of language.  As Rowan Williams recognises: “For Derrida himself, it is 
                                                             
66 Mjaaland, p. 323.  
67 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 147).  
68 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 173-4).  
69 Davies, ‘Soundings’, p. 207. 
70 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 147).  
71 Derrida, ‘Denials’, pp. 143-195 (p. 166). 
72 Merold Westphal, Transcendence and Self-Transcendence: On God and the Soul (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2004), p. 105.  
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reasonably clear that ‘God’ is an ‘effect of the trace’: to speak of God is to try to put a face 
upon that which haunts language- what is over the shoulder, round the corner, what is by 
stipulation not capable of being confronted, being faced”.73  Similarly, in ‘Denials’ itself, he 
restates his, now famous, claim from ‘The Supplement of Origin’ that “infinite differance is 
finite”,74 which implies that the trace cannot be understood as ‘God’ as the latter is perceived 
in any orthodox sense.  These two seemingly contradictory positions can, once again, be 
perceived as part of a double reading or movement, in which neither position is wholly 
endorsed or discounted.   
        
In ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’, Derrida reinscribes the gestures of negative theology 
within the boundaries of deconstructive discourse, reinforcing the connection between God 
and language and therefore, the need to find the right mode of language or silence to speak 
of God.  He both suspends the question of the external reality of ‘God’ as traditionally 
perceived, and rewrites God, through the mode of linguistic silence or ‘avoiding speaking’ 
he learns from negative theology, as an otherness or promise which remains internal to 
language itself.  In my forthcoming analysis of The Gift of Death, I shall observe the same 
action of ‘avoiding speaking’ in order to preserve an element of otherness, or ‘secret’, which 
is equivalent to the promise in ‘Denials’.  Such a ‘promise’ or ‘secret’ is again commensurate 
with Derrida’s conception of a structural or linguistic God.         
3. Reading The Gift of Death: Silence, Secrecy and Responsibility 
Like ‘Denials’, Derrida’s 1995 text The Gift of Death also approaches the problem of how 
unspeakable and unhistoricisable elements may be expressed, or rather witnessed, within 
language.  Drawing on Jan Patočka’s Heretical Essays on the History of Philosophy, Derrida 
acknowledges the tensions inherent in writing a history of responsibility, figuring 
responsibility as singular, subjectifying and interruptive, and therefore antithetical to the 
consistent, homogenising narratives of history.  The history of religion, he declares, is such a 
history of responsibility, in effect a history of suppressing, sublating or silencing the 
excessive events which found and sustain it; a history of secrecy.  Derrida tracks  Patočka’s 
                                                             
73 Rowan Williams, ‘Hegel and the gods of postmodernity’, in Shadow of Spirit, as before, pp. 72-80 (p. 73). 
74 Jacques Derrida, ‘The Supplement of Origin’, in Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory 
of Signs, trans. by David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 88-104 (p. 102). 
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genealogy of this process: the replacement of the “orgiastic sacred”75 by Platonism, which in 
turn, is substituted for Christianity through the processes of incorporation and repression.  
Derrida explains: “religion exists once the secret of the sacred, orgiastic or demonic mystery 
has been, if not destroyed, at least integrated, and finally subjected to the sphere of 
responsibility” (2).  For both Patočka and Derrida, such a process, which represses rather 
than destroys its impossible, aporetic history, problematises responsibility.  Christianity, for 
Derrida, synonymous with responsibility, and whose history comprises incidences of 
responsibility, is secretly influenced by Platonic rationalism and thus becomes separated 
from responsibility.  Consequently, it “doesn’t thematize what a responsible person is, that 
is, what he must be” (25).  Whereas for Patočka, this is a temporary schism,76 Derrida, on the 
other hand, perceives Christianity’s relationship with responsibility as inescapably aporetic, 
rather than an historical problem to be solved.          
 As an instantiation of the tension between the singularity of responsibility, and the 
universality of historical narrative, in the central chapter of The Gift of Death, Derrida turns 
to Genesis 22 and its narrative of the ‘Binding of Isaac’.  Interweaving elements of 
Kierkegaard’s account in Fear and Trembling, Derrida explores the role of silence in this 
narrative in order to investigate the relationships between individual subjectivity and 
responsibility, and religion and ethics, as well as the nature and significance of both faith 
and ‘God’.  In my reading of The Gift of Death, I shall focus on the function of silence in the 
text’s central chapter, arguing that it is again a linguistic or relativistic silence, and showing 
how Derrida emphasises and adds to the layers of silence in the narrative, preserving them 
within the text.  Next I shall demonstrate that this act of ‘keeping silent’ is inescapably 
linked to what Derrida terms, being ‘in secret’, a linguistic mode of bearing witness which     
performs an ethical, political or religious responsibility.  I argue that this process of being ‘in 
secret’ or retaining linguistic silence, is inseparable from Derrida’s formulation of a linguistic 
God, before turning to the tensions created by this formulation.  
 
(a) The ‘Binding of Isaac’: Narratives of Silence 
 
                                                             
75 Derrida, The Gift of Death, p. 2. Further references will be given in parentheses in the text.  
76 This is illustrated by Patočka’s claim that “What has not yet come about is the fulfilment, within history and in 
political history, and first and foremost in European politics, of the new responsibility announced by the 
mysterium tremendum”, Derrida, The Gift of Death, p. 28.   
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As in ‘Denials’, which depicts silence as a ‘modality of speech’, in The Gift of Death Derrida 
focuses on the partial, inflected and linguistic silences which emerge within the competing, 
clamorous voices of different histories and narratives.  Michael Caspi and Sascha Cohen 
identify “a silencing of all feeling, silencing of emotions...”77 within the narrative of Genesis 
22, and Derrida draws attention to the silences of Abraham, Isaac, God, Sarah78 and the ram 
to be sacrificed,79 as well as written silences in Kierkegaard’s account in Fear and Trembling 
and within The Gift of Death itself.80  Here I shall focus on the limited, linguistic silences of 
Abraham and God, arguing that in The Gift of Death Derrida upholds these silences, and 
adopts them as a model for keeping silent in other areas.   
Recalling Kierkegaard’s account of Genesis 22 in Fear and Trembling, Derrida notes 
its accretion of silences and narrative layers, asserting: “God keeps silent about his reasons.  
Abraham does also, and the book is not signed by Kierkegaard but by Johannes de 
Silentio”.81  Derrida looks to rethink what silence might mean in this context, and is inspired 
by Abraham- rendered by Kierkegaard into “an unreadable text”-82 and by Abraham’s 
selective silence.  As Abraham and Isaac ascend Mount Moriah, Abraham continues to speak 
to Isaac without either lying or revealing his plan; his words are elliptical.  Derrida recounts 
Abraham’s reaction when Isaac questions the whereabouts of the lamb to be sacrificed:  
 
It can’t be said that Abraham doesn’t respond to him. He says God will provide. God 
will provide a lamb for the holocaust ([“burnt offering”] Genesis 22: 8).  Abraham 
thus keeps his secret at the same time as he replies to Isaac.  He doesn’t keep silent 
and he doesn’t lie.  He doesn’t speak nontruth. (59) 
 
This selective silence permeates Abraham’s speech; Derrida continues, “But even if he says 
everything, he need only keep silent on a single thing for one to conclude that he hasn’t 
spoken.  Such a silence takes over his whole discourse” (59).  This is further theorised as “a 
                                                             
77 Michael Maswari Caspi and Sascha Benjamin Cohen, The Binding [Aqedah] and its Transformations in Judaism 
and Islam: The Lambs of God (Lewiston: Mellen Biblical Press, 1995), p. 46. 
78 Following Derrida, John D. Caputo undertakes a feminist retelling under the name of Johanna de Silentio, 
“reading it as a story of the end of sacrifice, rather than of how much steely male machismo it takes to be willing 
to spill blood in the name of God”, Caputo, Against Ethics, p. 144. 
79 Again following Derrida, Caputo picks up on the ram as another silenced figure, claiming: “the ram was a way 
of deflecting attention from the man, of putting the blame for the man’s injustice on an animal with soft, 
innocent eyes”, Caputo, Against Ethics, p. 140. 
80 Derrida also remarks on the silence of the body, incorporating both biological and phenomenological language 
in order to try and answer the question: “What does the body mean to say by trembling or crying, presuming 
one can speak here of the body, or of saying, of meaning, and of rhetoric?” The trembling is henceforth 
presented as a response to the mysterium tremendum, the dissymmetrical encounter with God.  See The Gift of 
Death, p. 55.      
81 Derrida, The Gift of Death, p. 58. Further references are given after quotations in the text.  
82 Steven Shakespeare, Kierkegaard, Language and the Reality of God (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), p. 131. 
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sort of sublime irony.  Speaking in order to not say anything or to say something other than 
what one thinks, speaking in such a way as to intrigue, disconcert, question, or have 
someone or something else speak (the law, the lawyer), means speaking ironically” (76).83  
This irony, which entails holding more than one perspective simultaneously, recalls the 
‘double reading’ or dialogical approach of deconstruction which I discussed in the previous 
chapter.  For Derrida, dialogue and silence necessarily complement one another; whilst one 
linguistic voice is expressive, others are temporarily suspended, yet remain implicit in, or 
assumed by, the speaking voice.          
Abraham’s silence is presented as a necessary response to his singular responsibility 
which cannot be communicated through the generality of language.  However, whereas 
Kierkegaard interprets the silence as Abraham “speaking in a strange tongue”84 as “he speaks 
no human language” (74), Derrida suggests that it represents the innate strangeness of the 
mother tongue, the conjunction of the singular subject with the universality of language. 
Abraham’s silence therefore invites us to consider what is meant by singularity, 
responsibility and subjectivity.  In contrast to Abraham’s distinctly human silence, God’s 
silence is regarded as a sign of ‘his’ divinity, and provides, according to Derrida, a way to 
rethink what divinity might mean.  Derrida describes:  
 
God is himself absent, hidden and silent, separate, secret, at the moment he has to be 
obeyed.  God doesn’t give his reasons, he acts as he intends, he doesn’t have to give 
his reasons or share anything with us: neither his motivations, if he has any, nor his 
deliberations, nor his decisions.  Otherwise he wouldn’t be God, we wouldn’t be 
dealing with the Other as God or with God as wholly other [tout autre].  If the other 
were to share his reasons with us by explaining them to us, if he were to speak to us 
all the time without any secrets, he wouldn’t be the other, we would share a type of 
homogeneity.  Discourse also partakes of that sameness… (57) 
 
Derrida’s assessment of the significance of God’s silence influences the various definitions of 
God which appear in The Gift of Death.  God commands Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, offering 
no explanation, and remaining silent as they ascend Mount Moriah.  God’s silence is only 
broken when Abraham lifts the knife to kill his son and God halts him with the words: “Lay 
not thine hand upon the lad, neither do thou anything unto him: for now I know that thou 
fearest God, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son, from me (Genesis 22:12)” 
                                                             
83 For a discussion of Derrida’s use of irony, see Claire Colebrook, Irony in the Work of Philosophy (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2002), p. 266. 
84 Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. by Alastair Hannay (London: Penguin republished 1985), p. 
119. 
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(71).  Derrida considers different interpretations of the silence which precedes this:  first, 
that it is an effect of God’s divinity, that the gap between God and creation is insuperable 
and God remains silent because he is incomprehensible, or secondly, that God’s silence 
reinforces or even generates this gap between God and humanity, enforcing God’s mastery 
and absolute authority by leaving Abraham in fear and ignorance.  This is expressed both as 
the tyrannical mastery of an Old Testament deity and, more mercifully, as testament to a 
dynamic relationship between God and creation.  Here Derrida rewrites God’s demand as a 
loving prayer, reflecting his own weakness and humility:    
   
The command requests, like a prayer from a God, a declaration of love that implores: 
tell me that you love me, tell me that you turn towards me, towards the unique one, 
towards the other as unique and, above all, over everything else, unconditionally, 
and in order to do that, make a gift of death, give death to your only son and give 
me the death I ask for, that I give to you by asking for it. (72)   
 
This interpretation of God’s silence situates it within a linguistic framework, as the 
relativistic silence which Adam Jaworski describes and Derrida explores in ‘Denials’.  In 
suggesting limitations to God’s power, this understanding of silence also gestures towards a 
more radical understanding of God.  The structures of linguistic silence and secrecy form the 
basis of Derrida’s understanding of a non-sovereign, post-ontotheological God, with The 
Gift of Death juxtaposing this vision of God with the transcendent God of Genesis 22.      
 
Considering the relationship between silence and the figure of God both in Genesis 22 and 
in Kierkegaard’s retelling, Steven Shakespeare suggests that silence becomes “a context for 
becoming aware of God”.85  Kierkegaard’s account in Fear and Trembling emphasises and 
develops the accumulation of silence within the narrative, with his adoption of a 
pseudonym contributing towards this process of keeping silent; Derrida considers: “This 
pseudonym keeps silent, it expresses the silence that is kept.  Like all pseudonyms, it seems 
destined to keep secret the real name as patronym, that is, the name of the father of the 
work” (58).  In highlighting the role and responsibilities of the father, this denial of the 
patronym indicates a shift in interpretation of the narrative, with Kierkegaard focusing not 
on Isaac’s silence, but that of Abraham.86  Derrida is drawn to Kierkegaard’s layering of 
narrative and silence, and the possibility of preserving secrets within the text.  Jerome 
                                                             
85 Shakespeare, Kierkegaard, p. 113.  
86 Jerome Gellman, Abraham! Abraham! Kierkegaard and the Hasidim on the Binding of Isaac (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2003), p. 52. 
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Gellman notes the critical consensus “that Kierkegaard’s work is best understood as 
comprised of layers of meaning, where each lower layer illuminates those above it”,87  an 
approach which leaves critics searching for a “hidden message”,88 be it about Kierkegaard’s 
former fiancée Regine or his relationship with his father.  Shakespeare similarly emphasises 
the importance of narrative form and linguistic silence in Fear and Trembling, perceiving: 
 
It is able to communicate without translating the absurd, secretive faith of Abraham 
into a determinate content.  The narrative is open-ended, or rather, it cannot 
constitute a seamless whole which is self-evident or self-interpreting.  It contains 
within itself a paradox which resists any narration, but which requires a narrative 
context to appear as such (and here ‘to appear as such’ means precisely not to be 
made manifest or intelligible, but to be respected in its hiddenness and 
paradoxicality).89 
 
Here, Shakespeare stresses the importance of a language of silence as that which can 
communicate something other than ‘determinate content’ and which doesn’t forcibly 
translate the singular into the general.  It is this feature which accounts for Derrida’s 
adoption of the discourse of relative or linguistic silence, as it doesn’t demand complete 
manifestation, and can therefore support a structure of secrecy.  I shall now examine how, 
for Derrida, this silence enables secrecy, and, in turn, the processes of bearing witness and 
becoming responsible.  
 
(b) ‘Can one witness in silence? By silence?’: Secrecy, Bearing Witness and 
Responsibility  
 
Recalling his description of being ‘within the promise’, in ‘Denials’, Derrida describes 
Abraham as being “in secret” (79).  This contrasts with the idea of keeping a specific secret, 
particularly as here there is a double structure of secrecy, both between God and Abraham, 
and Abraham and his family.  The effect is a simultaneous binding and separation, with 
Abraham “cut off from both man and from God” (79) yet affirming his commitment to God.  
In Derrida’s understanding of secrecy, there is no clearly defined content to be withheld or 
disclosed; it consists in a state of being rather than the transmission of knowledge or 
information.  Whereas keeping a secret puts one in a position of power, being ‘in secret’ puts 
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89 Shakespeare, Kierkegaard, p. 133. 
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one in service of, or subject to, another.  In being denied comprehensive knowledge of his 
situation, Abraham is rendered powerless; he must continue “without knowing why yet 
keeping it a secret” (72).  However, Abraham’s powerlessness, his subjection, is also framed 
as subjectivization.  He is called to a singular task which only he can fulfil, and this separates 
him from the language and objectives of his community, and renders him, as Kierkegaard’s 
‘Knight of Faith’, incomprehensible to the people around him.  Derrida terms this process, 
necessitated by the demands of secrecy, “subjectivizing interiorization” (13), as it calls the 
subject into being.  As I shall go on to discuss, this process foregrounds the privileged 
relationship between the subject and God, as well as calling into question what these terms 
might mean.  Consequently, The Gift of Death attests to “the affinity between the sacred 
and secrecy” (21), exploring our understanding of ‘the sacred’ and questioning whether 
Abraham’s silence and his singular commitment to God may only be understood within a 
religious framework.   
 
For Derrida, secrecy describes a structure which, like the promise, is made possible through 
language; as Joseph Kronick reveals, “There is something like a secret every time, which is 
to say, everywhere, there is writing”.90  Secrecy gestures towards an impossible and 
unknowable exterior, the trace of something older than language within language.  Derrida 
describes:  
 
a kind of shibboleth, a secret formula such as can be uttered only in a certain way in 
a certain language.  As a chance or aleatory effect, the untranslatibility of this formal 
economy functions like a secret within one’s so-called natural or mother tongue. 
(88) 
 
For Derrida, bearing witness to the secret is problematic, as bearing witness would demand 
naming and exposing it, a process which would in turn betray and destroy its secrecy.  In  
this, secrecy parallels the gift, which is both generated and annulled by the process of 
naming.  Indeed, Derrida claims that “Secrecy is the last word of the gift which is the last 
word of the secret” (30).  Here, in order to address this problem of bearing witness, Derrida 
returns to apophatic language, insisting:  “To share a secret is not to know or to reveal the 
secret, it is to share we know not what: nothing that can be determined.  What is a secret 
that is a secret about nothing and a sharing that doesn’t share anything?” (80)   
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Derrida looks to respond to the theoretical difficulties of bearing witness to the 
secret or secrecy without destroying it by demonstrating how silence and secrecy are 
interconnected, and thus responding affirmatively to the question: “Can one witness in 
silence? By silence?” (73)  Just as secrecy is not defined as the retention of discrete 
information, for Derrida, witnessing does not entail producing a factually accurate 
representation or exposing that which was previously concealed, rather testifies to and re-
affirms a certain structure of non-manifestation.  Thus, bearing witness involves using 
linguistic modes to retain rather than reveal that which defies expression in some way.  
Again, this structure draws attention to Abraham’s singularity; he is, for Kierkegaard, “a 
witness and not a teacher”,91 “a witness of the absolute faith that cannot and must not 
witness before men” (73), and his speech and actions cannot be translated into ethical or 
universal language.   
 Derrida again emphasises the linguistic nature of this practice of witnessing, as well 
as its links to religious structures.  Elsewhere, in Demeure: Fiction and Testimony, he 
illustrates how witnessing instantiates the paradox of language by demonstrating the 
necessary translation, and therefore betrayal, of the singular event into the generality of 
language.  As such, the words of witnessing “must promise their own repetition and thus 
their own quasi-technical reproducibility… Consequently the instant is instantaneously, at 
this very instant, divided, destroyed by what it nonetheless makes possible- testimony”.92  
Linguistic witnessing is therefore, both necessary and impossible.  For Derrida, not only is 
language the mode in which one must bear witness, the language itself bears witness.  
Referring again to Patočka’s work, he explains, “The narrative is genealogical but it is not 
simply an act of memory.  It bears witness, in the manner of an ethical or political act, for 
today and for tomorrow” (35).  This accounts for Derrida’s scrupulous attention to mode and 
detail in his writing practice.  In The Gift of Death, he adopts and develops a structure of 
linguistic silence, and therefore secrecy, which in turn bears witness to both the specifics of 
the narrative and to the infinite nature of signification.  Consequently, in the text, Derrida 
both bears witness to extra-textual events, and demonstrates how bearing witness itself 
becomes the event.    
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This act of bearing witness becomes a way of assuming and fulfilling responsibility; in the 
case of Abraham, ‘a witness and not a teacher’, this responsibility is absolute responsibility 
to God.  This question of responsibility and the disjunction between singular responsibility 
and ethical universality, links Abraham’s controversial actions and Patočka’s conceptual 
genealogy.  Derrida follows Kierkegaard in interpreting Abraham’s intended actions as an 
ethical transgression which contravenes his duties as both father and leader.  Ethically 
speaking, he is “a murderer” (85) whose actions can only be interpreted otherwise within a 
religious framework.  Derrida employs Kierkegaard’s distinctions between the aesthetic, 
ethical and religious as modes of living, with the religious level valued most highly and 
embodied by the ‘Knight of Faith’, here represented by Abraham.  The ethical level is 
defined by universality and is therefore often breached by religious demands as the 
individual acknowledges and fulfils their singular commitment to God above all else.  
Whereas, “The ethical involves me in substitution, as does speaking” (61), religious 
responsibility cannot be translated into generality and explained linguistically as it is 
entirely singular, unique and incommunicable, thus accounting for Abraham’s silence and 
secrecy.  The ‘tragic hero’ who represents the ethical may explain and share his actions, yet 
Abraham as ‘Knight of Faith’, “cannot be mediated”,93 and “cannot speak”;94 he thus, in 
Derrida’s words, “declines the autobiography that is always auto-justification” (62).  
Derrida states that responsibility comprises two components: the active or practical, 
and the theoretical, which answers for the action, for example in its awareness of causes and 
consequences.  This relationship is one of “original and irreducible complexity” (25) as the 
two elements are necessarily connected yet heterogeneous.  The act or decision always 
occurs before the theoretical element (i.e. its justification), and as such, irresponsibility 
always intrudes into even the most responsible of acts.  This renders an inescapable 
separation between the act and the dogma of responsibility, and “keeps responsibility apart 
and in secret” (26).  Further, the association of ‘religion’, as that which designates an 
institution with a structure and history, with responsibility, here a singular, often ethically 
transgressive commitment, reveals an internal tension.  The collective history of religion, 
which appears as a history of responding and responsibility, is therefore the tracing of 
singular, unshareable and at the time, unjustifiable events.  Through its two narrative 
threads, The Gift of Death enacts the impossible encounter between history and the event, 
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revealing the ‘historic event’ to be a necessary contradiction which both forms and deforms 
the historical narrative.  For Derrida, the event, as expression of singular subjectivity and 
here responsibility, disrupts linear temporality, can never be realised fully in itself, and is 
therefore experienced through surrounding signs or symptoms and expressed through the 
future anterior as that which will have taken place.  The event is both constitutive and 
disruptive of history, which “depends on such an excessive beginning” (6).95  Derrida argues 
that such events as manifestations of one’s singular responsibility to God which exceed 
historical expression, should never be reduced to it; history “must not touch the essence of 
an experience that consists precisely in tearing oneself away from one’s one historical 
conditions” (5).  Thus, accepting Kierkegaard’s claim that “faith... has no history”, 
progressive and teleological conceptions of history should be passed over in favour of a 
“nonhistory of absolute beginnings.”  Consequently, “we must always start over”.  Derrida’s 
reading preserves this paradox, in which the ‘Binding of Isaac’ is both part of “a history... a 
story” (80), or rather various histories, and a singular, unhistoricisable event, as “taking it to 
be a fable still amounts to losing it to philosophical or poetic generality; it means that it loses 
the quality of a historic event” (66).   
In this section I have shown that, for Derrida, being ‘silent’ enables secrecy, bearing 
witness and responsibility, states which interpellate the subject and emphasise the 
singularity of religious commitment.  In the next section, I shall investigate how this 
understanding of subjectivity, responsibility and silence anchors Derrida’s reconfiguration of 
‘God’.    
 
(c) Rewriting God: From Transcendence to Immanence? 
 
The unseen figure of God and his absolute yet incomprehensible authority, is central to 
accounts of the ‘Binding of Isaac’.  However, rejecting traditional ideas of the God of 
revelation as transcendent and omnipotent, Derrida looks to rewrite the concept of God, 
which he develops out of his experience and understanding of language.  In this section, I 
shall examine Derrida’s definitions of God in The Gift of Death, considering both their 
persuasiveness and any tensions between them, and relating them to the ideas and 
imperatives of silence, secrecy and bearing witness which motivate the text.  
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In The Gift of Death, Derrida defines God in two ways: first, as the structure of the secret 
which constitutes human subjectivity, and secondly as the ‘absolute other’.  The first 
definition finds God inextricably linked to ideas of silence and secrecy.  Here, as testament 
to the double movement which characterises deconstruction, Derrida regards this re-vision 
of ‘God’ as both faithful and unfaithful to monotheistic tradition.  He declares:  
 
It is perhaps necessary, if we are to follow the traditional Judaeo-Christiano-Islamic 
injunction, but also at the risk of turning it against that tradition, to think of God 
and of the name of God without such idolatrous stereotyping or representation.  
Then we might say: God is the name of the possibility I have of keeping a secret that 
is visible from the interior but not from the exterior.  Once such a structure exists, 
of being-with-oneself, of speaking, that is, of producing invisible sense, once I have 
within me, thanks to the invisible word as such, a witness that others cannot see, 
and who is therefore at the same time other than me and more intimate with me 
than myself, once I can have a secret relationship with myself and not tell 
everything, once there is secrecy, and secret witnessing within me, then what I call 
God exists, (there is) what I call God in me, (it happens that) I call myself God- a 
phrase that is difficult to distinguish from ‘God calls me’, for it is on that condition 
that I can call myself or that I am called in secret.  God is in me, he is the absolute 
‘me’ or ‘self’, he is that structure of invisible interiority that is called, in 
Kierkegaard’s sense, subjectivity.  And he is made manifest, he manifests his 
nonmanifestation when, in the structures of the living or the entity, there appears in 
the course of phylo- and ontogenetic history, the possibility of secrecy, however 
differentiated, complex, plural, and overdetermined it be; that is, when there 
appears the desire and power to render absolutely invisible and to constitute within 
oneself a witness of that invisibility.  That is the history of God and of the name of 
God as the history of secrecy... (108-9)    
 
Derrida argues that ‘God’ names a certain structure of subjectivity in which the interior ‘self’ 
cannot be externally manifested, and that this structure guarantees the heterogeneity and 
otherness of other ‘selves’.  God both calls the ‘self’ into existence and names its very 
structure of subjectivity.  This link between religion, specifically Christianity, and the 
development of a particular subjectivity is evident in Derrida’s description of Patočka’s 
history of responsibility as a “history of egological subjectivity” (19).  Further, Derrida insists 
that “Religion presumes access to the responsibility of a free self” (2).  This development of 
“the Christian self” (6), from which follows the instantiation of a certain political 
subjectivity, is ascribed to the dissymmetrical encounter with God and the experience of the 
mysterium tremendum.  Derrida describes: “This trembling seizes one at the moment of 
becoming a person, and the person can become what it is only in being paralyzed [transie], 
in its very singularity, by the gaze of God” (6).  This shift from Platonism to Christianity in 
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Patočka’s narrative is inscribed as the passage from exterior to interior; experienced both 
individually and collectively, it is the “becoming-historical of humankind” (6).  Through 
this notion of God as a certain linguistic non-manifestation, Derrida narrates an equivalent 
shift: from Abraham, whose linguistic silence bears witness to an external, transcendent 
God, to Derrida’s own text, in which God is immanent to the very experiences of silence, 
secrecy and witnessing.  
 Derrida’s second definition of God, as the ‘absolute other’, is reiterated numerous 
times in The Gift of Death.  Derrida describes “the absolute other... the absolute singularity 
of the other, whose name here is God” (66); later asserting that “God is the name of the 
absolute other as other and as unique (the God of Abraham defined as the one and unique)” 
(68); and reinforcing, “The absolute other: God, if you wish” (69).  This repeated association 
of God with the ‘absolute other’ is also achieved through the use of linguistic silence within 
the text.  For Derrida, such a silence, which remains intrinsic to, and signifies within, 
language, provides a way of being ‘in secret’ and bearing witness to that which resists 
manifestation, the extra-linguistic or ‘other’ within language.  This is what Derrida names 
God.  Whereas associating God with absolute silence would link God’s otherness to absolute 
transcendence, Derrida’s use of relative or linguistic silence reinforces his reconfiguration of 
the meaning of ‘God’.   
 
The significance of God in The Gift of Death is determined by the interaction between these 
definitions of God as ‘absolute other’, and as the structure of secrecy or subjectivity.  
Shakespeare regards the two as incompatible; he states:  
 
How far Derrida is committed to this position is unclear.  However, it is fraught 
with tension.  If God is met as infinite alterity, how can ‘God’ name a possibility that 
‘I’ have? At this point, Derrida seems to fall back on a reductionist option which is as 
open to challenge as the crude realism which he rejects as idolatrous.  Surely 
whatever God names eludes any control or possession on my part; and if that is so, it 
cannot be equated with a characteristic of human subjectivity without further ado.96  
 
Shakespeare’s dismissal of the definitions as incompatible seems overhasty for three reasons.  
First, he overlooks the way that the structure of subjectivity that Derrida describes ensures 
the otherness of every other, thus linking the two definitions through God’s relationship to 
otherness.  Secondly, Shakespeare incorrectly perceives a subjective element in the structure 
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of subjectivity.  Finally, the two are also linked through the connected structures of secrecy 
and witnessing, as God is, for Derrida, the “present-absent witness of every oath or of every 
possible pledge”.97  In Derrida’s dynamic process of witnessing, God is variously presented as 
witness, witnessed and witnessing, and also figures as an other or third, pace Levinas: “this 
‘thirdness’ [tertialite] turns or makes turn toward it, like a witness (terstis) made to bear 
witness to it”.98  Futher, the relationship with God as other provides the model for every 
other relationship, as, “The a-dieu, for God or before God and before anything else or any 
relation to the other, [is] in every other adieu” (47).  This structure of bearing witness or 
giving testimony, so central to The Gift of Death, is for Derrida a uniquely religious act; 
elsewhere, he maintains that “any testimony testifies in essence to the miraculous and the 
extraordinary from the moment it must, by definition, appeal to an act of faith beyond any 
proof”.99  This association between religion and witnessing is reinforced by Hent de Vries, 
who reveals, following Derrida, that, “To sin then, would thus precisely be to fail to bear 
witness”.100  It seems that Shakespeare’s critique oversimplifies Derrida’s definitions of God, 
and that otherness and subjectivity are, for Derrida, profoundly interrelated, rather than 
opposed.  Further, Derrida’s retention of two definitions of God, rather than collapsing them 
into one, looks to develop the association of God with self-difference, rather than self-
identity and sovereignty.   
 
Another critic who evaluates Derrida’s account of God in The Gift of Death is Marius 
Timmann Mjaaland.  In his comparative study of Kierkegaard and Derrida, Mjaaland 
assesses Derrida’s claims about God and considers Kierkegaard’s influence on Derrida.  He 
identifies a similarity between the thinkers’ conceptions of God; for both, “the sign ‘God’ 
refers to a condition of possibility that opens the space, opens the self as the space of 
possibility, as a self that is called by God”.101  Despite this, he argues that the Kierkegaard of 
The Sickness Unto Death would consider Derrida’s God to be lost in the circularity of self-
reference.102  Tracking the historical precedents of Derrida’s concept of God, notably 
ontotheological and Enlightenment philosophical definitions, Mjaaland observes that 
although there is something traditionally Jewish in Derrida’s rejection of representations of 
                                                             
97 Jacques Derrida, ‘Faith and Knowledge’, pp. 42-101 (p. 65). 
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99 Derrida, Demeure, p. 75.   
100 De Vries, p. 394. 
101 Mjaaland, p. 305.  
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God as idolatrous, his God is rather “a certain late modern repetition of the Christian 
concept of God”,103 albeit one whose complete interiority conflicts with the transcendence 
of the Christian God.  Mjaaland rejects the proximity and interiority of Derrida’s 
understanding of God, in part because he perceives both hubris and inescapable self-
referentiality in considering God to be “the hidden and secret ‘surplus’ in the self’s 
relationship to itself”.104  Such a definition is somewhat redeemed, according to Mjaaland, by 
the inherence of God’s otherness in language, which:  
 
makes the relationship to God an integral proposition, not only of the relationship to 
the other, but also of the relationship to oneself, through the designation of the 
other as other and of oneself as oneself.  This prevents a purely instrumental 
understanding of language, and gives it an ethical and religious meaning which is 
determined by the relationship to the other.105       
 
This account underlines the importance of the relationship between God and language for 
Derrida’s accounts of religion and ethics, and I would only quibble with Mjaaland’s 
accusation of self-referentiality, which seems to overlook the way in which language 
renders otherness internal to the self-relationship.  Appearing to contradict his earlier, 
positive appraisal of Derrida’s understanding of God, and again underplaying the function of 
the ‘other qua other’ in the formation of subjectivity, Mjaaland reiterates this critique of 
self-referentiality, suggesting that such a God would be “empty,”106 “subjective, and 
abstract,”107 and merely a “function of the self”.  He continues:  
       
With God as a ‘structure of invisible interiority’, the concept of God may be reduced 
to a function of the self.  This makes Derrida’s concept of God too weak to be able to 
open up the self to the other qua other- in the philosophical, religious and ethical 
sense.  His concept of God exhausts its meaning in the interpretation of writing as 
writing, as a secret inscribed upon writing and the self-relationship (il y a là du 
secret).108 
 
Mjaaland’s scepticism towards Derrida’s linguistic definition of God (‘writing as writing’) 
seems to depart from Derrida’s rejection of more orthodox definitions, yet Mjaaland resists a 
clear statement of his own position.  Yet, despite these potential limitations of Mjaaland’s 
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claims, his critique reveals a telling frustration with the interiority of Derrida’s account of 
God, a  disjunction between interior and exterior which he traces back to Kierkegaard, of 
whom he claims: “At the moment when he confronts the exterior world on a political level, 
it becomes obvious that Kierkegaard himself lacks a differentiated reflection on how God 
affects the relationship between the interior and exterior”.109  Returning to The Gift of 
Death, Mjaaland states:  
 
I find such a circumscription of philosophical and religious piety far too pietistic, in 
fact, far too traditional, and it suits all too well the modern view on religion as a 
strictly private matter... The entire exteriority is affected by the question of God, 
politically, ethically, aesthetically and philosophically.110   
 
I shall return to Mjaaland’s claim that the question of God cannot be confined to the private 
but permeates the external sphere, later in this chapter and in Chapter Four.  First however, 
I shall demonstrate Derrida’s ambivalence towards the internalisation of God which 
Mjaaland perceives in his work.   
 
Derrida’s seemingly internalised conception of God chimes with Oliver Davies and Denys 
Turner’s observation-with regard to the resurgence of interest in negative theology- of a 
“deeply rooted trend in contemporary religiosity towards the privatisation and 
internalisation of religion, whereby faith is translated into transcendence or ‘religious 
experience’ which is indifferent or even hostile to traditional beliefs and practices.”.111  
Derrida’s work is clearly sceptical towards the beliefs and structures of institutional religion, 
and, by aligning ‘God’ with the generation of subjectivity, he seems to be constructing an 
image of God which is private and internal.  For him, it is the dissymmetry of the encounter 
between God and ‘self’ which creates both subjectivity, responsibility and being towards 
death, “namely, this exposing of the soul to the gaze of another person, of a person as 
transcendent other, as an other who looks at me, but who looks without the-subject-who-
says-I being able to reach that other, see her, hold her within the reach of my gaze” (25).  
However, this seemingly internalised process also illustrates, following Levinas’s account of 
the ethical encounter, that exposure to otherness institutes subjectivity.  Here, Derrida both 
reveals and challenges Levinas’s influence, describing: “There is no face-to-face exchange of 
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looks between God and myself, between the other and myself.  God looks at me and I don’t 
see him and it is on the basis of this gaze that singles me out [ce regard qui me regarde] that 
my responsibility comes into being” (91).  God and subjectivity are further linked, for 
Derrida, by the impossibility of complete manifestation, and the ‘existence’ of a mystery, 
silence, or promise preserved by Derrida’s mode of ‘avoiding speaking’.  Derrida insists upon 
“the authentic mystery of the person” which “must remain mysterious”, arguing that “we 
should approach it only by letting it be what it is in truth- veiled, withdrawn, dissimulated” 
(37).  Yet this too, which refers to the importance of silence and secrecy, is not a simple 
withdrawal into privacy and interiority; the secret, as I shall demonstrate explicitly in the 
next chapter, itself disrupts the relationship between public and private, naming the 
possibility of a hiddenness or non-manifestation which is not confined to the private realm.   
 Derrida’s retelling of the ‘Binding of Isaac’ in The Gift of Death also questions any 
simplistic opposition between faith and religion, or between the interior and exterior 
elements of religion.  Challenging the narrative of a disparity between the singular, 
individual and ahistorical experience of faith which encounters the historical, universal 
institution of religion (internal meeting external), Derrida shows that the purely internal 
experience is always already contaminated by the exterior, that history is itself internalised 
and that this ‘encounter’ therefore takes place both within and without.  Consequently, any 
boundary between interior and exterior is shifting and permeable. 
 
(d) ‘Religion and Ethics: Kierkegaard and Levinas 
 
Aside from Mjaaland, who identifies a “mutual complementarity”112 between Kierkegaard 
and Derrida, other recent critics have also identified Kierkegaard’s influence on Derrida as a 
key point of access to the latter’s writings on religion and subjectivity.  These include Don 
Cupitt, who labels Derrida “the modern Kierkegaard”,113 and John Llewelyn, who looks to 
assert the autonomy of religious experience from religious dogma and institution.  Focusing 
on “religion in general”,114 that is, non-dogmatic, disruptive and responsive to the singular, 
he looks “to fend off God”,115 perceiving God as that which is irrecuperable from 
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ontotheology.  Although he constructs a more generative reading of Derrida’s understanding 
of God elsewhere, as he writes of “the optical option between seeing through God and 
seeing through God”,116 Llewelyn doesn’t fully explore the complex relationship between 
the two thinkers.  This relationship is in part determined by Kierkegaard’s exploration of the 
differences between ethics and religion, a tension on which Derrida focuses in his 
examination of Kierkegaard and Levinas in The Gift of Death and which again relates to the 
problematic relationship between interior and exterior, or singular and universal 
commitments.  Responding to Derrida’s presentation of Kierkegaard and Levinas’s different 
approaches to the ethical dilemma of Genesis 22, I shall investigate this tension further now.  
     
At first glance, Kierkegaard and Levinas’s positions towards the relationship between ethics 
and religion seem radically opposed.  In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard depicts the 
religious level of experience, in which one is motivated by faith, “the highest passion in a 
human being”117 and responds to one’s “absolute duty to God”,118 as in some way superior to 
ethical experience.  In contrast, Levinas celebrates the pre-eminence of the ethical, for, “It is 
there, in the ethical, that there is an appeal to the uniqueness of the subject”.119  However, it 
seems that such a bald opposition between Levinas and Kierkegaard, and therefore between 
the demands of ethics and religion, is reductive.  
  First, Kierkegaard’s understanding of the ethical is not reducible to “the general”,120 
or to that which is overcome or contravened in pursuit of the religious; rather, as 
Shakespeare remarks, the ethical “is a category under dispute”,121 both within Fear and 
Trembling and as it is modified in the course of Kierkegaard’s work.  In Fear and Trembling, 
Kierkegaard’s use of a pseudonym enables him to explore and express ideas without 
committing to them, and thus this position, which displays at least a scepticism towards the 
ethical, cannot simply be conflated with that of de Silentio.122  Moreover, rather than 
confirming a Kierkegaardian model of the ethical, here, Jerome Gellman argues, the ethical 
is allied “with Hegelian morality as immanent in the societal institutions of which one is a 
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part”,123 a position from which Kierkegaard strongly diverges.  Furthermore, C. Stephen 
Evans suggests that we should consider the ethical in Fear and Trembling as part of 
Kierkegaard’s ongoing attempt to fashion a new proto-existential ethics.  Evans argues:  
 
It seems clear that the life of faith is not a life that repudiates ethical existence, but 
rather substitutes a new conception of the ethical for that which underlies 
prevailing social ethics.  The new conception differs from the old one in two 
fundamental ways: (1) the basis of the ethic is not the collective judgments of 
society but the transcendent message of God; (2) the ethic does not merely prescribe 
ideals but concerns itself with the concrete conditions that make it possible to 
realise its ideals.124           
 
However, despite the subtleties of Kierkegaard’s position, it remains subject to critique from 
Levinas, who perceives in it a misunderstanding and devaluation of the ethical.  For Levinas, 
“the attention Abraham pays to the voice that brings him back to the ethical order... is the 
most intense moment of the drama”.125  Levinas’s disapproval of Kierkegaard’s interpretation 
of Genesis 22 derives from his rejection of Kierkegaard’s understanding of subjectivity, and 
its influence on his reading of Abraham.  Levinas argues:  
Thus faith, the going forth from self, the only possible going forth for subjectivity, is 
the solitary tête-à-tète with what for Kierkegaard admits of nothing but the tête-à-
tète: God... It carries within it an irresponsibility, a ferment of disintegration... Thus 
begins the disdain for the ethical basis of being, the somehow secondary nature of 
all ethical phenomena that, through Nietzsche, has led us to the amoralism of the 
most recent philosophers.126  
As Merold Westphal notes, Levinas perceives Kierkegaard’s faith as “irresponsibility rather 
than responsibility, that in all its preoccupation with its own God relation it leaves the 
neighbour in the lurch”.127  Critics including Westphal argue that Levinas overstates the 
differences between himself and Kierkegaard, with Westphal observing a structural 
similarity between Levinas’s “ethical transcendence” and Kierkegaard’s “religious 
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transcendence”.128  Further, he charges Levinas with a limited reading of Kierkegaard, 
noting a lack of reference to Works of Love, a text in which Kierkegaard relates the 
experience of faith and responsibility to being with one’s neighbour.  Similarly, Karl 
Verstrynge finds in both Kierkegaard and Levinas, “the notion of a strange element that at 
once destabilizes and constitutes the subjectivity of the subject”.129   
 
The suggestion that the thinkers are more alike than Levinas cares to admit is reinforced by 
Derrida’s examination of two different readings of the phrase ‘tout autre est tout autre’ in 
The Gift of Death.  Of these readings, 
 
One of them keeps in reserve the possibility of reserving the quality of the wholly 
other, in other words, the infinite other, for God alone, or in any case for a single 
other.  The other attributes to or recognizes in this infinite alterity of the wholly 
other, every other, in other words each, each one, for example each man and 
woman. (83) 
 
The first reading, referring to the absolute otherness of God, is clearly attributable to 
Kierkegaard’s understanding of religious experience, whereas the second, in which this 
absolute otherness can be experienced through every instance of otherness, refers to 
Levinas’s depiction of the ethical.  In the text, Derrida affirms both readings of ‘tout autre 
est tout autre’ whilst demonstrating their interdependence.  Thus God is represented as both 
the absolute other who secures the value and significance of all instances of alterity, and 
alternatively, as one other amongst many.  In the first case, it is the figure of God’s otherness 
which generates the language of responsibility, ethics and commitment.  Derrida explains: 
“As soon as I enter into a relation with the absolute other, my absolute singularity enters 
into relation with his on the level of obligation and duty” (68).  Here otherness has a 
religious significance.  However, in the second reading, Derrida retains the language of 
‘absolute singularity’ and “absolute responsibility” (67), derived from the example of 
Abraham, as well as the structure of bearing witness to otherness through silence and 
secrecy, yet dispensing with the surety of a transcendent God to ensure the meaning of this 
otherness.  However, Derrida suggests that the clear distinction between the two positions 
cannot be maintained, rather:         
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If every human is wholly other, if everyone else, or every other one, is every bit 
other, then one can no longer distinguish between a claimed generality of ethics 
that would need to be sacrificed in sacrifice, and the faith that turns towards God 
alone, as wholly other, turning away from human duty.  But since Levinas also 
wants to distinguish between the infinite alterity of God and the ‘same’ infinite 
alterity of every human, or of the other in general, then he cannot simply be said to 
be saying something different from Kierkegaard.  Neither one nor the other can 
assure himself of a concept of the ethical and of the religious that is of consequence; 
and consequently they are especially unable to determine the limit between those 
two orders.  Kierkegaard would have to admit, as Levinas reminds him, that ethics is 
also the order of and respect for absolute singularity, and not only that of the 
generality or of the repetition of the same.  He cannot therefore distinguish so 
conveniently between the ethical and the religious.  But for his part, in taking into 
account absolute singularity, that is, the absolute alterity obtaining in relations 
between one human and another, Levinas is no longer able to distinguish between 
the infinite alterity of God and that of every human.  His ethics is already a religious 
one.  In the two cases the border between the ethical and the religious becomes 
more problematic, as do all attendant discourses. (84) 
 
Consequently, for Derrida, the simplistic definitions of ethics as a discourse of universality, 
religion as a discourse of singularity, and responsibility as that to which both discourses 
make claim, are destabilised by the interaction between the terms.  One consequence of this 
is a translation of the tension between ethics and religion, or universality and singularity to 
within the ethical sphere.  Mjaaland observes that “both Levinas and Kierkegaard introduce 
the religious within the ethical sphere”,130 a move which Derrida follows in translating 
absolute responsibility out of its purely religious context, and into contemporary life.  Thus, 
we are all infinitely responsible, “we no longer know who is called Abraham” (79) because 
every time we are torn by conflicting demands, we are, in effect, Abraham.  Ethics in this 
sense would demand the same singular responsibility as a religious call.  As such, ethics 
would then be divided, naming “an insoluble and paradoxical contradiction between 
responsibility in general and absolute responsibility” (61).  However, for Derrida, the gap 
between the two readings (religion as internal or external to ethics) and the tension 
between religion and ethics is never wholly subsumed into the ethical.  In this way, 
Mjaaland argues that the formula ‘tout autre est tout autre’: “opens a space between the two 
readings of Fear and Trembling which is indefinable and allows the two readings to stand 
over against each other in such a way that the differences are not removed and neither 
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reading is permitted to replace the other”.131  Consequently, the other reading, in which the 
religious remains external to, and in tension with, ethics, is also sustained.   
 Derrida consistently re-inscribes this double reading.  Although he looks to translate 
both the concept of God and the idea of absolute commitment and responsibility into an 
ethical framework through a deconstructive understanding of subjectivity, he also stresses 
the inadequacy of political, legal and philosophical accounts of ethics in the face of the 
exorbitance of religion and religious responsibility.  In this way, he underlines the 
irreducibility of religion to ethics revealing: “As soon as I enter into a relationship with the 
other, with the gaze, look, request, love, command, or call of the other, I know that I can 
respond only by sacrificing ethics…” (68).  Similarly, he declares elsewhere: “I am really 
Kierkegaardian: the experience of faith is something that exceeds language in a certain way, 
it exceeds ethics, politics and society”.132  Consequently, Shakespeare’s claim that “Religious 
language opens a way to articulate the irreducible ethical import of deconstruction”133 is 
both accurate and insufficient, as the religious language used cannot ultimately be contained 
within this framework.  This is instantiated by Derrida’s chapter on Genesis 22 which 
figures as a shudder of religious singularity in the text, excluding other discourses, 
particularly those of ethics, philosophy and politics, until later pages.   
Mjaaland’s accusation- that Derrida’s ‘God’ remains inescapably and unhelpfully 
interiorised- reinforces a simplistic binary between interior and exterior which Derrida’s 
entire oeuvre, and particularly his strategy of the ‘double reading’, look to challenge.  In the 
final section of this chapter I shall recapitulate my argument so far, and suggest that, 
although Derrida’s account of God evades this critique, he too is reluctant to discuss how 
this account and the modes of writing which enable it, might provide a way of responding 
to the aporias between ethics and religion, and ethics and politics.      
  
4. Conclusion 
 
At the start of the chapter, I outlined two types or interpretations of silence: absolute and 
relative.  In my analysis of ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ and The Gift of Death, I 
showed that for Derrida, relative or linguistic silence which is already embedded within 
language and communication may be brought to express that which is silenced or 
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suppressed by other linguistic modes.  Regarding ‘Denials’, I argued that this mode of 
‘avoiding speaking’, influenced by negative theology, enabled the preservation of the 
‘promise’, developed by Derrida into conceptions of God both as a promise or otherness 
which insists within language, and as the infinite nature of signification.  This silence 
proved effective for approaching and rethinking divinity, highlighting the association of 
God with language and enabling Derrida to generate multiple definitions of God and 
fragmented histories which serve as a counter to absolute, monolithic, self-same conceptions 
of God and homogenised histories.  Identifying a similar mode, structure and silence in the 
account of the ‘Binding of Isaac’ in The Gift of Death, I showed how for Derrida, the 
language of silence removes the need for violent and untruthful manifestation, permitting 
that which cannot be expressed to remain hidden, veiled or secret, and complementing the 
dialogical mode of multiple voices explored in Chapter Two.  Akin to the promise in 
‘Denials’, Derrida’s mode of ‘avoiding speaking’ is allied with being ‘in secret’, which in turn 
enables bearing witness or becoming responsible, states which draw out the singularity of 
the subject.  Derrida connects this notion of subjectivity with God, defined both as absolute 
otherness, and as the internalised structure of subjectivity.  These related yet non-identical 
notions deviate from the traditional conception of God as sovereign and self-identical.  
Responding to Mjaaland’s critique of the interiorised nature of Derrida’s understanding of 
God, I argued that this understanding draws out the interrelation between interior and 
exterior, same and other, and challenges any fixed binaries.  Similarly, turning to the 
apparent tension between ethics and religion as explored through Kierkegaard and Levinas, 
I demonstrated that Derrida’s insistence on the double reading of ‘tout autre est tout autre’ 
prevents any resolution between, or conflation of, the two terms, and emphasises the 
irreducibility of religion to ethics.   
 
In The Gift of Death, Derrida repeatedly stresses the dissimilarity between ‘avoiding 
speaking’ and philosophy, which is allied with “the very order and essence of manifestation” 
(66), and disavows secrecy.  He presents this as a limitation of philosophy, disclosing that, 
“By disavowing this secret, philosophy would have come to reside in a misunderstanding of 
what there is to know, namely, that there is secrecy and that it is incommensurable with 
knowing, with knowledge and objectivity” (92).  Such a weakness is not confined to 
philosophy but also affects ethics and politics as traditionally understood.  Derrida explains:  
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There are no final secrets for philosophy, ethics, or politics.  The manifest is given 
priority over the hidden or the secret, universal generality is superior to the 
hidden... But the paradox of faith is that interiority remains ‘incommensurable with 
exteriority’. (63)   
 
Again in a familiar double reading, Derrida both accepts and re-inscribes this ‘paradox of 
faith’, both insisting that there is no pure interiority, and acknowledging an irreducible 
‘otherness’ which can’t be assimilated by philosophy.134  This double reading, 
incomprehensible to, and prohibited by, philosophical discourse, is facilitated by his 
adoption of the complementary discourses of dialogue and silence; the former assumes 
multiple voices and perspectives to approach that which challenges current modes of 
expression, whereas the latter looks to let it speak through the gaps and spaces it leaves.   
 
The Gift of Death gestures understatedly towards some of the ethical and political 
implications both of Derrida’s choice of modes and of his reconfiguration of God.  Derrida’s 
dual understanding of God as absolute alterity and as structure of secrecy or subjectivity, 
conditions his conception of both the self-relation and intersubjectivity, challenging 
political models of sovereignty derived from the notion of divine sovereignty, and thus 
supporting Mjaaland’s claim that ‘The entire exteriority is affected by the question of God, 
politically, ethically, aesthetically and philosophically’.  For Derrida, the truth of individual 
subjectivity and the possibility of a politics would be connected by a constitutive otherness.  
Derrida’s adoption of discourses of dialogue and silence, his insistence on the 
interaction between the two, and on the value of secrecy and non-manifestation, looks 
towards a politics of non-sovereignty.  Such a politics or political discourse would allow 
rather than disable elements of faith, secrecy and non-manifestation and would not 
systematically suppress singularity in favour of universality, rather taking into account “the 
                                                             
134 John J. Davenport argues that Derrida misunderstands the ‘paradox of faith’ in Fear and Trembling, treating 
Abraham as a tragic hero rather than as a knight of faith. Derrida, he argues, “reduces Abraham’s faith to infinite 
resignation without eschatological hope” (Davenport, p. 182), mistakenly interprets Isaac’s sacrifice 
metaphorically (on this, see also Gellner, p. 36), and fails to understand that “existential faith consists in trust 
that all obstacles to the complete realization of the ethical will be overcome ‘in the end’” (Davenport, p. 177).  
Consequently, for Davenport, “Derrida’s rhetoric is pure idolatry of aporia, worship of contradiction, 
sanctification of dilemma- an aestheticization of movement beyond ethics” (Davenport, p. 186).  Davenport’s 
rather reactive critique overlooks Derrida’s ‘double reading’ and presents an over-simplified account of his 
approach to Levinas and Kierkegaard. However, Derrida does seem to overlook Abraham’s belief that Isaac will 
be returned to him “on the strength of the absurd” (Kierkegaard, p. 70) which is frustrating as such a belief 
parallels Derrida’s own development of a structure of thought which challenges accepted notions of possibility 
and impossibility. John J. Davenport, ‘What Kierkegaardian Faith Adds to Alterity Ethics: How Levinas and 
Derrida Miss the Eschatological Dimension’, in Kierkegaard and Levinas: Ethics, Politics and Religion, ed. by J. 
Aaron Simmons and David Wood (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), pp. 169-196.   
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impossibility of substitution” (58) and not operating solely according to a programmatic 
logic of calculation.  It would not obscure its own aporetic heritage (85-6) rather it would 
insistently question the concepts, such as that of responsibility, in which it is grounded.  
Regarding this, Derrida is scathing towards his critics, recalling the ‘accepted’ position that 
“One simply keeps on denying the aporia and antimony, tirelessly, and one treats as nihilist, 
relativist, even poststructuralist, and worse still deconstructionist, all those who remain 
concerned in the face of such a display of good conscience.” (85)  For Derrida, the political is 
that which, like religion, must constantly negotiate between the singularity of the event and 
the individual, and the effective universality of history and law, as well as that which must 
devise a new language which is not prey to such divisive logic. 
The importance of such a new language, named ‘post-writing’ in ‘Sauf le nom’, 
‘another syntax’ in ‘Denials’, and inspired in part by negative theology which ‘deconstructs 
grammatical anthropomorphism’, is here however, frustratingly underplayed.  This 
language, which rejects traditional philosophical delineations, having first deconstructed 
their purported neutrality, enables Derrida to rethink God as non self-identical, and to 
reconfigure the relationships between ethics, religion and politics without falling into the 
familiar traps created by oppositions such as interiority and exteriority and faith and 
religion.  It would provide a way to express, in Derek Attridge’s terms, “that which is, at a 
given moment, outside the horizon provided by the culture for thinking, understanding, 
imagining, feeling, perceiving”.135  Derrida’s ‘double reading’, which resists reinforcing such 
oppositions or their dialectical resolution, is a key step in the development of such a ‘post-
writing’.  Similarly, in its resistance to the opposition between private and public modes of 
religious expression, Derrida’s depiction of God looks to recondition our understanding of 
what can be thought and achieved.  In the final chapter I shall consider how this depiction 
of God is developed through Derrida’s use of that most philosophical discourse, reason, and 
how this illuminates the relationships between religion and politics, and the public and the 
private.
                                                             
135 Derek Attridge, The Singularity of Literature (London; Routledge, 2004), p. 19.  
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Chapter Four: Reason 
 
Derrida’s entire oeuvre is preoccupied with the continuous deconstruction of that new 
nomos of reason.        
Michael Dillon 
 
The authority of judgment or of the critical evaluation is not the final authority for 
deconstruction.  Deconstruction is also a deconstruction of critique.  Which does not mean 
that all critique or all criticism is devalued, but that one is trying to think what the authority 
of the critical instance signifies in history- for example in the Kantian sense but not only in 
the Kantian sense.        
          
        Jacques Derrida  
   
1. Introduction 
 
Of all Derrida’s concerns, reason is perhaps the most enduring.  Emerging in his early work, 
particularly through his dispute with Foucault,1 issues surrounding the nature and 
significance of reason persist throughout Derrida’s writing.  Such issues influence crucial 
conceptions of subjectivity and alterity, and span both the philosophical investigations of 
the earlier work and Derrida’s later exploration of the ethical and political implications of 
such investigations.  As the Derrida of ‘Cogito and the History of Madness’ makes clear, 
reason determines the limits of both thought and action:  
 
The unsurpassable, unique and imperial grandeur of the order of reason, that which 
makes it not just another actual order or structure (a determined historical structure, 
one structure among other possible ones), is that one cannot speak out against it 
except by being for it, that one can protest it only from within its domain.  Reason 
leaves us only the recourse to stratagems and strategies.2         
  
Given the apparent power and dominance of reason, it is no surprise that Derrida keeps 
returning to question both our definitions of, and responses to, it.  In this chapter I shall 
focus primarily on ‘Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of “Religion” at the Limits of 
Reason Alone’, a key text which marks the nexus of the ethical, political and religious 
concerns of Derrida’s later work and continues the ongoing process of determining 
deconstruction’s relationship to the Western philosophical tradition.  Here Derrida looks to 
rethink our understanding of reason, and asks: “How ‘to talk religion’? Of religion? 
                                                             
1 For an exploration of this dispute, see Roy Boyne, Foucault and Derrida: The Other Side of Reason (London: 
Unwin Hyman, 1990).  
2 Jacques Derrida, ‘Cogito and the History of Madness’, in Writing and Difference, as before, pp. 36-76 (p. 42).  
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Singularly of religion today?”3 concerning itself with the scope and relevance of religion, its 
circulation, dissemination and contamination.  The intersection of these issues surrounding 
reason and religion is framed in terms of the contemporary “return of the religious” (45), for 
Derrida a phenomenon which demands urgent recognition, investigation, and ultimately, 
action.  
 In the first part of the analysis, I track Derrida’s argument that the apparently 
sovereign and divergent discourses of religion and reason are structurally similar, mutually 
dependent and contradictory or non-self-identical.  Moving beyond ‘Faith and Knowledge’, 
I consider Derrida’s understanding of ‘reason’ in his later texts,  particularly his contention 
that reason is composed of “heterogeneous rationalities”4 and names the irreducible, non-
economic relationship between calculation and the incalculable.  This concept of reason, I 
argue, forms the basis of what Derrida terms the ‘Enlightenment to come’, which 
presupposes a new understanding of the interaction between philosophy and politics, and, 
in its emphasis on faith and incalculability, is connected to the ‘return of the religious’.  
However, returning to ‘Faith and Knowledge,’ I argue that the political focus of the text, 
linked to the shared future of reason and religion, is accompanied by a suspension of the 
related question of God.  Such a suspension is a result of the association of the question of 
God with issues of interiority, responsibility and subjectivity, rendering it seemingly 
problematic to integrate with the political.  This suspension results in an undeconstructive 
tension between the private and the political, which would sustain the claims made by 
Žižek and Bradley- discussed in Chapter Two- that the religious focus of Derrida’s later 
work results in a depoliticisation of deconstruction    
 As ‘Faith and Knowledge’ offers no account or resolution of this tension between 
private and political, in the second half of the chapter I look outside the text to the 
philosopher Richard Rorty and to his theorisation of the division between  private and 
public, both in Derrida’s work and beyond.  Here I outline Rorty’s vision of a “liberal 
utopia”5 in which the hope of uniting public and personal obligations has been abandoned.  
Assessing this claim and the responses of various critics, along with Rorty’s reading of 
Derrida, I outline the limitations of this account and argue that it is significant that Rorty’s 
divergences from Derrida are related to questions of language and literature.  Whereas 
                                                             
3 Jacques Derrida, ‘Faith and Knowledge’, pp. 42-101 (p. 42). Further references are given after quotations in the 
text. 
4 Derrida, Rogues, p. 121.  
5 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. xv. 
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Rorty, although valuing literature highly, considers it another instantiation of the 
public/private opposition, I argue that Derrida presents literature as connected both to 
democracy and public space, singularity and secrecy, and thus offers a potential resolution of 
what is for Rorty an insuperable division.  I also connect Derrida’s focus on the literary with 
his emphasis on ‘post-writing’ a mode which would challenge naturalized binaries such as 
that between public and private.  Finally, bringing these observations to bear on ‘Faith and 
Knowledge’ I suggest that it is the rejection of literary analysis or ‘close reading’ in favour of 
topical political critique in the text which generates the restatement of undeconstructive 
divisions such as those between God and religion, the public and the private, or even ethics 
and politics.             
 
2. Reason, Religion and God: Tensions in ‘Faith and Knowledge’  
 
Editor Gil Anidjar claims that ‘Faith and Knowledge’ is “Derrida’s most explicit treatment of 
‘religion’”.6  The text revisits Derrida’s earlier religious concerns, here however, integrating 
them within a broader discussion of the links between politics, reason, faith and technology, 
a task which in its ambition undercuts Kevin Hart’s claim that “‘Faith and Knowledge’ is at 
heart a modest essay”.7  A weightier critique is offered by Marius Timmann Mjaaland, who 
suggests that Derrida’s observations are less effective when not anchored in a specific text; of 
‘Faith and Knowledge’, he argues: “These deliberations... seem completely outdated less than 
ten years after their publication”.8  The lack of textual grounding is accompanied by a 
reduced emphasis on writing, which as I shall later show does influence the scope, mode 
and focus of the text.  Discursive yet fragmented, ‘Faith and Knowledge is divided into fifty 
two numbered entries arranged over three sections.  Like ‘Envois’, the text is incomplete, 
“telegraphic” (83), and dramatises problems of form and signification.  The premise of its 
argument is the strict division and perceived antagonism between faith and knowledge, or 
religion and reason, an opposition which Derrida claims is groundless and unsustainable.  I 
shall begin by examining this claim.       
 
                                                             
6 Gil Anidjar, ‘Introduction “Once more, once more”: Derrida, the Arab, the Jew’, in Acts of Religion, as before, 
pp. 1-39 (p. 40). 
7 Kevin Hart, ‘Kingdoms of God’, in Kant after Derrida, ed. by Philip Rothfield (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 
2003), pp. 142-170 (p. 158). 
8 Mjaaland, p. 334.  
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(a) Contamination between Reason and Religion  
 
Derrida argues that the opposition between reason and religion is misconceived and 
proposes that an understanding of the ‘return of the religious’ requires a shift of perspective 
from those who “opposed religion, on one side, and on the other, Reason, Enlightenment, 
Science, Criticism” (45).  He insists on “an entirely different schema that would have to be 
taken as one’s point of departure in order to try to think the ‘return of the religious’” (45).  
He initiates such a shift by exposing the contamination between faith and knowledge, 
arguing that they develop from a single origin and exhibit a mutual dependency.  
First, Derrida contends that “religion and reason have the same source” (66), that 
they “develop in tandem” (66) as both depend on a certain testimonial performativity or on 
an act of witnessing.  Although it is obvious that religion incorporates an element of belief 
or witnessing, reason too, affiliated with both philosophy and science as the “critical history 
of the production of knowledge” (66), is dependent on conducting experiments which 
require a witness.  However, in a process of “sacrificial indemnification” (66), this single 
source becomes divided and opposed as the two elements react against each other, 
remaining linked by the protective gesture of autoimmunity, in effect a controlled 
contamination.  Illustrating the dependence of reason or knowledge on that which is usually 
termed religion or faith, Derrida returns to the issue of performativity, claiming that     
discourses of science, knowledge and reason which pride themselves on objectivity require a 
structurally necessary, and yet disavowed “elementary act of faith” (81) in the form of a 
fallible witness.  This blindspot, he argues, results in the mistaken assertion “not only that 
one knows what one knows (which wouldn’t be too serious) but also that one knows what 
knowledge is, that is, free, structurally, of belief or of faith” (68).  A similar oversight occurs 
in reason’s claim to self-justification.  As Derrida insists, “the foundation of law... is a 
‘performative’ event that cannot belong to a set that it founds, inaugurates or justifies” (57).  
However, this performativity, not usually associated with scientific discourse, forms, for 
Derrida, an inescapable bond between faith and knowledge.  He reinforces this claim 
elsewhere, in Without Alibi, asserting:    
 
To link in a certain way faith to knowledge, faith in knowledge, is to articulate 
movements that could be called performative with constative, descriptive, or 
theoretical movements.  A profession of faith, a commitment, a promise, an assumed 
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responsibility, all that calls not upon discourses of knowledge but upon performative 
discourses that produce the event of which they speak.9  
 
Consequently, although scientific discourses hinge upon knowledge, evidence, 
experimentation and that which is apparently quantifiable, they are driven by changing 
human needs and perceptions, occur within a dynamic framework, and require an act of 
witnessing.  Profession or testimony, Derrida asserts, “conditions every ‘social bond’, every 
questioning, all knowledge, performativity, and every tele-techno-scientific performance, 
including those of its forms that are most synthetic, artificial, prosthetic, calculable” (98).  
Derrida also identifies a mystical element in the interaction between humanity and 
technology, a “counter-fetishization” (91) of the machine whereby the desire to reinstate a 
more direct relation to the body in light of increased mechanization of this relation is 
redirected to the machines themselves which are embraced and domesticated.  As he 
explains: “because one increasingly uses artifacts and prostheses of which one is totally 
ignorant, in a growing disproportion between knowledge and know-how, the space of such 
technical experience tends to become more animistic, magical, mystical” (91).   
 The incursion of religious elements into scientific discourses and the inescapable 
dependence of knowledge on faith, is, however mirrored, as Derrida proceeds to assert the 
opposite, that “the technical is the possibility of faith” (83), and to explain how the global 
scope of the ‘return of the religious’ is enabled by technology.  This occurs in two ways.  
First, Derrida argues that faith, as a bearing of openness to an unknown other, paradoxically 
requires that which is “technical, automatic, machine-like” (83) as repetition of the same 
must be possible both to enable the coming of difference and to render it recognisable as 
‘other’.  In this respect, as we shall see, it is comparable to the ‘to come’, which although an 
incursion of difference depends upon “heritage and the possibility of repeating” (83).  
Mechanicity, it seems, both institutes and undermines singularity.  This characteristic of 
both faith and the ‘to come’ present the beginnings of a response to Derrida’s question, 
iterated in the ‘Confession’ chapter, of how to think the compatibility of event and 
machine.10  Such a possibility would require an alternative logic to that of reasoned 
calculation; perhaps, Derrida suggests in Specters of Marx, a logic of spectrality.11   
                                                             
9 Derrida,Without Alibi, p. 209. 
10 Derrida discusses this problem in Without Alibi: “Pure performativity implies the presence of a living being, 
and of a living being speaking one time only, in its own name, in the first person.  And speaking in a manner 
that is at once spontaneous, intentional, free and irreplaceable.  Performativity, therefore, excludes in principle, 
in its own moment, any machinelike [machinale] technicity… If, then, some machinality (repetition, 
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The second way in which Derrida demonstrates that ‘the technical is the possibility 
of faith’ is by exposing religion’s current practical dependence on and auto-immune 
relationship with technology, avowing: “Religion today allies itself with tele-technoscience, 
to which it reacts with all its forces” (82).  He claims that the globalization of religion is 
enabled by technology, exemplified by “the trips and global spectacularizing of the Pope… 
the interstate dimensions of the ‘Rushdie affair’… planetary terrorism” (82).  This generates 
an autoimmune reaction: technologies both increase the influence and power of religions, 
and threaten their sanctity, sovereignty and propriety through “dislocation, expropriation, 
delocalization, deracination, disidiomatization and dispossession” (81).  The global spread of 
religion, therefore, entails a loss or “fear of self” (81), and a turn against this alien element, a 
declaration of “war against that which gives it this new power only at the cost of dislodging 
it from all its proper places, in truth from place itself” (82).  Derrida insists that “It is this 
terrifying but fatal logic of the autoimmunity of the unscathed that will always associate 
Science and Religion” (80).12  For Derrida, the inevitable contamination of auto-immunity 
seems to have an ethical function as it ensures that the community remains “open to 
something other and more than itself: the other, the future, death, freedom, the coming or 
the love of the other, the space and time of a spectralizing messianicity beyond all 
messianism” (87).  Derrida demonstrates that both reason and religion are always 
contaminated by their ‘other’, and this illustration of their co-dependence challenges the 
perceived sovereignty of both discourses.  This attack on their apparent sovereignty is 
further developed by Derrida’s individual analyses of the discourses, in which he 
undermines their claims to self-identity by considering their self-presentation, defining 
concepts and internal tensions.  Looking first at religion, I shall reiterate Derrida’s 
demonstration that this apparently pure and self-identical concept is divided and disparate, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
calculabilty, inorganic matter of the body) intervenes in a performative event, it is always as an accidental, 
extrinsic, and parasitical element, in truth a pathological, mutilating, or even mortal element.  Here again, to 
think both the machine and the performative event together remains a monstrosity to come, an impossible 
event”.  Derrida, Without Alibi, p. 74.  
11 “Repetition and first time: this is perhaps the question of the event as question of the ghost”, Derrida, Specters 
of Marx, p. 10. 
12 Derrida perceives the accusations of ‘obscurantism’ or ‘irrationality’ often levelled at religion as a side effect of 
autoimmunity, the “residues, surface effects, the reactive slag of immunitary, indemnificatory or auto-
immunitary reactivity” (p. 81).  For further discussion of Derrida’s understanding of autoimmunity see Alex 
Thomson’s claim that: “Derrida is not terribly concerned to differentiate between the immune and the 
autoimmune, accounts for his use of the term ‘autoimmunitary’ to refer to both processes as if they were a single 
phenomenon whose pervertibility or malfunction is regularly and critically indistinguishable from its proper 
purpose”, Alex Thomson, ‘What’s to Become of “Democracy to Come”?’, PMC, 15.3 (2005) (para. 6 of 32).  
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comprising two different and incompatible strata which produce the effect of auto-
immunity.   
 
(b) Religion  
 
Derrida’s response to his own question ‘How ‘to talk religion’? Of religion? Singularly of 
religion today?’ is pragmatic, rejecting etymological and genealogical studies and forgoing 
any attempt to write “a serious treatise on religion”, a task which “would demand the 
construction of new Libraries of France and of the universe” (76).  Instead, he writes “a 
short treatise” (43), even a “brief press release” (75) whose style is more digressive, 
disseminative and polemical than a traditional tract or treatise might permit.  Further, ‘Faith 
and Knowledge’ is highly performative, looking to generate knowledge and understanding 
through the processes of writing.  Such dynamism is at odds with the treatise form in which 
“one would content oneself with remembering, archiving, classifying, taking note in a 
memoir of what one believes one already knows” (76).   
Derrida’s pragmatic response to the question ‘what is religion?’ addresses the current 
“return of the religious” (45).  As Kevin Hart observes, “Derrida makes no attempt to offer a 
comprehensive philosophy of religion… His concern is with an overlap of the philosophy of 
religion and political philosophy that can be used to explicate ‘religion today’”.13  Derrida’s 
diffidence however, is somewhat disingenuous, as the analysis of the contemporary ‘return 
of the religious’ is not clearly separable from either the historical significance of the 
religious or its forms and structures, the questionable existence of “a universal structure of 
religiosity” (86).  My analysis of Derrida’s approach to religion will be broadly split into two 
interconnected parts: the first a consideration of Derrida’s assessment of the structure of 
religion and its autoimmune function; and the second, an investigation of his claims 
regarding the ‘return of the religious’.     
 
(i) The Structure of Religion and Autoimmunity 
Derrida introduces ‘religion’ as an umbrella term which can refer to a variety of disparate 
and even incompatible ideas and experiences.  Its meaning is not self-evident, self-identical 
and sovereign as, like reason, it contains inescapable internal tensions.  Examining these 
                                                             
13 Hart, ‘Kingdoms of God’, pp. 142-170 (p. 158). 
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widely disavowed tensions, Derrida identifies two radically different sources or strata of the 
religious:  
 
1. the experience of belief, on the one hand (believing or credit, the fiduciary or the 
trustworthy in the act of faith, fidelity, the appeal to blind confidence, the 
testimonial that is always beyond proof, demonstrative reason, intuition); and 
2. the experience of the unscathed, of sacredness or of holiness, on the other (70) 
 
This structure is virtually identical to that of reason as Derrida perceives it: one element, the 
unscathed or sacred, perceives itself as pure, discrete, singular and separate, indeed a certain 
principle of non-contamination, and the other, the experience of belief, reveals the 
necessity of contamination, as “faith or fidelity signifies here acquiescing to the testimony of 
the other- of the utterly other who is inaccessible in its absolute source” (70).  The 
incompatibility of these two elements seems to highlight the absurdity of speaking about 
religion in the singular.  However, Derrida argues that these strata are connected by “the 
experience of witnessing” (98), as an observer, inevitably fallible and subjective, is always 
required to bear witness to the experience of purity or holiness.  He asserts, “the necessity 
for these two heterogeneous sources of religion to mingle their waters, if one can put it that 
way, without ever, it seems to us, amounting simply to the same” (70), recalling the 
‘heterogeneous rationalities’ which he perceived in his investigation of reason.  For Derrida, 
the tension between the two strata is exemplified by the ‘phallic component’ of Islam, 
Christianity and Judaism.  The phallus is required to be “heilig, living, strong and fertile, 
erect and fecund: safe, whole, unscathed, immune, sacred, holy and so on” (85), images that, 
in deriving from both sources, are inherently contradictory.  Derrida describes how the 
singularity and purity of the phallus is inevitably compromised by the necessary enactment 
of its fertility which assures its contamination and loss of integrity.  Derrida argues that this 
contamination of purity produces an effect of autoimmunity, by which the pure element 
adopts a trace of the other in order to avoid complete submission to it.  The effect is one of 
movements, ideas or institutions “suspending themselves, and in truth, interrupting 
themselves” (85), and, he argues, is unavoidable.  In the case of Christianity, this is 
exemplified by the official response to the commandment ‘thou shall not kill’.  On the one 
hand, this is borne out by “the ‘fundamentalist’ prohibition of abortion, of artificial 
insemination” (86), yet on the other, in order to accommodate increasing populations 
without compromising the sanctity of human life, the Catholic Church paradoxically 
espouses its “universal sacrificial vocation” (86), exemplified by the acceptance of “large-
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scale breeding and slaughtering, in the fishing or hunting industries, in animal 
experimentation” (86).  This autoimmune structure accounts for the interrelation of these 
two apparently opposed sources of religion.  Their simultaneous singularity and duality is 
also for Derrida, figured by the ellipse, which reveals ‘religion’ as ultimately unknowable; he 
describes: “‘Religion’ figures their ellipse because it both comprehends the two foci but also 
sometimes shrouds their irreducible duality in silence, in a manner precisely that is secret 
and reticent” (72).  This autoimmunity undermines religion’s claims of self-identity and 
blurs the distinction between itself and its others.  
 These ‘two sources’ are also comparable to Kant’s division of religion into two types: 
the institutional or organised, and moral religion, the latter demanding reflexive faith.  
Professing an interest in the second, Derrida considers: “Because it does not depend 
essentially upon any historical revelation and thus agrees with the rationality of pure 
practical reason, reflecting faith favours good will beyond all knowledge” (49).  The 
detachment of religion from historical revelation generates the possibility of “a universal 
structure of religiosity” (86); here, however, Derrida demonstrates that the structure of 
religion is always anchored in specific historical expressions. 
 
(ii) Religious Histories and the ‘Return of the Religious’  
Referring both to the resurgence of fundamentalisms, and to an awareness of the widespread 
influence of religion in contemporary, apparently secular, life, the ‘return of the religious’ is 
a key focus in ‘Faith and Knowledge’.  Derrida insists on acknowledging the specific 
histories of the term religion, claiming that its very utterance means that “we are already 
speaking Latin” (66).  This challenges the possibility of a ‘universal structure of religiosity’ as 
Derrida reveals the specificity and limits of the apparently universal term religion; 
Benveniste, he observes, “recalls that there is no ‘common’ Indo-European term for what we 
call ‘religion’” (72).  Rather, the term ‘religion’ derives from a specific idiom and refers to 
particular historical circumstances.  Consequently, Derrida asks whether these terms and 
concepts, for example, religion ‘within the limits of reason alone’, or ‘moral religion’ can be 
understood outside of their specific contexts.  He concludes that they cannot.  Speaking of 
Kant’s moral law, he asserts that “when it addresses us, it either speaks the idiom of the 
Christian- or is silent” (50).  This attachment to a specific idiom, Derrida suggests, is also an 
attachment to a book or testament, which, furthermore, “is inseparable from the social 
nexus, from the political, familial, ethnic, communitarian nexus, from the nation and from 
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the people” (44).  Knowledge of context and idiom are required for the concept of religion to 
make sense, however this sense is not fixed and the ‘return of the religious’ is not a return of 
the same but here names a translation of religion beyond the limits of its native idiom, 
influenced by factors such as globalization and technologization.  This shifting significance 
of the term religion invokes the logic of autoimmunity, as the strength, identity and 
sovereignty of religion demand a fixed meaning, yet its power increases through 
propagation which compromises this self-identity; as Derrida asserts:  “Religion circulates in 
the world, one might say, like an English word <comme un mot anglais> that has been to 
Rome and taken a detour to the United States” (66). 
 Although the rise of fundamentalisms is the most controversial contemporary 
religious expression, Derrida focuses on other, overlooked manifestations.  He argues that 
the Judaeo-Christian influence is still clearly evident in secular humanitarian liberalism, as 
expressed, for example, in Western military interventions.  He contests that it is virtually 
impossible to “dissociate the essential traits of the religious as such from those that establish, 
for example, the concepts of ethics, of the juridical, of the political or of the economic”(63), 
and,  consequently, that what is at stake in the current “cyberspaced wars of religion” is no 
less than the current “determination of the ‘world’, of ‘history’, of the ‘day’ and of the 
‘present’” (62).  However, despite Derrida’s clear expression of the wide-ranging influence of 
religion in contemporary life, it is unclear as yet, what he perceives the implications of this 
to be.  
 Although he exposes the heterogeneity of the term ‘religion’, Derrida maintains that 
thinking religion in the singular must always remain possible, a “may-be” (63).  This 
association of religion with singularity follows the distinction between ethics and religion 
advanced in the previous chapter, where ethics refers to a universal commitment which 
may be translated into generality and religion names the singular responsibility which 
generates subjectivity.  Correspondingly, in ‘Faith and Knowledge’ Derrida argues that 
“Religion is the response” (64).  The response and responding are, as we saw in The Gift of 
Death, allied with the singular responsibility of the individual, and point towards a tension 
between singular and universal in the concept of the ‘religious’.  This is here reiterated as   
Derrida acknowledges that religion partakes in a transhistorical and therefore, social, 
dialogue, as the response, act or profession of faith consists of “a word committing a future 
to the present but concerning an event that is past” (68).  Consequently, religion marks the 
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intersection between singular and general,14 naming the tension between an ahistorical, 
transcendental structure and the occurrence of historical movements, events and 
possibilities.  Derrida speaks of “a universalizable culture of singularities” which might 
bridge this gap between singular and general, personal and public, and enable “a ‘rational’ 
and universal discourse on the subject of ‘religion’” (56).  This tension, and Derrida’s 
responses to it are, in a sense the starting point for rethinking religion, politics and their 
interrelation through deconstruction.15           
 
(c) Reason 
 
The disavowed yet potentially generative tensions Derrida exposes in the discourse of 
‘religion’ parallel those he reveals as he assesses and reinscribes the concept of ‘reason’.  In 
this section, I shall show how Derrida undermines reason’s alleged sovereignty by 
demonstrating both its groundlessness and its lack of self-identity, and dispels the myth that 
it is synonymous with calculation by exposing the necessary interrelation between 
calculation and the incalculable.  This challenge to reason’s independence and self-identity 
does not, however, reduce reason’s significance for Derrida, who uses this revised 
understanding of reason as the basis of the ‘Enlightenment to come’.  Having outlined 
Derrida’s concept of reason, I shall turn to the ‘Enlightenment to come’ in order to 
investigate its meaning and implications.  
 
(i) The Groundlessness of Reason 
In his later work, Derrida emphasises the impossibility of a self-legitimating discourse or 
institution.  In ‘Force of Law’, for example, he records the violent establishment of law, 
arguing that this cannot be ‘legally’ justified as it precedes the constitution of law itself.16  
Similarly, reason cannot comprehensively account for its own origins and grounds; it is 
however, according to Derrida’s article ‘The Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes 
of its Pupils’, preoccupied with its raison d’etre.  Consideration of “the institution of the 
principle of reason” raises “questions about the origin or ground of this principle of 
                                                             
14 Or, as Neil Saccamano describes: “the hiatus between the unconditional and the conditional”. Neil Saccamano, 
‘Inheriting Enlightenment, or Keeping faith with reason in Derrida’, Eighteenth-Century Studies, 40.3 (2007), 
405-424 (p. 412). 
15 One such rather problematic response comes in the form of the “messianicity without messianism” (p. 56) to 
which I referred in the ‘Introduction’.   
16 Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, pp. 230-298. 
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foundation”.17  Such questioning extends beyond the remit of reason as the principle of 
reason cannot be grounded in that which proceeds from it, and thus reason develops from a 
certain arationality.  Derrida describes this as a circle which cannot be closed:    
 
The circle would consist in seeking to account for reason by reason, to render reason 
to the principle of reason, in appealing to the principle at the very point where, 
according to Heidegger, the principle of reason says nothing about reason itself.  The 
abyss, the hole, the Abgrund, the empty ‘gorge’ would be the impossibility for a 
principle of grounding to ground itself.  This very grounding, then... would have to 
hold itself suspended above a most peculiar void.  Are we to use reason to account 
for the principle of reason? Is the reason for reason rational? Is it rational to worry 
about reason and its principle? Not simply; but it would be over-hasty to seek to 
disqualify this concern and refer to those who experience it back to their own 
irrationalism, their obscurantism, their nihilism.18  
 
This crisis in the grounding of reason recurs in Rogues as an autoimmune encounter 
between ‘grounding’ and running aground’; external groundlessness becomes internal 
tension, the attempt by reason to “win out over itself”.19  Reason’s dependence on its other, 
here and in the case of its need for an external witness, “throws reason into crisis”,20 the 
existence of “objectivist irrationalism born on the inside of reason itself”21 undermining its 
self-identity.  Again, in Points, Derrida reiterates this limitation on reason’s independence, 
explaining that its appeal for grounds cannot be answered adequately by philosophy or 
reason itself:    
 
And the question: What is reason, what is its interest, its necessarily pre- or a- 
rational interest, the reason without reason of reason, and so forth, this question can 
no longer give rise to demonstrations of a philosophical type (the demonstration 
that Heidegger puts forward in Der Satz vom Grund on a very similar question, from 
a certain point of view, is already no longer strictly philosophical) or a traditional 
theoretico-scientific type.22 
 
For Derrida this realisation and acceptance of the limits of reason’s jurisdiction necessitates a 
new type of thinking which does not retreat into the fictive sureties of reason’s sovereignty.  
                                                             
17 Jacques Derrida, ‘The Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes of Its Pupils’, trans. by Catherine Porter 
and Edward P. Morris, Diacritics, 13.3 (Autumn 1983), 3-20 (p. 8-9). 
18 Derrida, ‘The Principle of Reason’, 3-20 (p. 9). 
19 Derrida, Rogues, p. 126.  
20 Derrida, Rogues, p. 127.  
21 Derrida, Rogues, p. 128. 
22 Jacques Derrida, ‘Ja, or the faux-bond’’, in Points, pp. 30-77 (p. 69). 
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It is reasonable, he argues, to acknowledge and take into account the limits of reason itself, 
“where the Grund opens onto the Abgrund”.23  Indeed, in ‘The Principle of Reason’, he asks:   
 
Who is more faithful to reason’s call, who hears it with a keener ear, who better sees 
the difference, the one who offers questions in return and tries to think through the 
possibility of that summons, or the one who does not want to hear any question 
about the reason of reason? This is all played out, along the path of the Heideggerian 
question, in a subtle difference of tone or stress, according to the particular words 
emphasized in the formula nihil est sine ratione.24 
 
Thus, Derrida claims that reason makes demands on us, that “We have to respond to the call 
of the principle of reason” which “always entails a certain addressing of speech.  The word is 
not seen, it has to be heard and listened to, this apostrophe that enjoins us to respond to the 
principle of reason”.25  Witnessing and responding to reason appropriately entails admitting 
its limits, and, following Leibniz, ‘rendering’ reason, bringing it forth or making it visible.  
In revealing reason’s groundlessness, the impossibility of self-validation, Derrida highlights 
reason’s dependence on, and even contamination by, other discourses, even indicating that 
“the principle of reason may have obscurantist and nihilist effects”.26  
 
(ii) ‘Heterogeneous rationalities’: Calculation and the Incalculable  
Derrida’s contention that reason’s alleged autonomy is fallacious, and that it must look 
outside itself for its grounds and authority, is accompanied by an examination of the interior 
of reason, and the discovery not of self-identity but of “heterogeneous rationalities”.27  
Derrida rejects the assumption- here taken as given- that reason is synonymous with 
calculation, pointing out reason’s complex history, in his opinion clouded by the assumption 
of a monolithic and homogeneous meaning.28  Instead, following this complex history, he 
advances a concept of reason which is divided and propagates difference.  He appeals to “a 
                                                             
23 Derrida, Rogues, p. 122. 
24 Derrida, ‘The Principle of Reason’, 3-20 (p. 9).  
25 Derrida, ‘The Principle of Reason’, 3-20 (p. 8). 
26 Derrida, ‘The Principle of Reason’, 3-20 (p. 15).  
27 Derrida, Rogues, p. 121.  
28 Richard Beardsworth points out that Derrida’s assumption that reason is, or is widely perceived to be, 
synonymous with calculation is one he shares with much recent French thought.  Beardsworth summarises the 
position: “Reason is considered as a faculty of thought that, abstracting from particularity in its push to 
universality, reduces the world of difference to measured units of apprehension.  In this reduction, the 
determination of alterity subsumes alterity under the power of calculation”. Richard Beardsworth, ‘In 
Memoriam Jacques Derrida: The Power of Reason’, Theory and Event, 8.1 (2005), 
<http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1bearsworth.html> [accessed January 11th 2011], (para. 
31 of 50).   
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certain future or to-come [avenir] of reason that resists the teleological unity of reason”.29  
This fragmented concept of reason is not synonymous with calculation but exhibits a 
dynamic relationship between calculation and the incalculable.  
This relationship becomes evident in ‘Faith and Knowledge’, which is preoccupied 
with counting, accounting and calculation.  The speaker expresses a desire to be “able to 
measure up” (45), insists upon the need for “a calculable programme” (47), and the text itself 
consists of rigorously numbered sections written in a “quasi-aphoristic form” (76), chosen 
“as one chooses a machine” (76).  Furthermore, the text dramatises its own mechanical and 
systematic movements.  In its preoccupation with counting, the text allies itself with 
religious writing, observing that “this question of numbers obsesses, as is well known, the 
Holy Scriptures and the monotheisms” (90).  However, the possibility of controlling by 
counting is now being jeopardised by movements which are increasingly difficult to 
quantify.  Counting, Derrida stresses, has its limits.   
Responding to the limitations of counting, Derrida looks to distinguish between 
counting and accounting.  The latter, he suggests, is not restricted by calculation and 
economy in the way that the former is, but refers to a certain responsibility, often one 
which can’t be quantified.  Referring to notable absences in the text- here the sustained 
discussion of woman and of Islam- he insists that “We ought to take this into account” (45).   
Similarly, in response to Kant’s claim that Christianity is “the only truly ‘moral’ religion” 
(50), he asks: “Are we ready to measure without flinching the implications and 
consequences of the Kantian thesis?” (50), before going on to suggest that the Kantian mode 
is insufficient to the demands of thinking religion and reason together today. This too must 
be taken into account.  Like Rogues’ figure of the incomplete circle which remains open to 
the other, in ‘Faith and Knowledge’ the urge to measure, count and retain self identical 
categories is always thwarted as the mechanical itself generates difference.  The division 
which opens up in reason between calculation and the incalculable is compared by Derrida 
to the two sources which comprise religion; these divisions are structurally necessary, 
“Because there are, for the best and for the worst, division and iterability of the source.  This 
supplement introduces the incalculable at the heart of the calculable” (100).  Derrida’s 
insistence on the significance of the incalculable disrupts the precedence of the calculable 
and its synonymity with reason.  Reason, Derrida shows, is instead constituted by the 
                                                             
29 Derrida, Rogues, p. 128. 
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relationship between calculation and the incalculable, a relationship which must be ‘taken 
into account’.   
Derrida argues convincingly that calculation is always contaminated or haunted by 
the incalculable.30  This relationship is extensively described in Rogues, which, whilst 
incorporating numerous references to the incalculable, stresses the inextricability of the two 
terms.31  Derrida explains:    
 
Calculable measure also gives access to the incalculable and the incommensurable, 
an access that remains itself necessarily undecided between the calculable and the 
incalculable- and that is the aporia of the political and of democracy.  But by the 
same token, by effacing the difference of singularity through calculation, by no 
longer counting on it, measure risks putting an end to singularity itself, to its quality 
or its nonquantifiable intensity.  And yet the concept of measurable equality is not 
opposed to the immeasurable.32  
 
Frequently regarded as oppositional, these terms are instead connected by a mutual 
dependence which is constitutive of reason.  Such a dependence recalls the dialogical 
relationship which constitutes différance as well as the interrelation between other 
apparently opposed terms such as law and justice, between finite and infinite expressions of 
hospitality and between the two ‘truths’ of democracy as discussed in Rogues.  These two 
‘truths’ are akin to the sources of religion in that one seeks to preserve sovereignty and 
purity through “some quasi-circular return”,33 and the other entails contamination, it is “the 
truth of the other, heterogeneity...”34  The tension between the two is expressed as that 
between equality and freedom and is unresolvable; the two terms “are reconcilable, so to 
speak, only in a turning or alternating fashion, only in alternation”.35  
 This tension or excess which disrupts conceptual self-identity is exemplified by the 
relationship between calculable and incalculable which forms reason.  However, Richard 
Beardsworth argues that in recording and analysing this ‘excess’, Derrida’s account of reason 
changes between his early and later works, situated first outside reason, and later, inside 
                                                             
30 This contamination is a consequence of différance as Derrida explains: “The same, precisely, is différance as the 
displaced and equivocal passage of one different thing to another, from one term of an opposition to the other”, 
Derrida, ‘Différance’, pp. 1-27 (p. 17). 
31 References to the incalculable: “bottomless gratitude” (p. 2) and the “excessive gift” (p. 4) amongst others, and 
emphasising the importance of the “incalculable perhaps” (p. 5).  All references to Derrida, Rogues.    
32 Derrida, Rogues, p. 52. 
33 Derrida, Rogues, p. 10. This motif of the circle also appears in relation to the economic in Given Time: 1. 
Counterfeit Money as Derrida asserts “The figure of the circle is obviously at the center, if that can still be said of 
a circle.  It stands at the center of any problematic of oikonomia, as it does of any economic field” (p. 6).  He goes 
on to describe the gift as “That which opens the circle so as to defy reciprocity or symmetry” (p. 7). 
34 Derrida, Rogues, p. 14.  
35 Derrida, Rogues, p. 24. 
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reason.  Beardsworth maintains that this excess assumes religious overtones in Derrida’s 
later work, becoming “an archi-originary ‘promise’ or ‘faith’ that forms, for Derrida, the 
common source of both faith and reason, both religion and science”.36  Beardsworth 
associates this increasingly religious stance with the political positions which become 
explicit in the later work, for example, Derrida’s espousal of a ‘democracy to come’.  For 
Beardsworth, the connection between the two is most clearly expressed in Rogues, a text 
which, he argues, shifts the excess to which reason is always bound, from being an external 
other to an internal element, constitutive of reason, “an auto-delimitation that divides 
reason from itself”.37  This, he claims, is a tactical shift in Derrida’s thinking, a response to a 
disjunction between “his [Derrida’s] quasi-categorical account of law and singularity and the 
immediate needs of reason within the world”.38  Derrida has realised, Beardsworth suggests, 
that if reason is self-critical and self-limiting, then it cannot unequivocally ally itself with 
the hegemonic power.39  This is similar to Žižek’s critique, discussed in the ‘Dialogue’ 
chapter, as both critics claim that Derrida imposes a retrospective limit on deconstruction, 
here guised as internal to reason, in order to safeguard deconstruction’s ethical and political 
significance.  Other critics are divided as to whether this excessive element which interacts 
with reason is external, internal, or, as Beardsworth claims, changes from one to the other.  
Julie Candler Hayes maintains that the excess is external, asserting that “Reason reasons and 
this is the source of its identity, its sovereign self-sameness- but to make reason see reason, it 
must be ‘reasoned with’: questioned, subjected to ongoing critique, engaged in an ongoing 
dialogue with that which comes from without.”40  Alternatively, John Caputo responds to 
Derrida’s assertion of the significance of the incalculable and records reason’s internal 
instability:  
 
Reason is a movement back and forth between the incalculable and the calculable, 
calculating always in the face of the incalculability, keeping calculability open to the 
incalculable.  While the irrational for Kant lay in allowing reason to be overcome by 
something other, reason for Derrida is precisely defined by its openness to the other, 
                                                             
36 Beardsworth, ‘In Memoriam Jacques Derrida’, (para. 31 of 50).   
37 Derrida cited in Beardsworth, ‘In Memoriam Jacques Derrida’, (para. 32 of 50). 
38 Beardsworth, ‘In Memoriam Jacques Derrida’, (para. 33 of 50). 
39 Beardsworth observes that this positive account of reason sets him apart from his contemporaries, who 
consider only reason’s “subsumption of difference”. Instead, Derrida perceives its conceptual barriers as points of 
potential openness, asserting “the necessity of the concept to apprehend what lies beyond it in the first place”. 
This can be seen in the mutual dependence of oppositions such as law and justice or finite and infinite 
hospitality, where one term is irreducibly excessive. Beardsworth, ‘In Memoriam Jacques Derrida’, (para. 31 of 
50). 
40 Julie Candler Hayes, ‘Unconditional Translation: Derrida’s Enlightenment-to-Come’, Eighteenth-Century 
Studies, 40.3 (2007), 443-455 (p. 452). 
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to the event, to the future, its desire for the incalculable and the unconditional, for 
the promise… Derrida’s idea of reason is marked by faith, by a faith in reason that 
belongs to an ‘Enlightenment to come’ (Voyous 167), so that the distinction between 
faith and reason remains porous.41  
 
However, Caputo’s perception of a shift in the meaning of reason from Kant to Derrida 
diverges from Derrida’s own position, which traces his own understanding of reason-as the 
relationship between calculation and the incalculable- back to the Enlightenment, asserting 
that: “a rational and rigorous incalculability presented itself as such in the greatest tradition 
of rationalist idealism.  The rationality of the rational has never been limited, as some have 
tried to make us believe, to calculability…”42  This is reinforced by Hent de Vries, who 
claims that “one can easily find passages where Kant seems forced to admit that the 
derailment accompanies philosophy from its first origin and, in a sense, constitutes it from 
within”.43  Such critical differences illustrate the complexity of reason’s relationship with its 
external and internal others, undermining Beardsworth’s claim that a distinct and politically 
motivated turn occurs.  Further, disagreement as to whether the excess is internal or 
external to reason is created because Derrida shows that both are true.  Like other concepts 
in Derrida’s work, the tension is both internal and external as Derrida challenges simplistic 
conceptions of interiority and exteriority.  Undermining Beardsworth’s claim of a shift in 
Rogues, Derrida’s 1994 text Given Time 1: Counterfeit Money insists that reason’s excess is 
both internal and external:  
 
Linked to the double bind... this madness is all the more maddened and maddening 
that it besieges reason at its two borders, so to speak, from the inside and the 
outside.  It is at once reason and unreason because it also manifests that madness of 
the rational logos itself, that madness of the economic circle the calculation of 
which is constantly reconstituted, logically, rationally, annulling the excess that 
itself, as we underscored at the end of the preceding chapter, entails the circle, 
makes it turn without end, gives it its movement, a movement that the circle and 
the ring can never comprehend or annul.  Whence the difficulty in knowing whom 
and what one is talking about.  Is madness the economic circulation annulling the 
gift in equivalence?  Or is it the excess, the expenditure, or the destruction?44 
 
                                                             
41 John D. Caputo, ‘Without Sovereignty, Without Being: Unconditionality, The Coming God, and Derrida’s 
Democracy to Come’, in Religion and Violence in a Secular World: Toward a New Political Theology, ed. by 
Clayton Crockett (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2006), pp. 137-156 (p. 147). 
42 Derrida, Rogues, p. 133. 
43 De Vries, p. 368. 
44 Derrida, Given Time, p. 36-7. 
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This element of ‘madness’ or incalculability destabilises reason’s self-identity, distancing 
Derrida’s understanding of reason from the deified, self-identical concept of reason which 
developed from certain strands of Enlightenment thought.  In this way, through the 
‘Enlightenment to come’, which is rooted in this non-identical concept of reason, Derrida 
can think the Enlightenment otherwise, retaining yet reworking its emancipatory aims.  
Further, as Derrida explains in a 1988 interview with Jean-Luc Nancy, the element of 
incalculability is a prerequisite for any ethical or political action:  
 
And if I speak so often of the incalculable and the undecidable it’s not out of a 
simple predilection for play nor in order to neutralize decision: on the contrary, I 
believe there is no responsibility, no ethico-political decision, that must not pass 
through the proofs of the incalculable or undecidable.  Otherwise everything would 
be reducible to calculation, program, causality, and at best, ‘hypothetical 
imperative’45 
 
In the next section, I shall show how incalculability grounds Derrida’s ‘New Enlightenment’ 
or ‘Enlightenment to come’, a concept which both situates deconstruction in relation to the 
philosophical tradition and, arising from Derrida’s insistence on reason’s heterogeneity and 
lack of sovereignty, connects philosophy and politics, suggesting what the political 
implications of deconstruction might be.   
 
(iii) The ‘Enlightenment to Come’: Enlightenment legacies, ‘democracy to come’ and the 
interruptive urgency of ‘come!’  
Self-consciously deriving and differing from texts by Kant and Bergson, ‘Faith and 
Knowledge’ foregrounds its Enlightenment heritage, investigating the various meanings of 
‘Enlightenment’ and assessing deconstruction’s relationship to its philosophical 
predecessors.  Like ‘religion’, Derrida shows that ‘Enlightenment’ is a catch-all term, and 
that although “Aufklärung, Lumières, Enlightenment, Illuminisimo” (46) may be linked by 
shared imagery, all have different histories and characteristics.  Derrida outlines some of 
these, paying particular attention to their varied relations to religion, referring, for example, 
to “an Aufklarung, whose critical force is profoundly rooted in the Reformation” (65) and to 
the Lumieres, “which traverses like a single ray a certain critical and anti-religious 
vigilance” (65).  In expanding on these differences, he reminds us that any perceived 
singularity or sovereignty in the concept of ‘Enlightenment’ is fictive, and advocates a new 
                                                             
45 Derrida, ‘“Eating Well”, or the Calculation of the Subject’, trans. by Peter Connor and Avital Ronell in Points, 
pp. 255-287 (p. 273). 
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appreciation of its plurality.  As Hent de Vries describes, “Whenever and wherever there is 
to be Enlightenment, Derrida tells us, it will always be (will always have been) in the form 
of ellipses, that is to say, in the irreducible and infinitely reaffirmable form(s) of 
Enlightenments”.46  This idea of the Enlightenment as both divided and unfinished will 
provide the scope for the ‘Enlightenment to come’.47  Such an Enlightenment will also be 
alert to the links between reason and religion, through for example their shared imagery, 
which connects “the light of revelation and the light of Enlightenment” (77), as the ‘proper’’ 
meaning of God is “‘luminous’ and ‘celestial’” (46).  Being neither priest nor anti-religious 
philosopher, Derrida’s own task is to respond and interpret this illumination, “to think 
religion in the daylight of today without breaking with the philosophical tradition” (77).  
 ‘Faith and Knowledge’ both reiterates and revolutionizes Enlightenment positions, 
methods and gestures, particularly through its relationship with Kant, with the speaker 
asking: “What would a book be like today which, like Kant’s, is entitled Religion Within the 
Limits of Reason Alone?” (48)  Derrida looks to reveal the ‘unthought’ element of both Kant 
and Bergson’s texts (76), exchanging a dominant position for the margins, both in its focus 
on religion at the limits, rather than within them, and its interest in the parerga on the 
peripheries of Kant’s text, which “situate perhaps the fringe where we might be able, today, 
to inscribe our reflections” (52).  Thus, Derrida’s position immediately differs from Kant’s; as 
Kevin Hart observes, “There will be no attempt to position himself at the very source of law, 
as Kant does, to enclose all discourse within the gaze of a philosopher-judge”.48  A stylistic 
difference is evident too, with Derrida rejecting the authoritative and systematic inscription 
of knowledge required by the treatise genre in favour of performativity, digression, and 
generic contamination.  The text’s “multiplicity of voices, of gestures”49 would avoid both 
the fetishization of reason and the way forms of Enlightenment reason are, as Christopher 
Norris observes, “compromised by virtue of their long association with instituted structures 
                                                             
46 De Vries, p. 361. 
47 Despite divergent positions in their work more generally, here Derrida’s idea of the Enlightenment as 
unfinished resonates with the thought of Jürgen Habermas. Perceiving the “project of modernity”, as instantiated 
by Enlightenment thinkers, as the attempt “to develop objective science, universal morality and law, and 
autonomous art according to their inner logic” and to use this knowledge “for the rational organization of 
everyday social life” (p. 103), Habermas insists that “instead of giving up modernity and its project as a lost cause, 
we should learn from the mistakes of those extravagant programs which have tried to negate modernity”, and 
endeavour to recuperate the legacy of the Enlightenment. Jürgen Habermas, ‘Modernity- an Incomplete Project’, 
in Postmodernism: A Reader, ed. by Thomas Docherty (Harlow: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), pp. 98-109 (p. 
106).     
48 Hart, ‘Kingdoms of God’, pp. 142-170 (p. 155). 
49 Jacques Derrida, ‘In Discussion with Christopher Norris’, in Deconstruction: Omnibus Volume, ed. by Andrew 
Benjamin, Catherine Cooke and Andrea Papadakis (London: Academy Editions, 1989), pp. 71-5 (p. 75) 
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of authority”.50  In contrast, although it rejects restrictive conditions, Derrida’s 
‘Enlightenment to come’ would be first and foremost a ‘yes’ to the opening of unknowable 
possibilities.  
 Critics such as Richard Terdiman interpret Derrida’s later references to the 
Enlightenment as an indication of a shift in his work.  Terdiman asserts: “It’s as if Derrida 
found himself shipwrecked on the island of the Enlightenment- relieved to have fetched up 
on dry land, but astonished that it should be that land which saved him”.51  However, 
Terdiman’s position overlooks both Derrida’s consistent ambivalence towards the 
Enlightenment, his demonstration that reason juxtaposes the calculable with the 
incalculable, and his depiction of the Enlightenment, as Julie Candler Hayes observes, “as 
self-reflexive critique”.52  The Enlightenment, as a self-critical tradition, an unfinished and 
unfinishable critical project, naturally feeds into the self-questioning methods of 
deconstruction.  Despite philosophical differences, these methodological similarities prove 
crucial; in fact Derrida’s shift from specific Enlightenment claims and positions renders his 
work consistent with a certain Enlightenment legacy.  Considering his relationship with the 
Enlightenment, Derrida reveals:   
 
Of course I am in favour of the Enlightenment… But at the same time I know that 
there are certain historical forms of Enlightenment, certain things in this tradition 
that we need to criticise or deconstruct.  So it is sometimes in the name of, let us say, 
a new Enlightenment that I deconstruct a given Enlightenment53   
 
This ‘deconstruction’ stresses the limitations of critique, which, he argues, cannot itself be a 
point of exemption from critical questioning.  In Without Alibi, he explains:  
  
When I say ‘more than critical’, I have in mind ‘deconstructive’… I am referring to 
the right to deconstruction as an unconditional right to ask critical questions not 
only about the history of the concept of man, but about the history even of the 
notion of critique54 
                                                             
50 Christopher Norris, ‘Versions of Apocalypse: Kant, Derrida, Foucault’, in Apocalypse Theory and the End of 
the World, ed. by Malcolm Bull (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 227-249 (p. 240). 
51 Richard Terdiman, ‘Determining the Undetermined: Derrida’s “University Without Condition”’, Eighteenth-
Century Studies, 40.3 (2007), 425-441 (p. 427). 
52 Candler Hayes, 443-455 (p. 450). 
53 Derrida, ‘In Discussion with Christopher Norris’, pp. 71-5 (p. 75).  
54 Derrida, Without Alibi, p. 204.  See also Derrida’s aspiration towards “An analysis which is not merely a 
theoretical analysis, but at the same time another writing of the question of Being or meaning: deconstruction is 
also a manner of writing and putting forward another text... The authority of judgment or of the critical 
evaluation is not the final authority for deconstruction.  Deconstruction is also a deconstruction of critique.  
Which does not mean that all critique or all criticism is devalued, but that one is trying to think what the 
authority of the critical instance signifies in history- for example in the Kantian sense but not only in the 
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Elsewhere, in Points, he describes what this deconstruction of critique might entail: 
 
The critical idea, which I believe must never be renounced, has a history and 
presuppositions whose deconstructive analysis is also necessary.  In the style of the 
Enlightenment, of Kant, or of Marx, but also in the sense of evaluation (esthetic or 
literary), critique supposes judgment, voluntary judgment between two terms; it 
attaches to the idea of krinein or of krisis a certain negativity.  To say that all this is 
deconstructible does not amount to disqualifying, negating, disavowing, or 
surpassing it, of doing the critique of critique (the way people wrote critiques of the 
Kantian critique as soon as it appeared), but of thinking its possibility from another 
border, from the genealogy of judgment, will, consciousness or activity, the binary 
structure, and so forth.  This thinking perhaps transforms the space, and, through 
aporias, allows the (non-positive) affirmation to appear, the one that is presupposed 
by every critique and every negativity.55   
 
Consequently, this deconstructive response to critique is not an ever more formalised and 
programmatic critique, but is rather a thinking of grounds, an affirmation, and an insistence 
on the need to respond to specificity and singularity.  Deconstruction highlights the limits 
of the programmatic, demonstrating that undecidability is inescapable.  Such undecidability 
describes the relationship between calculation and the incalculable which constitutes reason 
and cannot be resolved dialectically.  Derrida explains:    
 
Calculable measure also gives access to the incalculable and the incommensurable, 
an access that remains itself necessarily undecided between the calculable and the 
incalculable- and that is the aporia of the political or of democracy… the concept of 
measurable equality is not opposed to the immeasurable.56 
 
For Derrida, the irresolvable co-dependence of calculation and the incalculable within 
reason undermines reason’s sovereignty and renders it both unpredictable and interminable.  
A reasoned or reasonable act is not determined by calculation alone; rather, “What is 
‘reasonable’ is the reasoned and considered wager of a transaction between these two 
apparently irreconcilable exigencies of reason, between calculation and the incalculable”.57  
It is reasonable, Derrida here argues, to consider the limitations of reason itself, as well as its 
opening onto the incalculable which can’t be known, named, figured or codified.  Julie 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Kantian sense,” Jacques Derrida, ‘“There is No One Narcissism” Autobiophotographies),’ trans. by Peggy Kamuf 
in Points, pp. 196-215 (p. 212). 
55 Derrida, ‘A “Madness” Must Watch Over Thinking’, in Points, pp. 339-364 (p. 357). 
56 Derrida, Rogues, p. 52.   
57 Derrida, Rogues, p. 151. 
176 
 
Candler Hayes casts the ‘Enlightenment to come’ as the “middle way”58 between 
unconditional sovereignty and complete, irrational openness.  However, the ‘to come’ is not 
a balanced interaction between calculable and incalculable, rather it is an unknowable and 
unpredictable “opening to the future or to the coming of the other” (56) which betrays the 
influence of religion on Derrida’s work.  Neil Saccamano claims that “the difficulty for 
Derrida is to think religion today in the spirit of Enlightenment without relying, however, 
solely on the demystifying aims of rational critique”.59  Yet Saccamano underplays the 
contamination between reason and religion in Derrida’s work.  Derrida’s ‘Enlightenment to 
come’ is propelled by a religious element; it is an act of faith which “permits a ‘rational’ and 
universal discourse on the subject of ‘religion’” (56).60   
 
Derrida’s ‘Enlightenment to come’ is highly politicised and links to his understanding of the 
‘democracy to come’.  The former inherits, incorporates and reworks the emphasis on the 
“enlightened virtue of public space” and the task of “emancipating it from all external 
power” (47).  In ‘The University Without Condition’, Derrida argues that “This reference to 
public space will remain the link that affiliates the new Humanities to the age of 
Enlightenment”.61  It is this reference to public space, and the concept of reason as an 
‘unconditional rationalism’ yoking together together conditional and unconditional which 
links the ‘democracy to come’ to this ‘Enlightenment to come’. As Derrida asserts in Rogues, 
the relationship between finite and infinite conditions the political horizon of 
deconstruction.  He declares:   
 
deconstruction, if something of the sort exists, would remain above all, in my view, 
an unconditional rationalism that never renounces- and precisely in the name of the 
Enlightenment to come, in the space to be opened up of a democracy to come- the 
possibility of suspending in an argued, deliberated, rational fashion, all conditions, 
hypotheses, conventions and presuppositions and of criticizing unconditionally all 
conditionalities, including those that still found the critical idea, namely those of the 
krinein, of the krisis of the binary or dialectical decision or judgment.62 
 
                                                             
58 Candler Hayes, 443-455 (p. 449). 
59 Saccamano, 405-424 (p. 407). 
60 This religious element is, perhaps, however, overstated by James K. A. Smith, for whom Derrida’s reason 
becomes “a passionate reason that bears affinity to the madness of (fearful, trembling) Abrahamic faith,” James K. 
A. Smith, Jacques Derrida, p. 88. 
61 Derrida, Without Alibi, p. 205.  Like ‘Faith and Knowledge’, Derrida’s discussion of the future of the university 
in this essay aims to “link in a certain way faith to knowledge” (p. 209) by exposing the dependence of all 
knowledge on a certain performative element.  Again, the text is highly performative; “This will no doubt be like 
a profession of faith” (p. 202), Derrida states.    
62 Derrida, Rogues, p. 142.   
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This interaction between the ‘Enlightenment to come’ and the ‘democracy to come’ may 
illuminate the complex and dynamic relationship between theory and practice in Derrida’s 
work, as well as revealing deconstruction’s political significance.  Julie Candler Hayes 
detects a changing relationship between the two terms, with the former increasingly aligned 
with the latter. She argues:  
 
It thus seems clear that in the decade following the publication of Spectres, the 
‘democracy-to-come’ exercised a gravitational pull on the ‘New Enlightenment’, 
shifting the focus from the historical, however idealized Enlightenment, that might 
be renewed or continue to inspire action in the present, to an ahistorical 
Enlightenment situated in the never-fully-present à-venir even as it continues to 
bear the trace of the historical moment.63 
 
Candler Hayes here hesitates to claim that the ‘Enlightenment to come’ is 
transcendentalized, however, her allegation of its ‘ahistorical’ nature seems to miss the 
increasingly pressing political demands it makes on us as a consequence of its association 
with the ‘democracy to come’.  Rather than severing it from history, this connection renders 
the Enlightenment alive and dynamic; as Hent de Vries insists: “Enlightenment no longer 
coincides with ‘itself’, nor can it be put to rest in a historical archive”.64  This connection is 
again reinforced in The Politics of Friendship:   
 
Is it possible, in assuming a certain faithful memory of democratic reason and reason 
tout court- I would even say, the Enlightenment of a certain Aufklärung (thus 
leaving open the abyss which is again opening today under these words) -not to 
found, where it is not longer a matter of founding, but to open out to the future, or 
rather, to the ‘come’, of a certain democracy?65 
 
If Candler Hayes undervalues the urgency of the ‘to come’, it is perhaps because the phrase 
invokes a certain deconstructive double perspective, requiring that we think both in terms 
of the specificity of a concrete temporal horizon- a singular, seemingly finite problem or 
question- and in terms of the continuous and infinite work of deconstruction, that of 
rewriting the differences repressed by larger forces, and enabling a constantly renewed 
“opening to the future or to the coming of the other” (56).  This double aspect is explored 
through the spatial motif of the Promised Land, which bridges between promise and 
                                                             
63 Candler Hayes, 443-455 (p. 445). 
64 De Vries, p. 360. 
65 Derrida, Jacques, The Politics of Friendship, trans. by George Collins (London: Verso, 2005), p. 306. 
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practice, transcendence and empiricism, defying Bradley’s critique of an “empirical deficit”66 
in Derrida’s later work.  The Promised Land represents “the essential bond between the 
promise of place and historicity” (48); it emerges within history yet disables historical 
closure and linearity, and its significance can never be exhausted or fully explained.67   This 
unhistoricisable core, which emerges historically yet can never be resolved within history 
means that for Derrida, the historicity of religion is “historicity of history- and the 
eventfulness <événementialité> of the event as such” (48).  This determines the nature of 
history, and, Samir Haddad explains, of Derridean inheritance: 
 
while it remains that an aporia is inherited from the past, the fact that there will 
always be a remainder, an excess beyond all mastery, entails that this aporia is also 
always still to come, given over to the future.  That which we inherit is always 
behind us and before us, for it can never be located fully, once and for all, in a 
present, be it a present past, present, or future.68 
 
The ‘a-venir’ is a radical opening to that which can never become fully present; as Derrida 
says of the democracy to come in Rogues: “democracy will never exist… not because it will 
be deferred but because it will always remain aporetic in its structure”.69  One should not 
attempt to condition its arrival as “the absence of horizon conditions the future itself.  The 
emergence of the event ought to puncture every horizon of expectation” (47).  Nevertheless, 
this very ‘impossibility’ of the ‘democracy to come’ means that one “should force oneself to 
achieve it”.70  This urgency of the ‘to come’, the fact that despite partaking in “some sort of 
iterability” (83) it always entails a singular call or demand and thus marks “the intersection 
of repetition and the unforeseeable”71 is explored through the figure of the imperative 
‘come!’ or ‘veni’ which Derrida considers in Rogues and other texts.  He describes: “a call 
might thus be taken up and take hold: the call for a thinking of the event to come, of the 
democracy to come, of the reason to come.  This call bears every hope, to be sure, although 
it remains, in itself, without hope”.72  Despite its religious resonances, Derrida insists that 
                                                             
66 Bradley, ’Derrida’s God’, 21-42 (p. 32). 
67 See also Derrida’s discussion of khôra (here chora), that which is both within and without history, an originary 
‘taking place’ of “the place of absolute exteriority” (p. 57) which can only be conceptualized spatio-temporally 
and yet “remains absolutely impassible and heterogeneous to all the processes of historical revelation or of 
anthropo-theological experience” (p. 58).   
68 Samir Haddad, ‘Inheriting Democracy to Come’, Theory and Event, 8.1, (2005) 
<http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v008/8.1haddad.html> [accessed 18th January 2011] (para. 22 of 
39). 
69 Derrida, Rogues, p. 86.   
70 Derrida, Rogues, p. 74. 
71 Derrida, Rogues, p. xii.  
72 Derrida, Rogues, p. xv.  
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this call or ‘come!’ remains heterogeneous to “the economy of redemption”.73  As Hent de 
Vries explains, it is “Neither immanent or transcendent (or, in a sense, both immanent and 
transcendent), it is an order or imperative as though it were not one”.74  This figure of the 
‘come!’ is foregrounded in ‘On an Apocalyptic Tone Newly Arisen in Philosophy’,75 another 
text in which Derrida responds to Kant.  I shall briefly discuss the subversive effect of this 
‘come!’ which marks interruption and alterity without territorializing them.    
Regarded by Christopher Norris as “a profoundly ambivalent essay,”76 ‘Apocalyptic 
Tone’ constructs a double reading of Kant’s critique of the ‘mystagogues’ in the polemical 
late essay ‘On a Newly Arisen Superior Tone in Philosophy’.77  Unlike Kant, Derrida both 
distances himself from the ‘apocalyptic tone’ and acknowledges an “elective affinity”78 
between it and deconstruction.  The former is linked to the recurring figure of the ‘Come!’ 
in the text through echoes of St. John’s Apocalypse, and through the significance of tone.  
Here, ‘come!’ is located at the intersection between event and machine, repetition and 
iterability; as Derrida insists: “the drama of its citationality was what mattered to me at the 
outset, its repetitive structure and what, even in a tone, must be able to be repeated, thus 
mimicked, indeed “synthesized””.79  The ‘come!’ is “a pure differantial vibration”80 which 
precedes ontology;81 defying representation, it “could not become an object, a theme, a 
representation, or indeed a citation in the current sense”.82  However, its “singularity 
remains at once absolute and absolutely divisible”83 and it partakes in the categories and 
classifications which it nonetheless exceeds.  For Derrida, this ‘come!’ interrupts chronology, 
                                                             
73 Derrida, Rogues, p. xv.  
74 De Vries, p. 395. 
75 Derrida asserts: “For want of time, I shall limit myself to the word, if it is a word, and to the motif ‘Come’”, 
Jacques Derrida, ‘On a Newly Arisen Apocalyptic Tone in Philosophy’, trans. by John Leavey Jr., in Raising the 
Tone of Philosophy: Late Essays by Immanuel Kant, Transformative Critique by Jacques Derrida, ed. by Peter 
Fenves (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp. 117-171 (p. 162). 
76 Christopher Norris in ‘In Discussion with Christopher Norris’, pp. 71-75 (p. 75). This is reinforced by Derrida 
who affirms: “It is a very, very ambivalent essay”, Derrida, ‘In Discussion with Christopher Norris’ pp. 71-5 (p. 
75).  See also Michael Thomas, The Reception of Derrida: Translation and Transformation (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006), p. 119-120. 
77 Editor Peter Fenves asserts that, of all of Kant’s texts, “none is more biting, none more sarcastic, none so 
wholly satirical as the one written against certain Christianizing Platonists who granted feelings and sentiments 
a cognitive status” Peter Fenves, ‘Introduction: The Topicality of Tone’, in Raising the Tone of Philosophy, as 
before, pp. 1-48 (p. 1).  For a discussion of Kant’s rejection of mysticism see: Emil L. Fackenheim, The God 
Within: Kant, Schelling and Historicity, ed. by John Burbidge (London: University of Toronto Press, 1996), p. 18.  
78 Norris, ‘Versions of Apocalypse’, pp. 227-249 (p. 235). 
79 Derrida, ‘Apocalyptic Tone’, pp. 117-171 (p. 162). 
80 Derrida, ‘Apocalyptic Tone’, pp. 117-171 (p. 151). 
81 He admits: “This ‘Come’- I do not know what it is, not because I yield to obscurantism, but because the 
question “what is” belongs to a space (ontology, and from it the knowledge of grammar, linguistics, semantics 
and so on) opened by a ‘come’ come from the other” Derrida, ‘Apocalyptic Tone’, pp. 117-171 (p. 166).  
82 Derrida, ‘Apocalyptic Tone’, pp. 117-171 (p. 165). 
83 Derrida, ‘Apocalyptic Tone’, pp. 117-171 (p. 165). 
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narrative and other structures of meaning by signifying at the level of tone rather than 
reference.   
The significance of tone is explored by the text’s editor, Peter Fenves, who asserts: “The 
chronic vibrations to which the human mind is exposed make themselves known with the 
greatest clarity, moreover, at the precise moment that cognitive discourse- ‘mathematical’ 
language in a broad sense- exhausts itself”.84  Fenves claims that tone makes it possible to 
“dissociate ‘language’ from logos”,85 a proposition which links the ‘come!’ to Derrida’s 
espousal of a ‘post writing’ which disrupts logocentrism.  Further, according to Fenves, tone 
cannot be subsumed by the language of calculation,86 thus reinforcing Derrida’s emphasis on 
the incalculable as that which grounds both a certain understanding of reason and assures 
the possibility of an Enlightenment and a democracy ‘to come’.  Tone designates “an 
insensible- unmeasurable if not immense- dimension of discourse.  The term thus traverses 
the cleft separating the sensible from the intelligible”.87  The ‘Come!’ always interrupts self-
identity, sovereignty and homogeneity, presenting an opening towards the Other: it “breaks 
in [fait effraction]”,88 triggers an “overturning of sense”89 and is “plural in itself, in oneself”.90  
It is “absolutely derivable, but only from the other”.91  For Derrida, this relationship 
between interruption and Otherness, examined in texts such as ‘At this very moment in this 
work here I am’, takes place within language, disrupting conceptions of interior and 
exterior, and self and other, and the structures of power which depend on them.  As Derrida 
describes, “there, near but infinitely distanced, the dislocation is to be found in the interior 
without inside of language which is yet opened out to the outside of the wholly other”.92  
‘Apocalyptic Tone’ theorises the significance of the ‘come!’, its functioning at the level of 
                                                             
84 Fenves, pp. 1-48 (p. 4-5). 
85 Fenves, pp. 1-48 (p. 26). 
86 “This newly overheard language of an outstanding pathos, is incommensurable with the language of 
measurement, schematization, counting, cognition, and representational thought in general..,” Fenves, pp. 1-48 
(p. 8). 
87 Fenves, pp. 1-48 (p. 11). In this process, “Nothing is left of language but its emphasis”, Fenves, p. 25.   
88 Derrida, ‘Apocalyptic Tone’, pp. 117-171 (p. 168).  
89 Derrida, ‘Apocalyptic Tone’, pp. 117-171 (p. 167). 
90 Derrida, ‘Apocalyptic Tone’, pp. 117-171 (p. 167).  
91 Derrida, ‘Apocalyptic Tone’, pp. 117-171 (p. 166).   
92 Derrida, ‘At this very moment in this work here I am’, trans. by Ruben Berezdivin in Re-reading Levinas, ed. 
by Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley (London: Indiana University and Athlone Press, 1991), pp. 11-48.  
Simon Critchley offers an astute reading of the text’s mode of ‘double reading’ in the same volume; see Simon 
Critchley, ‘“Bois”- Derrida’s Final Word on Levinas’, in Re-reading Levinas, as before, pp. 162-89.  For a more 
extensive account of the disruption of the boundary between interior and exterior, see Jacques Derrida, ‘Living 
On’, trans. by James Hulbert in Deconstruction and Criticism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), pp. 62-
142 (p. 100-101). 
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tone, and subsequent disruption of assumed categories, oppositions and concepts,93 and its 
inescapable relation to interruption and alterity.   Derrida’s text both repeats and differs 
from Kant’s text.  The Kantian position is grounded in the ego cogito which guarantees the 
discrete identities of self and other, and provides a position from which “to stop listening to 
the other and to hear, once again, oneself: to hear, according to the terms Kant employs, the 
altogether clear and intimate voice of reason, not that of an enigmatic ‘oracle’”.94  Yet, 
following the realisation that “no one can decide who is speaking when reason raises its 
voice…”95 Derrida shows that there can be no clear distinctions between self and other, or 
reason and unreason.  As a consequence, the ‘come!’ figures as a necessary openness to that 
which is unknown and incalculable, be it a “a ‘divine’ Other”96 or a monstrosity.  This 
imperative of the ‘come!’ challenges sovereignty and closure, resonating within Derrida’s 
understanding of ‘Enlightenment to come,’ particularly through the connection he 
establishes between reconfigured concepts of reason and religion through faith or 
unconditionality.  In the next section, I shall return to this relationship in ‘Faith and 
Knowledge,’ arguing that the link between this account of religion and Derrida’s 
understanding of God remains surprisingly undertheorised.          
 
(d) From Religion to God: Derrida’s Suspension of God 
 
‘Faith and Knowledge’ contains many elements which contribute towards the wider 
exploration and understanding of religion in Derrida’s later work.  These elements include 
Derrida’s careful and lengthy examination of the concept of ‘religion’, his demonstration 
that our context is already religious, and his questioning of the contemporary phenomena of 
‘religion’ aside from their empirical ‘truth’.  However, I shall argue that in thinking the 
limits and possibilities of religion in ‘Faith and Knowledge, Derrida suspends any discussion 
of the question of God, so significant in other texts, and clearly a key determinant of the 
relations between religion, history, politics and the event.  Having employed the discourse 
of reason in order to expose the essential contamination of calculability by the incalculable, 
envisaging this unknowable constituent as a space for the ‘to come’, Derrida seems 
                                                             
93 As Fenves asserts: “To hear tonality otherwise- to write in a tone and of a tone and with a tone without the 
key polemical categories of inside and outside, inclusion and exclusion- is, then, the task of Derrida’s address,” 
Fenves, pp. 1-48 (p. 3). 
94 Fenves, pp. 1-48 (p. 30-1). 
95 Fenves, pp. 1-48 (p. 31). 
96 Fenves, pp. 1-48 (p. 31). 
182 
 
unwilling to fully explore or theorise its implications, relating it to the ‘Enlightenment to 
come’ and to a nondogmatic religiosity, despite its clear connection to Derrida’s 
reconfiguration of the divine in other texts.  In this section, I shall examine the virtual 
absence of ‘God’ in ‘Faith and Knowledge’, analysing the way Derrida both demands and 
suspends the term, and arguing that it is the undeclared supplement to religion, enabled by 
Derrida’s recasting of reason, and suspended as a consequence of Derrida’s primarily 
political focus in the text.    
To follow Derrida’s argument requires that we at least accept that “religion has the 
slightest relation to what we thus call God” (65) yet Derrida does little either to examine the 
strengths and tensions of this dynamic relationship or to wholly absent ‘God’ from the text.   
Rather, he tries to fix the term ‘God’ as a synonym for religion, which results in its use as an 
interchangeable trope for the contemporary social and political climate, rather than having 
any currency or significance of its own.  However, Derrida fails to efficiently suspend the 
signification of the term, and, in order to approach the question of religion, finds himself 
returning to various understandings of the concept ‘God’ which I shall briefly outline now.  
Derrida demonstrates that our structure of language demands, assumes or produces the 
concepts of absolute name, origin and witness which have historically contributed to the 
idea of God.  As soon as we begin speaking of, or in the name of religion, Derrida claims: 
 
we are confronted by the overwhelming questions of the name and of everything 
‘done in the name of’: questions of the name or noun ‘religion’, of the names of God, 
of whether the proper name belongs to the system of language or not, hence, of its 
untranslatability but also of it iterability (46) 
 
The name of God, unlike the name of religion, represents a linguistic limit, operating both 
within the system and referring to the origins and exterior of the system.  It is defined by 
“its untranslatability but also, its iterability” (46) as technology both inhibits and enables 
singularity.  God is, therefore, “unnameable in his very name” (65).   
The name of God also serves as a necessary structural supplement to Derrida’s 
understanding of ‘religion as response’.  Response always entails responsibility “before the 
other” (64) and requires a “given word” (64), yet just as there is no access to the question 
which precedes “the beginning of a response” (64) there appears to be no way of delineating 
this other.  In this way, religion becomes a self-referential, automated system of responding, 
which cannot account for itself.  This inverts the familiar structure of cause and effect as 
Derrida argues that God is engendered as a necessary cause or ‘spectral supplement’ by the 
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response; what must be posited, absurdly in retrospect, is “the absolute right of anteriority” 
(64).  He states: “the oath cannot not produce, invoke or convoke him as already there, and 
therefore as unengendered and unengenderable, prior to being itself, unproducible” (65).  
Here. God seems to function merely as a structural placeholder distinct from historical 
revelation.  Similarly, God is also “engendered… quasi-mechanically” (64) as the necessary 
element of every act of witnessing.  If all knowledge demands the testimony of a witness, 
God, as all-seeing and omniscient, is the paradigmatic witness, and is invoked as both the 
one who witnesses and the one to whom we witness as well as in the very act of witnessing 
itself.  Thus, God is “the witness as ‘nameable-unnameable’, present-absent witness of every 
oath or of every possible pledge” (65).  This figure of God as witness is particularly relevant 
here, as the reliance on witnessing- always in some way linguistic- draws together reason 
and religion.     
 In addition to these brief references to a structural God, Derrida offers a 
frustratingly cursory consideration of the status and meaning of God within philosophy of 
religion and post-theistic philosophy.97  He notes that Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit 
marks a modern religion “founded on the sentiment that ‘God himself is dead’” (53), a 
pronouncement explored in Slavoj Žižek’s work, following Hegel, on the incarnation as the 
expression of a shift in God’s nature from transcendence to immanence.98  However, Derrida 
doesn’t situate either his own work or the structural and linguistic definitions of God I 
explored in previous chapters within this genealogy.  Even more frustrating, considering the 
status of Kant within the text, are Derrida’s scant expositions of Kant’s account of God, of 
the relationship between God and religion, and of the connections between Kant and 
Derrida on these issues.  Derrida gestures towards the comparative irrelevance of God for 
Kant’s moral religion, with morality requiring that one act “as though God did not exist or 
no longer concerned himself with our salvation” (50), thus suspending any questions of 
God’s existence and nature.  This Derrida links to Nietzsche’s observation of “a certain 
internalizing movement within Christianity” (50); he asks:  
 
Is this not another way of saying that Christianity can only answer to its moral 
calling and morality, to its Christian calling if it endures in this world, in 
phenomenal history, the death of God, well beyond the figures of the Passion? That 
                                                             
97 See, for example, Derrida’s fleeting reference to Bergson’s claim that “the essential function of the universe... is 
[as] a machine for the making of gods” (77).   
98 “Christ’s appearance itself effectively stands for God’s death.” Slavoj Žižek, On Belief, p. 132. 
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Christianity is the death of God thus announced and recalled by Kant to the 
modernity of the Enlightenment? (51) 
 
Derrida doesn’t pursue this line of thinking or its implications for Kant’s relevance to what 
George E. Michalson Jr. terms “the story about post-Hegelian atheism”99 despite the clear 
influence of Kant on Derrida’s conception of God.  Allen W. Wood insists that “Kant’s God 
is, most aggressively, the God of the philosophers”100 which exhibits a tension derived from 
Kant’s scepticism of empiricist claims about God’s attributes, and, common to “the whole 
Western tradition of orthodox rational theology” between a “detailed inventory of divine 
attributes” and “an extreme degree of agnosticism about the real nature of what was being 
inventoried”.101  As I have shown in earlier chapters, Derrida’s dramatisation of the 
relationship between negative and positive theologies acknowledges and enacts this ongoing 
tension, as well as juxtaposing theological and philosophical accounts of God.  Particularly 
relevant here however, with regard to the way ‘Faith and Knowledge’ draws together reason 
and religion through the alterity and incalculability of the ‘to come’, is the fact that for 
Kant, “God is a necessary idea of reason”.102  The rejection of revelation in favour of a certain 
structural account of God’s identity and significance is a feature of both accounts, with Peter 
Byrne’s claim that Kant “must construct a new understanding of what it means to talk of 
God”103 and can therefore be understood as “a post-Christian and post-theistic thinker”104 
clearly recognisable from the task that Derrida himself adopts.  Perhaps the most 
illuminative point of comparison between the two, considering Derrida’s virtual expulsion 
of the question of God from ‘Faith and Knowledge’, is the connection between language 
about God and conceptions of subjectivity.  Reiterating Byrne’s claim that Kant is in some 
way ‘post-theistic’, George E. Michalson Jr. asserts that in Kant’s writing, “language about 
God gradually becomes either redundant or a disguised version of language about 
ourselves”.105  Michalson depicts Kant’s discussion of God as a precedent “for our modern 
notions of autonomy”,106 through which the transcendent characteristics of God are 
gradually perceived as immanent.107  Michalson describes: 
                                                             
99 George E. Michalson Jr., Kant and the Problem of God (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), p. 5.   
100 Allen W. Wood, Kant’s Rational Theology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 60.  
101 Allen W. Wood, p. 93.  
102 Allen W. Wood, p. 19.  
103 Peter Byrne, Kant on God (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), p. 1  
104 Byrne, p. 2. 
105 Michalson, p. 2.  
106 Michalson, p. 9.  
107 Michalson, p. 20-1.  
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It is this Cartesian priority of self-relatedness to other-relatedness that sets the terms 
for our modern notions of autonomy, including the kind of intellectual autonomy at 
stake in the progressive theologian’s uneasiness with an unbelievable religious 
message.  For on the terms of the reflexive Cartesian scheme there can be no 
autonomy when some ‘other’ (understood now as anything distinct from my own 
subjectivity) relates to the self in a way that is prior to or disruptive of the self’s 
natural relationship with itself.108                  
 
It is here that Derrida’s account differs, disrupting the idea of ‘modern autonomy’ by 
demonstrating that the relationship with oneself is always mediated or disrupted.  Against 
the claim that subjectivity has untethered itself from dependence on an external, 
transcendent God, Derrida exposes this myth of autonomy, reintroducing God as a name for 
the otherness which intrudes upon the self-relationship, challenging the political 
implications of autonomy which modern thinkers championed.       
 
Bearing in mind both these points and disjunctions raised by Kant’s account of God, and 
Derrida’s revelation of the complex and multivalent nature of ‘religion’ in ‘Faith and 
Knowledge’, it is surprising that its references to God are limited to fleeting appeals to a 
structural God which is here untheorised and assumed to be synonymous with religion.  
This account of God is insufficient, and the relation between religion and God- flexible, 
dynamic and with the potential to challenge notions of ethics and politics by questioning 
the divisions between experience and abstraction, and personal and public- is here 
undeveloped.  The conception of God which we do glimpse is characteristic of Derrida’s late 
work, yet it is divorced from its development in the work and from other conceptions of 
God which derive from the religious traditions he examines.  In its minimal engagement 
with the question of ‘God’, the text considers only a philosophical or formal God, 
overlooking conceptions of God from religion, revelation and theology and neglecting to ask 
whether the ‘return of the religious’ is connected to a changing conception of God, or even 
to a particular ‘death of God’. The text is haunted by its unaccountability to and for the 
spectral and ahistorical God who haunts phenomenal history and thus renders all actions 
impossible and unaccountable; as Derrida dramatically points out: “Everything begins with 
the presence of that absence” (65).  Yet Derrida here neglects to theorise the significance of 
that ‘absence’, and its relationship to the religions instituted and developed on the grounds 
                                                             
108 Michalson, p. 9.  
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of divine presence.  This neglect or oversight, is, I will argue, a consequence of the style and 
focus of ‘Faith and Knowledge’. 
Despite its rejection of the treatise mode in favour of that which is urgent and 
contemporary, “almost... a brief press release” (75), ‘Faith and Knowledge’ continues to 
engage with philosophy, contaminating idioms and genres, and with ‘religion’, showing how 
the term is transmuted and transplanted from its original Judaeo-Christian context, and 
illustrating its interaction with ethics, politics and economics as well as with other modes of 
faith and belief.  Derrida’s concern with ‘religion now’ is framed in dynamic terms: religion 
is that which returns and which responds, and so its grounds and implications are constantly 
shifting.  In contrast, God is that which remains uninvestigated in the course of this 
discussion of religion, as if its meaning was either wholly resolved by the questions of 
religion or completely unrelated, Derrida apparently overlooking his own assumption that 
‘religion has the slightest relation to what we thus call God’.  This suspension of God in 
‘Faith and Knowledge’, one of Derrida’s most politically driven texts, is perhaps a 
consequence of Derrida’s potentially problematic depiction of God in other texts- recall 
Mjaaland’s critique of The Gift of Death- in terms of interiority, subjectivity and secrecy.109   
In this case, Derrida’s virtual silence on ‘God’ in ‘Faith and Knowledge’ implies that God is 
the private, personal face of the more public issue of religion, which he considers in terms of 
politics, community and history, and that to speak of ‘God’ here may destabilise or disarm 
Derrida’s political gestures, or overemphasise his connection to the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition.     
However, the complex connection between religion and ‘God’, specifically a non-
sovereign ‘God’, is integral to the “incalculable calculation of religion for our times” (79) and 
to notions of religion, ethics, politics and subjectivity.  Without a concomitant 
reconfiguration of the concept of God, Derrida’s argument in ‘Faith and Knowledge’ is 
ultimately unconvincing.  This also has broader consequences for Derrida’s work, 
reproducing a binary between public and private, or religion and God, which appears to be 
profoundly undeconstructive.  In the next section, I shall examine this disjunction as it is 
presented by the philosopher Richard Rorty, particularly in his commentaries on Derrida’s 
                                                             
109 At the end of Chapter Three, I argued that Mjaaland’s critique could be challenged by Derrida’s claims both 
that the interior and exterior are always contaminated, and that the concepts of interior and exterior themselves 
proceed from a logic and a language which he looks to subvert and rewrite through a ‘post-writing’, but that 
Derrida himself retreated from this response, leaving his work prey to Mjaaland’s critique. The limited nature of 
Derrida’s discussion of God in ‘Faith and Knowledge’ seems to further reinforce this critique. I shall develop my 
response to this critique at the end of this chapter.      
187 
 
work.  Considering the implications of this division for religious and political readings of 
deconstruction, I shall offer a possible resolution of the dichotomy.    
 
3. Rorty and Derrida: Resolving the Public/Private Opposition?   
 
Derrida’s neglect of the question of God in ‘Faith and Knowledge’ seems to reinforce the 
thesis- presented in different ways by Beardsworth, Bradley and Žižek- of an irrevocable 
split between religious and political readings of deconstruction, whilst also reinscribing this 
division within religion itself, as the tension between politically active religious 
commitment and the personal experience of faith or a ‘God’ whose name here refers to an 
interiorized experience of one’s own subjectivity.  The establishment or fortification of this 
division or tension- variously expressed in Derrida’s work through oppositions including 
those between religion and politics, faith and religion, ethics and politics, private and 
public, and self and other- is uncharacteristic.  Indeed such divisions are frequently 
challenged by deconstructive practice.  In order to assess whether, as Beardsworh claims, 
such a tension or division prevails, both in ‘Faith and Knowledge’ and elsewhere, I shall 
examine it firstly through the presentation of separation between public and private in the 
work of philosopher and commentator on Derrida, Richard Rorty, and secondly, through 
critical responses to the relationship between ethics and politics in Derrida’s work.     
 
(a) Reading Rorty 
 
(i) Rorty’s ‘Liberal Utopia’  
Like Derrida, Rorty too looks to reconsider and re-articulate “the Enlightenment’s promise 
of freedom”.110  However, unlike Derrida, in his book Contingency, Irony and Solidarity he 
urges that “we drop the demand for a theory which unifies the public and private”,111 
perceiving this demand to be central to the current aims of Western philosophy.   
Rorty asserts that “there is no way to bring self-creation together with justice at the 
level of theory” (xiv), perceiving attempts at reconciliation as misguided or even dangerous.  
                                                             
110 Neil Gascoigne, Richard Rorty: Liberalism, Irony and the Ends of Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), p. 9. 
For an investigation of how Rorty locates his work in the trajectory of post-Enlightenment Western thought, see 
Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, rev. edn (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).  
111 Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. xv. Further 
references will be given in parentheses within the body of the text.  
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Instead, he envisages “a liberal utopia” (xv) which would espouse liberal values without 
reinscribing them as ‘truth’, offer maximum creative freedom and privacy to its individual 
participants, and ground itself in literature and narrative rather than philosophy and theory.  
For Rorty, the closest relationship between public and private that may be envisaged is their 
constitution of an uneasy equilibrium in which public freedom would maximally enable self 
creation without conceding to its own violation.  Such a claim, if sustained, would uphold 
the critiques by Žižek and Bradley, that the religious focus of Derrida’s later work privatizes  
and depoliticizes deconstruction.  Rorty’s claim however, must first be assessed, particularly 
with reference to his liberal perspectivism and to his focus on language and literature. 
   Rorty’s political vision develops from a liberalism for which “cruelty is the worst 
thing we do” (xv).  Although this is a belief which, for Rorty, cannot be theoretically 
grounded or justified, this doesn’t diminish his commitment; rather, he foresees a ‘liberal 
utopia’ in which the community would look to minimize human suffering.  Such a utopia 
would be enabled by “the imaginative ability to see strange people as fellow sufferers” (xvi) 
and by our capacity for redescription.  Rorty claims that these faculties are improved by our 
consumption of literature, and this, he states, “is why the novel, the movie, and the TV 
program have gradually, but steadily, replaced the sermon and the treatise as the principal 
vehicles of moral change and progress” (xvi).  An equivalent perspectivism informs Rorty’s 
conception of private autonomy.  He rejects the conception of language as referential or 
representative, asserting instead that “the history of language” is “the history of metaphor” 
(16) and that everything is “a product of time and chance” (22).  Consequently, individual 
autonomy would be best exhibited by the subject whose “recognition of contingency” (26) 
enabled complete self-creation through the creation of “a new language” (27).112  Such a 
figure, inscribing particularity by means of a new vocabulary, is exemplified, for Rorty, by 
the poet.  Literature and literary language inform Rorty’s visions of the public and the 
private, but he continually strives to separate these two realms, enlisting Freud, who 
“distinguished sharply between a private ethic of self-creation and a public ethic of mutual 
accommodation” (34).113  In this section, I shall examine Rorty’s understanding of a liberal 
community more closely, before turning to Derrida and Rorty’s application of the 
public/private distinction to Derrida’s work.                 
                                                             
112 Neil Gascoigne situates this project of self-creation within an existentialist framework; see Gascoigne, p. 142.  
113 Such an impermeable distinction is not however, characteristic of pragmatism more generally, or even 
representative of all of Rorty’s work.  Responding to Dewey and his influence on Rorty, Neil Gascoigne notes 
that “the future development of society requires that its members can fulfil their potentialities”, Gascoigne, p. 
148.  
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Rorty suggests that historical shifts are reflected in changing vocabularies, as one 
vocabulary, more suited to an individual or community’s needs, gradually supplants another.  
Here, rejecting any conception of objective truth in favour of a pragmatic appeal to use-
value, he argues  that “the vocabulary of Enlightenment liberalism... has become an 
impediment to the preservation and progress of democratic societies” and should be replaced 
by one “which revolves around notions of metaphor and self-creation rather than around 
notions of truth, rationality, and moral obligation” (44).  Therefore, the resources of 
Enlightenment rationalism, key to the development of liberalism, are no longer required; in 
fact “this undermining” of the philosophical grounds of liberalism serves, for Rorty, as well 
as for fellow liberals Dewey, Oakeshott and Rawls, “as a way of strengthening liberal 
institutions” (57).  Poetry here replaces philosophy for Rorty, facilitating “resdescription” 
(45), and enabling “culture as a whole” to be “‘poeticized’”, thus rendering the “‘strong 
poet,’” liberalism’s “culture hero” (53).  Rorty regards this preference for ‘redescription’ as 
compatible with, if not constitutive of, liberal thought, which in acknowledging “the 
indefinite plurality of standpoints” (51) requires practical, discursive resolutions to problems 
rather than a ‘neutral’ philosophy to adjudicate.  Central to such a liberal society would be 
the recognition of contingency, both within the structure itself, which would be grounded 
in consensus rather than philosophy, and by its inhabitants, “liberal ironists” (61) who 
would acknowledge the contingency of their identities and moral decisions.  This society, 
“which has no purpose except freedom” (60), is for Rorty, achievable, as he asserts “that 
contemporary liberal society already contains the institutions for its own improvement,” 
and thus, “that Western social and political thought may have had the last conceptual 
revolution it needs” (63).114  Warning against the potentially illiberal consequences of 
conflating public and private aims,115 Rorty nevertheless depicts redescription and self-
creation as a point of similarity between public and private in a liberal society held together 
by a “social glue” which “consists in little more than a consensus that the point of social 
organization is to let everybody have a chance at self-creation to the best of their abilities” 
(84).   
                                                             
114 Rorty regards the freedom from cruelty delivered by liberalism as sufficient compensation for its restrictive or 
even oppressive elements.  He develops these ideas in his critique of Foucault (p. 61-6).  See also Richard Rorty, 
‘Moral identity and private autonomy: The case of Foucault’, in Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical 
Papers, Volume 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
115 Here he urges: “Privatize the Nietzschean-Sartrean-Foucauldian attempt at authenticity and purity, in order 
to prevent yourself from slipping into a political attitude which will lead you to think that there is some social 
goal more important than avoiding cruelty” (p. 63).   
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Set against the liberals and pragmatists to whom he turns for political guidance, 
Rorty delineates a tradition of thinkers or ironist theorists who are examples of self-
creation.  Ironist traits include a rejection of the premises of metaphysics yet a desire “to 
understand the metaphysical urge” (96), and the supreme aspiration towards autonomy 
based on the belief that “there is nothing more powerful or important than self-
redescription” (99).  Such self-description is always “narrative in form” (101) and is 
confronted by the problem of “how to overcome authority without claiming authority” 
(105).  Rorty suggests that the ironist novelist responds to this problem better than the 
ironist theorist, as he is less tempted to inscribe his own self-creation as a new universal; 
therefore, “Heidegger failed where Proust succeeded” (120).116  Further, Heidegger is, for 
Rorty, an example of why “irony is of little public use” (120), and that publically or 
politically, such ironists are “at best useless and at worst dangerous” (68).   
            It is in this ironist genealogy that Rorty situates Derrida, depicting him as 
Heidegger’s critics, just as Heidegger himself critiqued Nietzsche (122).  In 1989, Rorty 
already observes a division in Derrida’s work between “an earlier, more professorial period” 
and later experimentation, in which his writing “becomes more eccentric, personal, and 
original” (123).  In Rorty’s schema, Derrida’s earlier work shares too much with late 
Heidegger and tends towards “transcendental temptations” (129).  Such issues are resolved 
in what Rorty considers the ‘later’ work, in his opinion, “the end product of ironist 
theorizing” (125).  Here, Rorty argues, Derrida “privatizes his philosophical thinking” and 
“simply drops theory,” moving, in effect, from philosophy to irony.  Consequently, for 
Rorty, “Derrida’s importance” lies “in his having had the courage to give up the attempt to 
unite the private and the public” (125), an achievement which, according to Rorty, is best 
illustrated by the text ‘Envois’.  Rorty’s attests that ‘Envois’ is either focusing on the private 
or marginal, the latter as an example of the former,117 or it is engaged in the “reduction of 
public to private productions” (130).  Consequently, ‘Envois’ can best be understood as the 
reinscription of certain philosophical problems within the private realm, in which they no 
longer have universal significance or make transcendental claims.  For Rorty, this gesture 
                                                             
116 As Lorenzo Fabbri observes, Derrida’s dismissal of Rorty’s idolization of Proust can be found in 
‘Circumfession’ where he points out “the grimace of a good taste naive enough to believe that one can efface the 
labor of theory, as if there wasn’t any in Pr., and mediocre theory at that, to believe that one must and above all 
that one can efface the price to be paid... I admit that I write with the price on,” Jacques Derrida, cited in 
Lorenzo Fabbri, The Domestication of Derrida: Rorty, Pragmatism and Deconstruction, trans. by Daniele Mani 
and ed. by Vuslat Demirkoparan and Ari Lee Laskin (London: Continuum, 2008), p. 52.   
117 Rorty argues that “Nothing is more private than a love letter” (p. 126) and suggests that Derrida has shifted 
emphasis “to what has hitherto been treated as marginal” (p. 131).  
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and Derrida’s emphasis on particularity, prove that he has progressed beyond the 
philosophical preoccupation with truth, universality, reason and argumentation.        
This is a controversial account of Derrida, delivering a decisive solution to the 
tension between public and private that ‘Faith and Knowledge’ seems unable to resolve.  In 
responding to that particular text, Rorty would perhaps dismiss its attempts at political 
intervention as misguided, suggesting that the tension arises because Derrida has, like 
Heidegger before him, misunderstood the scope and significance of his own work.  
Furthermore, in sacrificing specificity in favour of political analysis, Rorty might add, 
Derrida adopts pre-existing vocabularies and limits the scope of his own self-creation.  In 
order to assess the success of Rorty’s resolution of the public/private opposition, and its 
application to Derrida’s work, I will now turn to some critical attempts to clarify the 
relationships between deconstruction, pragmatism and politics.  
 
(ii) Critical Responses to Rorty 
Comparing deconstruction and pragmatism, Chantal Mouffe alleges that both “could 
provide important insights for democratic politics,” although neither necessarily result in 
“one single type of politics”.118  Mouffe objects to Rorty’s conception of politics, arguing that 
it lacks awareness of “the complexity of politics”, a consequence of “his dismissal of any kind 
of theoretical inquiry into the nature of the political realm”.119  Mouffe contends that Rorty 
overlooks or downplays the antagonistic dimension of liberal democracy, which “consists in 
the legitimation of conflict and the refusal to eliminate it”.120  Rorty’s claim that, in the 
‘liberal utopia’, dissent would be resolved or that “disagreements might be relegated to the 
private”,121 is, for Mouffe, a misunderstanding of the political.  Deconstruction highlights 
this error by exposing “the impossibility of establishing consensus without exclusion”.122  
Further, by maintaining that justice can never be embodied in given institutions, 
deconstruction “forces us to keep the democratic contestation alive”.123  Consequently, for 
Mouffe, deconstruction is “‘hyperpoliticizing,’” by which she means: “Politicization never 
ceases because undecidability continues to inhabit the decision”.124 
                                                             
118 Chantal Mouffe, ‘Deconstruction, Pragmatism and the Politics of Democracy’, in Deconstruction and 
Pragmatism, ed. by Chantal Mouffe (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 1-12 (p. 4). 
119 Mouffe, pp. 1-12 (p. 6).  
120 Mouffe, pp. 1-12 (p. 8). 
121 Mouffe, pp. 1-12 (p. 9).  
122 Mouffe, pp. 1-12 (p. 9).  
123 Mouffe, pp. 1-12 (p. 9).  
124 Mouffe, pp. 1-12 (p. 9).  
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 In his analysis of deconstruction and pragmatism in the same volume, Simon 
Critchley also focuses on the limitations of Rorty’s political vision, relating in particular to 
its idealisation of liberal democracy.  Critchley emphasises the inseparability of economic 
and political liberalism, and recalls “the evidence of imperialism, racism and colonialism 
that has always accompanied- or perhaps has always been the reality behind the cynical 
veneer of a legitimating discourse- the expansionism of Western liberal democracy”.125  
Consequently, Rorty risks “political complacency,”126 and a purely negative and individualist 
definition of freedom, as well as missing the critical potential of “public irony”.127  Critchley 
rejects both Rorty’s narrative of a ‘turn’ in Derrida’s work128 and his attempts to distance 
himself from the Levinasian elements of Derrida’s later texts.129  Like Mouffe, Critchley 
stresses that, for Derrida, “no political form can or should attempt to embody justice”,130 and 
that deconstruction therefore rejects totalitarianisms and aligns itself with a certain kind of 
democracy.  Although rejecting Rorty’s perception of the public/private distinction in 
Derrida, Critchley identifies a problematic relationship between ethics and politics, 
asserting that “the central aporia of deconstruction... concerns the nature of this passage 
from undecidability to the decision, from the ethical ‘experience’ of justice to political 
action, to what we might call the moment of judgement”.131 I shall return to this tension at 
the end of the chapter.  In responding to Critchley’s critique, Rorty reinforces the 
differences between his own work and deconstruction, particularly his expulsion of theory 
from the realm of politics.  First, he rejects Derrida’s understanding of justice, asserting “I do 
not see the point of defining a commonly used term such as ‘justice’ as the name of an 
impossibility”.132  Secondly, he rejects the application of deconstructive critique to liberalism 
itself, insisting that “we do not need what Critchley calls ‘a critique of liberal society’.  We 
                                                             
125 Simon Critchley, ‘Deconstruction and Pragmatism: Is Derrida a Private Ironist or a Public Liberal?’, in Simon 
Critchley, Ethics- Politics- Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas and Contemporary French Thought, 
(London: Verso, 1999), pp. 83-105 (p. 87). 
126 Critchley, ‘Deconstruction and Pragmatism’, pp. 83-105 (p. 88). 
127 Critchley, ‘Deconstruction and Pragmatism’, pp. 83-105 (p. 88).  
128 He does, however, observe “a change in the mode of presentation of Derrida’s work, from a constative form of 
theorizing to a performative mode of writing, or in other terms, from meta-language to language”. Critchley, 
‘Deconstruction and Pragmatism’, pp. 83-105 (p. 96).   
129 In fact, he links Rorty and Levinas, asking if both are not “attempting to locate a source for moral and political 
obligation in a sentient disposition towards the other’s suffering?” Critchley, ‘Deconstruction and Pragmatism’, 
pp. 83-105 (p. 98).  
130 Critchley, ‘Deconstruction and Pragmatism’, pp. 83-105 (p. 101).  
131 Critchley, ‘Deconstruction and Pragmatism’, pp. 83-105 (p. 100).  
132 Richard Rorty, ‘Response to Simon Critchley’, in Deconstruction and Pragmatism, as above, pp. 41-46 (p. 41-
42).  
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just need more liberal societies, and more liberal laws in force within each such society”.133  
With regard to the political, Derrida maintains that critique must be ongoing and would 
thus reject Rorty’s attempt to exempt liberalism.   
 The distinction between public and private, so fundamental to Rorty’s vision, is also 
problematized by Ernesto Laclau, who claims that the opposition is assumed rather than 
analysed and is presented, contradictorily, in both essentialist and historicist terms. Laclau 
describes:   
 
If... we inscribe the distinction itself in the patchy and complex history of its 
production- something that any consequent pragmatist should do... the distinction 
itself becomes problematic and reveals itself as what it actually is- just an ideal-
typical attempt at stabilizing an essentially unstable frontier which is constantly 
trespassed and overflown by movements coming from its two sides: personal self-
realization investing public aims, politicization of the private sphere, private aims 
whose fulfilment requires legal recognition, etc. Only in a tidy rationalistic world 
can the demands of self-realization and those of human solidarity be so neatly 
differentiated as Rorty wants them to be.134                         
 
Laclau here claims that Rorty is seeking solace in the philosophical domain which he has 
rejected, and that this division which underpins so much of Rorty’s thought, is 
unsustainable.  One area where the distinction is both particularly unstable and persistently 
defended, is in Rorty’s discussion of the importance of literature.       
 
(iii) Rorty and Literature 
Both literary writers and writing are privileged in Rorty’s utopia.  The former, in their 
engagement with particularity, narrative and changing vocabularies, demonstrate an 
awareness of contingency which allies them with “freedom” (26), and the latter providing a 
fitting way of understanding the world, with history, “the history of successive metaphors” 
(20), and, via Freud, “every human life... a poem” (35).  Here, Rorty expands the term ‘poet’ 
to include anyone who generates a new vocabulary, “so that Proust, Nabokov, Newton and 
Darwin, Hegel and Heidegger, also fall under the term” (24).  The figure of the ‘poet’ is 
                                                             
133 Rorty, ‘Response’, pp. 41-46 (p. 45).  This seems to be part of a wider rejection of the legacies of Marxism, for 
example see his claim elsewhere that, “there seems to be no particular reason why, after dumping Marx, we have 
to keep on repeating all the nasty things about bourgeois liberalism which he taught us to say”, Richard Rorty, 
‘Method, Social Science, Social Hope’, in Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Essays: 1972-1980), 
(Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1982), pp. 191-210 (p. 207).   
134 Ernesto Laclau, ‘Deconstruction, Pragmatism, Hegemony’, in Deconstruction and Pragmatism, as above, pp. 
47-67 (p. 65).  
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obviously central to Rorty’s vision, but its position in relation to the poles of public and 
private, and to ethics and politics, is less than clear.  
 Alert to the potential for confusion, Rorty looks to divide literature into that which 
excels at redescription and self-creation, for example the writings of Nietzsche, Proust and 
Derrida, and that which may be morally and politically significant, illustrated by the work 
of Orwell and Nabokov.  This distinction is inflexible as Rorty insists that we should 
“distinguish books which help us become autonomous from books which help us become 
less cruel” (141).  However, as Rorty seems to conflate the moral with the political, this 
distinction becomes remarkably similar to the “moral-aesthetic contrast” (142) which he 
rejects so strongly.  Further, it is the self-creative aspect of literature which Rorty most 
clearly admires and repeatedly associates with the future of liberalism, insisting that “the 
heroes of liberal society are the strong poet and the utopian revolutionary” (60) as these 
figures “are protesting in the name of the society itself against those aspects of the society 
which are unfaithful to its own self-image” (60).  Here, the capacity for redescription is 
depicted as a feature of both self-creating individuals and of society yet Rorty rejects any 
connection between the two, asserting that “poetic, artistic, philosophical, scientific, or 
political progress results from the accidental coincidence of a private obsession with a public 
need” (37).  Despite this strict division, Rorty repeatedly claims that the literature of self-
creation serves a moral function, without clarifying whether morality is the fulfilment of 
one’s political duties, the rejection of cruelty, or the expression of one’s autonomy.135     
Rorty urges that literary critics be regarded as “moral advisers” because “they have been 
around.  They have read more books and are thus in a better position not to get trapped in 
the vocabulary of any single book” (81), however the moral function of literature seems to 
exceed this simple, didactic role.  Rorty even ventures to suggest that the scope of literature 
is equivalent to the scope of morality, as the former challenges “one’s sense of what is 
possible and important” (82).  For Rorty, morality is “the voice of ourselves as members of a 
community, speakers of a common language” (59), facilitated by language and developed 
and challenged through literature.  Thus the liberal society is “’poeticized’” rather than 
“‘rationalized’ or ‘scientized’” (53), aiming “to make life easier for poets and revolutionaries 
while seeing to it that they make life harder for others by words, and not deeds” (60-1).  
Rorty inherits the idea that literary self-creation may have a moral function from Dewey 
                                                             
135 Gascoigne asserts that, for Rorty, following Dewey, “the only moral end is growth: specifically, the growth of 
the self”, Gascoigne, p. 159.    
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who contends that “imagination is the chief instrument of the good... art is more moral than 
moralities.  For the latter either are, or tend to become, consecrations of the status quo... 
The moral prophets of humanity have always been poets even though they spoke in free 
verse or by parable” (69).136  Rorty’s attempt to prove that literature reinforces the 
public/private opposition is challenged by his association of literature with morality.137  On 
the contrary, literature is, for Derrida, a potential bridge between the public and private.  In 
the next section, I shall first return to Rorty’s reading of Derrida, demonstrating that Rorty 
looks to distance himself from Derrida at this very point when Derrida focuses on language 
and literature, and secondly, I shall suggest how literature might provide a way of 
challenging Rorty’s division between public and private.  
 
(b) Rorty Reading Derrida  
 
As we have seen, for Rorty Derrida is an exemplar of ironist self-creation who excels in 
creative autonomy yet who should be disregarded when considering social and political 
practice.  Derrida himself unequivocally rejects Rorty’s analysis, stating: “I must say that I 
obviously cannot accept the public/private distinction in the way he uses it in relation to my 
work”.138  However, this distinction, so rigorously applied in Contingency, Irony and 
Solidarity appears somewhat softened as Rorty writes in 1996: “to understand Derrida’s 
motives one must see his work against a political background- and in particular against the 
background of the Holocaust”.139  This concession that Derrida’s work may have some 
political significance, or at least should not be divorced, from a historical and political 
context, is not however, a sign of agreement with wholly ethical or political readings of his 
work.  Regarding Derrida as a humanist,140 an exclusionary term which conflicts with 
                                                             
136 See also Rorty’s rather reductive claim that “the Romantic poets did not know that their purpose was to 
contribute to the development of an ethical consciousness suitable for the culture of political liberalism” (p. 55). 
137 By framing Contingency, Irony and Solidarity as a demonstration of the theoretical incompatibility of private 
and public commitments, Rorty drives the reader towards counter-arguments.  A more generous and generative 
reading is perhaps available if we instead read the text, as Neil Gascoigne advocates, as “an apologia for the 
resentful, self-absorbed quest of the post-philosophical intellectual to find a role for herself.” Gascoigne, p. 181.  
138 Jacques Derrida, ‘Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism’, trans. by Simon Critchley in Deconstruction 
and Pragmatism, as above, pp. 77-88 (p. 78).  
139 Rorty, ‘Response’, pp. 41-46 (p. 44). This coincides with Lorenzo Fabbri’s claim that “Rorty does not really 
refute that Derrida’s work has some bearing on public life.  What he contests is the delusional belief that 
exclusively by passing through ‘theory’, one can be productively engaged with the political life of a given 
community”, Fabbri, p. 96.   
140 For Rorty, Derrida is a humanist as a consequence of his acceptance of a certain Enlightenment legacy, and in 
his hope that human beings “may learn to rely on their own romantic imagination, and their own ability to 
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Derrida’s rejection of anthropocentrism, Rorty both struggles “with the specifically 
Levinasian strains in his [Derrida’s] thought”141 and continues to reject the relevance of 
theory for politics, which he regards as “a matter of pragmatic, short-term reforms and 
compromises”.142  
 These disparities between Rorty and Derrida, linked to the political implications of 
deconstruction and to the very nature of the political, may also be traced back to questions 
surrounding Derrida’s inheritance from Heidegger and, relatedly, the significance of 
language and literature.  For Rorty, Derrida’s greatest achievement is his debunking of the 
claim that philosophy transcends writing.  Rorty asserts that “Philosophical writing, for 
Heidegger as for the Kantians, is really aimed at putting an end to writing”.143  Such writing 
assumes the transparency or insignificance of its medium, and its own ability to access and 
issue truths irrespective of the medium.  For Rorty, Derrida starts from the recognition of 
philosophy as a type of writing, moreover, a writing which always refers to other writing.  
Thus, Derrida’s work endeavours to answer the question: “‘Given that philosophy is a kind 
of writing, why does this suggestion meet with such resistance?’”144  Given Rorty’s 
preference for Derrida’s ‘later’ work, moments where Derrida appears to be making 
transcendental claims or ‘doing philosophy’ are judged as lapses as Rorty asserts: “I see the 
worst parts of Heidegger and Derrida as the parts which suggest that they themselves have 
finally gotten language right”.145  As becomes evident in the essay ‘Wittgenstein, Heidegger, 
and Language’, in which Rorty compares Wittgenstein’s increasingly pragmatic trajectory 
with the later Heidegger’s gestures towards mysticism, Rorty is notably hostile towards the 
idea that there may be something incomprehensible or inexhaustible in language.  Recalling 
Heidegger’s famous declaration that “it is language that speaks...,”146 Rorty perceives both a 
universalising abstraction and an egotistical “hope that the thinker can avoid immersion in 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
cooperate with each other for the common good”, Richard Rorty, ‘Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism’, 
in Deconstruction and Pragmatism, pp. 13-18 (p. 14). 
141 He continues, “In particular, I am unable to connect Levinas’s pathos of the infinite with ethics or politics,” 
also asserting that he believes Levinas to be inapplicable to “reformist, democratic politics”, the only type of 
politics which concerns him.  Rorty, ‘Remarks’, pp. 13-18 (p. 17). 
142 Rorty, ‘Remarks’, pp. 13-18 (p. 17).  
143 Richard Rorty, ‘Philosophy as a Kind of Writing: An Essay on Derrida’, in Consequences of Pragmatism, as 
before, pp. 90-109 (p. 94).  
144 Rorty, ‘Philosophy as a Kind of Writing’, pp. 90-109 (p. 94).    
145 Richard Rorty, ‘Introduction: Pragmatism and post-Nietzschean philosophy’, in Essays on Heidegger and 
Others, as before, pp. 1-6 (p. 5).  
146 Richard Rorty, ‘Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the reification of language’, in Essays on Heidegger and Others, 
pp. 50-65 (p. 64). 
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the always already disclosed”,147 hence his dislike of Derrida when such ideas leach into his 
work.  Heidegger’s influence on Derrida’s understanding of language is palpable, yet, contra 
Rorty, does not tend towards mystical irrelevance.  Rather, it determines the concrete 
conditions of deconstruction.  Derrida’s observations: of the inexhaustibility of signification, 
or the fact that “writing does not begin”;148 of the insistence of an unknowable Otherness 
within the same; and of the finitude of infinite difference, all constitute the non-
prescriptive practices which challenge the limits and practices of ethics and politics.  Rorty 
may present his differences with Heidegger and Derrida as philosophical, but they doubtless 
intersect the political.  Rorty espouses a ‘liberal utopia’ which can be made present, whereas, 
for Derrida, as a consequence of his understanding of language and alterity, the political is 
that which can never be foreclosed.149  
 The antipathy that Rorty exhibits towards traces of Heidegger’s philosophy of 
language in Derrida is paralleled by a similar hostility towards Paul de Man’s approach to 
language.  Representative of a certain type of ‘deconstructionist’ for Rorty, de Man is 
accused of fetishizing language or the absences it represents, thus rendering language “a way 
of mourning a Deus absconditus”.150  Rorty perceives de Man’s approach to language as a 
perversion of Derrida’s assertion that “the sign... is deferred presence”,151 and repeatedly 
parodies de Man, asserting for example, that “The initiates, the negative theologians, the 
worshippers of the Dark God whose Voice is in the Literariness of Language, are those who 
no longer believe that ‘language functions according to principles which are those, or which 
are like those, of the phenomenal world’”.152  In his attempt to deny that this representation 
of de Man is derived from Derrida, he assumes an unlikely ally, citing Michael Ryan’s claim 
in Deconstruction and Marxism that Derrida’s work is not “privileging language, rhetoric or 
‘literary texts’”.153  Ryan’s claim, with which I shall disagree, is driven by his intention to 
repoliticise Derrida, here by distancing his work from the Yale School.  Although any 
conflation of Derrida with De Man or other Yale School thinkers is an oversimplification, 
Rorty’s rejection of literary readings of Derrida seems odd considering both his 
                                                             
147 Rorty, ‘Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the reification of language’, pp. 50-65 (p. 65).   
148 Derrida, Positions, p. 11. 
149 This is illustrated by Rorty’s own observation that “his [Derrida’s] great theme is the impossibility of closure,” 
Richard Rorty, ‘Deconstruction and circumvention’, in Essays on Heidegger and Others, as before, pp. 85-106 (p. 
92). 
150 Richard Rorty, ‘Two meanings of “logocentrism”: a reply to Norris’, in Essays on Heidegger and Others, pp. 
107-118 (p. 114). 
151 Jacques Derrida, cited in Rorty, ‘Two meanings of “logocentrism”’, pp. 107-118 (p. 115).   
152 Rorty, ‘Two meanings of “logocentrism”’, pp. 107-118 (p. 115).  
153 Michael Ryan cited in Rorty, ‘Two meanings of “logocentrism”’, pp. 107-118 (p. 116).  
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interpretation of ‘Envois’ and the privileged role of literature in his own ‘liberal utopia’.  
Again, it seems likely that Rorty’s unease towards Derrida’s approach towards literature is 
caused by its challenge to his own political perspective.  In the final part of the chapter, I 
shall briefly examine Derrida’s relationship with literature and the literary.            
 
   (c) Derrida and Literature  
 
The significance of language, literature and textuality in Derrida’s work has been a source of 
debate since the earliest texts; on the one hand, Yale School scholars endeavoured to claim 
deconstruction for literary studies, and, on the other, Michael Ryan controversially 
suggested that ‘textuality’ is simply “the name for radical heterogeneity,” and “has very little 
if anything to do with an idealist concept like ‘the literary’”.154  Ryan’s suspicion of ‘the 
literary’ is characteristic of deconstruction, yet he understates the importance of language 
and literature for Derrida, as Derrida’s famous interview, ‘This Strange Institution Called 
Literature,’ reveals.  Here, Derrida is called to account for his claim that “my [his] most 
constant interest, coming even before my philosophical interest I should say, if that is 
possible, has been directed towards literature, towards that writing which is called 
literary”.155  It is this interest, oddly downplayed by Rorty, considering his own focus on 
literature, which, I shall argue, may challenge Rorty’s assumption of the private/public 
opposition.         
 Derrida gives a revealing account of his understanding of literature in ‘This Strange 
Institution Called Literature’, claiming that “literature seemed to me [him], in a confused 
way, to be the institution which allows one to say everything, in every way”.156  For Derrida, 
literature is always excessive; it is “an institution which tends to overflow the institution”.157  
It also illuminates the workings of all language; “Literature ‘is’ the place or experience of 
this ‘trouble’ we also have with the essence of language, with truth and with essence, the 
language of essence in general”.158  Unlike philosophy, literature doesn’t aspire to 
                                                             
154 Michael Ryan, Marxism and Deconstruction: A Critical Articulation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1982), p. 103-4.  
155 Jacques Derrida, cited by Derek Attridge in ‘This Strange Institution Called Literature: An Interview with 
Jacques Derrida’, in Jacques Derrida, Acts of Literature, ed. by Derek Attridge and trans. by Geoffrey Bennington 
and Rachel Bowlby, (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 33-75 (p. 33).  
156 Derrida, ‘This Strange Institution Called Literature’, pp. 33-75 (p. 36).  
157 Derrida, ‘This Strange Institution Called Literature’, pp. 33-75 (p. 36).  
158 Derrida, ‘This Strange Institution Called Literature’, pp. 33-75 (p. 48). 
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universality, but is particular and idiomatic, always “an absolutely singular event,”159 even 
though its singularity is always already compromised.  As Derrida asserts, “there has to be 
this play of iterability in the singularity of the idiom.  And this play threatens what it makes 
possible”.160  Consequently, and again testament to this tension between singularity and 
generality, in Derrida’s work, the term ‘literature’ signifies beyond the individual literary 
work.   As Simon Critchley describes, “The name ‘literature’ becomes the placeholder for 
the experience of a singularity that cannot be assimilated into any overarching explanatory 
schema, but which permanently disrupts the possible unity of such a schema”.161  In this 
sense, the space of literature enacts the encounter between singular and universal, or private 
and public.  Derrida’s repeated emphasis on the relationship between literature and public 
space and democracy, as well as to the singularity of literature, testifies to this juxtaposition.  
In the ‘Strange Institution’ interview he claims that literature, as “linked to an authorization 
to say everything... seems inseparable to me from what calls forth a democracy, in the most 
open (and doubtless itself to come) sense of democracy”.162  A more extensive theorization of 
this connection can be found in the essay ‘The Future of the Profession or the University 
Without Condition (thanks to the “Humanities”, what could take place tomorrow)’.  Here 
Derrida declares:  
 
I will call the unconditional university or the university without condition: the 
principal right to say everything, whether it be under the heading of a fiction and 
the experiment of knowledge, and the right to say it publicly, to publish it.  The 
reference to public space will remain the link that affiliates the new Humanities to 
the Age of Enlightenment.  It distinguishes the university institution from other 
institutions founded on the right or the duty to say everything, for example religious 
confession and even psychoanalytic ‘free association’.  But it is also what 
fundamentally links the university, and above all the Humanities, to what is called 
literature, in the European and modern sense of the term, as the right to say 
everything publicly, or to keep a secret, if only in the form of fiction.163    
 
                                                             
159 Derrida, ‘This Strange Institution Called Literature’, pp. 33-75 (p. 43). For a discussion of the nature and 
implications of this singularity see Derek Attridge, The Singularity of Literature (London: Routledge, 2004). 
160 Derrida, ‘This Strange Institution Called Literature’, pp. 33-75 (p. 65). 
161 Simon Critchley, ‘Derrida: The Reader’, in Derrida’s Legacies: Literature and philosophy, ed. by Simon 
Glendinning and Robert Eaglestone (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 1-11 (p. 2).  
162 Derrida, ‘This Strange Institution Called Literature’, pp. 33-75 (p. 37). 
163 Jacques Derrida, ‘The Future of the Profession or the University Without Condition (thanks to the 
“Humanities”, what could take place tomorrow)’, in Jacques Derrida and the Humanities: A Critical Reader, ed. 
by Tom Cohen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 24-57 (p. 26-27).  
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Consequently, literature, that “certain democratic institution”164 is the paradigmatic 
democratic or deconstructive institution as it incessantly highlights its own lack of 
sovereignty; as Joseph Kronick attests, it is “the reserve or remainder that cannot be taken 
up or totalized within its institution.”165   
In his Foreword to Derrida’s Geneses, Genealogies, Genres and Genius: The Secrets 
of the Archive, Martin McQuillan emphasises the link between literature and democracy, 
asserting that “Literature is in other words a space in which the impossibility of the 
democracy-to-come might be possible”.166  Following Derrida’s discussion of “literature’s 
secret, the infinite power to keep undecidable and thus forever sealed the secret of what 
it/she {elle} says...”,167 McQuillan affirms that “This is the genius of literature, the infinite 
power to keep the secret undecidable and sealed from what it says even as it is publicly 
avowed”.168  It is this element of the secret and its relationship to literature which may 
present an alternative to Rorty’s ossification of the public/private distinction.  In Chapter 
Two, I discussed Derrida’s understanding of being ‘in secret’, a phrase which refers not to a 
specific reserved content, but a mode of linguistic silence through which one bears witness.  
This conception of secrecy, I argued, is also linked to Derrida’s perception of God and 
subjectivity, as “God is the name of the possibility I have of keeping a secret that is visible 
from the interior but not from the exterior”.169  God thus names a certain non-sovereign 
subjectivity, and signifies an encounter which both generates this singular subjectivity and 
determines that its interiority is always mediated by an otherness.  This very process 
challenges any stable distinction between public and private, or self and other.  Similarly, 
Derrida’s association of the secret with literature also enables a way of rethinking or 
destabilising these divisions.  Considering Derrida’s presentation of the relationship between 
literature and the secret in ‘Passions’, J. Hillis Miller explains:  
 
the freedom to say everything in literature means the right not to respond, a right to 
absolute non-response, to keep secret.  Derrida associates this hyperbolic right to 
non-response with the democracy to come... Literature keeps a secret that does not 
have to be revealed, or rather than cannot by any means... be revealed170   
                                                             
164 Derrida, ‘The Future of the Profession’, pp. 24-57 (p. 30).  
165 Joseph Kronick, Derrida and the Future of Literature (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 
1999), p. 10.  
166 Martin McQuillan, ‘Foreword’, in Derrida, Geneses, pp. v-xv (p. vi).  
167 Derrida, Geneses, p. 18.  
168 McQuillan, pp. v-xv (p. viii).  
169 Derrida, The Gift of Death, p. 108. 
170 J. Hillis Miller, ‘Derrida and Literature’, in Jacques Derrida and the Humanities: A Critical Reader, as above, 
pp. 58-81 (p. 65). 
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In ‘Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism’, Derrida again reinforces the relationship 
between literature and democracy171 before expanding on the political implications of the 
secret, associated with literature as “The secret of literature is thus the secret itself”.172  
Derrida describes: 
 
The secret is irreducible to the public realm- although I do not call it private- and 
irreducible to publicity and politicization, but at the same time, this secret is that on 
the basis of which the public realm and the realm of the political can remain open.  
It is on the basis of the secret that I would take up again the question of democracy, 
because there is a concept of politics and democracy as openness- where all are 
equal and where the public realm is open to all- which tends to deny, efface or 
prohibit the secret; in any case, it tends to limit the right to secrecy to the private 
domain, thereby establishing a culture of privacy (I think that this is the dominant 
and hegemonic tendency in the history of politics in the West).  This is a very 
serious matter, and it is against this interpretation of democracy that I have 
attempted to think an experience of the secret and of singularity to which the public 
realm has no right and no power.  Even if we take the example of the most 
triumphalistic totalitarianism, I believe the secret remains inaccessible and 
heterogeneous to the public realm.  And this heterogeneity is not depoliticizing, it is 
rather the condition of politicization: it is the way of broaching the question of the 
political, of the history and genealogy of this concept, with the most concrete 
consequences. 173   
 
In this enigmatic passage, Derrida seems again to risk reinforcing the primacy of the 
individual or personal over the public.  However, his aim is rather to demonstrate the 
interdependence of secrecy and public space, and to undermine the privatization of secrecy.  
For Derrida, the secret, as an instance of singularity, opens public space yet cannot be 
subsumed by it.  Although it appears similar to privacy, the two aren’t identical as the very 
interiority of the secret is enabled by the experience of otherness. Consequently, the secret 
precedes and undermines any reductive binary between public and private.   
 It is this element of resistance which seems to determine the political implications of 
both secrecy and literature.  “Literary fictionality”174 ensures that a text remains open, that, 
having no assured external meaning, it cannot be translated or foreclosed without a certain 
loss.  This is understood as a kind of non-sovereign resistance; as Martin McQuillan 
                                                             
171 Derrida asserts: “I am not able to separate the invention of literature, the history of literature, from the history 
of democracy.  Under the pretext of fiction, literature must be able to say anything; in other words, it is 
inseparable from the human rights, from the freedom of expression etc.” Jacques Derrida, ‘Remarks on 
Deconstruction and Pragmatism’, pp. 77-88 (p. 80).    
172 Derrida, Geneses, p. 18. 
173 Derrida, ‘Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism, pp. 77-88 (p. 80-1).  
174 Derrida, ‘Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism’, pp. 77-88 (p. 80).  
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describes: “the undecidable in literature refuses sovereignty its own ipseity rendering the 
sovereign divisible and no longer sovereign.  This power is not a counter-force to the 
sovereign but the activity of the passive ‘what happens’ of the all-powerful, powerless 
other”.175  Derrida recalls that this structural resistance, where the text itself undermines 
referential, transcendental or universal readings, is paralleled by a history of literary 
challenges to political and social norms.  The non-sovereign power of literature, which 
derives from its lack of essence and self-identity, and its liminality- it “perhaps stands on the 
edge of everything”176- renders it remarkably similar to the figure of God in Derrida’s later 
work.  In fact, whereas Derrida uses the term ‘literature’ to describe “this excess of 
language”177 in the 1970s and 1980s, it seems that ‘God’ often serves a similar function in the 
later texts.   
 
As we have seen, Derrida’s emphasis on the transformative power of textuality often 
emerges as the imperative to develop a new language, a ‘post-writing’ or ‘athetic writing’, 
which provides a way of thinking otherwise, a mode of thought which is not underpinned 
by such binary oppositions.  In this way, Derrida responds to the apparent tension between 
public and private with two languages or voices: first, he demonstrates that the two terms, 
public and private co-constitute each other, and that the interior or private element is 
always already contaminated by that which appears to be external, and secondly, perhaps 
more radically, he denaturalizes the opposition between public and private, demonstrating 
that it issues from a philosophical logic which is not the only possible mode of thought, and 
instead developing a way of reading and writing which responds to singularity.   
In light of this, it becomes clearer why ‘Faith and Knowledge’ presents such an 
undeconstructive disjunction between God and religion, or the private and the public.  
Whereas other texts I have analysed are anchored in close reading and therefore always 
return to the singularity of the text, in ‘Faith and Knowledge’, Derrida looks to address 
‘reason’, ‘religion’ and ‘the political’ more directly, and in so doing fulfils Marius Timmann 
Mjaaland’s criticism that his work becomes less powerful, and indeed less deconstructive, 
when not rooted in an instance of close, textual reading.178  The text, speaking through the 
discourse of reason, which proves itself inappropriate for speaking about God, loses touch 
                                                             
175 McQuillan, pp. v-xv (p. ix).  
176 Derrida, ‘This Strange Institution Called Literature’, pp. 33-75 (p. 47). 
177 Derrida, ‘This Strange Institution Called Literature’, pp. 33-75 (p. 48). 
178 Mjaaland, p. 334.  
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with singularity.  To borrow Rorty’s terminology, here Derrida, despite his exploration of 
the limitations of the philosophical modes of tract and treatise, is seduced by the desire to 
philosophise and universalise, forsaking his ironist skills of self-description and instead 
borrowing pre-prepared philosophical and political discourses.  At times, Derrida even veers 
close to what Rorty regards as philosophy’s cardinal error, that of assuming his mode’s 
transparency.   
 
4. Conclusion 
  
Beginning with ‘Faith and Knowledge’, this chapter has analysed the significance of reason 
in Derrida’s later work, particularly for Derrida’s investigation of the ‘return of the religious’ 
and in his development of a deconstructive account of the political.  I have argued that 
Derrida links together all of these elements through the ‘Enlightenment to come’ which, in 
attesting that both reason and religion require an incalculable element of faith or testimony, 
names a non-prescriptive vision of democracy defined by its excess over all existing social 
and political institutions and propelled by a desire for justice.  The forceful political focus, I 
argued, was maintained through an understanding and investigation of religion as a 
contemporary, dynamic and public phenomenon, whose component of faith, although 
essential, and relation to God, were radically undertheorised, resulting in an apparent 
disjunction between God and religion, self and other, and the private and the public.   
This disjunction undermines Derrida’s very politics, which depends on the 
rethinking of subjectivity and divinity which appears in other later texts.  Turning to 
Richard Rorty’s espousal of this division, I outlined Rorty’s ‘liberal utopia’ and its possible 
limitations, noting that Rorty shies away from Derrida’s understanding of language and 
literature, as a consequence of literature’s function as a bridge between the singular and the 
general, and its connection to secrecy as that which precedes the public/private division.  
Thus, I argued, Derrida’s perception of literature short-circuits Rorty’s reductive opposition 
between the political and the private.  Finally, returning to ‘Faith and Knowledge’, I 
suggested that here Derrida overlooks the subversive power of re-reading and re-writing, 
instead adopting a philosophical discourse which makes universal claims, cannot respond to 
singularity and the idiom and thus reinforces certain undeconstructive binaries.  
 What becomes evident when considering the limitations of ‘Faith and Knowledge’ is 
the importance of language, literature and textuality for deconstruction: the fact that 
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literature is active, resistant and performative, and the way in which “changing language, 
change[s] more than language”.179  In the final section of the thesis, I shall draw together the 
key elements that have emerged in my thesis and some of their implications, maintaining 
reference to the function of textuality in this process as that which enables a certain 
“imperative” to become both apparent and achievable.180   
                                                             
179 Derrida, ‘This Strange Institution Called Literature’, pp. 33-75 (p. 55). 
180 Derrida, ‘This Strange Institution Called Literature’, pp. 33-75 (p. 55). 
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Conclusion 
 
Deconstruction is also a manner of writing and putting forward another text... 
Jacques Derrida 
 
1. Writing God 
 
At the start of the thesis, I described my aim to track Derrida’s search for a discourse which 
would both respond to singularity and to what is understood by ‘God’.  Looking to establish 
a link between ‘God’ and the modes and processes of writing, and to assess any tension 
between this figure of ‘God’ and the political emphasis of deconstruction, I focused 
particularly on the discourses of confession, dialogue, silence, and reason as Derrida employs 
and investigates them.  Here I shall first recapitulate my findings before suggesting some of 
their wider implications. 
 
In Chapter One, I examined ‘Circumfession’, a highly personal text in which Derrida 
explores the profoundly religious genre of confession through the structure of a ‘double 
reading’ which both re-inscribes familiar confessional gestures, and challenges or subverts 
them.  Demonstrating the insufficiency of current readings to explain the significance of 
writing and of contamination, or impurity, in the text, I re-read ‘Circumfession’ through 
this ‘double reading’, revealing how the text both repeats and rewrites, or deconstructs, the 
tightly controlled economies of confessional structure, confessional subject, and the figure 
of God.  In this chapter, I first drew attention to Derrida’s declared desire to ‘invent a new 
language’ or ‘syntax’.  This new language, I insisted, is immediately linked to Derrida’s 
reconception of both the subject and of God as non self-identical, and responds to the 
inadequacy of current discourse to conceptualise lived experience.  Derrida’s challenge to 
the accepted perception of a transcendent and omnipotent God develops from Augustine, 
who, for Derrida, begins to inscribe a God who is changeable and connected to the processes 
of writing.  In turn, Derrida asserts his atheism with regard to the Judaeo-Christian God, 
associating ‘God’ with writing, dynamism, mortality and with the negotiation of 
subjectivity.  God is something or someone to be discovered and addressed by the text, and 
is linked with the new language, an ‘unknown grammar’, as well as with an unnamed 
witness, and an inescapable otherness.  As a consequence, I argued that Derrida’s ‘double 
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reading’ of the confessional discourse, which revealed the restrictions of the confessional 
economy, rendered it more, rather than less, open to understanding, perceiving and 
addressing ‘God’.   
 In the final part of the chapter, I turned to ‘Envois’, maintaining that it too promotes 
a ‘double reading’ of confession.  Although fewer than those in ‘Circumfession’, the 
references to God in this text focus on God’s limitations and on the negotiation between the 
unresolved identities of self and other.  Here however, I showed that Derrida depicts 
confession as a process of repression and subjection, thus introducing the question of 
political rights and norms.  ‘Envois’ enacts the formation of the political, negotiating 
between public and private, and between disorder and control, and Derrida’s medium, the 
postcard, challenges the accepted division between interior and exterior, and its relationship 
to subjectivity.  In this way, I argued that in ‘Envois’, Derrida gestures towards questions of 
ethics and politics and their relationship to religion, as well as to a new language or ‘athetic 
writing’, without fully exploring them.        
 
Prior to the second chapter I turned to the critically contested relationship between 
deconstruction and negative theology, the latter a discourse which clearly informs Derrida’s 
writing strategies, particularly with regard to the modes of dialogue and silence which 
concern Chapters Two and Three.  Here I highlighted key links between negative theology 
and deconstruction, including their exploration of non-dialectical negativity and their use of 
a variety of linguistic modes and strategies.     
 In Chapter Two, I examined two key expressions of the dialogical mode in Derrida’s 
work.  The first of these was based upon différance, which, I demonstrated, consists of two 
apparently contrary positions or movements which are in constant dialogue with each 
other.  Responding to assertions from Arthur Bradley and Slavoj Žižek of a distinct ‘turn’ in 
Derrida’s later work, I explained that this dialogical movement which constitutes différance 
remains consistent throughout Derrida’s work, emerging in later texts, for example, as the 
relationship between law and justice, and invalidating such claims of a ‘turn’.  Moving on to 
the significance of dialogue for Derrida’s understanding of God, I proposed a reading of ‘Sauf 
le nom (Post scriptum)’.  In this text, I argued that dialogue provides a non-dogmatic way of 
investigating the nature of language, the concept of ‘God’ an the relationships between 
deconstruction and negative theology, and kataphatic and apophatic theologies.  Paralleling 
the ‘double reading’ I perceived in ‘Circumfession’, the dialogical mode enables Derrida to 
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both replicate the gestures of negative theology, and, as Arthur Bradley writes, to repeat 
them otherwise.  I argued that the text’s exploration of the relationship between negative 
theology and deconstruction revealed the shared desire for a new language or ‘post-writing’ 
to express what is currently inexpressible.  Such a writing would be performative, plurivocal 
and non-logocentric, as well as responsive to singularity and alterity.  Further, for Derrida, 
it would enable the inscription of a non-ontotheological God, again linked to the 
movements and structures of textuality.  The many conflicting definitions of God in ‘Sauf le 
nom’ both follow a certain tradition of negative theology, and, in looking to save God from 
‘idolatry’, sovereignty and self-identity,  give the name ‘God’ the potential to become a 
‘strategic political lever’ in rethinking deconstructive politics.   
 At the end of the chapter, I considered this question of the political, returning to the 
claims of Bradley and Žižek that Derrida’s disputed religious ‘turn’ depoliticizes 
deconstruction.  Here I argued that their critiques were both limited by their conceptions of 
politics, and that Derrida’s later work, including his model of a non-sovereign God and 
demand for a new non-logocentric discourse, destabilises the concept of the political 
without detracting from the need for urgent action.  Finally, I gestured towards a tension- 
which begins to emerge through Derrida’s engagement with negative theology- between the 
perceived interiority of experiences of negative theology and Derrida’s political 
commitments.      
 
In Chapter Three, I examined the discourse of silence, another mode employed by negative 
theology, and a complement to the dialogical mode of Chapter Two.  Looking first at ‘How 
to Avoid Speaking: Denials’, a text preoccupied with apophaticism, I reasoned that Derrida’s 
model of ‘avoiding speaking’ refers to a type of linguistic or relativistic silence.  Next I 
stressed that such a linguistic silence here provides a way for Derrida to ‘keep the promise’, 
referring both to the specific promise that he would one day speak of negative theology, and 
to a more general promissory structure which he perceives as an intrinsic part of language.  
Such a structure, I contended, is linked to Derrida’s understanding of God, an 
understanding, which, consistent with texts examined in previous chapters, is anchored in 
language.  Here Derrida is preoccupied with the ontotheological recuperation of the name of 
‘God’, but also looks again to reject ‘idolatry’ and to associate ‘God’ with the infinitude of 
language, and with ‘the trace of the singular event that will have made speech possible’.  
The inscription of such a God is rendered possible, I argued, by Derrida’s adoption of a 
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relativistic or linguistic silence, and is again connected to a new mode of writing, here 
‘another syntax’ or, in Mjaaland’s terms, an ‘alternative logos’. 
 Recognising a similar linguistic silence in The Gift of Death, I argued that Derrida’s 
observation of such silence in his rereading of the ‘Binding of Isaac’ creates and preserves a 
structure of secrecy which is akin to the structure of the promise in ‘Denials’.  Derrida’s 
account draws upon Genesis 22 and on Fear and Trembling, emphasising how Abraham’s 
linguistic silence puts him in a position of secrecy, which names a process of ‘subjectivizing 
interiorization’.  Secrecy, as a mode of non-manifestation which draws out the singularity of 
the subject, becomes a way of bearing witness or becoming responsible, and connects to 
Derrida’s reconfiguration of God.  Rejecting the definition of God received through 
scripture, Derrida here defines God both as an absolute otherness and as a structure of 
secrecy which generates subjectivity. 
 At the end of the chapter I returned to the tension raised in Chapter Two between 
the apparent individuality of religious experience for Derrida, and politics, a tension 
between interior and exterior.  Challenging Mjaaland’s critique of the interiority of 
Derrida’s God by demonstrating that otherness and exteriority always permeate the interior, 
I then looked at this tension between interior and exterior as it is presented through the 
accounts of Levinas and Kierkegaard of Genesis 22.  Here I traced Derrida’s account of the 
thinkers’ different perspectives on ethics and religion, and in particular, the emergence of 
these perspectives in his double reading of the phrase ‘tout autre est tout autre’, which, he 
suggests can be read as locating religious responsibility (understood as a singular, individual 
commitment) both as internal and external, to ethics.  This double reading, I argued, resists 
any simplistic opposition between ethics and religion, or interior and exterior, exposing a 
constitutive otherness in the development of interiority, “the irreducible openness in the 
inside”,1 which goes some way to resolving, or at least reviewing the terms of the apparent 
tension.  A further response, yet one which Derrida here underplays, comes in the form of 
‘post-writing’.  Such a writing would provide a way of thinking which is not determined by 
the familiar, and often misleading oppositions, between interior and exterior, or private and 
political.                 
 
                                                             
1 Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs, trans. by David B. 
Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 86. 
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In Chapter Four, I examined Derrida’s engagement with the discourse of reason, focusing 
mainly on the text ‘Faith and Knowledge’.  In the first part of the chapter I tracked Derrida’s 
argument that reason and religion are terms which signify varied, disparate meanings, and 
that any animosity between the two is misplaced, as they are mutually dependent.  Drawing 
on other texts in which Derrida considers or employs the discourse of reason, I showed that 
reason, for Derrida, consists of ‘heterogeneous rationalities’ which are constituted by a 
dialogical relation between calculation and the incalculable.  This, I argued, forms the basis 
for Derrida’s concept of the ‘Enlightenment to come’ which links together the futures of 
reason and politics, as well as that of religious thought, as it necessarily incorporates 
elements of faith, incalculability and the unknown.   
 Despite the sustained consideration of religion in ‘Faith and Knowledge’- arguably 
the text in which Derrida most clearly addresses the ‘return of the religious’- I argued that it 
virtually ignores the related question of the meaning and significance of ‘God’, referring to 
this unexplored ‘God’ fleetingly, and as if synonymous with religion.  Addressing this 
problem, it became clear that the question of God is suspended in ‘Faith and Knowledge’ 
because, in its relation to interiority, it appears to conflict with the primarily political thrust 
of the text, a suspension, which, I contended, actually undermines the political element of 
Derrida’s work, which is itself rooted in the concept of a God of non-sovereignty.  Having 
already shown how Derrida’s adoption of other discourses and of a ‘post-writing’ 
undermines such undeconstructive oppositions as that between interior and exterior, it 
seems that the discourse of reason, which reinstates such oppositions, is unsuited both to 
speaking about God, and to expressing the aims of deconstruction.  Given that ‘Faith and 
Knowledge’ introduces a division between public and private which it does not resolve, I 
then turned to Richard Rorty, a thinker who both challenges philosophy’s claims to primacy 
yet suggests that we renounce the urge to unify public and private, praising what he 
perceives as Derrida’s separation of public and private, and his creative autonomy.  Looking 
to challenge Rorty’s account, I argued that his relationship with language and literature is 
problematic.  Rather than illustrating the opposition between public and private as he 
claimed, I contested that, for Derrida, literature is that which disregards or rewrites this 
division, being as it is, connected to both secrecy and interiority, and democracy and public 
space.  This function and power of literature, which develops new modes of expression, and 
in them, new ways of understanding the world, connects to the ‘post-writing’ or new 
language which other discourses have enabled Derrida to develop.   
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In the course of my readings, it became clear that some discourses are better suited than 
others to speaking about God or to ascertaining what the name of ‘God’ might mean.  
Although in his discussion and adoption of confession, dialogue and silence, Derrida 
considers the religious heritage of these discourses and their tendency towards the 
recuperation of an ontotheological God, all of these discourses enable Derrida to reframe 
‘God’ outside an ontotheological structure.  The mode of reason, however, proves itself 
unsuited to exploring the meaning of ‘God’, perhaps because it remains anchored in 
structures which perceive ‘God’ as inescapably metaphysical.              
 The figures of ‘God’ which Derrida outlines in the first three discourses have many 
similarities; all exhibit alterity, non-identity and a relationship with writing as defining 
features.  Derrida multiplies the definitions of God however, and renders them all subtly 
different in order to emphasise God’s non-identity, which represents a significant 
divergence from the Judaeo-Christian tradition whose influence he acknowledges in all of 
these texts.  Such differences are also evident in critical responses to Derrida’s ‘God’: David 
Wood tracks Derrida’s understanding of God from being “a ‘transcendental signified’”2 to 
“the marker of a different ethical economy”;3 Steven Shakespeare foregrounds “the way in 
which Derrida challenges the idea of the simplicity of God”;4 and Rodolphe Gasché 
perceives the question of God to be “embedded in Derrida’s texts”.5  Derrida repeatedly 
speaks of saving God from idolatry, and looks to demonstrate that the concept of ‘God’ and 
theological structures inescapably influence our conditions of experience.  Rather than 
descrying religious thought as politically conservative, as Richard Beardsworth does, 
Derrida envisages both a ‘post-writing’ which would liberate non-logocentric processes and 
structures, and a non-identical and non-sovereign God, which would have a subversive 
rather than a conservative political function.      
 
2. The Implications of Non-Sovereignty? 
 
                                                             
2 David Wood, ‘Thinking God in the Wake of Kierkegaard’, in Kierkegaard: A Critical Reader, ed. by  
Jane Chamberlain and Jonathan Rée (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 53-74 (p.  62). 
3 Wood, pp. 53-74 (p. 65). 
4 Shakespeare, Derrida and Theology, p. 19. 
5 Rodolphe Gasché, Inventions of Difference: On Jacques Derrida (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1994), p. 150. 
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Although currently downplayed by critics and commentators, it is clear that Derrida’s 
concept of “a god without sovereignty”6 has crucial significance for deconstruction thought 
and for the construction of the ‘political’.7  Indeed, in a recent article Michael Dillon 
declares of Derrida that: “His turn to religion may be nothing but, one may then say, a 
means of resourcing a renewed interrogation of ‘the secret interface’ between the thought of 
the divine and the thought of the political. In many ways nothing could be more politically 
urgent today”.8  In fact, as we have seen, this ‘God’ is both aligned with the structure of the 
‘democracy to come’, and offers a ‘strategic political level’ to reformulate the structures of 
power.9  Derrida asserts:  
 
I have tried again and again to dissociate two concepts that are usually indissociable: 
unconditionality and sovereignty... If I think of God on the side of grace, 
forgiveness, hospitality, unconditional law, then in order not to have to agree with 
what I call the onto-theological tradition of sovereignty, one has to dissociate God’s 
sovereignty from God, from the very idea of God.  We would have God without 
sovereignty, God without omnipotence.  If one thinks of this possibility of the name 
of God being dissociated from the absolute power, then this would be a strategic 
political lever to think of unconditionality without sovereignty, and to deconstruct 
the political concept of sovereignty today, which I would argue is a heritage of onto-
theology. 
 
Tracking and deconstructing the political concept of sovereignty in The Beast and the 
Sovereign, Derrida emphasises the persistence of ontotheological ideas in existing political 
structures, as well as the dominance and oppression which they perpetuate.  In contrast, 
deconstruction looks to provide an alternative to structures based on power and sovereignty; 
deconstruction, Derrida reiterates in ‘Passages’, is “the memory of some powerlessness... a 
way of reminding the other and reminding me, myself, of the limits of the power, of the 
limits of mastery- there is some power in that.”10  In this context, the concept of a ‘god 
without sovereignty’ becomes central.  Derrida stresses in The Beast and the Sovereign that 
the model of God which a society holds, even without credulity, influences its dominant 
                                                             
6 Derrida, Rogues, p. 114.  
7 John D. Caputo examines the concept of a non-sovereign God at length in John D. Caputo, The Weakness of 
God: A Theology of the Event (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).  
8 Michael Dillon, ‘Force [of] Transformation’, in Derrida: Negotiating the Legacy, ed. by Madeleine Fagan, 
Ludovic Glorieux, Indira Hašimbegović and Marie Suetsugu (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), pp. 
80-93 (p. 7-8). 
9 For an analysis of Derrida’s interest in sovereignty and non-sovereignty, see Vincent B. Leitch, ‘Late Derrida: 
The Politics of Sovereignty’, in The Late Derrida, ed. by W. J. T. Mitchell and Arnold I. Davidson (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007), pp. 11-29.  
10 Derrida, ‘Passages’, pp. 372-395 (p. 385).  
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structures and its attitudes to subjectivity and intersubjectivity as well as its conception of 
the role of humanity more broadly.11  Derrida’s reconception of God as non-sovereign 
grounds his attempt to challenge and reform all of these.   
One key expression of this is Derrida’s later work on animality and “the question of 
the living”.12  Here he identifies a systematic misrepresentation of animal life in post-
Cartesian philosophy, and contends that this misrepresentation, “the discourse of 
domination itself”13 is inseparable from humanity’s self-representation and auto-biography.  
His response is to look for a mode which acknowledges and responds to the “unsubstitutable 
singularity”14 of the animal, and to rethink human and non-human agency, ipseity and 
responsibility.  As with Derrida’s exploration of God, here he looks for an appropriate 
discourse or mode which would liberate a different way of thinking.  Again he registers the 
insufficiency of philosophy, turning instead to poetry,15 to “the animality of writing”16 and 
in striking similarity to his consideration of God, to “an unheard-of-grammar” which would 
provide an alternative to “anthropo-theocentric logics and axiomatic”.17  In The Animal 
That Therefore I Am, Derrida makes a clear connection between his reformulation of ‘God’ 
and the non-human animal through the figure of “divinanimality”,18 contending that God 
and “animot”19 are “at bottom the same thing”,20 figures of originary exclusion, and a way of 
rethinking power structures and relationality.21   
 
Andrew M. Koch declares that “The political question for the twenty-first century will 
center around the extent to which a transcendent, universal form of subjectivity can be 
                                                             
11 For a deconstructive account of alternative modes of subjectivity, see: Cary Wolfe, What is Posthumanism? 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010). Relatedly, analyses of the implications of Derrida’s work for 
animal and environmental studies include:  Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal, ed. by Cary Wolfe 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2003). Timothy Morton, Ecology Without Nature: Rethinking 
Environmental Aesthetics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), Matthew Calarco, The Question of 
the Animal: From Heidegger to Derrida (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008) and Leonard Lawlor, This 
is Not Sufficient: An Essay on Animality and Human Nature in Derrida (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2007).   
12 Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, p. 34.  
13 Derrida, Animal, p. 89.  
14 Derrida, Animal, p. 9 
15 Derrida, Animal, p. 7.  
16 Derrida, Animal, p. 52 
17 Derrida, Animal, p. 64. 
18 Derrida, Animal, p. 132.  
19 Derrida, Animal, p. 41.  
20 Derrida, Animal, 132. 
21 He also speaks of “the finitude of a God who doesn’t yet know what’s going to happen to him with language”, 
Derrida, Animal, p. 17.  
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removed from the political lexicon”.22  Acknowledging the extent to which ontotheology 
permeates our language, and regarding sovereignty as a “prosthetic monstrosity”23 which 
propagates structures of domination, Derrida looks instead to new models of subjectivity 
and interaction.  These would begin from a ‘God without sovereignty’, from singularity, 
difference and alterity, and from new imaginative ways of thinking, responding and ‘post-
writing’.   
                                                             
22 Andrew M. Koch, Poststructuralism and the Politics of Method (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2007), p. 129. 
23 Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, p. 52.  
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